FAA & CAA disagree over B747 continued 3 engine flight
I am stunned that this thread still goes on and on with criticism of the crew who used their training and the best info available to bring this incident to a perfectly safe conclusion.
Perhaps we should continue this thread with nominations for positions in a team of monday morning quarterbacks!!
( 6500 hrs 747-100/200/300/400)
Perhaps we should continue this thread with nominations for positions in a team of monday morning quarterbacks!!
( 6500 hrs 747-100/200/300/400)
Last edited by BusyB; 8th May 2005 at 11:02.
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BS (!)
Please read my post... I said, BA and other Euopean Carriers i.e. a general precedent has been set, not a BA specific one.
PS What is the "long oceanic" stretch you refer to...? This was a LAX-LHR flight... No long over water bits I know of
PS, on many of our routes the PAX might get a 777 or 744... so are you suggesting when a 744 is used, the PAX pay a 4 eng supplement
In other words, the precedent has already been set, in the last five years or so (sic), for BA aircraft to operate over long oceanic stretches with 75% of available thrust, as a matter of routine
PS What is the "long oceanic" stretch you refer to...? This was a LAX-LHR flight... No long over water bits I know of
PS, on many of our routes the PAX might get a 777 or 744... so are you suggesting when a 744 is used, the PAX pay a 4 eng supplement
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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Lots of opinions here, many showing the ignorance of the posters, especially when it comes to those with no experience of the B744 and west coast US to Europe ops. I do wish that those who have expressed a strong opinion about how incompetent or inexperienced they think the BA crew were would let us know their own personal experience on the same type of a/c and routes. It's becoming fairly obvious to many of us when we get opinionated commentators who think that an LAX-LHR flight involves some kind of huge over water crossing! 
You only have to read opinionated stuff such as "Engine shutdowns on that fleet may now be considered an amber event, as opposed to a red one, to be treated much the same way as, say, the loss of one hydraulic system." to realise that the author has absolutely no experience or knowledge of the B744 yet we have to suffer the pontification with such drivel. Had the author the remotest inkling of B744 ops then he/she would know that a single engine shut down is only an 'amber' event and as long as it is not due to catastrophic failure reverts back to a 'green' event. Another thing that shows the authors uneducated opinion with regards to B744 ops is that you don't lose one of the 4 (four) hydraulic systems on the B744 when you shut an engine down (or indeed when you shut two down) but should you lose a single hydraulic system for whatever reason, that is indeed a 'red' even on this type.
Could we please ask that anyone giving us their opinion at least provide a note as to their experience of the B744 and the type of operations they conduct in it so that the rest of us can form our own opinion and whether to treat it as valid or file it as being of the same category as we would if it had come from one of our beloved tabloid journalists.
At the end of the day it would seem that the most vociferous critics of this crew have little understanding of the a/c and the type of operation, even though they may be professional pilots themselves. Far better for us to think you are fools than write such rubbish and prove it beyond a doubt! 
Cargo Boy
Current type: B744
Ops: UK based long haul
You only have to read opinionated stuff such as "Engine shutdowns on that fleet may now be considered an amber event, as opposed to a red one, to be treated much the same way as, say, the loss of one hydraulic system." to realise that the author has absolutely no experience or knowledge of the B744 yet we have to suffer the pontification with such drivel. Had the author the remotest inkling of B744 ops then he/she would know that a single engine shut down is only an 'amber' event and as long as it is not due to catastrophic failure reverts back to a 'green' event. Another thing that shows the authors uneducated opinion with regards to B744 ops is that you don't lose one of the 4 (four) hydraulic systems on the B744 when you shut an engine down (or indeed when you shut two down) but should you lose a single hydraulic system for whatever reason, that is indeed a 'red' even on this type.
Could we please ask that anyone giving us their opinion at least provide a note as to their experience of the B744 and the type of operations they conduct in it so that the rest of us can form our own opinion and whether to treat it as valid or file it as being of the same category as we would if it had come from one of our beloved tabloid journalists.
At the end of the day it would seem that the most vociferous critics of this crew have little understanding of the a/c and the type of operation, even though they may be professional pilots themselves. Far better for us to think you are fools than write such rubbish and prove it beyond a doubt! Cargo Boy
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Cargo Boy,
You don't seriously expect passengers to be completely technically and operationally aware do you. After all it is their perception of what has happened is partly what we are debating here!
Also just because not every contributor has 744 experience, can you brush them all aside as irrelevant. The world doesn't work quite like that.
Cargo Boy
Current type: B744
Ops: UK based long haul
QUALIFIED TO DEBATE 744 EVENTS!
You don't seriously expect passengers to be completely technically and operationally aware do you. After all it is their perception of what has happened is partly what we are debating here!
Also just because not every contributor has 744 experience, can you brush them all aside as irrelevant. The world doesn't work quite like that.
Cargo Boy
Current type: B744
Ops: UK based long haul
QUALIFIED TO DEBATE 744 EVENTS!
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You don't seriously expect passengers to be completely technically and operationally aware do you. After all it is their perception of what has happened is partly what we are debating here!
The other, to my mind more interesting group, come from a different operating/legal culture (such as our U.S. cousins). Which is exactly the original point of the thread, which I thought was to discuss what underlies the CAA and FAA difference of opinion on operational decisions such as was made on this occasion (and by many airline captains on many previous occasions).
(Currently ETOPS, European based).
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Well I can't speak for all pax, but as a fully qualified frequent traveller, with many atlantic crossings, I am much more reassured by the postings from the experienced 744 pilots, than from others.
I'm with cargo boy on this one.
F3G
about 5K hours in the back of various pax jets
current on all types of IFE
I'm with cargo boy on this one.
F3G
about 5K hours in the back of various pax jets
current on all types of IFE
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Hello,
As a driver of 4 engines 'bus', I would not have continue that flight not of safety concern but on PR and passenger comfort...of mind.
Imagine the cabin filing with smoke, crew quickly determine it is air conditionning smoke and shutdown the responsible pack. On a lot of airliner flying with one pack off is a non event, even recommended for fuel saving on some type/pax configuration, would you continue a long-haul flight in these conditions?
Safety concern is nihil, except on very special routes, but your pax will be scare as hell for the rest of the flight, whatever PA you come with. Look at what happens with what pax perceived as a fuel leak.....
Another point, I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??
As a driver of 4 engines 'bus', I would not have continue that flight not of safety concern but on PR and passenger comfort...of mind.
Imagine the cabin filing with smoke, crew quickly determine it is air conditionning smoke and shutdown the responsible pack. On a lot of airliner flying with one pack off is a non event, even recommended for fuel saving on some type/pax configuration, would you continue a long-haul flight in these conditions?
Safety concern is nihil, except on very special routes, but your pax will be scare as hell for the rest of the flight, whatever PA you come with. Look at what happens with what pax perceived as a fuel leak.....
Another point, I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Final 3 Greens: Well I can't speak for all pax, but as a fully qualified frequent traveller, with many atlantic crossings, I am much more reassured by the postings from the experienced 744 pilots, than from others.
I'm with cargo boy on this one.
I'm with cargo boy on this one.
If I were on a BA 744 that had shut one down in these circumstances, and the crew said that after conferring with maintrol, they thought it was safe to press on - even if they said that things might have to be reviewed later in the flight - I would happily go back to sleep and be pleased to be woken up on arrival in the UK even if not quite at LHR.
And if a non-744 airline pilot sitting next to me started wittering on about what he'd do on his own aircraft, I'd ignore him on the basis that I'd rather have people making the decisions who are 744 type-rated and in possession of the facts, thank you.
The same goes for the postings on this thread and the other thread. To the 744 crew who've almost unanimously said that they would have done the same thing as the crew on this flight, thank you.
Globaliser: over 3,500 recorded hours back in the cheap seats, about 2/3 of that on 747s, about 1/3 on 744s
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Risk Assessment is something that affects all of us in our daily lives. In aviation it is essential to ensure the safety of our customers while at the same time providing them with an efficient, reliable service at a reasonable cost.
The first level of risk control is made by the regulatory authorities such as the CAA or FAA. They obviously regulate to give a high level of safety, but over-regulation can put their own airlines at a commercial disadvantage. In many ways the JAA has helped to equalise the regulations to form a level playing field at least for the JAA airlines.
The second level of risk assessment comes from the manufacturers. In a competitive world each manufacturer wants to produce an efficient product. However there is often a play-off between cost and risk. As an example, the 747 Vmcg was calculated using only a 7 knot crosswind. To use a higher windspeed would have seriously restricted the payload. Have an upwind engine failure at V1 in a strong crosswind and it could ruin your day, but then, what are the chances of that happening? It’s all about risk assessment.
The third link in the risk assessment chain is the crew. JAR requires an annual refresher in CRM principals, including option generation and risk assessment. Crews are assessed in this during their checks using the NOTECHS marker system. From the CAA Doc29 “Option Generation refers to the ability of a crew member to generate multiple responses to a problem. Risk Assessment and Option Selection refers to the ability of a crew member to successfully assess risks and benefits of different responses to a problem, and to select the best response.”
The crew on this particular flight would have used this training to assess all of the options and their various risks. As has been pointed out already, there are risks involved with dumping fuel and returning at maximum weight. Having made the decision to continue they would have been constantly reviewing all of their options to ensure that any further failure would result in a safe conclusion. These options were covered in detail in the other thread so there’s no need to repeat them.
It would seem that the FAA and the JAA differ in their approach to this, and to the amount of decision-making latitude that they give their crews. However would it not have been better for the two authorities to discuss these differences, rather than make accusations against a crew, possibly for political reasons?
I am saddened by some of the posts on these threads by professional aviators. Just because a crew did not make the decision that you would have made does not mean that they were ‘foolish’ or ‘irresponsible’. By all means discuss the relative merits of the FAA vs the JAA logic, but please don’t insult a fellow aviator who was doing his best under difficult circumstances.
Airclues (over half my life flying 747s)
The first level of risk control is made by the regulatory authorities such as the CAA or FAA. They obviously regulate to give a high level of safety, but over-regulation can put their own airlines at a commercial disadvantage. In many ways the JAA has helped to equalise the regulations to form a level playing field at least for the JAA airlines.
The second level of risk assessment comes from the manufacturers. In a competitive world each manufacturer wants to produce an efficient product. However there is often a play-off between cost and risk. As an example, the 747 Vmcg was calculated using only a 7 knot crosswind. To use a higher windspeed would have seriously restricted the payload. Have an upwind engine failure at V1 in a strong crosswind and it could ruin your day, but then, what are the chances of that happening? It’s all about risk assessment.
The third link in the risk assessment chain is the crew. JAR requires an annual refresher in CRM principals, including option generation and risk assessment. Crews are assessed in this during their checks using the NOTECHS marker system. From the CAA Doc29 “Option Generation refers to the ability of a crew member to generate multiple responses to a problem. Risk Assessment and Option Selection refers to the ability of a crew member to successfully assess risks and benefits of different responses to a problem, and to select the best response.”
The crew on this particular flight would have used this training to assess all of the options and their various risks. As has been pointed out already, there are risks involved with dumping fuel and returning at maximum weight. Having made the decision to continue they would have been constantly reviewing all of their options to ensure that any further failure would result in a safe conclusion. These options were covered in detail in the other thread so there’s no need to repeat them.
It would seem that the FAA and the JAA differ in their approach to this, and to the amount of decision-making latitude that they give their crews. However would it not have been better for the two authorities to discuss these differences, rather than make accusations against a crew, possibly for political reasons?
I am saddened by some of the posts on these threads by professional aviators. Just because a crew did not make the decision that you would have made does not mean that they were ‘foolish’ or ‘irresponsible’. By all means discuss the relative merits of the FAA vs the JAA logic, but please don’t insult a fellow aviator who was doing his best under difficult circumstances.
Airclues (over half my life flying 747s)
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Any licence-holder on here who goes on about the 'long oceanic sectors' has forgotten everything he ever knew about great circle routes.
(Apologies to professional pilots): For those uninitiated who don't know what a great circle is, it's the shortest distance on the surface of a globe between two points. Take a classroom globe and draw the shortest line between LAX and LHR. You will cross more sea going from Gatwick to Lanzarote.
(Apologies to professional pilots): For those uninitiated who don't know what a great circle is, it's the shortest distance on the surface of a globe between two points. Take a classroom globe and draw the shortest line between LAX and LHR. You will cross more sea going from Gatwick to Lanzarote.
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windmilling
sky330 sez:
What model bus (A330?), & whose donks?
I won't attempt to speak for all engines, but for the ones I have long familiarity with, there is NO windmilling limitation.
And even if there were consequent damage, that is an economic issue, not a safety one; and should not affect the captain's decision. (Anyway, I submit it's probably cheaper to change out a bearing set at main base than to ship engines to&fro the outstation.)
... I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??
I won't attempt to speak for all engines, but for the ones I have long familiarity with, there is NO windmilling limitation.
And even if there were consequent damage, that is an economic issue, not a safety one; and should not affect the captain's decision. (Anyway, I submit it's probably cheaper to change out a bearing set at main base than to ship engines to&fro the outstation.)
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To barit1,
A340 !, A330 is a twin so one engine-out is a completly different issue.
Agreed fully and based on the information from this forum, whitch is most probably not all the picture, I would have done the same considering safety issue ONLY.
But economic issue is something you should take into account as a captain, even if obviously safety have priority.
Not quite sure, that the replacement cost of a main bearing at home base is lower than replacing/repairing the engine with lower damage at a main american station.
Agreed that in this situation, you have plenty of time to solve that with your maintenance before taking a decision.
I will check with our maintenance guy, strange that we have a limitation and not Boeing. The design of these engines is not so different.
It is maybe a company restriction.
As it is in limitation chapter of AOM, I assumed it was Airbus (more GE in the case being) limitation, but I may be wrong, and it could be internal company, I will check.
What model bus (A330?),
And even if there were consequent damage, that is an economic issue, not a safety one
But economic issue is something you should take into account as a captain, even if obviously safety have priority.
Not quite sure, that the replacement cost of a main bearing at home base is lower than replacing/repairing the engine with lower damage at a main american station.
Agreed that in this situation, you have plenty of time to solve that with your maintenance before taking a decision.
I will check with our maintenance guy, strange that we have a limitation and not Boeing. The design of these engines is not so different.
It is maybe a company restriction.
As it is in limitation chapter of AOM, I assumed it was Airbus (more GE in the case being) limitation, but I may be wrong, and it could be internal company, I will check.
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Smile and wave, smile and wave!
Essentially, next time* a 744 / 340 loses an engine immediately* after takeoff so far* from its destination*…….will the pilot* still call their company frequency for ‘advice’* or just take it as red* to land? Surely BA or anyone* else is only going to pull so many stunts* like this* before one of 2* things happens:
1) pax refuse* to fly without ‘guarantees’* (yeah right!)
2) pax learn to lump the obvious truth that it isn’t* a big deal (sigh of relief - keep mooing!)
…….but then, without the pax (and their opinions) the 744 (or any other airframe*) is just scrap metal.*
….Concorde fell victim* to this very mindset*. (unhappy / “non-existent”* pax!)
(And before anyone gets arsy….I’m aware of all the other “factors” (variables / events / contentious issues = *), but thanks for humouring me for a second - how kind of you - and if you can spot any other word worthy of highlighting as ‘contentious’ (=*) then congratulations – I’m addressing you!)
But be warned if you dare to retort……I might suspect you work for Britannia… and how many 4 engine buses do they have?
Just a thought…..
001 (I told 'em....... fabric for the cabin / leather for the drivers but did they listen...? Did they f**K)
“If you can’t laugh, are you sure you’re enjoying the party?”
1) pax refuse* to fly without ‘guarantees’* (yeah right!)
2) pax learn to lump the obvious truth that it isn’t* a big deal (sigh of relief - keep mooing!)
…….but then, without the pax (and their opinions) the 744 (or any other airframe*) is just scrap metal.*
….Concorde fell victim* to this very mindset*. (unhappy / “non-existent”* pax!)
(And before anyone gets arsy….I’m aware of all the other “factors” (variables / events / contentious issues = *), but thanks for humouring me for a second - how kind of you - and if you can spot any other word worthy of highlighting as ‘contentious’ (=*) then congratulations – I’m addressing you!)
But be warned if you dare to retort……I might suspect you work for Britannia… and how many 4 engine buses do they have?
Just a thought…..
001 (I told 'em....... fabric for the cabin / leather for the drivers but did they listen...? Did they f**K)
“If you can’t laugh, are you sure you’re enjoying the party?”
Another point, I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??
The oil is mostly present to carry away the friction heat generated under thrust load conditions. Thus just a minute coating is all that is needed
These engines sometimes sit outside a hangar for days windmilling away in the breeze while not producing a thrust load on the bearings.
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An engine windmilling at alttitude will be cold soaked after several hours.
Limitations on the RR are oil temperture of -20 C for starting on the 524 C2
The 524 DX is -40C.
Minnimum Temp for advancing the throttles is -10C.
I am not sure which RR they use but willing to bet these limitations are close.
This engine may have not been available for restart or performed as needed.
Or an engine that could be relied upon.
Who knows what would have happened if they had to start this one.
Ever try to start a cold soaked engine at altittude, not as easy as on the ground even using enrich.
Murphys law?
We all learn from the past actions of others.
As far as everyone slaming this crew, this is not the case.
Just something that happened that we will all gain a little knowledge from.
We are still entitled to our opinions.
I am sure they acted on the information at hand.
Limitations on the RR are oil temperture of -20 C for starting on the 524 C2
The 524 DX is -40C.
Minnimum Temp for advancing the throttles is -10C.
I am not sure which RR they use but willing to bet these limitations are close.
This engine may have not been available for restart or performed as needed.
Or an engine that could be relied upon.
Who knows what would have happened if they had to start this one.
Ever try to start a cold soaked engine at altittude, not as easy as on the ground even using enrich.
Murphys law?
We all learn from the past actions of others.
As far as everyone slaming this crew, this is not the case.
Just something that happened that we will all gain a little knowledge from.
We are still entitled to our opinions.
I am sure they acted on the information at hand.
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Capt.KAOS: Including on Mayday?
As I understand it from reading the other (long) thread), this was basically a precautionary Mayday because there was something which may not have been quite right and the crew were playing safe, not an oh-my-God-half-the-wing's-on-fire Mayday.
Thread Starter
.....a precautionary Mayday because there was something which may not have been quite right and the crew were playing safe"
Huh? Have another look at CAP413, which states the following for UK-licensed crews in UK airspace:
1.2 States of Emergency
1.2.1 The states of emergency are classified as follows:
a) Distress A condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.
b) Urgency A condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but does not require immediate assistance.
1.2.2 The pilot should make the appropriate emergency call as follows:
a) Distress ‘MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY’
b) Urgency ‘PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN’
By that definition, it seems that the ba 744 crew must have considered themselves to be "threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance" IF they made a Distress call during their diversion to Manchester.
Hardly a 'something's not quite right' scenario.
There has been much discussion of the rights and wrongs of this event; what we are really interested to know is the real views of the CAA and FAA over this type of event - airline, a/c type and crew members are irrelevant to the core issue.
Huh? Have another look at CAP413, which states the following for UK-licensed crews in UK airspace:
1.2 States of Emergency
1.2.1 The states of emergency are classified as follows:
a) Distress A condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.
b) Urgency A condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but does not require immediate assistance.
1.2.2 The pilot should make the appropriate emergency call as follows:
a) Distress ‘MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY’
b) Urgency ‘PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN’
By that definition, it seems that the ba 744 crew must have considered themselves to be "threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance" IF they made a Distress call during their diversion to Manchester.
Hardly a 'something's not quite right' scenario.
There has been much discussion of the rights and wrongs of this event; what we are really interested to know is the real views of the CAA and FAA over this type of event - airline, a/c type and crew members are irrelevant to the core issue.