MD82 crash in Venezuela
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Dagger Dirk
It is correct that there is a design flaw, which may cause deep cold fuel to create ice at the root of the MD-80 wing after flights at high levels, with high fuel loads. The phenomen is observable on ground even at quite high OAT's. It may fit the WCW708 scenario; previous flight Bogota-Panama City about 1:30 hr, relatively full tanks, night time, humid and dewy conditions. Do we know how much (warmer) fuel they took on board in PTY ?
It doesn't seem that likely to to people commenting this in a professional MD-80 pilots forum, though, that any FOD ingestion would have occurred up at cruise levels. I'm not an expert myself, rather a webmaster for those who are. So I refer to the MD-80 forum where more hands-on people may comment on these scenarios here and here. Any relevant findings will be summarized and crossfed back to this thread.
As for your questions, this is what has come up from experienced MD-80 drivers' comments:
a. I imagine there's a RAT or ADG for to cover "no eng-driven generators left" scenarios?
No, there is not.
c. Does the standby peanut gyro have integral battery power or does it run off the main battery?
It runs off the main battery for 30 mins. The gyro spins 7 mins after final power loss.
d. Is it SOP to start the APU after losing an engine? Assuming that it's airstartable...
Yes its SOP to start the APU. It can be windmilled below FL240, higher up is unlikely to be successful because the oil is cold, as stated in the previous post. IIRC, there may also be different models of APU's with varying specs installed on MD-80's.
e. If you lost both engines, can you still then crank up the APU? Or will that seriously drain/deplete the main battery power?
Starting the APU is considered heavy on batteries and is prevented by relays if no AC power left. Windmilling is recommended.
f. Is there a separate emergency battery?
No, there is not.
Jan-Erik
www.md80.net
It doesn't seem that likely to to people commenting this in a professional MD-80 pilots forum, though, that any FOD ingestion would have occurred up at cruise levels. I'm not an expert myself, rather a webmaster for those who are. So I refer to the MD-80 forum where more hands-on people may comment on these scenarios here and here. Any relevant findings will be summarized and crossfed back to this thread.
As for your questions, this is what has come up from experienced MD-80 drivers' comments:
a. I imagine there's a RAT or ADG for to cover "no eng-driven generators left" scenarios?
No, there is not.
c. Does the standby peanut gyro have integral battery power or does it run off the main battery?
It runs off the main battery for 30 mins. The gyro spins 7 mins after final power loss.
d. Is it SOP to start the APU after losing an engine? Assuming that it's airstartable...
Yes its SOP to start the APU. It can be windmilled below FL240, higher up is unlikely to be successful because the oil is cold, as stated in the previous post. IIRC, there may also be different models of APU's with varying specs installed on MD-80's.
e. If you lost both engines, can you still then crank up the APU? Or will that seriously drain/deplete the main battery power?
Starting the APU is considered heavy on batteries and is prevented by relays if no AC power left. Windmilling is recommended.
f. Is there a separate emergency battery?
No, there is not.
Jan-Erik
www.md80.net
Last edited by md80forum; 21st Aug 2005 at 13:09.
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Engine Out Controllability
I hope Im not being repetititive, I think I read at least most of this thread at some point.
On the MD 80 and up series A/C, what flight controls are available with both engines out and APU not running (ie no hydraulics)?
Also how is the stabilizer trim jackscrew powered? (trim available in this sit?)
I'm not trying to speculate, just simply want a better understanding of the situation these poor guys were in (not that pitch black and dead quiet isnt bad enough!).
Thanks,
FlyVMO
On the MD 80 and up series A/C, what flight controls are available with both engines out and APU not running (ie no hydraulics)?
Also how is the stabilizer trim jackscrew powered? (trim available in this sit?)
I'm not trying to speculate, just simply want a better understanding of the situation these poor guys were in (not that pitch black and dead quiet isnt bad enough!).
Thanks,
FlyVMO
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In our local paper (Saskatoon Star-Phoenix) this morning there was an agency report that the Venezuelan chief investigator was examining the possibility that the plane may have run out of fuel.
Is is just me or does it sound from the above posts that loosing both engines on a DC9/MD80 sounds like very, very bad news… ?!
(not that it would be good news in any case but it sounds like it would be more manageable in a 7xx or Axxx)
(not that it would be good news in any case but it sounds like it would be more manageable in a 7xx or Axxx)
Last edited by atakacs; 23rd Aug 2005 at 04:16.
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as per the sat chart above, it does appear there are a couple cells in the area where the accident occurred....a foray into the wrong part of a cb can also take put out the fires
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Ok, as an Mad-Dog pilot I was in the unfortunate position of having a total electrical failure, with an inop APU. We landed safely in Florida, but we still had 2 turning and burning, so not quite the same scenario, but I can give you insight into what you do have:
Capt has EFIS in Emerg. power and able to NAV etc.
I flew the jet initially, using just the trimmed last airspeed (it's frozen on the FO's ASI, so you can cross-reference the standby ADI and fly the last trimmed speed, as the stab is stuck. All other flight controls normal in this case (in Venezuela they would have had no roll spoilers - no hydraulics probably, even from windmilling engines)).
We turned off all high load stuff, especially as we tried to get a genny back on line (drive had sheared, so no luck there).
It gets very quiet. No avionics fans, and you can't hear the engines anyway.
The standby compass is not relevant 'cos it's back behind the FO's head and viewed through a mirror (yes, really - more on the design flaws later....), until you get emergency power selected you have no heading info.
You land at flaps 15 because of stuck trim, and the Mad-Dog is a runway hog at the best of times....
In my opinion, probably the worst, most out-of-date airliner still in mass usage. The number of cobbled-together sticky-plaster fixes to the original design is pathetic. It annunciates trivia, and quietly socks you with massive critical failures with no warning. It has the most un-harmonized controls of any large aircraft I have flown, and now it's a gas-guzzler in expenses. It's eye-watering out of Burbank or Midway. The build quality of the flight deck is laughable. It's CAT3 Autolands are pure thrill-ride student pilot stuff, probably not certifiable today.
You guys on A-320'S don't know what you're missing.
Capt has EFIS in Emerg. power and able to NAV etc.
I flew the jet initially, using just the trimmed last airspeed (it's frozen on the FO's ASI, so you can cross-reference the standby ADI and fly the last trimmed speed, as the stab is stuck. All other flight controls normal in this case (in Venezuela they would have had no roll spoilers - no hydraulics probably, even from windmilling engines)).
We turned off all high load stuff, especially as we tried to get a genny back on line (drive had sheared, so no luck there).
It gets very quiet. No avionics fans, and you can't hear the engines anyway.
The standby compass is not relevant 'cos it's back behind the FO's head and viewed through a mirror (yes, really - more on the design flaws later....), until you get emergency power selected you have no heading info.
You land at flaps 15 because of stuck trim, and the Mad-Dog is a runway hog at the best of times....
In my opinion, probably the worst, most out-of-date airliner still in mass usage. The number of cobbled-together sticky-plaster fixes to the original design is pathetic. It annunciates trivia, and quietly socks you with massive critical failures with no warning. It has the most un-harmonized controls of any large aircraft I have flown, and now it's a gas-guzzler in expenses. It's eye-watering out of Burbank or Midway. The build quality of the flight deck is laughable. It's CAT3 Autolands are pure thrill-ride student pilot stuff, probably not certifiable today.
You guys on A-320'S don't know what you're missing.
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Hi 747Focal:
when you say you were 'just told there was no fire at the crash site because of extremely heavy rain", what do you mean exactly?
Do you mean that a colleague just passed on this information to you as gossip when you were next to each other at the water-cooler in the corridor of your office? Or do you mean that you had just read this theory in an earlier posting on this thread? Or do you mean that you have heard some validated commentary that emanates from the actual crash investigation process that is going on right now in Venezuela?
In other words, I am asking you the degree to which we should regard your comment as being a current objective evaluation by the crash investigation team, or not? I am not putting you down or anything, but I merely want to know how credible is the statement that you are putting forward. Is it your opinion, or is it a validated fact?
I readily admit to my own theory (about the lack of a ground fire being evidence of a lack of fuel in the crashing plane) being based on nothing more than sheer common sense, able to be dismissed in an instant by objective fact. I have no grounds for defending my position other than the two points I previously raised to propose this view earlier on this thread.
Do you have any factual evidence to support your claim that heavy rain snuffed out a potential fire? In the photos there is little evidence of any kind of fuel sheen covering the water around the crash site. Was all the fuel washed away by the torrential rain that also stopped the fire from occuring in the first place?
If the plane had enough fuel to continue on to Martinique and the alternate destination beyond, and if rain snuffed out any potential crash fire, then would there not be a ton or so of fuel sitting on top of the swampy water at the crash site?
when you say you were 'just told there was no fire at the crash site because of extremely heavy rain", what do you mean exactly?
Do you mean that a colleague just passed on this information to you as gossip when you were next to each other at the water-cooler in the corridor of your office? Or do you mean that you had just read this theory in an earlier posting on this thread? Or do you mean that you have heard some validated commentary that emanates from the actual crash investigation process that is going on right now in Venezuela?
In other words, I am asking you the degree to which we should regard your comment as being a current objective evaluation by the crash investigation team, or not? I am not putting you down or anything, but I merely want to know how credible is the statement that you are putting forward. Is it your opinion, or is it a validated fact?
I readily admit to my own theory (about the lack of a ground fire being evidence of a lack of fuel in the crashing plane) being based on nothing more than sheer common sense, able to be dismissed in an instant by objective fact. I have no grounds for defending my position other than the two points I previously raised to propose this view earlier on this thread.
Do you have any factual evidence to support your claim that heavy rain snuffed out a potential fire? In the photos there is little evidence of any kind of fuel sheen covering the water around the crash site. Was all the fuel washed away by the torrential rain that also stopped the fire from occuring in the first place?
If the plane had enough fuel to continue on to Martinique and the alternate destination beyond, and if rain snuffed out any potential crash fire, then would there not be a ton or so of fuel sitting on top of the swampy water at the crash site?
McGinty,
From Flight International
This link http://www.rescate.com/HK-4374XFOTO1.html has a large photo of the impact site, the location of the engines can be seen.
From Flight International
The MD-82 crew is understood to have uplifted 15,400kg (34,000lb) of fuel to perform charter flight WCW708 from Panama City to Fort de France, Martinique. This was more than sufficient for the planned 2h 38min flight’s planned route, providing an estimated endurance of 4h. The flight left Panama City’s Tocumen airport at 01:00 local time and headed east, intending to fly a course that would take it over northern Colombia and Venezuela near Maracaibo.
The wreckage indicated a high- velocity impact, but heavy rain doused any post-crash fire. Late last week at least one of the flight recorders had been recovered. Panamanian aviation authorities said on 17 August that the fuel source at Tocumen airport from which the aircraft refuelled had been certified uncontaminated.
Those photos indicate pretty clearly that there was fire, but it would have been an explosion where all the fuel was quickly consumed, the drenched vegetation didn't propagate it and what was left of the combustible parts of the aircraft were too scattered.
RRamjet: Yes, but is requires no hydraulics for the flight controls, except to extend flaps, and has pretty straightforward systems, about like its forerunner 
, but longer range. Maybe the AC crosstie system was overloaded or there was a generator bus fault etc?
THe report on the total failure was educational. Maybe you saw my complaints in another totpic about the C-130. Do our Air Force components still have NO standby ADI in the C-130 E/H etc? My father suffered two total elec. failures (C-130 A and E models) in night IMC.
Without top-notch career Flight Engineers, they would all be dead. Unless I'm wrong about the equipment nowadays, the people in charge of the Pentagon programs and funding are either too stupid or too cheap to care about actual flight safety on those series? Or were too distracted over a few decades?
, but longer range. Maybe the AC crosstie system was overloaded or there was a generator bus fault etc?THe report on the total failure was educational. Maybe you saw my complaints in another totpic about the C-130. Do our Air Force components still have NO standby ADI in the C-130 E/H etc? My father suffered two total elec. failures (C-130 A and E models) in night IMC.
Without top-notch career Flight Engineers, they would all be dead. Unless I'm wrong about the equipment nowadays, the people in charge of the Pentagon programs and funding are either too stupid or too cheap to care about actual flight safety on those series? Or were too distracted over a few decades?
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Two recent accidents show a chain of events starting with maintenance errors (wrong p/n fuel indicator installed, outflow valve left open), flight crews not doing their checks (fuel uplifted/burnt cp. indicator, press panel settings), consequently confusion about cause of system failures.
I bet this one is similar.
I bet this one is similar.
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From elsewhere
WCA MD-82 Venezuela – night-time loss of control after loss of second engine.
Possible Precursor: NTSB #LAX83IA174.
Double sequential flameout on empty wingtanks in day visual conditions after flight-crew became distracted by a knob falling off a control set on the center console – and they neglected to switch on the center section fuel transfer pumps (per the checklist). Crew finally discovered their error and achieved a relight at 12,000ft.
Despite West Caribbean Awys being an acknowledged ailing airline, the reality is that a double flame-out at night can happen and it’s a very dark hole to climb out of. The STBY attitude gyro runs off the main battery for a max of 30 minutes. There is no RAM AIR Turbine and the APU can be a deferred maint item – but in any case, after a double flame-out the APU must be windmill started (and not cranked – it kills the battery). High altitude APU starts are frequently unsuccessful due to frozen and viscous oil. There is no separate emergency battery. Human error is deemed as likely as any other maint-related cause but technical factors make recovery from a double flame-out at night highly unlikely for an average crew.
It is believed that the WC707 crew were simply overwhelmed by developments.
Possible Precursor: NTSB #LAX83IA174.
Double sequential flameout on empty wingtanks in day visual conditions after flight-crew became distracted by a knob falling off a control set on the center console – and they neglected to switch on the center section fuel transfer pumps (per the checklist). Crew finally discovered their error and achieved a relight at 12,000ft.
Despite West Caribbean Awys being an acknowledged ailing airline, the reality is that a double flame-out at night can happen and it’s a very dark hole to climb out of. The STBY attitude gyro runs off the main battery for a max of 30 minutes. There is no RAM AIR Turbine and the APU can be a deferred maint item – but in any case, after a double flame-out the APU must be windmill started (and not cranked – it kills the battery). High altitude APU starts are frequently unsuccessful due to frozen and viscous oil. There is no separate emergency battery. Human error is deemed as likely as any other maint-related cause but technical factors make recovery from a double flame-out at night highly unlikely for an average crew.
It is believed that the WC707 crew were simply overwhelmed by developments.