JetBlue A320 landing at LAX
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here is a report from a previous and I believe identical incident.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...05X00227&key=1
NYC99IA062
On February 16, 1999, at 1602 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus A-320-231, N628AW, operated by America West Airlines as flight 2811, received minor damage when it landed at Port Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio, with the nose wheels rotated 90 degrees. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated pilots, 3 flight attendants and 26 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight which had departed from Newark (EWR), New Jersey, about 1404. Flight 2811 was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to statements from the flight crew, flight 2811 was uneventful until the landing gear was lowered prior to landing at CMH. After the landing gear was extended to the down-and-locked position, the flight crew received indications of dual landing gear control and interface unit (LGCIU) faults.
The flight crew entered into a holding pattern and attempted to troubleshoot the faults; however, they were unable to determine the source of the problem. The flight crew then prepared for a landing at CMH, with nosewheel steering and thrust reversers inoperative due to the faults. During the final approach, at the flight crew's request, the control tower performed a visual check of the landing gear, which revealed that the nosewheels were rotated about 90 degrees.
The flight crew then initiated a missed approach and declared an emergency. The cabin crew was notified of an impending emergency landing, and the cabin and passengers were prepared for the landing. The captain initiated the approach, and described the touchdown as soft. The airplane stopped on the 10,250-foot-long runway with about 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Damage was limited to the nose landing gear tires and rims.
The captain reported that after landing, he noticed smoke was drifting up on the right side of the airplane. He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to frequency congestion. He then initiated an emergency evacuation using the left and right side overwing exits.
A review of the air/ground communications, as recorded by the Columbus Air Traffic Control Tower, did not reveal a congested frequency when the emergency evacuation was initiated.
According to Airbus, nose wheel steering was hydraulically actuated through either the cockpit tiller and/or the rudder pedals.
A post-incident visual inspection of the nose landing gear assembly revealed no anomalies. The steering control module was replaced, and a subsequent functional check of the nosewheel steering was successful.
The steering control module was a sealed unit, opened only during overhaul, with no specified overhaul time, and had accumulated 3,860 hours since last overhauled on March 3, 1998. It was shipped to Messier-Bugatti, the manufacturer, and examined under the supervision of the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA). The examination revealed that the external hydraulic O-ring seals on the steering control module's selector valve were extruded (distorted out of the seal's groove). A small offset was found in the steering control valve.
Airbus further reported that while the offset would have been measurable, it would not have been noticeable under normal operations. Additionally, during landing gear extension, the brake and steering control unit (BSCU) would have been energized and hydraulic pressure would have been directed toward the steering servo valve. The BSCU would have then commanded a small rotation of the nose wheel to check for proper movement. Any disagreement between the commanded position and actual position of the nose wheel would have deactivated the nose wheel steering. However, if hydraulic pressure had bypassed the steering control valve, there would have been continued pressurization to the servo valve, and because of the servo valve's inherent offset, in-flight rotation of the nose wheels.
Procedures existed for removal of hydraulic pressure from the steering control module. However, once the nosewheel strut had deflected 90 degrees, the centering cam would have been rotated to a flat area, and would have been incapable of overriding the 3,000 PSI hydraulic system, and returning the nose wheels to a centered position.
Documents from Airbus indicated there have been three similar incidents in which A320 airplanes landed with the nose wheels rotated about 90 degrees. Examination of the steering control modules on two of the airplanes revealed extrusion of the selector valve's external seals similar to that found on N628AW. Airbus had attributed the extrusion failures to the lack of a backup seal or the effects of aging on the seals. As a result of these incidents, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1197 on October 8, 1998, to recommend replacement of the external seals on the steering control module's selector valve on A320 and A321 airplanes within 18 months of the SB's issuance.
At the time of the incident, neither the French Direction General de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), had adopted the service bulletin as an airworthiness directive. The operator was not required to comply with the service bulletin, and had not complied with it.
On March 24, 1999, the DGAC issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 1999-124-129(B) to require compliance with the SB. On December 17, 1999, the FAA issued AD 99-23-09 which was based upon the French AD, with a 12 month time of compliance for modification of the nose wheel steering control valve.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...05X00227&key=1
NYC99IA062
On February 16, 1999, at 1602 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus A-320-231, N628AW, operated by America West Airlines as flight 2811, received minor damage when it landed at Port Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio, with the nose wheels rotated 90 degrees. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated pilots, 3 flight attendants and 26 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight which had departed from Newark (EWR), New Jersey, about 1404. Flight 2811 was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to statements from the flight crew, flight 2811 was uneventful until the landing gear was lowered prior to landing at CMH. After the landing gear was extended to the down-and-locked position, the flight crew received indications of dual landing gear control and interface unit (LGCIU) faults.
The flight crew entered into a holding pattern and attempted to troubleshoot the faults; however, they were unable to determine the source of the problem. The flight crew then prepared for a landing at CMH, with nosewheel steering and thrust reversers inoperative due to the faults. During the final approach, at the flight crew's request, the control tower performed a visual check of the landing gear, which revealed that the nosewheels were rotated about 90 degrees.
The flight crew then initiated a missed approach and declared an emergency. The cabin crew was notified of an impending emergency landing, and the cabin and passengers were prepared for the landing. The captain initiated the approach, and described the touchdown as soft. The airplane stopped on the 10,250-foot-long runway with about 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Damage was limited to the nose landing gear tires and rims.
The captain reported that after landing, he noticed smoke was drifting up on the right side of the airplane. He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to frequency congestion. He then initiated an emergency evacuation using the left and right side overwing exits.
A review of the air/ground communications, as recorded by the Columbus Air Traffic Control Tower, did not reveal a congested frequency when the emergency evacuation was initiated.
According to Airbus, nose wheel steering was hydraulically actuated through either the cockpit tiller and/or the rudder pedals.
A post-incident visual inspection of the nose landing gear assembly revealed no anomalies. The steering control module was replaced, and a subsequent functional check of the nosewheel steering was successful.
The steering control module was a sealed unit, opened only during overhaul, with no specified overhaul time, and had accumulated 3,860 hours since last overhauled on March 3, 1998. It was shipped to Messier-Bugatti, the manufacturer, and examined under the supervision of the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA). The examination revealed that the external hydraulic O-ring seals on the steering control module's selector valve were extruded (distorted out of the seal's groove). A small offset was found in the steering control valve.
Airbus further reported that while the offset would have been measurable, it would not have been noticeable under normal operations. Additionally, during landing gear extension, the brake and steering control unit (BSCU) would have been energized and hydraulic pressure would have been directed toward the steering servo valve. The BSCU would have then commanded a small rotation of the nose wheel to check for proper movement. Any disagreement between the commanded position and actual position of the nose wheel would have deactivated the nose wheel steering. However, if hydraulic pressure had bypassed the steering control valve, there would have been continued pressurization to the servo valve, and because of the servo valve's inherent offset, in-flight rotation of the nose wheels.
Procedures existed for removal of hydraulic pressure from the steering control module. However, once the nosewheel strut had deflected 90 degrees, the centering cam would have been rotated to a flat area, and would have been incapable of overriding the 3,000 PSI hydraulic system, and returning the nose wheels to a centered position.
Documents from Airbus indicated there have been three similar incidents in which A320 airplanes landed with the nose wheels rotated about 90 degrees. Examination of the steering control modules on two of the airplanes revealed extrusion of the selector valve's external seals similar to that found on N628AW. Airbus had attributed the extrusion failures to the lack of a backup seal or the effects of aging on the seals. As a result of these incidents, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1197 on October 8, 1998, to recommend replacement of the external seals on the steering control module's selector valve on A320 and A321 airplanes within 18 months of the SB's issuance.
At the time of the incident, neither the French Direction General de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), had adopted the service bulletin as an airworthiness directive. The operator was not required to comply with the service bulletin, and had not complied with it.
On March 24, 1999, the DGAC issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 1999-124-129(B) to require compliance with the SB. On December 17, 1999, the FAA issued AD 99-23-09 which was based upon the French AD, with a 12 month time of compliance for modification of the nose wheel steering control valve.
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Congrats to the crew indeed..
Impressive photo already available:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/926274/L
Wonder how hard it was to keep centre line...
Salz
Impressive photo already available:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/926274/L
Wonder how hard it was to keep centre line...
Salz
Last edited by Salzinger_FOO; 22nd Sep 2005 at 03:28.
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I just had a chance to watch the whole video. The person flying really did a text book job. Setting down very light. Keeping the nose off the ground for as long as possible. right down the center line...... Excellent job.
innuendo - Dont be a cheaky monkey. You know what I meant.
innuendo - Dont be a cheaky monkey. You know what I meant.
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Job well done, the first airport fire engine arrived alongside the plane about 22 seconds after the plane stopped, i thought they would be there much faster as the emergency was planned and well co-ordinated..??
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NW through 90 degrees catered for in the 'Book 3' (Abnormals). Associated potentially with NW Steer Fault and/or L/G Shock Absorber Faults. Sole advice is "During Landing, delay nose wheel touchdown for as long as possible" as was nicely demonstrated.
Interesting lack of 'drama' or 'drills' in Airbus' advice here, and definitely in contrast to 'L/G in Abnormal position'. I think we need to keep in context here that the 'emergency' was heightened by being on Live TV. Seems from the history above a fairly regular A32x problem...
Interesting lack of 'drama' or 'drills' in Airbus' advice here, and definitely in contrast to 'L/G in Abnormal position'. I think we need to keep in context here that the 'emergency' was heightened by being on Live TV. Seems from the history above a fairly regular A32x problem...
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Same thing happened on an Air Malta A320 a few years back. If i remember correctly, the nose wheel twisted to 90 degrees off during takeoff roll before V1. Crew rejected takeoff safely. Seems like this is a re-occurring event on 320s.
Well done to Crew.
bobdbuilder
Well done to Crew.
bobdbuilder
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Airbus checklist recommends not to arm GND SPLRS (although only for main landing gear problems), which means, they will not extend.
To my knowledge, they will extend when reverse is selected....
With spoilers armed, they will extend with thrust lever idle.
regards
To my knowledge, they will extend when reverse is selected....
With spoilers armed, they will extend with thrust lever idle.
regards
Ut Sementem Feeceris
If one of the main gear is not extended, then the spoilers should not be armed. This is because at touchdown they will deploy and KILL the lift on the wings resulting in a very rapid, hard contact of the wing with no gear onto the runway. This was demonstrated a few years back by an MD-80 (I think) which had this problem. There was some excellent footage taken from behind the aircraft which showed a nice touchdown, followed by spoliers, followed by the wing SLAMMING onto the runway as the lift was destroyed. If you keep the wing producing lift, you can hold it off the deck with aileron as long as possible and "cushion" the blow.
If this is the third recorded instance of a nose gear at 90°, I hardly call it a recurring problem with the Airbus
Not seen the footage of the JetBlue, but glad everyone is ok.
A4
Catchup - You are correct, but for a landing with abnormal gear both engines are shutdown at touchdown - so reverse isn't an option. For a nose gear problem, the QRH says shutdown both before the nose gear makes contact.
If this is the third recorded instance of a nose gear at 90°, I hardly call it a recurring problem with the Airbus
Not seen the footage of the JetBlue, but glad everyone is ok.
A4
Catchup - You are correct, but for a landing with abnormal gear both engines are shutdown at touchdown - so reverse isn't an option. For a nose gear problem, the QRH says shutdown both before the nose gear makes contact.
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All credit to the crew...but,
This 90 degree nosewheel skew seems to have happened more than once or twice. Why have these nosegears not had some re-design in place long ago? If it happens twice, the relevant gear should be withdrawn and the weakness removed. Any future such incident, if it results in loss of life, should result in negligent manslaughter charges against agencies responsible for maintenance oversight, and Airbus; or are we to rely on superb crew response, and luck, each time Airbus's faulty design results in this same situation? It's just possible next time, the nosegear will skew the aircraft over on its side, a wing will dig in, and fire with resulting loss of life will result. Reminds me of the DC-10 cargo door blindness over many incidents, finally with the Turkish Air disaster with loss of all on board. Actually, corporate murder.
This 90 degree nosewheel skew seems to have happened more than once or twice. Why have these nosegears not had some re-design in place long ago? If it happens twice, the relevant gear should be withdrawn and the weakness removed. Any future such incident, if it results in loss of life, should result in negligent manslaughter charges against agencies responsible for maintenance oversight, and Airbus; or are we to rely on superb crew response, and luck, each time Airbus's faulty design results in this same situation? It's just possible next time, the nosegear will skew the aircraft over on its side, a wing will dig in, and fire with resulting loss of life will result. Reminds me of the DC-10 cargo door blindness over many incidents, finally with the Turkish Air disaster with loss of all on board. Actually, corporate murder.
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Two weeks ago we had an A319 here at ARN.
When the crew started to taxy away from the gate, the nose wheels turned to 90 deg and the plane stopped. The BSCU (Brakes and Steering Control Unit) had ceased to control.
We checked it all out and reset the computor and off it went.
On return to base they replaced the computor. No damage done.
When the crew started to taxy away from the gate, the nose wheels turned to 90 deg and the plane stopped. The BSCU (Brakes and Steering Control Unit) had ceased to control.
We checked it all out and reset the computor and off it went.
On return to base they replaced the computor. No damage done.
Interesting replies above ....
The QRH checklist calls for no autobrake to be used, also for both engines to be shut down once the mains are on, and for reverse not to be used.
This will explain the lack of spoilers and reverse thrust, and as to why they could hold the nose up for so long.
Engine pumps continue to supply hydraulic pressure for 30 seconds after first engine shutdown.
Ground spoilers are not armed for MAIN L/G, armed for nose gear.
The QRH checklist calls for no autobrake to be used, also for both engines to be shut down once the mains are on, and for reverse not to be used.
This will explain the lack of spoilers and reverse thrust, and as to why they could hold the nose up for so long.
Engine pumps continue to supply hydraulic pressure for 30 seconds after first engine shutdown.
Ground spoilers are not armed for MAIN L/G, armed for nose gear.
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Geesh what a load of hype !!..... and from which even the BBC are not immune, e.g. using phrases such as:
- Lucky escape
- Miraculous ending
- Terrifying flight
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I'm sorry to insist, but this is really a minor incident. Of course, crew did a great job, no doubt about that.
Otherwise... - loss of lives?! hard to keep centerline???
Please, dear ppruner, keep it on the realistic side:
An airplane with an unstearable NW will stay steady because of the inertia of the trajectory. Where should the nosewheel drift to? Left or right? If it's 90! The tyre will be converted into fumes within seconds, then you "roll" on the rim. Metal against concrete produces sparkes, and this ignites. No, the fuel tank will not explode
Also nose wheel collaps is not a catastrophic failure per se. We remember the Iberia MD-87 in Madrid (?) with a complete retracted nose wheel. Soft landing. A few cratches on the lower fuselage.
I agree this outcome depends heavily on the performance of the flying crew. But it's not soooo difficult to do a soft touchdown, keep the nose in the air and let it go down softly.
Apologies again to disagree to you all - it has to be said.
Dani
Otherwise... - loss of lives?! hard to keep centerline???
Please, dear ppruner, keep it on the realistic side:
An airplane with an unstearable NW will stay steady because of the inertia of the trajectory. Where should the nosewheel drift to? Left or right? If it's 90! The tyre will be converted into fumes within seconds, then you "roll" on the rim. Metal against concrete produces sparkes, and this ignites. No, the fuel tank will not explode
Also nose wheel collaps is not a catastrophic failure per se. We remember the Iberia MD-87 in Madrid (?) with a complete retracted nose wheel. Soft landing. A few cratches on the lower fuselage.
I agree this outcome depends heavily on the performance of the flying crew. But it's not soooo difficult to do a soft touchdown, keep the nose in the air and let it go down softly.
Apologies again to disagree to you all - it has to be said.
Dani
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Not suggesting anything, just asking to learn something.....
Apparantly they disembarked the passengers using steps. Off course we don't have the whole picture but I wouldn't have been surprised if they evacuated.
Any thoughts on that?
On the America West Airlines flight 2811 in 1999:
"He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to FREQUENCY CONGESTION. He then initiated an emergency evacuation...."
You declare a mayday and you still have to deal with frequency congestion?????
Apparantly they disembarked the passengers using steps. Off course we don't have the whole picture but I wouldn't have been surprised if they evacuated.
Any thoughts on that?
On the America West Airlines flight 2811 in 1999:
"He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to FREQUENCY CONGESTION. He then initiated an emergency evacuation...."
You declare a mayday and you still have to deal with frequency congestion?????
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Some questions for the experts!
This could have turned nasty, I watched it live on TV and I have a few questions:
1) Why Fire Units were so slow to go close to the aircraft whilst they had been waiting for this aircraft for a very long time and they should have known pretty well where the aircraft would have stopped? It looked like a very long time on TV.
2) Why firemen did not cool the front nose gear as soon as aircraft stopped, avoiding the risk of fire? Nothing was done.
3) Why the runway was not foamed? Would this have reduced friction and risk of fire? Why wasn't done?
4)Why pilots decided not to evacuate? Was this agreed with firemen? This would make sense.
I am still astonished by the fact that the runway was left dry and hard for such a planned and expected landing.
Thanks.
1) Why Fire Units were so slow to go close to the aircraft whilst they had been waiting for this aircraft for a very long time and they should have known pretty well where the aircraft would have stopped? It looked like a very long time on TV.
2) Why firemen did not cool the front nose gear as soon as aircraft stopped, avoiding the risk of fire? Nothing was done.
3) Why the runway was not foamed? Would this have reduced friction and risk of fire? Why wasn't done?
4)Why pilots decided not to evacuate? Was this agreed with firemen? This would make sense.
I am still astonished by the fact that the runway was left dry and hard for such a planned and expected landing.
Thanks.
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Further article from CNN Internet news ... pilot's name: Scott Burke.
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/09/22....ap/index.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/09/22....ap/index.html
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foam
I think this incident with foam on the runway would have been less "risky"...yes slippery runway, but this would have meant less friction between landing gear, tyres and asphalt which is exactly what I would have wanted if I was the pilot!
I did not really like to see those flames and debris, you never know, I would have preferred no flames, no fire, no heat down there.
Just in case!
Well done to the crew anyway.
Does anybody know if foaming is decided by pilot or fire authority?
I did not really like to see those flames and debris, you never know, I would have preferred no flames, no fire, no heat down there.
Just in case!
Well done to the crew anyway.
Does anybody know if foaming is decided by pilot or fire authority?