MD82 crash in Venezuela
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This sounds more like the BMI incident some years ago in England where the wrong engine was shut down and only discovered at a lower altitude when power was again required for flight . ie they were very close to their enroute alternate and went into an immediate descent before establising which engine had failed . during the descent therwrong engine was shut down .
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Shouldn't we have some news about FDR/CVR content at this point ?
BEA press release (9/9/05):
http://www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/actua...e20050909.html
BEA press release (9/9/05)
Not too sure what to read into this... I woud have expected some basic infos about the engines, crew actions, etc...
Any idea ?
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I have read that the Venezuelans (accident site) and Colombians (carrier home) are the primary investigators on this accident. It appears that the BEA's task was to assist the investigators in extracting data from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. So the BEA would not be authorized to release any statements about details, cause or other circumstances. I think only the primary investigating authorities can do that.
The "French and Venezuelan judicial authorities" investigations mentioned in the BEA press release seem to refer to parallel legal proceedings, not the primary accident investigation itself. Early on after the accident, there were accounts of judicial/criminal proceedings in Martinique.
The "French and Venezuelan judicial authorities" investigations mentioned in the BEA press release seem to refer to parallel legal proceedings, not the primary accident investigation itself. Early on after the accident, there were accounts of judicial/criminal proceedings in Martinique.
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Does this Inspire any Fitting Scenarios? Engine Icing plus??
VENEZUELA RELEASES FACTUAL INFORMATION
ON AUGUST MD-82 CRASH INVESTIGATION
*************************************************
On August 16, 2005, West Caribbean Airways flight 708, an MD-82 (registration HK-4374X), crashed near Machiques, Venezuela while on a charter flight from Panama to Martinique. All 160 persons aboard the flight died in the crash.
The following information has been released by the Comite de Investigacion de Accidentes Aereos (CIAA) of Venezuela. All States assisting the investigation -- France, Colombia and the United States -- agree with the factual findings. The NTSB is distributing this information at the request of the Venezuelan Investigator-in-Charge.
Wreckage
Movement of the wreckage has been delayed due to very heavy rains in the area where the airplane crashed. However, it should be moved to a secure area in Maracaibo in the next few days. Once the wreckage has been moved, additional inspections will be completed. Initial examinations on site revealed:
--Ground scars indicate that the airplane impacted in a nose up and slight right roll attitude.
--Wreckage was distributed over a triangle shaped area that was approximately 205 meters long and 110 meters at its widest point.
--Both engines exhibited indications of high-speed compressor rotation at the time of ground impact.
--The engine inlets, empennage and wing leading edges showed no sign of pre-impact damage.
--The horizontal stabilizer was found at about the full airplane nose up position (about 12 units nose up).
Flight Recorders
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder
(FDR) were downloaded at the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la Securite de l'Aviation Civil (BEA) laboratory near Paris, France, during the week of September 5, 2005.
Both the FDR and CVR casings were severely damaged due to impact forces. Both recorders operated until impact.
Flight Data Recorder
The FDR protected module was in good condition and the magnetic tape was extracted in good condition. The investigation has gained good information from the recorder.
However, several parameters were not recorded as designed, including left engine pressure ratio (EPR), pitch attitude, roll attitude, magnetic heading, and column position.
The following events are recorded on the FDR:
--The accident flight lasted about one hour from takeoff to the end of the recording.
--The flight reached its initial cruise altitude of flight level (FL) 310 at about 6:25 UTC (universal coordinated time).
--At about 6:41 UTC, about 20 minutes before the end of the recording, the airplane began a normal climb to FL330.
It leveled off at about 6:43 and accelerated to Mach 0.76. The right engine EPR was consistent with normal climb and cruise values.
--About 90 seconds after reaching Mach 0.76 (6:49 UTC), the airspeed began to steadily decrease. The horizontal stabilizer moved from about 2 units nose up to about 4 units nose up during this deceleration.
--About 3 minutes and 30 seconds (6:57 UTC) from the end of recording, the Mach number reached about 0.60. The autopilot was then disengaged and the airplane started to descend from FL330.
--As the airplane descended past about FL315, the airspeed continued to decrease and the right engine EPR decreased to about flight idle.
--The airplane descent rate increased after passing through FL310.
--The airspeed reached a minimum of about 150 indicated air speed (IAS) knots at about FL250.
--Right engine EPR stayed at approximately flight idle through the descent and even increased several times, including shortly before the end of the recording.
--Once the airplane started to descend, the horizontal stabilizer moved in increments to about 12 units nose up (which is about full nose up trim) while descending through FL200.
Cockpit Voice Recorder
The CVR protected module was partly opened due to impact forces. Overall, the magnetic tape was in good condition, but the tape was partially cut due to impact forces. The overall quality of the recoding is poor, with many areas of static and loud background noises. However, valuable data was obtained.
Almost all crew discussions to communicate with each other and with air traffic control (ATC), in Colombia and Venezuela, were in Spanish.
The CVR recorded the last 32 minutes of the accident flight.
The following events are recorded on the CVR:
--At about 06:53 UTC, approximately 8 minutes before the end of recording (while the airplane is level at
FL330) the flight crew discusses weather concerns that included possible icing conditions. The flight crew also discusses turning on engine and airfoil anti-ice.
--About 3 minutes and 30 seconds (6:57 UTC) before the end of the recording, the crew requests and is cleared to descend to FL310.
--About 3 minutes before the end of the recording, an audio warning similar to altitude alert is heard, followed
22 seconds later by a sound similar to stick shaker
(6:58 UTC) and then an aural stall warning alert.
These warnings sound continuously until the end of the recording.
--The flight crew requests subsequently lower altitudes of FL290, FL240, and finally 14,000 feet.
--The flight crew does not declare an emergency, and they do not refer to any checklist during the descent.
--About 1 minute after the start of the sound similar to the stick shaker, the flight crew states that they had a dual engine flameout when asked by ATC if they had a problem.
--Last radio transmission from the flight crew to ATC was at about 07:00:11 UTC.
--About 8 seconds before the end of recording, a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning starts to be heard and continues to the end of recording.
--The time from first sound similar to stick shaker, to the end of the recording is about 2 minutes and 46 seconds.
--The end of the tape occurs at about 7:00:31 UTC.
For further information on the investigation and the contents of this release, please contact Tcnel. Lorllys Ramos Acevedo, Directora, CIAA, Venezuela, +58 (212) 201- 5491.
The information in this advisory has been translated into French by the BEA and can be accessed at the following URL :
http://www.bea.aero/francais/actualite/actu.htm. The information also will be available in Spanish (from the
CIAA) on the Safety Board's website Spanish-language page:
http://www.ntsb.gov/es/espanol.htm.
ON AUGUST MD-82 CRASH INVESTIGATION
*************************************************
On August 16, 2005, West Caribbean Airways flight 708, an MD-82 (registration HK-4374X), crashed near Machiques, Venezuela while on a charter flight from Panama to Martinique. All 160 persons aboard the flight died in the crash.
The following information has been released by the Comite de Investigacion de Accidentes Aereos (CIAA) of Venezuela. All States assisting the investigation -- France, Colombia and the United States -- agree with the factual findings. The NTSB is distributing this information at the request of the Venezuelan Investigator-in-Charge.
Wreckage
Movement of the wreckage has been delayed due to very heavy rains in the area where the airplane crashed. However, it should be moved to a secure area in Maracaibo in the next few days. Once the wreckage has been moved, additional inspections will be completed. Initial examinations on site revealed:
--Ground scars indicate that the airplane impacted in a nose up and slight right roll attitude.
--Wreckage was distributed over a triangle shaped area that was approximately 205 meters long and 110 meters at its widest point.
--Both engines exhibited indications of high-speed compressor rotation at the time of ground impact.
--The engine inlets, empennage and wing leading edges showed no sign of pre-impact damage.
--The horizontal stabilizer was found at about the full airplane nose up position (about 12 units nose up).
Flight Recorders
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder
(FDR) were downloaded at the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la Securite de l'Aviation Civil (BEA) laboratory near Paris, France, during the week of September 5, 2005.
Both the FDR and CVR casings were severely damaged due to impact forces. Both recorders operated until impact.
Flight Data Recorder
The FDR protected module was in good condition and the magnetic tape was extracted in good condition. The investigation has gained good information from the recorder.
However, several parameters were not recorded as designed, including left engine pressure ratio (EPR), pitch attitude, roll attitude, magnetic heading, and column position.
The following events are recorded on the FDR:
--The accident flight lasted about one hour from takeoff to the end of the recording.
--The flight reached its initial cruise altitude of flight level (FL) 310 at about 6:25 UTC (universal coordinated time).
--At about 6:41 UTC, about 20 minutes before the end of the recording, the airplane began a normal climb to FL330.
It leveled off at about 6:43 and accelerated to Mach 0.76. The right engine EPR was consistent with normal climb and cruise values.
--About 90 seconds after reaching Mach 0.76 (6:49 UTC), the airspeed began to steadily decrease. The horizontal stabilizer moved from about 2 units nose up to about 4 units nose up during this deceleration.
--About 3 minutes and 30 seconds (6:57 UTC) from the end of recording, the Mach number reached about 0.60. The autopilot was then disengaged and the airplane started to descend from FL330.
--As the airplane descended past about FL315, the airspeed continued to decrease and the right engine EPR decreased to about flight idle.
--The airplane descent rate increased after passing through FL310.
--The airspeed reached a minimum of about 150 indicated air speed (IAS) knots at about FL250.
--Right engine EPR stayed at approximately flight idle through the descent and even increased several times, including shortly before the end of the recording.
--Once the airplane started to descend, the horizontal stabilizer moved in increments to about 12 units nose up (which is about full nose up trim) while descending through FL200.
Cockpit Voice Recorder
The CVR protected module was partly opened due to impact forces. Overall, the magnetic tape was in good condition, but the tape was partially cut due to impact forces. The overall quality of the recoding is poor, with many areas of static and loud background noises. However, valuable data was obtained.
Almost all crew discussions to communicate with each other and with air traffic control (ATC), in Colombia and Venezuela, were in Spanish.
The CVR recorded the last 32 minutes of the accident flight.
The following events are recorded on the CVR:
--At about 06:53 UTC, approximately 8 minutes before the end of recording (while the airplane is level at
FL330) the flight crew discusses weather concerns that included possible icing conditions. The flight crew also discusses turning on engine and airfoil anti-ice.
--About 3 minutes and 30 seconds (6:57 UTC) before the end of the recording, the crew requests and is cleared to descend to FL310.
--About 3 minutes before the end of the recording, an audio warning similar to altitude alert is heard, followed
22 seconds later by a sound similar to stick shaker
(6:58 UTC) and then an aural stall warning alert.
These warnings sound continuously until the end of the recording.
--The flight crew requests subsequently lower altitudes of FL290, FL240, and finally 14,000 feet.
--The flight crew does not declare an emergency, and they do not refer to any checklist during the descent.
--About 1 minute after the start of the sound similar to the stick shaker, the flight crew states that they had a dual engine flameout when asked by ATC if they had a problem.
--Last radio transmission from the flight crew to ATC was at about 07:00:11 UTC.
--About 8 seconds before the end of recording, a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning starts to be heard and continues to the end of recording.
--The time from first sound similar to stick shaker, to the end of the recording is about 2 minutes and 46 seconds.
--The end of the tape occurs at about 7:00:31 UTC.
For further information on the investigation and the contents of this release, please contact Tcnel. Lorllys Ramos Acevedo, Directora, CIAA, Venezuela, +58 (212) 201- 5491.
The information in this advisory has been translated into French by the BEA and can be accessed at the following URL :
http://www.bea.aero/francais/actualite/actu.htm. The information also will be available in Spanish (from the
CIAA) on the Safety Board's website Spanish-language page:
http://www.ntsb.gov/es/espanol.htm.
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Any body care to comment upon the "LIKELY" Scenario at the URL below?
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I don't email.
Answers to your questions, to save others time:
a. The various MD-80 anti-ice systems are discussed above.
c. RATs and MD-80s are discussed above.
e. The FDR LH engine parameters are discussed in the report you pasted.
Answers to your questions, to save others time:
a. The various MD-80 anti-ice systems are discussed above.
c. RATs and MD-80s are discussed above.
e. The FDR LH engine parameters are discussed in the report you pasted.
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The Return of the "T-Tail" Deep Stall?
Any cogent comments? Is this peculiar to the MD80 series?
.
An MD-82 that crashed in Venezuela last August, killing 160, may have been behaving just the way Boeing had warned it might in a 2002 service bulletin. The bulletin warned that the autopilot(?) might reduce engine power too much after a rapid climb, allowing airspeed to bleed off to the point of a stall. Pilots of the West Caribbean Airways flight, out of Panama for Martinique, may have been unaware, unnamed French investigators (Martinique is a French island) told the International Herald-Tribune. An interim report on the crash released by the Venezuelan government last November said the plane climbed from 31,000 feet to 33,000 feet and held the altitude for eight minutes before the autopilot turned itself off. The plane then descended for a minute before the stall horn sounded. It then fell to the ground at about 10,000 feet per minute, with the pilots pulling full back on the control yoke.
.
The unnamed sources said the process would have happened gradually, with the autopilot trying to maintain altitude using pitch adjustments until shutting itself off just before the stall horn sounded. The pilots reported that both engines had flamed out but flight data recorder information indicated the engines were running normally when the descent began, although the right engine was cut back to idle shortly after. Data wasn't available for the left engine. Evidence from the wreckage shows both engines were turning at high speed at the point of impact. The recorder also shows that rather than push the nose over to recover from the stall, the pilots held the yoke to their chests all the way to the ground.
.
An MD-82 that crashed in Venezuela last August, killing 160, may have been behaving just the way Boeing had warned it might in a 2002 service bulletin. The bulletin warned that the autopilot(?) might reduce engine power too much after a rapid climb, allowing airspeed to bleed off to the point of a stall. Pilots of the West Caribbean Airways flight, out of Panama for Martinique, may have been unaware, unnamed French investigators (Martinique is a French island) told the International Herald-Tribune. An interim report on the crash released by the Venezuelan government last November said the plane climbed from 31,000 feet to 33,000 feet and held the altitude for eight minutes before the autopilot turned itself off. The plane then descended for a minute before the stall horn sounded. It then fell to the ground at about 10,000 feet per minute, with the pilots pulling full back on the control yoke.
.
The unnamed sources said the process would have happened gradually, with the autopilot trying to maintain altitude using pitch adjustments until shutting itself off just before the stall horn sounded. The pilots reported that both engines had flamed out but flight data recorder information indicated the engines were running normally when the descent began, although the right engine was cut back to idle shortly after. Data wasn't available for the left engine. Evidence from the wreckage shows both engines were turning at high speed at the point of impact. The recorder also shows that rather than push the nose over to recover from the stall, the pilots held the yoke to their chests all the way to the ground.
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Originally Posted by Avman
Jeez! If true, then a frightning lack of basic flying skills. Makes one wonder just how qualified they were. 
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I don't think we need to get bogged down thinking that problems of high altitude flight characteristics are the sole domain of jet a/c.... All a/c have a service ceiling ( from way back I seem to remember that it is when an a/c is incapable of sustaining a 50 ft per min rate of climb... any a/c at that point is going to be a bit sensitive and you don't have to be Chuck Yeager to recognise that you're approaching the edge of the flight envelope..swept wing jets are more tricky for sure ..especially when they give up trying to fly...but the lack of awareness demonstrated by the MD 82 crew and even more so by the pinnacle crew leaves one wondering just how easily professional licences are obtained in some countries..
Psychophysiological entity
When hopping from one time-frame to another, I'm not sure which accident you are referring to, but in the case of the pilot that was pulling hard back until impact, then one has to imagine those last few seconds.
Practically any line pilot will be aware that pulling back like that will be catastrophic. All his skills spent, what he is left with is outside any imagined scenario short of a nightmare. I have no doubt that at this stage he will be in shock; pulling the controls into his gut, just a symptom.
I occasionally bring to mind the horrific image of a young American sailor, one of several hauled aloft on the mooring line by a dirigible. Some hung on and some let go quickly, but one fell from 100 feet or so. All the way down he was running...it made no sense at all, but his legs kept pounding away until he hit the ground.
None of us know when we will cross that threshold.
Practically any line pilot will be aware that pulling back like that will be catastrophic. All his skills spent, what he is left with is outside any imagined scenario short of a nightmare. I have no doubt that at this stage he will be in shock; pulling the controls into his gut, just a symptom.
I occasionally bring to mind the horrific image of a young American sailor, one of several hauled aloft on the mooring line by a dirigible. Some hung on and some let go quickly, but one fell from 100 feet or so. All the way down he was running...it made no sense at all, but his legs kept pounding away until he hit the ground.
None of us know when we will cross that threshold.
Originally Posted by Belgique
.
may have been behaving just the way Boeing had warned it might in a 2002 service bulletin. The bulletin warned that the autopilot(?) might reduce engine power too much after a rapid climb, allowing airspeed to bleed off to the point of a stall. .
may have been behaving just the way Boeing had warned it might in a 2002 service bulletin. The bulletin warned that the autopilot(?) might reduce engine power too much after a rapid climb, allowing airspeed to bleed off to the point of a stall. .
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EEEEEppprrr
Looks like another (at least a second) kill of unexperienced crew
done by EPR.
EPRs are better for one thing, and that is if the engines are new or worn out,
EPRs would in both cases, all the time, give correct power setting,
while N1s would not.
Same N1 on new and old engine does not mean the same thrust.
For all other things like the safety here we are.
The slightliest icing of ONLY a PT2 probe,
even if the rest of engine may be deiced OK
and your EPR will increase to maximum scale..........
and consequently Auto Throttle would pull that power lever all the way back
The rest is to read above.....
done by EPR.
EPRs are better for one thing, and that is if the engines are new or worn out,
EPRs would in both cases, all the time, give correct power setting,
while N1s would not.
Same N1 on new and old engine does not mean the same thrust.
For all other things like the safety here we are.
The slightliest icing of ONLY a PT2 probe,
even if the rest of engine may be deiced OK
and your EPR will increase to maximum scale..........
and consequently Auto Throttle would pull that power lever all the way back
The rest is to read above.....
