Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)
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Armada, a speakers bureau website that acts as a booking agent for Mary Schiavo describes her as having the nickname "Scary Mary".
In any event, she is currently a lawyer for a US law firm that has joined with several Canadian firms to sue Air France on behalf of the passengers. This same law firm (Mobley Rice) has also joined with a Canadian firm suing MK Airlines on behalf of the crew in that Halifax crash.
You can fairly question what Mobley Rice's motives might be in particpating in law suits seeking damages for accidents in other countries when there is no tie to an interest in the United States. Maybe they will now sign up for the Nigerian crash as well, though I doubt it.
In any event, she is currently a lawyer for a US law firm that has joined with several Canadian firms to sue Air France on behalf of the passengers. This same law firm (Mobley Rice) has also joined with a Canadian firm suing MK Airlines on behalf of the crew in that Halifax crash.
You can fairly question what Mobley Rice's motives might be in particpating in law suits seeking damages for accidents in other countries when there is no tie to an interest in the United States. Maybe they will now sign up for the Nigerian crash as well, though I doubt it.
Not available in stores.
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"Jet not at fault in Toronto crash"
The headline probably isn't a great surprise to anyone, but good news at least for Airbus, perhaps -- they may not be sued as is Boeing for the recent crash in Indonesia...
OTTAWA, Ontario (Reuters) -- The crash of an Air France jet in Toronto on August 2 does not appear to have been caused by problems with the Airbus A340 itself, Canada's Transport Safety Board said Wednesday.
All 309 people on board survived the crash in which the plane ran off the end of the runway as it landed during a severe thunderstorm.
"To date, investigators have not found significant anomalies of the aircraft systems," the agency said in a preliminary report. "Review of digital flight data recorder data has not revealed any system troubles or malfunctions."
"No problems were detected with the flight controls, spoilers, tires and brakes, or thrust reversers," the report said.
It described the events as follows: "After landing long, the aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to rest in a ravine just outside the airport perimeter."
Some aviation analysts have said the ravine, about 200 meters (650 feet) beyond the end of the tarmac, should be filled in or covered to extend the runway's safety zone. The ravine was the site of an Air Canada crash in 1978 that killed two people.
The Air Line Pilots Association has complained about the ravine, saying obstacle-free safety areas are needed beyond the runway.
Passengers have filed a class-action lawsuit against Air France, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and air-traffic control agency Nav Canada, alleging negligence.
The suit, filed in Ontario Superior Court on behalf of the 297 passengers, is seeking C$325 million ($273 million) in general and special damages.
From: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/am...eut/index.html
OTTAWA, Ontario (Reuters) -- The crash of an Air France jet in Toronto on August 2 does not appear to have been caused by problems with the Airbus A340 itself, Canada's Transport Safety Board said Wednesday.
All 309 people on board survived the crash in which the plane ran off the end of the runway as it landed during a severe thunderstorm.
"To date, investigators have not found significant anomalies of the aircraft systems," the agency said in a preliminary report. "Review of digital flight data recorder data has not revealed any system troubles or malfunctions."
"No problems were detected with the flight controls, spoilers, tires and brakes, or thrust reversers," the report said.
It described the events as follows: "After landing long, the aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to rest in a ravine just outside the airport perimeter."
Some aviation analysts have said the ravine, about 200 meters (650 feet) beyond the end of the tarmac, should be filled in or covered to extend the runway's safety zone. The ravine was the site of an Air Canada crash in 1978 that killed two people.
The Air Line Pilots Association has complained about the ravine, saying obstacle-free safety areas are needed beyond the runway.
Passengers have filed a class-action lawsuit against Air France, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and air-traffic control agency Nav Canada, alleging negligence.
The suit, filed in Ontario Superior Court on behalf of the 297 passengers, is seeking C$325 million ($273 million) in general and special damages.
From: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/am...eut/index.html
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What does the bolded text mean ? Did they delay commiting the full stop to do a Go-Around !?? Too late 4 that !
....The aircraft touched down approximately 4000 feet down the 9000-foot runway. The spoilers deployed automatically after touchdown and the DFDR recorded that the crew applied maximum pressure to the aircraft's brake pedals. The pressure remained constant until the aircraft departed the end of the runway surface.
The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds. Maximum reverse thrust was observed on the engines 17 seconds after touchdown. ....
....The aircraft touched down approximately 4000 feet down the 9000-foot runway. The spoilers deployed automatically after touchdown and the DFDR recorded that the crew applied maximum pressure to the aircraft's brake pedals. The pressure remained constant until the aircraft departed the end of the runway surface.
The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds. Maximum reverse thrust was observed on the engines 17 seconds after touchdown. ....
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Nobody here commenting on the
"...throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown,...."
Wakey, wakey ...
The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds.
"...throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown,...."
Wakey, wakey ...
The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds.
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what comment?
I don't think any comments are neccessary other than to say the 12.8 sec interval was likely deliberate and judicious.
The reports don’t do justice to the weather at the scene. I spoke with two seasoned Toronto based vets on the scene and they said the weather conditions at the time were beyond anything they've ever experienced there. I also spoke with a acquaintance who driving home moments before on the roadway adjacent to 24 had to pull of the road because the rain was so intense.
Some relevant points from the TSB report:
- The crews of two previous aircraft that landed just before AF358 reported that braking action was poor, and one crew estimated that the surface wind near the runway was from 290 degrees magnetic at 15 knots, with gusts to 20 knots. This information was passed to AF358 by the tower controller.
- At about the time that AF358 landed, a sharp boundary of rain associated with the thunderstorm moved approximately north to south over Runway 24L, accompanied by wind gusts and a change in surface wind strength and direction. Severe lightning and lightning strikes were also reported during this period. At 1604, the conditions observed at the weather site to the south of Runway 24L were winds 340 degrees true at 24 knots with gusts to 33 knots, severe thunderstorm activity over the airfield with a visibility of 1 sm in heavy rain,
- During the flare, the aircraft entered a heavy shower area, and the crew's forward visibility was significantly reduced as they entered the downpour. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) recorded wind veered to 330 degrees true, causing a tailwind component of approximately 5 knots. The runway became contaminated with at least ¼ inch of standing water.
So put yourself in their shoes at flare - throttles retarded, visibilty virtually nil, contaminated runway, significant change in wind direction/strength, weather cocking, excess spd(?) etc ......I think their priority was probably getting the brakes on and making sure they had confirmed directional control before applying reverse.
The reports don’t do justice to the weather at the scene. I spoke with two seasoned Toronto based vets on the scene and they said the weather conditions at the time were beyond anything they've ever experienced there. I also spoke with a acquaintance who driving home moments before on the roadway adjacent to 24 had to pull of the road because the rain was so intense.
Some relevant points from the TSB report:
- The crews of two previous aircraft that landed just before AF358 reported that braking action was poor, and one crew estimated that the surface wind near the runway was from 290 degrees magnetic at 15 knots, with gusts to 20 knots. This information was passed to AF358 by the tower controller.
- At about the time that AF358 landed, a sharp boundary of rain associated with the thunderstorm moved approximately north to south over Runway 24L, accompanied by wind gusts and a change in surface wind strength and direction. Severe lightning and lightning strikes were also reported during this period. At 1604, the conditions observed at the weather site to the south of Runway 24L were winds 340 degrees true at 24 knots with gusts to 33 knots, severe thunderstorm activity over the airfield with a visibility of 1 sm in heavy rain,
- During the flare, the aircraft entered a heavy shower area, and the crew's forward visibility was significantly reduced as they entered the downpour. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) recorded wind veered to 330 degrees true, causing a tailwind component of approximately 5 knots. The runway became contaminated with at least ¼ inch of standing water.
So put yourself in their shoes at flare - throttles retarded, visibilty virtually nil, contaminated runway, significant change in wind direction/strength, weather cocking, excess spd(?) etc ......I think their priority was probably getting the brakes on and making sure they had confirmed directional control before applying reverse.
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So put yourself in their shoes at flare - throttles retarded, visibilty virtually nil, contaminated runway, significant change in wind direction/strength, weather cocking, excess spd(?) etc ......I think their priority was probably getting the brakes on and making sure they had confirmed directional control before applying reverse.
I'm only SLF, but shouldn't their priority have been to go around? Or am I missing something?
I'm only SLF, but shouldn't their priority have been to go around? Or am I missing something?
“Or am I missing something?”
Only the human factor; humans often act in irrational ways, particularly in error provoking situations.
In this respect I doubt that either pilot was thinking about the relative priorities of brakes vs reverse, more likely the delay is a typical time lag induced by stressful circumstances that reduce the attentional reserves available for thinking, assessing, deciding, etc. The First Officer (flying) lowering the nose and keeping straight in the sudden change of wind, the Captain monitoring and checking – recalling the duties of the NFP.
“shouldn't their priority have been to go around?” Yes, the option should have been considered much earlier in the approach, but without knowing the circumstances of the situation at the time of their decision, the crew’s action to continue may have been justifiable. The go around option should have remained open until touchdown, but then humans often discard sensible options believing that the current situation is under control right up to the very last moment . . . when it isn’t.
Error can only be recognized with hindsight.
Only the human factor; humans often act in irrational ways, particularly in error provoking situations.
In this respect I doubt that either pilot was thinking about the relative priorities of brakes vs reverse, more likely the delay is a typical time lag induced by stressful circumstances that reduce the attentional reserves available for thinking, assessing, deciding, etc. The First Officer (flying) lowering the nose and keeping straight in the sudden change of wind, the Captain monitoring and checking – recalling the duties of the NFP.
“shouldn't their priority have been to go around?” Yes, the option should have been considered much earlier in the approach, but without knowing the circumstances of the situation at the time of their decision, the crew’s action to continue may have been justifiable. The go around option should have remained open until touchdown, but then humans often discard sensible options believing that the current situation is under control right up to the very last moment . . . when it isn’t.
Error can only be recognized with hindsight.
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aardvark2zz
I hear you! Does it mean that the thrust levers remained in the CLB gate for 12.8 seconds after touchdown? 17 seconds to full reverse is a lot of runway.
The questions is whether it would have made any difference to the outcome...
TP
I hear you! Does it mean that the thrust levers remained in the CLB gate for 12.8 seconds after touchdown? 17 seconds to full reverse is a lot of runway.
The questions is whether it would have made any difference to the outcome...
TP
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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for 12.8 seconds after touchdown
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Mary S. always gets into the news with a crash and she is almost always wrong. Why people consult her is a mystery to me. I heard her rediculous analysis of the MIA DC8 crash years ago and couldn't believe anyone would print what she said. Of course it was all wrong and she continues to be the expert. In that accident the bear claws holding the freight in place were not set and all of the freight shifted aft causing the ac to stall shortly after take off but she had this rediculous scenario that aired about the multiple failures which were really just aft CG shift and compresser stall as engines reached high angle of attack before it stalled and crashed off of 27R at MIA.
Go around into a severe thunderstorm???
I agree that they got too close to too nasty a thunderstorm.
There are several thunderstorm induced windshear accidents where a succession of aircraft land until it becomes too much for the last one. This is a tough call to make before it's too late as has been demonstrated a number of times -- of course we do not hear about the crews who chicken out in time
Then there's the 727 in New Orleans back in Reagan's time that took off but was unable to climb
Happily AF358 did not end up in a crater.
There are several thunderstorm induced windshear accidents where a succession of aircraft land until it becomes too much for the last one. This is a tough call to make before it's too late as has been demonstrated a number of times -- of course we do not hear about the crews who chicken out in time
Then there's the 727 in New Orleans back in Reagan's time that took off but was unable to climb
Happily AF358 did not end up in a crater.
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alf5071h,
Yes, I understand about the human factors, but I was just commenting on the nightmarish combination of conditions from the previous post. I would have hoped that while on approach and with things apparently going to hell in a handbasket, someone in the cockpit would have said "Er, let's go around and think about this a bit more".
Regarding your comment about the continuation of the approach being justifiable. I would concede that would be possible, but only if a factor unknown to the flight crew led to the overrun.
If, given the information they had available, a safe landing wasn't reasonably certain, then surely it wasn't justifiable?
As SLF, I'm just an interested observer, but I'm concerned about your view of the scenario where the stress factors and workload lead to an incorrect decision. I'd far rather that situation was avoided in the first place.
Yes, I understand about the human factors, but I was just commenting on the nightmarish combination of conditions from the previous post. I would have hoped that while on approach and with things apparently going to hell in a handbasket, someone in the cockpit would have said "Er, let's go around and think about this a bit more".
Regarding your comment about the continuation of the approach being justifiable. I would concede that would be possible, but only if a factor unknown to the flight crew led to the overrun.
If, given the information they had available, a safe landing wasn't reasonably certain, then surely it wasn't justifiable?
As SLF, I'm just an interested observer, but I'm concerned about your view of the scenario where the stress factors and workload lead to an incorrect decision. I'd far rather that situation was avoided in the first place.
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I certainly have not read every post on this thread so someone probably already brought this up. We all know how it is when you are actually there focusing on landing in poor weather, especially after a long flight. There is a tendency not to see the forest despite the tree's. We want to complete the mission as it where. This, of course, is nothing new. There have been countless similar accidents, most of them fatal. The most recent in Little Rock in 1999.
The bottom line is they should have gone around or better yet not attempted the approach until the weather improved or, if they had insufficient fuel, flown to the alternate. If you try to land a heavy airplane fast and long on a wet runway odds are pretty good you will sail off the other end. We could debate this until the end of time but it will not change the fact that the captain of that jet made a bad decision in continuing that approach and definitely the landing once it became apparent how far beyond the touchdown zone they were. Why is it sometimes so hard to say the simple words "Go around".
The bottom line is they should have gone around or better yet not attempted the approach until the weather improved or, if they had insufficient fuel, flown to the alternate. If you try to land a heavy airplane fast and long on a wet runway odds are pretty good you will sail off the other end. We could debate this until the end of time but it will not change the fact that the captain of that jet made a bad decision in continuing that approach and definitely the landing once it became apparent how far beyond the touchdown zone they were. Why is it sometimes so hard to say the simple words "Go around".
Thor
We would all like to avoid such situations, but occasionally all the holes line up.
Your views are most reasonable. I cannot answer the questions surrounding the event, but they should at least be part of any judgement of what is justifiable or not.
I am not pursuing a totally no blame theme, pilots have to take responsibility as much as the ‘system’ does, the difficult problem is where to draw the dividing line.
A quote from Lord Denning’s report on the Herald of Free Enterprise accident provides one view:- “There are activities in which the degree of professional skill which must be required is so high, and the potential consequences of the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious, that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is enough to justify dismissal.”
But that too was a ‘judgement’ after the fact.
Re stress see the following quote that is taken from The Limits of Expertise. Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos NASA.
“Although we cannot be sure of the extent, we suspect that stress played a role in many of these accidents by interfering with the crews’ cognitive processes.
Stress hampers skilled performance by narrowing attention and reducing working memory capacity required to execute even highly practiced tasks. In particular, the combination of stress and surprise with requirements to respond rapidly and to manage several tasks concurrently, as occurred in several of these accidents, is a lethal setup”.
Perhaps we all need to change our mind set to reduce stress – ‘A landing is an approach without a go around.’
Crew should be go around minded, ATC should accommodate go arounds, our managers and peers must accept go arounds without prejudice, and the SLF be encouraged by a positive safety attitude as indicated by a go around.
Just a few of these for Christmas please!
More here: Managing Threats and Errors During Approach and Landing.
We would all like to avoid such situations, but occasionally all the holes line up.
Your views are most reasonable. I cannot answer the questions surrounding the event, but they should at least be part of any judgement of what is justifiable or not.
I am not pursuing a totally no blame theme, pilots have to take responsibility as much as the ‘system’ does, the difficult problem is where to draw the dividing line.
A quote from Lord Denning’s report on the Herald of Free Enterprise accident provides one view:- “There are activities in which the degree of professional skill which must be required is so high, and the potential consequences of the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious, that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is enough to justify dismissal.”
But that too was a ‘judgement’ after the fact.
Re stress see the following quote that is taken from The Limits of Expertise. Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos NASA.
“Although we cannot be sure of the extent, we suspect that stress played a role in many of these accidents by interfering with the crews’ cognitive processes.
Stress hampers skilled performance by narrowing attention and reducing working memory capacity required to execute even highly practiced tasks. In particular, the combination of stress and surprise with requirements to respond rapidly and to manage several tasks concurrently, as occurred in several of these accidents, is a lethal setup”.
Perhaps we all need to change our mind set to reduce stress – ‘A landing is an approach without a go around.’
Crew should be go around minded, ATC should accommodate go arounds, our managers and peers must accept go arounds without prejudice, and the SLF be encouraged by a positive safety attitude as indicated by a go around.
Just a few of these for Christmas please!
More here: Managing Threats and Errors During Approach and Landing.
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alf5071h,
I agree totally. I guess my point is that there should be some way crews can be trained to see the holes lining up and take the appropriate action.
In effect, to be able to say, although things are under control now, at the moment of decision we'll be pretty busy, and there is a reasonable possibility that our workload might impair our decision making.
It's at that point that, as SLF, I'd like the guys up front to take a bit more time to look at the holes and make sure they can't see through...
I agree totally. I guess my point is that there should be some way crews can be trained to see the holes lining up and take the appropriate action.
In effect, to be able to say, although things are under control now, at the moment of decision we'll be pretty busy, and there is a reasonable possibility that our workload might impair our decision making.
It's at that point that, as SLF, I'd like the guys up front to take a bit more time to look at the holes and make sure they can't see through...
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I don't know soe much, but would guess.
1. Airports know approx the conditions at the airfield.
2. Airlines like to arrive at target airfield about on time.
3. Crew are advised to arrive at target airfield about on-time.
As a previous reply says, first crew to chichen-out/reject landing at airport during these times is often mentioned. well my hat off to them. and would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft and view the Flt Data Rec Info. Am sure it will help in the future.!!!
Like all operations, Landing in conditions that are on the edge of limits will make many press reports when all is not perfect.
Better being at another airfield than off the run/taxiway at target airfield, AF340 evac worked very well, well done to all.
My understanding is operations put so much pressure on pilots and others in the airlline world we should not be surprised at what will happon.
Reep what you soe they call it.!!!!
1. Airports know approx the conditions at the airfield.
2. Airlines like to arrive at target airfield about on time.
3. Crew are advised to arrive at target airfield about on-time.
As a previous reply says, first crew to chichen-out/reject landing at airport during these times is often mentioned. well my hat off to them. and would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft and view the Flt Data Rec Info. Am sure it will help in the future.!!!
Like all operations, Landing in conditions that are on the edge of limits will make many press reports when all is not perfect.
Better being at another airfield than off the run/taxiway at target airfield, AF340 evac worked very well, well done to all.
My understanding is operations put so much pressure on pilots and others in the airlline world we should not be surprised at what will happon.
Reep what you soe they call it.!!!!