Air Transat loses A310 rudder inflight
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Flight Safety,
Despite what my collegue Captain104 has said, the A310-300 vertical tail is 0,5 m shorter than the A300-600. It also has a different aspect ratio, taper ratio, tail arm, and its aerodynamic properties are also different to the A300-600. They do share the same 1/4 chord sweep and overall area.
Aircraft sharing the same type certificate such as the A300/A310 do not need to have parts that interchange, for example the A345/A346 has a vertical tail 0,99 m longer than the A343/A342. The suggestion you have made is true with Boeing aircraft, eg the overall dimensions of a B774 vertical tail is the same as a B741, however as far as I am aware the parts are not interchangeable either.
I am not an expert in forensic analysis of photographs of aircraft failure modes. I would suggest you are not either. I see no basis for your unqualified comments “The rudder separation damage does appear very similar to the separation damage seen (sic) on AA587” and “The physical rudder separation damage (on the vertical stab) does appear very similar.”
Again, for the benefit of those naive enough to take your line of thought, the initial failure mode on the AA587 was the vertical stabilizer.
The failure mode in this event is the rudder, everything I have seen suggests that the vertical stabilizer is undamaged and still attached to the aircraft.
The rudder is an aeroelastic structure, no one is suggesting at this stage any dynamic or static loads (i.e. in your vernacular “force”) were exceeded to cause the failure. Structures can and have failed without and design loads being exceeded.
For example with metal structures corrosion can lead to failure of fasteners or the interface between fasteners well before design loads are exceeded. Aircraft are designed “damage tolerant” if such a failure does occur, in the case the crew returned to base without being aware of the extent of damage until after landing.
The airframe is over 13 years old. I am unaware that the maintenance or modification status of that part in that aircraft has been released, nor the results of testing of samples and detailed analysis of FDR/QAR/CVR devices.
As I said above, there is a correlation, they are both Airbus aircraft, that’s about where it stops.
I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however to draw any correlation between this event and AA587 is unfounded.
Despite what my collegue Captain104 has said, the A310-300 vertical tail is 0,5 m shorter than the A300-600. It also has a different aspect ratio, taper ratio, tail arm, and its aerodynamic properties are also different to the A300-600. They do share the same 1/4 chord sweep and overall area.
Aircraft sharing the same type certificate such as the A300/A310 do not need to have parts that interchange, for example the A345/A346 has a vertical tail 0,99 m longer than the A343/A342. The suggestion you have made is true with Boeing aircraft, eg the overall dimensions of a B774 vertical tail is the same as a B741, however as far as I am aware the parts are not interchangeable either.
I am not an expert in forensic analysis of photographs of aircraft failure modes. I would suggest you are not either. I see no basis for your unqualified comments “The rudder separation damage does appear very similar to the separation damage seen (sic) on AA587” and “The physical rudder separation damage (on the vertical stab) does appear very similar.”
Again, for the benefit of those naive enough to take your line of thought, the initial failure mode on the AA587 was the vertical stabilizer.
The failure mode in this event is the rudder, everything I have seen suggests that the vertical stabilizer is undamaged and still attached to the aircraft.
The rudder is an aeroelastic structure, no one is suggesting at this stage any dynamic or static loads (i.e. in your vernacular “force”) were exceeded to cause the failure. Structures can and have failed without and design loads being exceeded.
For example with metal structures corrosion can lead to failure of fasteners or the interface between fasteners well before design loads are exceeded. Aircraft are designed “damage tolerant” if such a failure does occur, in the case the crew returned to base without being aware of the extent of damage until after landing.
The airframe is over 13 years old. I am unaware that the maintenance or modification status of that part in that aircraft has been released, nor the results of testing of samples and detailed analysis of FDR/QAR/CVR devices.
As I said above, there is a correlation, they are both Airbus aircraft, that’s about where it stops.
I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however to draw any correlation between this event and AA587 is unfounded.
Zeke and 'Gang': Good guess. Flew ten years on an old machine as FO ( now five as captain), whose speed-controlled rudder limiter engages from about 170-300 knots. It has some (right) hydraulic assist but this only reduces the Vref speed several knots. Depending on the weight, naturally. This does not include the flap-rudder stop on most of them, to reduce the chance of excessive sideslip. We don't design, build or maintain them-we just fly them..somebody's got to do it...
Apparently, anyone from the US who even suggests a connection between various A-310/300 accident/incidents is clearly out of bounds. My company operates a large number of other Airbus products. This gets so tiresome.
Is this still not the case on Pprune? The same old cross-Atlantic chickens#it. We've read it on Pprune for years. The same old defensive verbal fortresses are built on the spot to quickly defend against just the questioning of any Airbus product or sometimes against a Boeing or McDonald Douglas product. I do enjoy the actual information which results from idle speculation.
But if those who question are from east of the Atlantic, then any such topic is fair game. As a reminder, the AMR A-300 went down in the US. There were reportedly also some damaged vertical stabilizers on A300s or A-310s operated by Interflug and Air France. Somebody else reported this on Pprune, weeks or months ago. Maybe none of it is true. Happy hunting chaps at Angels 15.
Apparently, anyone from the US who even suggests a connection between various A-310/300 accident/incidents is clearly out of bounds. My company operates a large number of other Airbus products. This gets so tiresome.
Is this still not the case on Pprune? The same old cross-Atlantic chickens#it. We've read it on Pprune for years. The same old defensive verbal fortresses are built on the spot to quickly defend against just the questioning of any Airbus product or sometimes against a Boeing or McDonald Douglas product. I do enjoy the actual information which results from idle speculation.
But if those who question are from east of the Atlantic, then any such topic is fair game. As a reminder, the AMR A-300 went down in the US. There were reportedly also some damaged vertical stabilizers on A300s or A-310s operated by Interflug and Air France. Somebody else reported this on Pprune, weeks or months ago. Maybe none of it is true. Happy hunting chaps at Angels 15.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 15th Mar 2005 at 03:36.
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Ignition Override,
I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however you are only coming up with conspiracy theories.
If you have a sound connection between the two events come up with it, no one has so far, come and collect your prize.
I should add that I was also on the team that designed the 777 composite rudder, now that either makes me a puddle jumper or someone who something about the design of composite rudders.
Your experience of from a flight crew perspective is welcome, I just hope that you reciprocate my experience as a design engineer and as a pilot, irrespective of where I sleep at night.
I welcome any and all sound postulations as to the cause of this event, however you are only coming up with conspiracy theories.
If you have a sound connection between the two events come up with it, no one has so far, come and collect your prize.
I should add that I was also on the team that designed the 777 composite rudder, now that either makes me a puddle jumper or someone who something about the design of composite rudders.
Your experience of from a flight crew perspective is welcome, I just hope that you reciprocate my experience as a design engineer and as a pilot, irrespective of where I sleep at night.
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@ Zeke
Could it be you just enjoyed a bottle of Cahors Prince Probus Reserve at sunrise? I simply stated:
1) The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 4886 is manufactured of advanced composite materials. The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A310 series airplanes with the same modification is manufactured of the SAME MATERIALS.
2) The original A-300 design had this primary structure as aluminum. Then Airbus designed the A-310, which was actually the first airliner with an all-composite vertical stabilizer. Later, Airbus rolled out an improved A-300-600, which BASICALLY used the A-310 composite tail design.
IMHO all correct. Nothing said about same dimensions, same aerodynamic specifications or even interchangeability!!!
Regards
Edit for spelling.
Could it be you just enjoyed a bottle of Cahors Prince Probus Reserve at sunrise? I simply stated:
1) The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 4886 is manufactured of advanced composite materials. The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A310 series airplanes with the same modification is manufactured of the SAME MATERIALS.
2) The original A-300 design had this primary structure as aluminum. Then Airbus designed the A-310, which was actually the first airliner with an all-composite vertical stabilizer. Later, Airbus rolled out an improved A-300-600, which BASICALLY used the A-310 composite tail design.
IMHO all correct. Nothing said about same dimensions, same aerodynamic specifications or even interchangeability!!!
Regards
Edit for spelling.
Last edited by Captain104; 11th Mar 2005 at 09:35.
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landing without rudder
About the question done before on how hard it could be to land the A310 without rudder I can tell you that this type of aircraft is quite forgiving in that aspect.
I still mean the crew did an excellent job but the 310 is rather short and quite stable along that axis during the approach. I've only flown 737 and 310 but I have about 4000 hours on each type and all the execises we simulated with jammed rudder or other similar flight control problems were easier to solve on the 310 than the 737, especially the streched 400, 800 and 900s.
After the DHL A300 misile attack in Irak we reviewed all types of scenarios affecting flight controls and I tried a few on the A/C during test or ferry flights, (ldg without yaw dampers + no rudder input, etc.)
I actually believe that the rudder problem is more critical during cruise at high altitude than on approach. The 310 has a trim tank with 5000 kg in the stabilizer and flies with the most aft cg position permitted. That makes it very unstable at high altitudes and we once had a fright at FL 390 with a double yaw dampers failure in turbulence. Unpleasant and I'd think the boys from Air transat had more trouble at high speed, high altitude than later.
I still mean the crew did an excellent job but the 310 is rather short and quite stable along that axis during the approach. I've only flown 737 and 310 but I have about 4000 hours on each type and all the execises we simulated with jammed rudder or other similar flight control problems were easier to solve on the 310 than the 737, especially the streched 400, 800 and 900s.
After the DHL A300 misile attack in Irak we reviewed all types of scenarios affecting flight controls and I tried a few on the A/C during test or ferry flights, (ldg without yaw dampers + no rudder input, etc.)
I actually believe that the rudder problem is more critical during cruise at high altitude than on approach. The 310 has a trim tank with 5000 kg in the stabilizer and flies with the most aft cg position permitted. That makes it very unstable at high altitudes and we once had a fright at FL 390 with a double yaw dampers failure in turbulence. Unpleasant and I'd think the boys from Air transat had more trouble at high speed, high altitude than later.
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Zeke, I don't understand your position. No one's speculation is any better than anyone else in the absence of facts. All ideas are on the table until the facts begin to steer us in the right direction for understanding what happened here. You have as many facts available to support you as I have, which is none.
Let's just wait for some facts to come in, before we start rejecting everyone else's ideas but our own.
Let's just wait for some facts to come in, before we start rejecting everyone else's ideas but our own.
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AA587 + Air Transat Connection: Some speculation:
I certainly hope that the investigators of the Air Transat incident will probe deeper and give a possible link to these two incidents - or at least give the NTSB investigators thought to reconsider AA587 findings.
The Air Transat rudder event occurred when the aircraft was in cruise flight at FL350. There was a strong initial yaw motion. A flight attendant standing in the flight deck was thrown to one side. The event was not precipitated by pilot input and was not reacted to (no counter input). It is possible that the rudder started to delaminate on one side causing the rudder to push over. In this case the rudder subsequently disintegrated due to air loads and drag as is evidenced by the pictures. The vertical stab did not fail because there was no rudder reversal input nor any preexisting weakness in the stab.
In the AA587 incident it is possible that the same or at least similar failure occurred. The aircraft entered an area of turbulence caused by a preceding aircraft. I speculate that coincidently the rudder started to delaminate at that point. There was an initial rudder hard over which was countered by a rudder input by the First Officer. The flight data recorder showed two inputs and Airbus has latched onto the idea of rudder reversal causing stab failure. I contend or at least ruminate that the first rudder input was a feedback from the delamination rudder hardover and the second input was the FO's correct reaction. The stab failed due to a preexising weakness caused by some other event or engineering weakness.
The American crew was up at the controls as they were in the initial climb phase and reacted correctly. The Transat crew was in cruise and in a more relaxed state. Different mode of flight and different reaction and preparedness. That is a fact of airline flying.
The A310 and A300-600 are very similar machines. One of the exceptions is length. The increased length of the 300 and the greater moment arm force on the tail in combination with the rudder input could be the difference in the two cases.
This is just my opinion. But in respect to the American crew and the victims of that accident it is worth looking into.
I certainly hope that the investigators of the Air Transat incident will probe deeper and give a possible link to these two incidents - or at least give the NTSB investigators thought to reconsider AA587 findings.
The Air Transat rudder event occurred when the aircraft was in cruise flight at FL350. There was a strong initial yaw motion. A flight attendant standing in the flight deck was thrown to one side. The event was not precipitated by pilot input and was not reacted to (no counter input). It is possible that the rudder started to delaminate on one side causing the rudder to push over. In this case the rudder subsequently disintegrated due to air loads and drag as is evidenced by the pictures. The vertical stab did not fail because there was no rudder reversal input nor any preexisting weakness in the stab.
In the AA587 incident it is possible that the same or at least similar failure occurred. The aircraft entered an area of turbulence caused by a preceding aircraft. I speculate that coincidently the rudder started to delaminate at that point. There was an initial rudder hard over which was countered by a rudder input by the First Officer. The flight data recorder showed two inputs and Airbus has latched onto the idea of rudder reversal causing stab failure. I contend or at least ruminate that the first rudder input was a feedback from the delamination rudder hardover and the second input was the FO's correct reaction. The stab failed due to a preexising weakness caused by some other event or engineering weakness.
The American crew was up at the controls as they were in the initial climb phase and reacted correctly. The Transat crew was in cruise and in a more relaxed state. Different mode of flight and different reaction and preparedness. That is a fact of airline flying.
The A310 and A300-600 are very similar machines. One of the exceptions is length. The increased length of the 300 and the greater moment arm force on the tail in combination with the rudder input could be the difference in the two cases.
This is just my opinion. But in respect to the American crew and the victims of that accident it is worth looking into.
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latetonite
I do not get your message. Do you mean a A-310 is longer than a A-300-600? Must be a joke.
Regards
just replace `A310` with `A300` and vice versa and you are pretty close..
Regards
Last edited by Captain104; 12th Mar 2005 at 18:56.
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IMHO there ARE very scary similarities.
I have my own theories on this, after that A300-600 crash out of New York, and remembering what we used to find on A checks in New York on our A300-600 which was operating in exactly the same environment as the American A300-600, and in a very similar environment to the Air Transat A310.
I have mentioned my concerns before somewhere else, and they were ridiculed by "experts" in composite technology.
However these incidents convince me even more of the "possible" dangers with water ingress into these composites.
Water is trapped in the tails of these Airbuses operating throughout the Caribbean, freezing and thawing on each flight, and I fear it must affect the integrity of these composites.
I have my own theories on this, after that A300-600 crash out of New York, and remembering what we used to find on A checks in New York on our A300-600 which was operating in exactly the same environment as the American A300-600, and in a very similar environment to the Air Transat A310.
I have mentioned my concerns before somewhere else, and they were ridiculed by "experts" in composite technology.
However these incidents convince me even more of the "possible" dangers with water ingress into these composites.
Water is trapped in the tails of these Airbuses operating throughout the Caribbean, freezing and thawing on each flight, and I fear it must affect the integrity of these composites.
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planemad2,
Water ingress into honeycomb leading to delamination as the water expands into ice as an aircraft climbs to altitude is a very real problem. This is what I thought may have occurred in this case myself.
As I said above structures can and have failed without design loads being exceeded, in terms of composites I see this a method how this can happen. The delaminating normally occurs between the honeycomb core type material and the skin.
I am not aware of this type of delamination being a problem in areas where you have multiple layers of composites, such as what is used for attachment points, like the rear lug on AA587. Multiple layers of composite are basically a mixture composite (or other) fibers and an epoxy type resin matrix, this does not ingest water like honeycomb.
On skin panels, like on control surfaces honeycomb is used as a spacer between layers of composites, to keep the layers separated and provides the stiffness. If this was to delaminate it would do so between either/or the inner or outer skin and the honeycomb, and is not structurally that significant. The delamination would not extend to the bond between the attachment point and the skin, or solid ribs as these would be layers of composites.
Whilst it may not be structurally significant, it can be aeroelastically significant as it changes the mass distribution over the hinge line which can lead to other aeroelastic phenomena.
The presence of delamination is easily checked whenever an aircraft returns from a flight with a thermal camera, cold spots on control surfaces will remain cold after landing indicating the presence of ice inside the surface.
I agree that the OAT was +6 deg C when AA587 took off, and the wake turbulence occurred at 3300 ft, which would put it at about 0 deg C, however one must also bear in mind what Dr Matthew R. Fox said in his materials investigation to the AA 587 enquiry. He said that the composite fractures were examined at high magnification using scanning electron microscopy. The lug area fractures were photographed at more than 300 locations, and over 500 square inches of crack surfaces examined at high magnification, with no observed pre existing defects, including fatigue.
Some of the pilot community use the term “rudder reversal”, I do not believe this was actually stated, “rudder reversal” is an aeroelastic phenomena like flutter.
A310GUY
Don’t forget the wake turbulence was correct by the F/O with a recorded control wheel inputs of over 62 degrees right, and 78 degrees left, combined with numerous recorded rudder pedal inputs (more than the two you stated) with over 6 inches of rudder pedal displacement. The sole use of rudder did not induce all the loads on the airframe, as the secondary effects of roll also played a part.
To quote the AA A300 fleet standards manager at the NTSB “Most pilots think that a limiter on some system will protect…the pilot from exceeding whatever parameter that limiter is limiting. And in this case…and it’s not unique to Airbus aircraft…the pilots think that the rudder limiter will protect the aircraft structurally, and if it can’t…they think…that there would be a limitation or a warning or caution or a note that would indicate…that the rudder limiter couldn’t protect [the aircraft] structurally.”
Flight Safety,
As I said in a previous post, I was unaware of facts being made public, that does not preclude them being available elsewhere. The aircraft was largely intact on arrival, crew are able to give statements.
Water ingress into honeycomb leading to delamination as the water expands into ice as an aircraft climbs to altitude is a very real problem. This is what I thought may have occurred in this case myself.
As I said above structures can and have failed without design loads being exceeded, in terms of composites I see this a method how this can happen. The delaminating normally occurs between the honeycomb core type material and the skin.
I am not aware of this type of delamination being a problem in areas where you have multiple layers of composites, such as what is used for attachment points, like the rear lug on AA587. Multiple layers of composite are basically a mixture composite (or other) fibers and an epoxy type resin matrix, this does not ingest water like honeycomb.
On skin panels, like on control surfaces honeycomb is used as a spacer between layers of composites, to keep the layers separated and provides the stiffness. If this was to delaminate it would do so between either/or the inner or outer skin and the honeycomb, and is not structurally that significant. The delamination would not extend to the bond between the attachment point and the skin, or solid ribs as these would be layers of composites.
Whilst it may not be structurally significant, it can be aeroelastically significant as it changes the mass distribution over the hinge line which can lead to other aeroelastic phenomena.
The presence of delamination is easily checked whenever an aircraft returns from a flight with a thermal camera, cold spots on control surfaces will remain cold after landing indicating the presence of ice inside the surface.
I agree that the OAT was +6 deg C when AA587 took off, and the wake turbulence occurred at 3300 ft, which would put it at about 0 deg C, however one must also bear in mind what Dr Matthew R. Fox said in his materials investigation to the AA 587 enquiry. He said that the composite fractures were examined at high magnification using scanning electron microscopy. The lug area fractures were photographed at more than 300 locations, and over 500 square inches of crack surfaces examined at high magnification, with no observed pre existing defects, including fatigue.
Some of the pilot community use the term “rudder reversal”, I do not believe this was actually stated, “rudder reversal” is an aeroelastic phenomena like flutter.
A310GUY
Don’t forget the wake turbulence was correct by the F/O with a recorded control wheel inputs of over 62 degrees right, and 78 degrees left, combined with numerous recorded rudder pedal inputs (more than the two you stated) with over 6 inches of rudder pedal displacement. The sole use of rudder did not induce all the loads on the airframe, as the secondary effects of roll also played a part.
To quote the AA A300 fleet standards manager at the NTSB “Most pilots think that a limiter on some system will protect…the pilot from exceeding whatever parameter that limiter is limiting. And in this case…and it’s not unique to Airbus aircraft…the pilots think that the rudder limiter will protect the aircraft structurally, and if it can’t…they think…that there would be a limitation or a warning or caution or a note that would indicate…that the rudder limiter couldn’t protect [the aircraft] structurally.”
Flight Safety,
As I said in a previous post, I was unaware of facts being made public, that does not preclude them being available elsewhere. The aircraft was largely intact on arrival, crew are able to give statements.
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To all, I've re-read this entire thread, and A310 has supplied the closest thing to publicly or privately available "facts" for this incident so far. He said:
Is there any other factual information (related to cause) available at this time?
The Air Transat rudder event occurred when the aircraft was in cruise flight at FL350. There was a strong initial yaw motion. A flight attendant standing in the flight deck was thrown to one side. The event was not precipitated by pilot input and was not reacted to (no counter input). It is possible that the rudder started to delaminate on one side causing the rudder to push over. In this case the rudder subsequently disintegrated due to air loads and drag as is evidenced by the pictures. The vertical stab did not fail because there was no rudder reversal input nor any preexisting weakness in the stab.
Union Goon
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From Zeke
You are quite wrong in that statement.
If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.
The rudder pedal travel is 4 inches on the ground. At 250 knots allowable travel of the pedal by the rudder load limiter sisytem on the A300600/A310 is 1 inch ! Furthermore, the breakout force to start the rudder moving is the same as to reach the stop. So at 250 knots the rudder pedals are effectively toggle switches.
The rudder load limiter on the A310/300600 works by restricted the range of motion of the rudder pedals, while maintaining the same ratio of motion to degrees of travel on the tail.,
If what you are saying is correct, then there was more rudder travel then available when the aircraft is stopped at the gate. What was really recorded was that not once did the pedals move more than 1 inch! from a controll input point of view with the aircraft not behaving as you would expect, its a guarantee of confusion.
Face it, it is Airbus's opinion that they have NEVER made a mistake, and it is an opinion in which they are saddly wrong.
And you are wrong, in your contention as well. The plane is a trap for a Pilot Induced oscilation, which is what may have occured in 587. A POI is a DESIGN fault!
Cheers
Wino
combined with numerous recorded rudder pedal inputs (more than the two you stated) with over 6 inches of rudder pedal displacement.
If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.
The rudder pedal travel is 4 inches on the ground. At 250 knots allowable travel of the pedal by the rudder load limiter sisytem on the A300600/A310 is 1 inch ! Furthermore, the breakout force to start the rudder moving is the same as to reach the stop. So at 250 knots the rudder pedals are effectively toggle switches.
The rudder load limiter on the A310/300600 works by restricted the range of motion of the rudder pedals, while maintaining the same ratio of motion to degrees of travel on the tail.,
If what you are saying is correct, then there was more rudder travel then available when the aircraft is stopped at the gate. What was really recorded was that not once did the pedals move more than 1 inch! from a controll input point of view with the aircraft not behaving as you would expect, its a guarantee of confusion.
Face it, it is Airbus's opinion that they have NEVER made a mistake, and it is an opinion in which they are saddly wrong.
And you are wrong, in your contention as well. The plane is a trap for a Pilot Induced oscilation, which is what may have occured in 587. A POI is a DESIGN fault!
Cheers
Wino
The following story in this week's edition of The Observer suggests that journalists are monitoring discussions on "pilots' bulletin boards" such as this one.
What made an Airbus rudder snap in mid-air?
What made an Airbus rudder snap in mid-air?
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Catchup,
Do you reall think that the pilots of 587 MEANT to go stop to stop on the rudder? I knew them both, and flew with them both, and have a LOT of time in that particular make and model.
If they didn't mean to do it, its a pilot induced oscilation. The need for coordinated rudder at 250 knots is a once in a career item, that most people will never experience in real life. If you give it a try in the A300 you will be in for a rude shock.
I was involved in the investigation, and did a lot of research on the subject and the aircraft, including climbing up inside the tail of its sister ships.
Cheers
WIno
Do you reall think that the pilots of 587 MEANT to go stop to stop on the rudder? I knew them both, and flew with them both, and have a LOT of time in that particular make and model.
If they didn't mean to do it, its a pilot induced oscilation. The need for coordinated rudder at 250 knots is a once in a career item, that most people will never experience in real life. If you give it a try in the A300 you will be in for a rude shock.
I was involved in the investigation, and did a lot of research on the subject and the aircraft, including climbing up inside the tail of its sister ships.
Cheers
WIno
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Wino,
You are correct I understated the recorded movement of the rudder pedal, page 6 figure 1 of the NTSB report pedal position inches shows over 6 inches of movement, thank you for pointing that out to me.
Please refer to the NTSB report, page 6 figure 1, FDR of the pedal position at 09:15:57, over 2 inches left, 09:16:01 4 inches right, total displacement over 6 inches.
The graph above shows the wheel position in degrees which varied twice from 80 degrees left to over 60 degrees right in a 10 second period. There were 10 control wheel movements through the neutral position within 10 seconds. Similarly, five rudder inputs through neutral in 10 seconds.
I would suggest airmanship dictates not to even attempt a control check with such rapid movement on the ground, and that’s when they are aerodynamically unloaded.
For coordinated control inputs the number of times through neutral would the same, for example at 09:15:54,5 shows 30 degrees of left wheel position, and 1,8 inches of right rudder position.
Flight Safety,
From Aibus to operators ... this OIT had ten (10) photographs attached.
My understanding is that a replacement rudder is now being fitted.
You are quite wrong in that statement.
If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.
If there was 6 inches of displacement of the rudder pedal, then the problem with 587 was the aircraft, not the pilot.
What was really recorded was that not once did the pedals move more than 1 inch! from a control input point of view with the aircraft not behaving as you would expect, its a guarantee of confusion.
The graph above shows the wheel position in degrees which varied twice from 80 degrees left to over 60 degrees right in a 10 second period. There were 10 control wheel movements through the neutral position within 10 seconds. Similarly, five rudder inputs through neutral in 10 seconds.
I would suggest airmanship dictates not to even attempt a control check with such rapid movement on the ground, and that’s when they are aerodynamically unloaded.
For coordinated control inputs the number of times through neutral would the same, for example at 09:15:54,5 shows 30 degrees of left wheel position, and 1,8 inches of right rudder position.
Flight Safety,
From Aibus to operators ... this OIT had ten (10) photographs attached.
FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F
TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500/A340-600 OPERATORS
OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX - OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX
Subject : Incident - Loss of Rudder Surface In-Flight
OIT classification : Information
Aircraft affected : A310
OUR REF.: SE 999.0017/05/AB dated 08 March 2005
1. Purpose :
The purpose of this OIT is to provide operators with first
details about the loss of a rudder surface during flight and to
give information on the actions taken by Airbus.
2. Event description :
An operator has reported the following incident on an A310-308.
On Sunday 6th March 2005, after departure from Varadero (Cuba),
in cruise at 35000 feet, the crew reported that a loud bang was
heard. The pilot took manual control and returned to land safely
at Varadero.
Visual inspection after landing revealed that a large part of
the rudder surface was missing. A portion of the rudder
structure remained attached between the lower hinge and the
three servo-control attachment points.
There were no injuries reported to passengers, crew or on the
ground.
3. Status :
At this time very few details and no detailed inspection reports
have been received. The event will be subject to a formal
investigation involving the Canadian and French Investigating
Boards. Airbus has sent a team of specialists to Varadero to
assist the authorities with their investigation.
4. Further action :
Based on the information we will receive, appropriate action
plan will be defined and operators informed accordingly.
5. Follow-up :
Follow-up of this OIT will be provided when further details
become available, or in any case not later than 16th March 2005.
TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500/A340-600 OPERATORS
OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX - OPERATOR INFORMATION TELEX
Subject : Incident - Loss of Rudder Surface In-Flight
OIT classification : Information
Aircraft affected : A310
OUR REF.: SE 999.0017/05/AB dated 08 March 2005
1. Purpose :
The purpose of this OIT is to provide operators with first
details about the loss of a rudder surface during flight and to
give information on the actions taken by Airbus.
2. Event description :
An operator has reported the following incident on an A310-308.
On Sunday 6th March 2005, after departure from Varadero (Cuba),
in cruise at 35000 feet, the crew reported that a loud bang was
heard. The pilot took manual control and returned to land safely
at Varadero.
Visual inspection after landing revealed that a large part of
the rudder surface was missing. A portion of the rudder
structure remained attached between the lower hinge and the
three servo-control attachment points.
There were no injuries reported to passengers, crew or on the
ground.
3. Status :
At this time very few details and no detailed inspection reports
have been received. The event will be subject to a formal
investigation involving the Canadian and French Investigating
Boards. Airbus has sent a team of specialists to Varadero to
assist the authorities with their investigation.
4. Further action :
Based on the information we will receive, appropriate action
plan will be defined and operators informed accordingly.
5. Follow-up :
Follow-up of this OIT will be provided when further details
become available, or in any case not later than 16th March 2005.
Last edited by Zeke; 14th Mar 2005 at 02:58.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Montreal
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March 16?
I would want some course of action before March 16 if I was operating A310's.....
Loss of a portion of the rudder....did everybody see the pictures?
How is 94% of rudder was lost sound to you?
I dont know but am I the only one nurvous about this?
I would want some course of action before March 16 if I was operating A310's.....
Loss of a portion of the rudder....did everybody see the pictures?
How is 94% of rudder was lost sound to you?
I dont know but am I the only one nurvous about this?
Union Goon
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: New Jersey, USA
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Its a mistake Zeke,
it is simply not possible,
Either that or they really did hang the wrong man, and there is your smoking gun of an Airbus coverup.
Are you aware of HOW the rudder load limiter works in the A300600r?
Cheers
Wino
it is simply not possible,
Either that or they really did hang the wrong man, and there is your smoking gun of an Airbus coverup.
Are you aware of HOW the rudder load limiter works in the A300600r?
Cheers
Wino