Armenian A320 crash whilst attempting to land in bad weather
Originally Posted by jackbauer
I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much!
Re-read my post. There was no judgement at all, but a clarification that Airbus protections can be a fools paradise- from evolved training and having flown the aircraft that crashed.
And your contribution?
Dani
You have opened a can of worms. Worthy of a seperate post. Airbus FCTM coaches raw data skills with the use of the FPA on approach. But no coaching on a possibly, disorientating raw data GA. Where the FPA can have a crew incorrectly following this reference (if the standard CPIP modification of FD reinstatement on GA not installed). And it wasn't on this aircraft when I flew it last.
Did Armavia upgrade?
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I will zip up til the prelim' report.
Originally Posted by jackbauer
I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much!
I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much!
DS
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Some facts
Not fuel exhaustion, or a few other things, according to Flight Int'l:
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles...nd+engine.html
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles...nd+engine.html
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Last Moment Switching
......and the significance of this finding is????
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"Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) has also disclosed that, during the last minute, the aircraft was switched into flight mode in which the flight director was active but the autopilot was disengaged."
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"Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) has also disclosed that, during the last minute, the aircraft was switched into flight mode in which the flight director was active but the autopilot was disengaged."
So a possibly, if nose low, disorientating HDG & V/S is reinstated on the FD's. If the aircraft had been through the CPIP, the FD's would have self-reinstated with GA Mode, enabling a simple and non-disorientating GA procedure to be flown.
Pretty obvious, one of the major recommendations that will come out of this accident.
Pretty obvious, one of the major recommendations that will come out of this accident.
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What Gnadenburg meant to say was.....
Can Gnadenburg (or somebody else familiar with the A320) please reduce Gnadenburg's post to a crystal clarity for someone unfamiliar with a Flight Director's vagaries and their relevance in the unmodified A320 in a go-round in this sort of circumstance.
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i.e. What is the precise hazard?
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.....and what have some A320 operators done about it?
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i.e. What is the precise hazard?
.
.....and what have some A320 operators done about it?
Only half a speed-brake
Cross hair directors show pitch/roll (attitude) commands. These commands are followed by positioning the att.indicator's fixed aircraft symbol (which inidcates present aircraft attitude over the artif. horizon) over them (mechanically, it is the other way around, of course). The autopilot follows the commands precisely or the manual pilot with a tiny delay. It is very clear and very precise. The display is sort of classical ILS presentation - up/down, left/right.
Airbus does provide the pilot with Flight Path Vector indication ("bird") and associated Flight Path Director ("moustache"). This indication is pilot selectable.
The bird appears as a "winged circle" less than 1 cm in size, the moustache as a barette with triangles at sides, hence the term. When displayed ontop of each other, the moustaches forms what looks like feathers to the little wings of FPV.
The Bird provides aircraft reference display by means of real velocity vector (trajectory) in PFD. In level flight, for instance, the attitude reference is 3 deg up, the bird's wings would be placed exactly on the horizon line (level flight) and the whole thing could be shifted to a side - indicating a drift. Wind from left -> bird on the right side (you're being blown to the right).
The moustache to bird is just as the flight director is to aircraft reference symbol on attitude indicator.
As you select FPV/D on, director bars are removed from view and aircraft reference symbol is dimmed somewhat. Your reference is now flight path, not aircraft attitude. But also, your FCU (MCP) guidance changes from V/S to degrees pitch and form heading to track.
This is a great way to fly non-precision approaches. With autopilot on, at FAF you select appropriate descent angle and final approach track. The flight guidance computer will provide guidance via FPD - the moustache to command the trajectory chosen. The autopilot will follow and aircraft will remain on profile and track regardless of speed, thrust, configuration and wind changes.
(rated prooners: Trying to keep it simple, I know when you deselect FDs you keep bird and AP stays on and you still can steer using FCU).
Now, comes the tricky part. Imagine it is not the autopilot that follows the "moustache" it is you, using trajectory as flying reference. It is not what humans are built for. We survive flying planes by using attitude as a reference. Airbus aircraft are flown like any other aircraft. Not only is this true, but it is also "the airbus golden rule #1" (basically A-N-C expanded to six items).
Today, Airbus say that for manual flight, FPD (moustache) is not used. The symbols are to small to follow, the indication si too confusing. You should switch the director part off (just like you could with normal FDs) and use the bird only which is very comfortable.
For dynamic manouvres like a go-around, the bird is of little use because it shows real trajectory with great precision when you need pitch/power settings.
I believe that Gnadenburg says that on some early manufactured models if crew had FPV/D for approach, during go-around it remained the reference system in PFD. Which, I agree, is totally incomprehensible and in IMC potentially deadly. Latter models have modification that automatically reselect classical FD bars for go around.
Imagine G/A with FPD/V
FD
Edited for VERY silly typos and some stupid grammar.
Airbus does provide the pilot with Flight Path Vector indication ("bird") and associated Flight Path Director ("moustache"). This indication is pilot selectable.
The bird appears as a "winged circle" less than 1 cm in size, the moustache as a barette with triangles at sides, hence the term. When displayed ontop of each other, the moustaches forms what looks like feathers to the little wings of FPV.
The Bird provides aircraft reference display by means of real velocity vector (trajectory) in PFD. In level flight, for instance, the attitude reference is 3 deg up, the bird's wings would be placed exactly on the horizon line (level flight) and the whole thing could be shifted to a side - indicating a drift. Wind from left -> bird on the right side (you're being blown to the right).
The moustache to bird is just as the flight director is to aircraft reference symbol on attitude indicator.
As you select FPV/D on, director bars are removed from view and aircraft reference symbol is dimmed somewhat. Your reference is now flight path, not aircraft attitude. But also, your FCU (MCP) guidance changes from V/S to degrees pitch and form heading to track.
This is a great way to fly non-precision approaches. With autopilot on, at FAF you select appropriate descent angle and final approach track. The flight guidance computer will provide guidance via FPD - the moustache to command the trajectory chosen. The autopilot will follow and aircraft will remain on profile and track regardless of speed, thrust, configuration and wind changes.
(rated prooners: Trying to keep it simple, I know when you deselect FDs you keep bird and AP stays on and you still can steer using FCU).
Now, comes the tricky part. Imagine it is not the autopilot that follows the "moustache" it is you, using trajectory as flying reference. It is not what humans are built for. We survive flying planes by using attitude as a reference. Airbus aircraft are flown like any other aircraft. Not only is this true, but it is also "the airbus golden rule #1" (basically A-N-C expanded to six items).
Today, Airbus say that for manual flight, FPD (moustache) is not used. The symbols are to small to follow, the indication si too confusing. You should switch the director part off (just like you could with normal FDs) and use the bird only which is very comfortable.
For dynamic manouvres like a go-around, the bird is of little use because it shows real trajectory with great precision when you need pitch/power settings.
I believe that Gnadenburg says that on some early manufactured models if crew had FPV/D for approach, during go-around it remained the reference system in PFD. Which, I agree, is totally incomprehensible and in IMC potentially deadly. Latter models have modification that automatically reselect classical FD bars for go around.
Imagine G/A with FPD/V
FD
Edited for VERY silly typos and some stupid grammar.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 21st Jun 2006 at 11:13.
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The loss of FD during go around is not a special problem of some old A320 but also other aircraft, some aircraft are even not ment to be flown with the FD during GA. This is perfectly safe, as long as crew is trained for it, aware of it and does it correctly.
Other aircraft have to be flown manually (autopilot off during go around) or have to use raw data (no FMS, navigation computer).
Automatics never replace good airmanship, proper procedures and their adherence.
Dani
Other aircraft have to be flown manually (autopilot off during go around) or have to use raw data (no FMS, navigation computer).
Automatics never replace good airmanship, proper procedures and their adherence.
Dani
Basically:
New Airbus- On GA, Flight Directors automatically reinstate, providing the pilot with a simple presentation on how to fly the manoeuvre. The presentation is super imposed on the attitude indicator. It relaxes the need for a solid foundation of IF skills on face value; but also probably takes away any risk whatsover of spatial disorientation of aircrew on GA.
Old Airbus- On GA your Flight Directors present GA Mode in whatever current function you are in-
a) simple conventional cross bar presentation as above.
b) flight path vector which can disorientate crew if they pitch the vector to a GA attitude instead of GA angle ( conventional Airbus protections protect against the gross error of over pitching; with the exception of a single engine GA and altitude capture or degraded situations common in abnormals ).
c) Raw Data presentation where the GA procedure is now flown on instruments soley.
"IF" Armavia is spatial disorientation on GA, Old Airbus presentations have been partially or fully responsible for a number of accidents IMO. It will probably never happen again with a compulsory upgrade of Airbus aircraft to new standard of Flight Directors.
New Airbus- On GA, Flight Directors automatically reinstate, providing the pilot with a simple presentation on how to fly the manoeuvre. The presentation is super imposed on the attitude indicator. It relaxes the need for a solid foundation of IF skills on face value; but also probably takes away any risk whatsover of spatial disorientation of aircrew on GA.
Old Airbus- On GA your Flight Directors present GA Mode in whatever current function you are in-
a) simple conventional cross bar presentation as above.
b) flight path vector which can disorientate crew if they pitch the vector to a GA attitude instead of GA angle ( conventional Airbus protections protect against the gross error of over pitching; with the exception of a single engine GA and altitude capture or degraded situations common in abnormals ).
c) Raw Data presentation where the GA procedure is now flown on instruments soley.
"IF" Armavia is spatial disorientation on GA, Old Airbus presentations have been partially or fully responsible for a number of accidents IMO. It will probably never happen again with a compulsory upgrade of Airbus aircraft to new standard of Flight Directors.
Originally Posted by Dani
The loss of FD during go around is not a special problem of some old A320 but also other aircraft, some aircraft are even not ment to be flown with the FD during GA. This is perfectly safe, as long as crew is trained for it, aware of it and does it correctly.
Other aircraft have to be flown manually (autopilot off during go around) or have to use raw data (no FMS, navigation computer).
Automatics never replace good airmanship, proper procedures and their adherence.
Dani
Other aircraft have to be flown manually (autopilot off during go around) or have to use raw data (no FMS, navigation computer).
Automatics never replace good airmanship, proper procedures and their adherence.
Dani
Dani
I concur. But consider the following.
Airbus endorsement conducted on 'upgraded' simulator. Everytime you do a GA FD's are introduced.
Now, you are flying a 'legacy' Airbus without FD upgrade. GA in anger is now surprisingly, a raw data manoeuvre if FD's earlier turned off. GA is a 180 degree turn. Introduce somato gravic and somato gyral illusions, TOGA thrust and unexpected raw data presentation. Do you see any CFIT risks?
Founder, although I fly airplanes and have never trained on any Airbus, it is very difficult to imagine a "normal approach speed" (on final?) at about 180-200 knots (from page 4), unless a plane must somehow be landed with no slats and no flaps. If somebody told you that such a speed is normal for final approach, you might want to determine whether the person is a pilot on similar turbofan transports.
In the most stretched version of a (swept-wing) transport jet which we fly, final approach speed can be as low as 135 knots or so. Our lowest clean speed (Vzf) might be as low as 190-195 with a small number of passengers and about 6,000# of fuel.
In the most stretched version of a (swept-wing) transport jet which we fly, final approach speed can be as low as 135 knots or so. Our lowest clean speed (Vzf) might be as low as 190-195 with a small number of passengers and about 6,000# of fuel.
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Originally Posted by Gnadenburg
Airbus without FD upgrade. GA in anger is now surprisingly, a raw data manoeuvre if FD's earlier turned off. GA is a 180 degree turn. Introduce somato gravic and somato gyral illusions, TOGA thrust and unexpected raw data presentation. Do you see any CFIT risks?
Remember the Überlingen Crash TU-154 vs DHL 757 Germany? Russian pilots were trained to follow the ATC orders, not the TCAS. This is wrong wrong very wrong. The chief pilots stated even months after the accident that this is correct procedure!
An A320 without this FD modification is also doing exactly what its ment to do, it remains in the same mode. There was no technical problem at all. It's just another behaviour of the FMGS. It's easily predictable if the crew KNOWS whats coming next.
Dani
Only half a speed-brake
Originally Posted by Ignition Override
Founder, although I fly airplanes and have never trained on any Airbus, it is very difficult to imagine a "normal approach speed" (on final?) at about 180-200 knots (from page 4)
For ILS approach there is no need neither SOP to select FPV/D. For non-precision apch, the speed should naturally be 130.
Gnadenburg:
Never in your posts I saw that you suggested what happened to THE lost Armavia ship. What I did read is that you speculate (which is not a dirty word!) over scenarios that could or could have developed into similar, disasterous endings.
Namely the FPD/V display on G/A is something I never heard of or imagined before. I fly newer hulls but if I change company, or there is leased older one without the modification, I would not even know. I am not trained to deselec FPV/D for G/A although I have the technical knowledge how it is done. But would I?
I should hope so.Not anymore. Now I know I would. Now I know I would ask abut the modification. Please keep sharing your ideas and observations.
Thank you, PPRuNe!
FD.
(the un-real)
Last edited by FlightDetent; 21st Jun 2006 at 12:58.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
BBC: Armenia air crash blamed on crew
Investigators examining what caused an Armenian airliner to crash with the loss of all 113 people on board have blamed pilot error. The Armavia A320 Airbus plunged into the Black Sea on 3 May as it tried to land near the Russian city of Sochi.
"The human factor in bad weather played a role," Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin said...... Mr Levitin was speaking in Moscow to announce the results of an enquiry into the crash held by the Russian government and investigators from Armenia and France.
Tatyana Anodina, head of the inter-governmental committee that took part in the enquiry, said that during the descent the captain "did not ensure control of the plane as far as angle and altitude were concerned," according to Russia's Itar-Tass news agency. Ms Anodina said that the co-pilot also failed to "ensure necessary control".
She added that an alarm system had gone off as the plane was plunging but it was too late to regain altitude.
The investigators said that there had been no engine failure or fuel shortage.
The A320 crashed at about 0215 (2215 GMT) as it made a second attempt to land at Adler airport, just outside Sochi. It was initially refused permission to land because of poor weather.
The plane reportedly hit the sea at an angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast.
Armavia said the plane was in good condition and that the crew were experienced. The Airbus was manufactured in 1995.
Investigators examining what caused an Armenian airliner to crash with the loss of all 113 people on board have blamed pilot error. The Armavia A320 Airbus plunged into the Black Sea on 3 May as it tried to land near the Russian city of Sochi.
"The human factor in bad weather played a role," Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin said...... Mr Levitin was speaking in Moscow to announce the results of an enquiry into the crash held by the Russian government and investigators from Armenia and France.
Tatyana Anodina, head of the inter-governmental committee that took part in the enquiry, said that during the descent the captain "did not ensure control of the plane as far as angle and altitude were concerned," according to Russia's Itar-Tass news agency. Ms Anodina said that the co-pilot also failed to "ensure necessary control".
She added that an alarm system had gone off as the plane was plunging but it was too late to regain altitude.
The investigators said that there had been no engine failure or fuel shortage.
The A320 crashed at about 0215 (2215 GMT) as it made a second attempt to land at Adler airport, just outside Sochi. It was initially refused permission to land because of poor weather.
The plane reportedly hit the sea at an angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast.
Armavia said the plane was in good condition and that the crew were experienced. The Airbus was manufactured in 1995.
ORAC your post of the BBC report verbatim failed to take the opportunity to clarify the vital point that human factors do not consist entirely of ‘pilot error’ as suggested by the reporter.
The Russian statement accurately sets the scene for what we hope will be more enlightening information than that the crew did not control / lost control of the aircraft.
We should also remember that ‘error’ is a classification of the events applied in retrospect; of greater interest will be an understanding of the conditions and circumstances preceding the event, and how the issue of blame or responsibility is presented.
The Russian statement accurately sets the scene for what we hope will be more enlightening information than that the crew did not control / lost control of the aircraft.
We should also remember that ‘error’ is a classification of the events applied in retrospect; of greater interest will be an understanding of the conditions and circumstances preceding the event, and how the issue of blame or responsibility is presented.
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That BBC report is very simplistic and doesn't really portray the situation as accurately as it might (the stuff about a 60-degree angle is, I believe, a mistake carried over from when the investigators were originally explaining the aircraft's heading of 060, the direction of the runway).
The investigators said it was down to a combination of loss of situational awareness and poor crew co-ordination. This is paraphrased from reports in Air Transport Intelligence and Flight International:
- Aircraft was instructed to go around at just above 1,100ft because of wx minima
- Made a climbing right turn heading for 2,000ft as per missed approach
- Captain switched off autopilot, subsequently lost awareness over the attitude of the aircraft, made pitch and roll inputs and put the aircraft into a descent
- First officer did not maintain adequate control over instrument readings, did not co-ordinate recovery of aircraft
- Despite EGPWS alert, crew did not apply sufficient nose-up input
Sounds an awful lot like GF back in 2000.
The investigators said it was down to a combination of loss of situational awareness and poor crew co-ordination. This is paraphrased from reports in Air Transport Intelligence and Flight International:
- Aircraft was instructed to go around at just above 1,100ft because of wx minima
- Made a climbing right turn heading for 2,000ft as per missed approach
- Captain switched off autopilot, subsequently lost awareness over the attitude of the aircraft, made pitch and roll inputs and put the aircraft into a descent
- First officer did not maintain adequate control over instrument readings, did not co-ordinate recovery of aircraft
- Despite EGPWS alert, crew did not apply sufficient nose-up input
Sounds an awful lot like GF back in 2000.
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Pilot "error" blamed for plane crash that killed 113
113 people died when an Armenian A320 airliner crashed into the Black Sea on 03 May during a missed approach at Sochi. "The human factor in bad weather played a role," Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin said. Levitin was speaking in Moscow to announce the results of an enquiry into the crash held by the Russian government and investigators from Armenia and France.
Tatyana Anodina, the head of a civil aviation agency that links Russia with 11 other ex-Soviet republics, said an automated system warned the two pilots that the plane was flying dangerously low, but that a last-ditch effort to gain altitude failed to head off the crash into the Black Sea. The plane reportedly hit the sea at a nose-down angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast. Safety analysts have drawn comparisons between this crash and that of a GulfAir A320 in identical circumstances off Bahrein in August 2000.
.
Airbus might not be keen to have any such comparisons drawn as it could reflect unfairly upon the A320. It's not therefore expected that any such conclusions will emerge in the official report into the Armavia A320 accident. Western experts have however ventured that a form of disorientation called a somatogravic illusion is likely to have played a role. This form of spatial disorientation is caused by changes in linear acceleration/deceleration that stimulate the ears’ otolith organs, resulting in a strong false perception of a pitching dynamic. The pitch-up illusion is normally experienced by a pilot under strong longitudinal acceleration – such as a go-round or missed approach with early level-off. It can be reinforced by a simultaneous turn, as was the case at Sochi.
.
The acceleration can cause the illusion that any pitch attitude change is much more severe than it actually is – in fact the pitch-up illusion can occur during level accelerated flight. A pilot experiencing the pitch up illusion whilst without any contrary external visual references is induced to respond by making what he perceives as a necessary nose-down correction. Unloading the aircraft to less than one g allows the rate of acceleration to increase and so induces an even stronger pilot nose-down input. Because of this it is said to be a self exacerbating phenomenon. Unfortunately it is not something that can be induced in the simulator. All such crashes have been, like at Sochi and Bahrein, characterised by impact in a steeply nose-down attitude.
.
There are two aspects of desperately needed physiological training that have emerged from recent crashes. The message from the Helios crash is that pilots need aeromedical theory refreshers including hypobaric chamber runs and personalized hypoxia experiences. The Armenian and GulfAir A320 crashes point to a need for a somatogravic and somatogyral illusions simulator.
Tatyana Anodina, the head of a civil aviation agency that links Russia with 11 other ex-Soviet republics, said an automated system warned the two pilots that the plane was flying dangerously low, but that a last-ditch effort to gain altitude failed to head off the crash into the Black Sea. The plane reportedly hit the sea at a nose-down angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast. Safety analysts have drawn comparisons between this crash and that of a GulfAir A320 in identical circumstances off Bahrein in August 2000.
.
Airbus might not be keen to have any such comparisons drawn as it could reflect unfairly upon the A320. It's not therefore expected that any such conclusions will emerge in the official report into the Armavia A320 accident. Western experts have however ventured that a form of disorientation called a somatogravic illusion is likely to have played a role. This form of spatial disorientation is caused by changes in linear acceleration/deceleration that stimulate the ears’ otolith organs, resulting in a strong false perception of a pitching dynamic. The pitch-up illusion is normally experienced by a pilot under strong longitudinal acceleration – such as a go-round or missed approach with early level-off. It can be reinforced by a simultaneous turn, as was the case at Sochi.
.
The acceleration can cause the illusion that any pitch attitude change is much more severe than it actually is – in fact the pitch-up illusion can occur during level accelerated flight. A pilot experiencing the pitch up illusion whilst without any contrary external visual references is induced to respond by making what he perceives as a necessary nose-down correction. Unloading the aircraft to less than one g allows the rate of acceleration to increase and so induces an even stronger pilot nose-down input. Because of this it is said to be a self exacerbating phenomenon. Unfortunately it is not something that can be induced in the simulator. All such crashes have been, like at Sochi and Bahrein, characterised by impact in a steeply nose-down attitude.
.
There are two aspects of desperately needed physiological training that have emerged from recent crashes. The message from the Helios crash is that pilots need aeromedical theory refreshers including hypobaric chamber runs and personalized hypoxia experiences. The Armenian and GulfAir A320 crashes point to a need for a somatogravic and somatogyral illusions simulator.
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Has nobody noticed that airbus has stated that the aircraft was being flown in Config full with flaps down in level flight. Then it went in after "inputs from the Capt's side."
After a G/A the procedure is to raise flaps by one level and get the gear up. This does not appear to have been done. The rest appears to have been disorientation and inputs from the Capt's sidestick. The FPV/FD may have been an issue in confusing the pilots but the basic G/A doesn't appear to have been flown correctly - level flight with flaps full and gear down is a no-no for any transport category aircraft. Rule 1 fly the aircraft, Rule 2 fly the aircraft!! Golden Rules since the dawn of aviation.
Airbus also states that there was no defect with the aircraft. In this case it seems they may be right. There's no substitute for basic airmanship. Unfortunately, Airbus constantly teaches pilots to almost blindly believe in their technology while bleating on about how the 320 "can be flown just like any other aircraft" while spending all their training time doing just the opposite.
The best safety aid in any cockpit is a well-trained pilot. The next best safety aid is a second well-trained pilot. I wonder what kind of training these poor guys got? If it was in Toulouse it won't surprise anyone.
After a G/A the procedure is to raise flaps by one level and get the gear up. This does not appear to have been done. The rest appears to have been disorientation and inputs from the Capt's sidestick. The FPV/FD may have been an issue in confusing the pilots but the basic G/A doesn't appear to have been flown correctly - level flight with flaps full and gear down is a no-no for any transport category aircraft. Rule 1 fly the aircraft, Rule 2 fly the aircraft!! Golden Rules since the dawn of aviation.
Airbus also states that there was no defect with the aircraft. In this case it seems they may be right. There's no substitute for basic airmanship. Unfortunately, Airbus constantly teaches pilots to almost blindly believe in their technology while bleating on about how the 320 "can be flown just like any other aircraft" while spending all their training time doing just the opposite.
The best safety aid in any cockpit is a well-trained pilot. The next best safety aid is a second well-trained pilot. I wonder what kind of training these poor guys got? If it was in Toulouse it won't surprise anyone.
"Has nobody noticed that airbus has stated that the aircraft was being flown in Config full with flaps down in level flight" "level flight with flaps full and gear down is a no-no for any transport category aircraft"....
I'm pretty sure that Airbus knows how to investigate an accident, as for not flying level in Config full with the gear down???? don't remember reading that as a limitation on any transport airplane I have flown.
The crash does bear all the hallmarks of GF072, which as we know was also a 320, how much bearing the type has in the accident is purely speculation. My guess would be that there have been crashes where crew have been disorientated on non-fly by wire plane too....Sharm-el-Sheik 737 is one that springs to mind.
Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why? I don't think anyone will ever know for sure, but accident investigation is pretty thorough and goes very deep into training history, personal life ,etc,etc
I'm pretty sure that Airbus knows how to investigate an accident, as for not flying level in Config full with the gear down???? don't remember reading that as a limitation on any transport airplane I have flown.
The crash does bear all the hallmarks of GF072, which as we know was also a 320, how much bearing the type has in the accident is purely speculation. My guess would be that there have been crashes where crew have been disorientated on non-fly by wire plane too....Sharm-el-Sheik 737 is one that springs to mind.
Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why? I don't think anyone will ever know for sure, but accident investigation is pretty thorough and goes very deep into training history, personal life ,etc,etc
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Originally Posted by 145qrh
Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why? I don't think anyone will ever know for sure, but accident investigation is pretty thorough and goes very deep into training history, personal life ,etc,etc
GD&L