C-5 accident at Dover AFB
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Oops, forgot. We're up to two versions from folks that know a guy, who knows a guy, that knows someone -
Version 1 - hit birds. Multiple engine problems.
Version 2 - T/R unlocked light. Shut engine down.
I vote for version 3. That would be the official version *after* the investigation.
Version 1 - hit birds. Multiple engine problems.
Version 2 - T/R unlocked light. Shut engine down.
I vote for version 3. That would be the official version *after* the investigation.
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Actually Osama bin Laden was seen earier at Dover clutching what appeared to be a copy of Salman Rushie's Satanic Verses, do you think there was a connection . . . . ?
Cmon guys, some of the theories that people appear completely unable to refrain from should be signed by the Brothers Grimm.
Looks like a really bad day for a few people, but at least they'll be alive to attend the Board of Enquiry.
Perhaps we should appreciate that mums and kids don't care why Dad's alive, they're just glad he is - irrespective of what comes out of this - human or technical.
Cmon guys, some of the theories that people appear completely unable to refrain from should be signed by the Brothers Grimm.
Looks like a really bad day for a few people, but at least they'll be alive to attend the Board of Enquiry.
Perhaps we should appreciate that mums and kids don't care why Dad's alive, they're just glad he is - irrespective of what comes out of this - human or technical.
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Originally Posted by Horst Schmitt
But if you look at the early reports and pictures on the first page, how do you explain the seperation of the wing and the heavy landing with the gear up?
Spoke with USAF heavy jet pilot today. 2 sims/qtr, 8 per year. That's much higher than the airline equivalent of 2.7 sims per year(2 sims every 9 months).
Horst Schmitt,
All the landing gear was down as attested by the photos posted by Shore Guy. Look at the furrows. "Separation of the wing" seems to have gone unnoticed, perhaps you meant separation of the nose section?
All the landing gear was down as attested by the photos posted by Shore Guy. Look at the furrows. "Separation of the wing" seems to have gone unnoticed, perhaps you meant separation of the nose section?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Survivors describe crash of C-5
..."About two or three minutes into the flight, both of us kind of looked at each other saying it didn't sound right -- as far as the engines were concerned -- and there just wasn't enough power," said Paul W. Kath, 59, a retired Navy senior chief petty officer who caught a ride on the plane with his wife, Hannelore...."We just felt that there's something wrong, and shortly after that they made an announcement that they did have mechanical difficulties and they were returning to base," Kath said by telephone Monday from his Honolulu home...
After takeoff, Kath recalled, he felt the engines being throttled back and forth, "going from low to high and back down, but I could never really feel the thrust of the engines." The plane took a gentle turn as the pilot headed back to Dover. "It seemed level to me all the way along the line, that's what amazes me," Kath said. "People on the ground, eyewitnesses, said it came at a very nose-high angle. I didn't notice that."
A short time later, he said, "I heard a really shrill sound, and about the best I can describe it, the closest I've heard before is a high-speed bandsaw cutting through metal." Kath said he believed the sound was the C-5's tail separating from the rest of the aircraft. "And then a few seconds after that it was a very violent hitting of the ground, and then the plane started going side to side, we were being rocked back and forth."
When the plane came to rest, a loadmaster in the troop compartment attempted to open one door without success. A second door opened but an escape chute failed to inflate. "So we went back to the other side, got that door open and the chute did inflate," Kath said. Hannelore Kath was sent down the chute first. Inside the compartment, a loadmaster and another retiree passenger were scrambling out from beneath an emergency life raft that had inflated on its own.
"When we landed at the bottom of the slide, there was a two-inch accumulation of jet fuel, it was spewing out of the wing, as well as gas [vapor]," Kath recalled. "I was told that the gas was nitrogen that's supposed to be deployed when there's a rupture. It was just flowing very heavily, in like a fog."
Other crew members were already at the bottom of the chute, helping passengers escape, Kath said. "They instructed us to run as fast as we could away from the plane," Kath recalled. "I was very fearful that it was going to blow up." Both were splashed with aviation fuel up to their knees.
Outside the plane, Hannelore Kath recalled, she was stunned at the damage. "It really struck home for her that it was much more serious," Kath said. "She just thought it was a hard landing, maybe we had some flat tires, some damage to the landing gear."....
Kath said that he and his wife ran about 1,000 yards to escape the fire threat, and then were taken in by fire and rescue crews.....
..."About two or three minutes into the flight, both of us kind of looked at each other saying it didn't sound right -- as far as the engines were concerned -- and there just wasn't enough power," said Paul W. Kath, 59, a retired Navy senior chief petty officer who caught a ride on the plane with his wife, Hannelore...."We just felt that there's something wrong, and shortly after that they made an announcement that they did have mechanical difficulties and they were returning to base," Kath said by telephone Monday from his Honolulu home...
After takeoff, Kath recalled, he felt the engines being throttled back and forth, "going from low to high and back down, but I could never really feel the thrust of the engines." The plane took a gentle turn as the pilot headed back to Dover. "It seemed level to me all the way along the line, that's what amazes me," Kath said. "People on the ground, eyewitnesses, said it came at a very nose-high angle. I didn't notice that."
A short time later, he said, "I heard a really shrill sound, and about the best I can describe it, the closest I've heard before is a high-speed bandsaw cutting through metal." Kath said he believed the sound was the C-5's tail separating from the rest of the aircraft. "And then a few seconds after that it was a very violent hitting of the ground, and then the plane started going side to side, we were being rocked back and forth."
When the plane came to rest, a loadmaster in the troop compartment attempted to open one door without success. A second door opened but an escape chute failed to inflate. "So we went back to the other side, got that door open and the chute did inflate," Kath said. Hannelore Kath was sent down the chute first. Inside the compartment, a loadmaster and another retiree passenger were scrambling out from beneath an emergency life raft that had inflated on its own.
"When we landed at the bottom of the slide, there was a two-inch accumulation of jet fuel, it was spewing out of the wing, as well as gas [vapor]," Kath recalled. "I was told that the gas was nitrogen that's supposed to be deployed when there's a rupture. It was just flowing very heavily, in like a fog."
Other crew members were already at the bottom of the chute, helping passengers escape, Kath said. "They instructed us to run as fast as we could away from the plane," Kath recalled. "I was very fearful that it was going to blow up." Both were splashed with aviation fuel up to their knees.
Outside the plane, Hannelore Kath recalled, she was stunned at the damage. "It really struck home for her that it was much more serious," Kath said. "She just thought it was a hard landing, maybe we had some flat tires, some damage to the landing gear."....
Kath said that he and his wife ran about 1,000 yards to escape the fire threat, and then were taken in by fire and rescue crews.....
6/13/2006 - SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill (AFPN) -- The results of an investigation into the C-5 Galaxy crash at Dover Air Force Base, Del., on April 3 found that human error was the cause, Air Mobility Command officials released today.
The accident investigation board determined the pilots and flight engineers did not properly configure, maneuver and power the aircraft during approach and landing.
Following a normal takeoff and initial climb, the C-5 aircrew observed a No. 2 engine “Thrust Reverser Not Locked” indication light. They shut down the No. 2 engine as a precaution and returned to Dover AFB. The board determined that during the return to the base:
-- The pilots and flight engineers continued to use the shut-down No. 2 engine’s throttle while leaving the fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle.
-- Both instructor and primary flight engineers failed to brief, and pilots failed to consider and use, a proper flap setting.
-- The pilots’ attempt at a visual approach to runway 32 resulted in the aircraft descending well below a normal glidepath for an instrument-aided approach or the normal visual flight rules pattern altitude.
-- The aircraft commander failed to give a complete approach briefing that would have included non-standard factors, configuration, landing distance and missed approach intentions.
All 17 people on board the C-5 survived the crash, but three crewmembers were seriously injured when the aircraft stalled, hit a utility pole and crashed into a field about a mile short of the runway. The other passengers and crewmembers sustained minor injures and were treated and released from local hospitals.
The aircraft was assigned to the 436th Airlift Wing and was flown by members of the 512th Airlift Wing, a Reserve associate unit at Dover. It was bound for Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and was carrying 105,000 pounds of replenishment supplies for the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
The accident investigation board determined the pilots and flight engineers did not properly configure, maneuver and power the aircraft during approach and landing.
Following a normal takeoff and initial climb, the C-5 aircrew observed a No. 2 engine “Thrust Reverser Not Locked” indication light. They shut down the No. 2 engine as a precaution and returned to Dover AFB. The board determined that during the return to the base:
-- The pilots and flight engineers continued to use the shut-down No. 2 engine’s throttle while leaving the fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle.
-- Both instructor and primary flight engineers failed to brief, and pilots failed to consider and use, a proper flap setting.
-- The pilots’ attempt at a visual approach to runway 32 resulted in the aircraft descending well below a normal glidepath for an instrument-aided approach or the normal visual flight rules pattern altitude.
-- The aircraft commander failed to give a complete approach briefing that would have included non-standard factors, configuration, landing distance and missed approach intentions.
All 17 people on board the C-5 survived the crash, but three crewmembers were seriously injured when the aircraft stalled, hit a utility pole and crashed into a field about a mile short of the runway. The other passengers and crewmembers sustained minor injures and were treated and released from local hospitals.
The aircraft was assigned to the 436th Airlift Wing and was flown by members of the 512th Airlift Wing, a Reserve associate unit at Dover. It was bound for Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and was carrying 105,000 pounds of replenishment supplies for the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
6/13/2006 - SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill (AFPN) -- The results of an investigation into the C-5 Galaxy crash at Dover Air Force Base, Del., on April 3 found that human error was the cause, Air Mobility Command officials released today.
The AF certainly wastes little time in reaching a conclusion as compared to the NTSB! But then, I suppose they don't have to deal with investigatory groups comprised of "interested parties" to quite the same degree. Military justice is known for it's swiftness when compared to the civilian variety, and it seems as though the same might be said of their accident investigations too.
This situation will no doubt trigger a review of cockpit procedures and crew training within the C-5 community. A much more detailed report will be necessary in order to form any valid opinions regarding the root causes of the apparrent procedural lapses implied in this report summary. I hope a full version of the report will become available to the public in the future. Thankfully, nobody was killed and there may be useful lessons to be learned.
Best regards,
Westhawk
Just out of curiosity, was the C-5 the first operational transport aircraft for both pilots? Had either one also trained on the T-44 (C-90 'King Air') or the T-1 Jayhawk ('Beechjet') during UPT (initial training)?
Years ago, all Air Force UPT graduates went from the T-37 and T-38, both centerline-thrust jets, directly into almost any operational Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, whether trainer, tactical, tanker, transport or heavy bomber.
The Navy/Marines/Coast Guard had always split up pilots early into about three different training 'pipelines' (tracks), with other differences in tng. philosophies. I met the sole survivor of the USAF Learjet crash in Alabama, while leaving Base Ops at Andrews back around '89, and although that accident was quite different, both the 2-engine Learjet (with one of the highest thrust/weight ratios of any transport aircraft) and especially a 4-engine C-5 present so many more combinations of possible malfunctions and mis-interpretations, compared to a twin-engine plane with centerline thrust.
Many now train in a somewhat combined Air Force/Navy syllabus, depending upon the pipeline/assignment.
I hope that all of those crewmembers in such an accident are recovering, and not just physically.
Years ago, all Air Force UPT graduates went from the T-37 and T-38, both centerline-thrust jets, directly into almost any operational Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, whether trainer, tactical, tanker, transport or heavy bomber.
The Navy/Marines/Coast Guard had always split up pilots early into about three different training 'pipelines' (tracks), with other differences in tng. philosophies. I met the sole survivor of the USAF Learjet crash in Alabama, while leaving Base Ops at Andrews back around '89, and although that accident was quite different, both the 2-engine Learjet (with one of the highest thrust/weight ratios of any transport aircraft) and especially a 4-engine C-5 present so many more combinations of possible malfunctions and mis-interpretations, compared to a twin-engine plane with centerline thrust.
Many now train in a somewhat combined Air Force/Navy syllabus, depending upon the pipeline/assignment.
I hope that all of those crewmembers in such an accident are recovering, and not just physically.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 16th Jun 2006 at 04:11.
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Hmmm, it seems all that could have gone wrong...did!
After listening for years to USAF transport flights in the Med, generally on the way to Cairo West, appear to not know where the heck they were, from time to time, and even on a few occasions (more that a few) go steaming down the wrong airway....is it any wonder just why a few are not surprised?
After listening for years to USAF transport flights in the Med, generally on the way to Cairo West, appear to not know where the heck they were, from time to time, and even on a few occasions (more that a few) go steaming down the wrong airway....is it any wonder just why a few are not surprised?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Was this a new glass cockpit C5 or the odd layout with "strip" engine indications
The airplane had the newest version of the C-5 flight deck with big panel glass. Unfortunately, only one of the three pilots was really comfortable with the new equipment and FMS.
The crew decided because of their weight to fly their approach to the longest runway, which unfortunately was only being served that day by a Tacan (fancy VOR for you civilian types) approach. They also decided to fly a full flap approach to keep the approach speed down. This isn't prohibited--just highly discouraged. The recommended flap setting for a three engine approach is Flaps 40. During the approach the crew became worried about not having enough power to fly a full flap approach and selected flaps 40--which they were now too slow for. Here's the point all you glass cockpit guys should sit up and take notice about. The one guy who was familiar with the new glass and FMS was also the one flying the aircraft. He became distracted inputting the new approach speed in the FMS. There was also some confusion about just who was flying the A/C while he had his head down updating the speed.
The usual shutdown drill is to pull the throttle first to verify that you are shutting down the problem engine, but in this case the problem engine is producing thrust; so, you anticipate losing thrust.
Yep, there would be quite the clue when the next engine is shutdown, but it got missed -- perhaps both actions were done together.
There could be an ergonomics issue if the fuel shutoffs are not lined up with the throttle levers -- perhaps a C5 driver could comment.
There is another thread titled FAA to conclude 2 engines are as safe as 3 or 4 -- they may use this accident to add support for that thesis.
Yep, there would be quite the clue when the next engine is shutdown, but it got missed -- perhaps both actions were done together.
There could be an ergonomics issue if the fuel shutoffs are not lined up with the throttle levers -- perhaps a C5 driver could comment.
There is another thread titled FAA to conclude 2 engines are as safe as 3 or 4 -- they may use this accident to add support for that thesis.
viva Osh Vegas
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"fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle" - why was the No 3 at idle in the first place? It will be really interesting to read the full report when anyone finds it. Sounds like there's an awful lot to be learnt from this event.
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Originally Posted by spitfire
"fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle" - why was the No 3 at idle in the first place? It will be really interesting to read the full report when anyone finds it. Sounds like there's an awful lot to be learnt from this event.
I think you have landed on the crux of the problem. I have some close friends who are former C5 jockeys and have had some discussions about this incident with them. At the time of the incident, they both said that flap settings can be confusing during non-standard "times" in a C5. If the crew involved were confused by this, while at the same time pulling the wrong throttle back to idle, they were compounding the situation. And we all know that this is when accidents happen. In this case, it appears that they were flying on the power of two engines but thought they had three. This, combined with selecting proper settings for the flaps made a bad situation much worse. Situational awareness was going away as the incident progressed. I do not want to second guess or criticize those who were flying at the time. As a non-pilot I have no basis for that.
But as a student of team management and crisis management, I do know that strict adherence to proper procedure and good checklist is a must in a situation as this, whether it involves flying or any other critical discipline. The Air Force seems pretty quick to serve up crew error. I hope they will pay as much attention to the quality of the procedures that were used as they are currently written, and to the amount of time and cockpit resource required to implement them. If it takes a minute to figure out what you're reading when you have 45 seconds to act, the results can be predicted.
I'm off my pulpit.
Patrick
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Originally Posted by patrickal
In this case, it appears that they were flying on the power of two engines but thought they had three.
Patrick
Patrick
rts
Last edited by rodthesod; 14th Jun 2006 at 20:59.
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unless there was some sort of interlock with the reverser, I would think that after an engine was shut down all throttles would be moved as one (assymetric issues aside).
given a choice it is probably better to be too fast than too slow on an approach ( chicago midway aside!).
I would like to hear about fatigue issues, the last time this crew flew together as a crew, the previous aircraft that the crew had flown ( most AF reserve/ANG are airline pilots)
I recall a crash in which the pilot, flying a 737-400, said he confused the rudder "feel" with the C130 he had just flown in the guard.
Back in the old days, airline pilots got lots of time off...they rested and hopefully came to work read to fly...but with hard times at USAIrlines, topped off with miliatry duty, fatigue may have been part of this equation.
given a choice it is probably better to be too fast than too slow on an approach ( chicago midway aside!).
I would like to hear about fatigue issues, the last time this crew flew together as a crew, the previous aircraft that the crew had flown ( most AF reserve/ANG are airline pilots)
I recall a crash in which the pilot, flying a 737-400, said he confused the rudder "feel" with the C130 he had just flown in the guard.
Back in the old days, airline pilots got lots of time off...they rested and hopefully came to work read to fly...but with hard times at USAIrlines, topped off with miliatry duty, fatigue may have been part of this equation.
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I'm inclined to draw a parallel with the Helios 737 accident a few months ago, in that the problem originated well before takeoff.
The indicated fault (t/r unlock light) should be a sim exercise, and OEI approaches (with complications like wx, etc.) should be well covered in the box. If they weren't, why is the MAC commander dispatching his valuable vehicles with half-trained crew?
(And speaking as a taxpayer, try this in a Google window:
"Milton Friedman" "Four ways to spend money" )
The indicated fault (t/r unlock light) should be a sim exercise, and OEI approaches (with complications like wx, etc.) should be well covered in the box. If they weren't, why is the MAC commander dispatching his valuable vehicles with half-trained crew?
(And speaking as a taxpayer, try this in a Google window:
"Milton Friedman" "Four ways to spend money" )
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http://www.newszap.com/articles/2006...ware/dsn01.txt
Errors C-5 crash cause; Three gaffes cited
By Drew Volturo, Delaware State News
DOVER - A series of human errors by three pilots and two flight engineers led to the April 3 crash of a C-5B Galaxy cargo aircraft into a field about 1,000 feet south of a Dover Air Force Base runway, Air Force officials announced Tuesday.
The plane, bound for Kuwait by way of Germany, was returning to the base shortly after taking off that morning because the number two engine's "thruster reverser not locked" indication light came on.
"Clearly, there was complacency and clearly a lack of situational awareness," said Col. Raymond G. Torres, president of the 10-member Air Force accident investigation board that reviewed and simulated the crash.
"Our crews are highly trained. This is not normal behavior for our crew members.
"If there was a good part to it, it's that (all) 17 people who were aboard the aircraft survived the crash, survived the accident."
Col. Torres said he "wouldn't quite go that far" in crediting the flight crew with saving the lives of the 13 active and reserve military crew members and four civilians.
The 19-page report identified three primary causes of the crash, the first involving a C-5 in 15 years:
* The pilots and flight engineers failed to use the fully operational number three engine, confusing it with the shut down number two engine;
* Bringing the flaps down 100 percent when C-5 directives prescribe opening them 62.5 or 40 percent;
* Landing on a visual approach at half the normal altitude for the circumstances.
Corrections could have been made to any one of the errors to safely land the aircraft, Col. Torres said.
The board also singled out the aircraft commander and lead pilot, Capt. Brian J. LaFreda, for not fully briefing the other crew members about the planned return to the Dover base.
"Had a full briefing occurred, it is possible the other pilots or flight engineers would have further discussed these factors, leading to a safe return to Dover Air Force Base," Col. Torres said.
All 13 airmen declined to comment on the crash. None of the airmen have flown since the accident.
Col. David H. Wuest, vice wing commander for the Air Force Reserve's 512th Airlift Wing, said the pilots and flight engineers were members of the wing.
He said it is too early to say what, if any, disciplinary action would be taken against the men.
"We will take as long as needed to make the proper decision," Col. Wuest said.
Series of errors
The C-5 took off from the base at 6:21 a.m. April 3 with what Col. Torres characterized as "an experienced crew."
The pilots had a combined 10,000 flight hours in a C-5, while the flight engineers had logged 12,000 hours.
After the "thrust reverser not locked" indication light came on, the crew followed protocol and shut down the number two engine, then decided to return to the base.
Col. Torres noted that flight crews routinely practice flying with three engines, calling it "not unique."
While preparing to land, Capt. LaFreda reduced all engines to idle for descent, Col. Torres said.
"(The pilot) mistakenly moved the (shutdown) number two throttle in concert with engines one and four, but left the (fully operational) number three throttle in idle for the remainder of the flight," said Col. Torres, adding that none of the other pilots or flight engineers recognized the error.
Had three engines been used, even as late as 300 feet above the ground, the plane could have been landed safely, he said.
C-5 directives instruct flight crews to deploy the flaps of heavy aircraft at 40 percent during landing.
The regulation applies to aircraft weighing more than 635,850 pounds. The C-5 weighed about 730,000 pounds when it crashed.
Deploying the flaps fully, Col. Torres said, would create more drag, slowing the aircraft by about 23 mph to 168 mph.
If the flaps had been opened to the prescribed 62.5 or 40 percent settings, the plane still could have landed safely with only two engines, Col. Torres said.
While on approach to land, the C-5 was coming in at about half the altitude necessary for a heavy plane with fully deployed flaps and only two engines, Col. Torres said.
"A normal glidepath would have been approximately 900 feet at three miles, 500 feet at 1.8 miles and 300 feet at one mile," he said.
"The mishap aircraft was 500 feet at three miles, 300 feet at 1.8 miles and 150 feet at one mile."
Before crashing, the flight crew attempted to make an adjustment.
"Just prior to stalling, they took the flaps from full to 40 percent at 147 feet and one mile out," Col. Torres said.
The aircraft entered a stall, he said, and the tail of the plane struck a telephone pole about 3/4-mile short of the runway, then slammed into the ground with 10 times the force of gravity, Col. Torres said.
"That was significant enough to snap off the tail of the airplane," he said.
The nose landing gear then smashed into a field the federal government owns with 30 times the force of gravity, and the plane skidded for several hundred feet, coming to rest about 1,000 feet short of the runway at 6:42 a.m.
The cockpit, which cracked on impact, broke off completely from the plane.
Firefighters and emergency personnel throughout Kent County responded to the scene.
All 17 crew members and passengers were taken to Delaware hospitals, with 11 discharged later that day.
Salvaging the C-5
Dover base maintenance personnel estimate they will be able to reuse about 1,100 parts from the downed 248-foot C-5.
The 13,000-pound crew compartment, already removed from the plane, will be transported to Warner Robins Air Force Base in Georgia to be used as a mock-up and training cockpit.
Other salvageable parts include flight control surfaces.
Base spokeswoman Lt. Col. Cheryl Law said the base plans to decide on a contractor by July to remove the remaining parts of the plane from the field.
She did not know how long it would take to disassemble the plane and remove it.
AMP not involved
The crashed C-5 was among those planes with an upgraded cockpit.
Last year, the Air Force began its Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) to extend the service lives of C-5s, partially at the insistence of some members of Congress, including Delaware's delegation.
The 12 modernized planes are split between the Dover base and Travis Air Force Base in northern California.
The accident investigation board has concluded that the AMP did not play a role in the crash, Col. Torres said.
"I think it is very important that the new avionics package was not involved," said Sen. Thomas R. Carper, D-Del., a retired Naval flight officer.
"We need to provide cost-effective airlift capabilities to support our troops stationed throughout the world. We can move forward with plans to upgrade the cockpits of all 100-plus C-5s."
Rep. Michael N. Castle, R-Del., said Dover Air Force Base could have suffered severely had the crash been caused by a problem with the plane.
"If it had something to do with problems with the new cockpit or with the planes' structure because of age that would have forced the grounding of the fleet, it would have been a serious blow to the base," Rep. Castle said.
Residents unfazed
Several people who live near Dover Air Force Base said April's crash didn't make them feel unsafe.
Kitts Hummock Road resident Sam Wilson heard the crash and was one of the first to reach the scene.
Mr. Wilson, a Vietnam veteran, does the same thing today when he hears the C-5s roar that he always has.
"I stand up and I salute. That plane, the C-5, that's a wonderful plane," Mr. Wilson said, citing its safety record.
Four C-5s have crashed since the cargo fleet went airborne in 1968.
Two of the four accidents - a 1990 crash at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a 1975 crash of a plane loaded with Vietnamese orphans near Saigon - were fatal.
Danny Wilson, a resident of Horsepond Road whose backyard borders the base, also saw the crash as an anomaly.
"It's the first time it's happened in like, ever," he said. "It's got to be the safest thing in the world.
"It doesn't bother me one bit. If it doesn't happen again for another 100 years, I feel pretty safe.
"I don't have any problems with still living here or being around these planes whatsoever."
Staff writers Elizabeth Redden and Joe Rogalsky contributed to this article.
Post comments on this issue at newszapforums.com/forum4
Staff writer Drew Volturo can be reached at 741-8296 or [email protected]
Errors C-5 crash cause; Three gaffes cited
By Drew Volturo, Delaware State News
DOVER - A series of human errors by three pilots and two flight engineers led to the April 3 crash of a C-5B Galaxy cargo aircraft into a field about 1,000 feet south of a Dover Air Force Base runway, Air Force officials announced Tuesday.
The plane, bound for Kuwait by way of Germany, was returning to the base shortly after taking off that morning because the number two engine's "thruster reverser not locked" indication light came on.
"Clearly, there was complacency and clearly a lack of situational awareness," said Col. Raymond G. Torres, president of the 10-member Air Force accident investigation board that reviewed and simulated the crash.
"Our crews are highly trained. This is not normal behavior for our crew members.
"If there was a good part to it, it's that (all) 17 people who were aboard the aircraft survived the crash, survived the accident."
Col. Torres said he "wouldn't quite go that far" in crediting the flight crew with saving the lives of the 13 active and reserve military crew members and four civilians.
The 19-page report identified three primary causes of the crash, the first involving a C-5 in 15 years:
* The pilots and flight engineers failed to use the fully operational number three engine, confusing it with the shut down number two engine;
* Bringing the flaps down 100 percent when C-5 directives prescribe opening them 62.5 or 40 percent;
* Landing on a visual approach at half the normal altitude for the circumstances.
Corrections could have been made to any one of the errors to safely land the aircraft, Col. Torres said.
The board also singled out the aircraft commander and lead pilot, Capt. Brian J. LaFreda, for not fully briefing the other crew members about the planned return to the Dover base.
"Had a full briefing occurred, it is possible the other pilots or flight engineers would have further discussed these factors, leading to a safe return to Dover Air Force Base," Col. Torres said.
All 13 airmen declined to comment on the crash. None of the airmen have flown since the accident.
Col. David H. Wuest, vice wing commander for the Air Force Reserve's 512th Airlift Wing, said the pilots and flight engineers were members of the wing.
He said it is too early to say what, if any, disciplinary action would be taken against the men.
"We will take as long as needed to make the proper decision," Col. Wuest said.
Series of errors
The C-5 took off from the base at 6:21 a.m. April 3 with what Col. Torres characterized as "an experienced crew."
The pilots had a combined 10,000 flight hours in a C-5, while the flight engineers had logged 12,000 hours.
After the "thrust reverser not locked" indication light came on, the crew followed protocol and shut down the number two engine, then decided to return to the base.
Col. Torres noted that flight crews routinely practice flying with three engines, calling it "not unique."
While preparing to land, Capt. LaFreda reduced all engines to idle for descent, Col. Torres said.
"(The pilot) mistakenly moved the (shutdown) number two throttle in concert with engines one and four, but left the (fully operational) number three throttle in idle for the remainder of the flight," said Col. Torres, adding that none of the other pilots or flight engineers recognized the error.
Had three engines been used, even as late as 300 feet above the ground, the plane could have been landed safely, he said.
C-5 directives instruct flight crews to deploy the flaps of heavy aircraft at 40 percent during landing.
The regulation applies to aircraft weighing more than 635,850 pounds. The C-5 weighed about 730,000 pounds when it crashed.
Deploying the flaps fully, Col. Torres said, would create more drag, slowing the aircraft by about 23 mph to 168 mph.
If the flaps had been opened to the prescribed 62.5 or 40 percent settings, the plane still could have landed safely with only two engines, Col. Torres said.
While on approach to land, the C-5 was coming in at about half the altitude necessary for a heavy plane with fully deployed flaps and only two engines, Col. Torres said.
"A normal glidepath would have been approximately 900 feet at three miles, 500 feet at 1.8 miles and 300 feet at one mile," he said.
"The mishap aircraft was 500 feet at three miles, 300 feet at 1.8 miles and 150 feet at one mile."
Before crashing, the flight crew attempted to make an adjustment.
"Just prior to stalling, they took the flaps from full to 40 percent at 147 feet and one mile out," Col. Torres said.
The aircraft entered a stall, he said, and the tail of the plane struck a telephone pole about 3/4-mile short of the runway, then slammed into the ground with 10 times the force of gravity, Col. Torres said.
"That was significant enough to snap off the tail of the airplane," he said.
The nose landing gear then smashed into a field the federal government owns with 30 times the force of gravity, and the plane skidded for several hundred feet, coming to rest about 1,000 feet short of the runway at 6:42 a.m.
The cockpit, which cracked on impact, broke off completely from the plane.
Firefighters and emergency personnel throughout Kent County responded to the scene.
All 17 crew members and passengers were taken to Delaware hospitals, with 11 discharged later that day.
Salvaging the C-5
Dover base maintenance personnel estimate they will be able to reuse about 1,100 parts from the downed 248-foot C-5.
The 13,000-pound crew compartment, already removed from the plane, will be transported to Warner Robins Air Force Base in Georgia to be used as a mock-up and training cockpit.
Other salvageable parts include flight control surfaces.
Base spokeswoman Lt. Col. Cheryl Law said the base plans to decide on a contractor by July to remove the remaining parts of the plane from the field.
She did not know how long it would take to disassemble the plane and remove it.
AMP not involved
The crashed C-5 was among those planes with an upgraded cockpit.
Last year, the Air Force began its Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) to extend the service lives of C-5s, partially at the insistence of some members of Congress, including Delaware's delegation.
The 12 modernized planes are split between the Dover base and Travis Air Force Base in northern California.
The accident investigation board has concluded that the AMP did not play a role in the crash, Col. Torres said.
"I think it is very important that the new avionics package was not involved," said Sen. Thomas R. Carper, D-Del., a retired Naval flight officer.
"We need to provide cost-effective airlift capabilities to support our troops stationed throughout the world. We can move forward with plans to upgrade the cockpits of all 100-plus C-5s."
Rep. Michael N. Castle, R-Del., said Dover Air Force Base could have suffered severely had the crash been caused by a problem with the plane.
"If it had something to do with problems with the new cockpit or with the planes' structure because of age that would have forced the grounding of the fleet, it would have been a serious blow to the base," Rep. Castle said.
Residents unfazed
Several people who live near Dover Air Force Base said April's crash didn't make them feel unsafe.
Kitts Hummock Road resident Sam Wilson heard the crash and was one of the first to reach the scene.
Mr. Wilson, a Vietnam veteran, does the same thing today when he hears the C-5s roar that he always has.
"I stand up and I salute. That plane, the C-5, that's a wonderful plane," Mr. Wilson said, citing its safety record.
Four C-5s have crashed since the cargo fleet went airborne in 1968.
Two of the four accidents - a 1990 crash at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a 1975 crash of a plane loaded with Vietnamese orphans near Saigon - were fatal.
Danny Wilson, a resident of Horsepond Road whose backyard borders the base, also saw the crash as an anomaly.
"It's the first time it's happened in like, ever," he said. "It's got to be the safest thing in the world.
"It doesn't bother me one bit. If it doesn't happen again for another 100 years, I feel pretty safe.
"I don't have any problems with still living here or being around these planes whatsoever."
Staff writers Elizabeth Redden and Joe Rogalsky contributed to this article.
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Staff writer Drew Volturo can be reached at 741-8296 or [email protected]