Bombardier Accident at Teterboro
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Admittedly don't know anything about the CL600, but am wondering if this a/c is fitted with control locks.
Wonder also how the control check went in the before t/o check.
Frost is a definite possibility if the a/c didn't want to fly, but if it wouldn't rotate, looks like there is another possible contributing factor.
Wonder also how the control check went in the before t/o check.
Frost is a definite possibility if the a/c didn't want to fly, but if it wouldn't rotate, looks like there is another possible contributing factor.
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Stop the speculating
Gentlemen, how about stopping all of the speculating? Remember: "But for the grace of God......"
The truth will emerge in time. Let us all be grateful that there were no fatalities.
Just my humble opinion.
Check 6
The truth will emerge in time. Let us all be grateful that there were no fatalities.
Just my humble opinion.
Check 6
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Those of you under the impression that you can takeoff in any aircraft with frost etc on the UPPER surface of the wing. You're in DIRECT contravention of the OPERATIONAL regs for your type of ops. I've already posted part 91 and part 121, the others are the same.
The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.
It's also, fundamentally, UNSAFE. Even small amounts of frost on the upper wing - and not even on the Leading Edge - can have dramatic effects on your aircraft's performance (there was some test data from NRC in Canada - using a Fokker model, IIRC) which showed dramatic losses in both lift and roll authority from frost in front of the ailerons.
The only safe and legal approach is to have no contaminants on the upper surface of the wing. In fact, if it were up to me, I'd say nothing on the undersurface either, because the underwing cold-soaked fuel frost alleviation just makes people tempted to "get away with" other instances of frost. A pure CLEAN WING philosophy would leave absolutely no room for confusion or creative misinterpretation.
The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.
It's also, fundamentally, UNSAFE. Even small amounts of frost on the upper wing - and not even on the Leading Edge - can have dramatic effects on your aircraft's performance (there was some test data from NRC in Canada - using a Fokker model, IIRC) which showed dramatic losses in both lift and roll authority from frost in front of the ailerons.
The only safe and legal approach is to have no contaminants on the upper surface of the wing. In fact, if it were up to me, I'd say nothing on the undersurface either, because the underwing cold-soaked fuel frost alleviation just makes people tempted to "get away with" other instances of frost. A pure CLEAN WING philosophy would leave absolutely no room for confusion or creative misinterpretation.
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Hortizontal stab Frozen
Years ago, I was flying a Lear 55 that had just come out of maint.
After a 2 hour flight to the D.R. I returned back to the states, so far all operating normally
Approach to land we touched down at airport and again all seemed fine, as the airplane slowed I began to relax yoke and found that the control would not move.
I looked at co pilot to see if he has holding things up and identified he was not. taxied in and later found that a bolt was put in inproperly after work and had jammed the Horiz Stab past landing flair.
Could have been a disastor.
To many variable going on but interesting to see everyones point of view.
After a 2 hour flight to the D.R. I returned back to the states, so far all operating normally
Approach to land we touched down at airport and again all seemed fine, as the airplane slowed I began to relax yoke and found that the control would not move.
I looked at co pilot to see if he has holding things up and identified he was not. taxied in and later found that a bolt was put in inproperly after work and had jammed the Horiz Stab past landing flair.
Could have been a disastor.
To many variable going on but interesting to see everyones point of view.
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Mad Scientist wrote:
Mad S. I'm talking about the 737NG, not ANY aircraft. I recommend, that you consult Boeing, FAA and the different European CAA authorities with your concern. They have all approved the procedure.
I'm not a testpilot, nor an aeronautical engineer, so whether you are right, and all the other organizations are wrong, I can't say for sure, although I have my opinion. I just try to follow the regulations, limitations, approved procedures and recomendations I read in my manuals. Add a bit of common sence on top, and I think that creates a perfectly safe and legal operation.
VK signing out of this thread.
Those of you under the impression that you can takeoff in any aircraft with frost etc on the UPPER surface of the wing. You're in DIRECT contravention of the OPERATIONAL regs for your type of ops. I've already posted part 91 and part 121, the others are the same.
The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.
The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.
I'm not a testpilot, nor an aeronautical engineer, so whether you are right, and all the other organizations are wrong, I can't say for sure, although I have my opinion. I just try to follow the regulations, limitations, approved procedures and recomendations I read in my manuals. Add a bit of common sence on top, and I think that creates a perfectly safe and legal operation.
VK signing out of this thread.
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Pilot pins jet crash on failed controller
Tells investigators cockpit wheel stuck
Saturday, February 05, 2005
BY ANA M. ALAYA
Star-Ledger Staff
The pilot of a corporate jet that sped off a runway at Teterboro Airport and smashed into a warehouse told investigators yesterday that the control wheel malfunctioned, forcing him to abruptly abort takeoff.
But the 58-year-old veteran pilot slammed on the brakes and slowed the plane from 176 mph to 104 mph in 10 seconds, which one aviation expert said made the crash "survivable." He also steered the plane to a less crowded area of Route 46.
"He hit the brakes so hard he has bruises all over his feet," said Michael A. Moulis, a lawyer for pilot John Kimberling and Platinum Jet Management, the company that was operating the Bombardier CL-600 Challenger that rammed into a clothing warehouse Wednesday, injuring 20.
The plane, carrying eight passengers, careened down a 6,000-foot runway, crashed through a fence and slid across busy Route 46, hitting two cars before smacking into the garage door of the warehouse and bursting into flames.
Federal investigators, while declining to pinpoint a control wheel malfunction as the cause of the crash so early in their probe, said they are examining the cockpit controls and other mechanical issues after a 90-minute interview with the pilot yesterday.
"The pilot stated that the flight was uneventful until the moment of liftoff," Debbie Hersman, a spokeswoman for the National Transportation Safety Board, said at a news conference yesterday.
"He got only one inch of movement from the yoke (the control wheel)," Hersman said. "He hit the brakes and the thrust reversers ... and tried to identify a path to steer it to."
Normally a pilot needs to move the control wheel, or yoke, three or four inches back toward himself to sufficiently raise the nose of the plane for takeoff, Hersman said.
"He told our investigators he didn't get the response he needed," Hersman said.
The pilot's account was consistent with some information retrieved from the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, and video footage of the aircraft on the runway taken from an airport security camera, according to Hersman...
...The NTSB has found no evidence that ice was present on the plane when it crashed. A preliminary review of video footage that shows the airplane on the runway showed there was no signs of frost on the windshield when the plane took off, according to Hersman.
...Moulis said both pilots "pulled and pulled and pulled," on the control wheel at the point they should have taken off, "but it wouldn't go and they realized the plane wasn't going to get off the ground."
After the crash, Kimberling crawled on his hands and knees with a broken leg, touching every seat in the aircraft to make sure no one was left inside, his lawyer said.
...A woman described as a cabin aide, Angelica Calad-Gomez, helped passengers out of the plane. "She was a real hero. She was soaked in fuel and kept going back to make sure everyone was off the plane," Moulis said.
According to FAA records, Kimberling has logged 15,805 flight hours and is licensed to fly five different kinds of jets. Salaverria has logged 4,800 flight hours and is licensed to fly one type of jet. Records show neither pilot has ever been disciplined.
...The plane involved in the crash was originally used by the Canadian military in the 1980s, is one of the original and oldest of the Challenger jets manufactured and has 6,800 flight hours and 4,300 take-offs and landings, according to the NTSB.
Investigators are also struggling to decode the flight data recorder information and determine why it only recorded 10 seconds of the 43 seconds from the time the plane revved up to impact. The information gleaned so far shows the plane was going 176 mph when the recorder was switched on, and 104 mph when it was turned off, sometime after the aborted takeoff...
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey...5594311120.xml
Tells investigators cockpit wheel stuck
Saturday, February 05, 2005
BY ANA M. ALAYA
Star-Ledger Staff
The pilot of a corporate jet that sped off a runway at Teterboro Airport and smashed into a warehouse told investigators yesterday that the control wheel malfunctioned, forcing him to abruptly abort takeoff.
But the 58-year-old veteran pilot slammed on the brakes and slowed the plane from 176 mph to 104 mph in 10 seconds, which one aviation expert said made the crash "survivable." He also steered the plane to a less crowded area of Route 46.
"He hit the brakes so hard he has bruises all over his feet," said Michael A. Moulis, a lawyer for pilot John Kimberling and Platinum Jet Management, the company that was operating the Bombardier CL-600 Challenger that rammed into a clothing warehouse Wednesday, injuring 20.
The plane, carrying eight passengers, careened down a 6,000-foot runway, crashed through a fence and slid across busy Route 46, hitting two cars before smacking into the garage door of the warehouse and bursting into flames.
Federal investigators, while declining to pinpoint a control wheel malfunction as the cause of the crash so early in their probe, said they are examining the cockpit controls and other mechanical issues after a 90-minute interview with the pilot yesterday.
"The pilot stated that the flight was uneventful until the moment of liftoff," Debbie Hersman, a spokeswoman for the National Transportation Safety Board, said at a news conference yesterday.
"He got only one inch of movement from the yoke (the control wheel)," Hersman said. "He hit the brakes and the thrust reversers ... and tried to identify a path to steer it to."
Normally a pilot needs to move the control wheel, or yoke, three or four inches back toward himself to sufficiently raise the nose of the plane for takeoff, Hersman said.
"He told our investigators he didn't get the response he needed," Hersman said.
The pilot's account was consistent with some information retrieved from the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, and video footage of the aircraft on the runway taken from an airport security camera, according to Hersman...
...The NTSB has found no evidence that ice was present on the plane when it crashed. A preliminary review of video footage that shows the airplane on the runway showed there was no signs of frost on the windshield when the plane took off, according to Hersman.
...Moulis said both pilots "pulled and pulled and pulled," on the control wheel at the point they should have taken off, "but it wouldn't go and they realized the plane wasn't going to get off the ground."
After the crash, Kimberling crawled on his hands and knees with a broken leg, touching every seat in the aircraft to make sure no one was left inside, his lawyer said.
...A woman described as a cabin aide, Angelica Calad-Gomez, helped passengers out of the plane. "She was a real hero. She was soaked in fuel and kept going back to make sure everyone was off the plane," Moulis said.
According to FAA records, Kimberling has logged 15,805 flight hours and is licensed to fly five different kinds of jets. Salaverria has logged 4,800 flight hours and is licensed to fly one type of jet. Records show neither pilot has ever been disciplined.
...The plane involved in the crash was originally used by the Canadian military in the 1980s, is one of the original and oldest of the Challenger jets manufactured and has 6,800 flight hours and 4,300 take-offs and landings, according to the NTSB.
Investigators are also struggling to decode the flight data recorder information and determine why it only recorded 10 seconds of the 43 seconds from the time the plane revved up to impact. The information gleaned so far shows the plane was going 176 mph when the recorder was switched on, and 104 mph when it was turned off, sometime after the aborted takeoff...
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey...5594311120.xml
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Isn't that what the pre-flight checks are for ??
Whilst not wishing to condemn the pilot, who may well have done everything by the book, but surely, testing all flight control surfaces is a basic first principal of operation before attempting to take to the air.
Of course, its possible that the pilot did have full movement, and a few minutes the mech broke/froze etc.
A tad unlucky to say the least if this happened
Whilst not wishing to condemn the pilot, who may well have done everything by the book, but surely, testing all flight control surfaces is a basic first principal of operation before attempting to take to the air.
Of course, its possible that the pilot did have full movement, and a few minutes the mech broke/froze etc.
A tad unlucky to say the least if this happened
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Sounds like a "interesting moment". Will be interesting to see what the cause is.
Sounds like his lawyer doesn't miss a trick :-)
After the crash, Kimberling crawled on his hands and knees with a broken leg, touching every seat in the aircraft to make sure no one was left inside, his lawyer said
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One Theory might be......
Credibility Check Required on this
Theory
Snow accumulates on horizontal stabilizer overnight
Pilots would need ladder to check on that (stab's top surface). Some operators leave hoz stab in LE fully up posn overnight for wind.
FBO staff brush any snow off wings before crew arrives to man up
Pilots check wings by touch (in accordance with NTSB's recent rec - which doesn't mention tail surfaces anywhere)
Wings are found to be clean by pilots - so pilots agree on no need for de-icing (as did many other a/c that morning)
After start up, idling hot air exhaust rises and gradually melts snow on hoz stab which runs back and collects in elevator hinge area or,
because of dihedral/relative wind, runs in and collects in the hinge-line and on inboard elevator areas, but up against the vert fin.
Pilots check elevator controls on taxi during checks and they're OK. Something as simple as the full and free check could cause water/slush
to flow to areas it wouldn't otherwise access (and there, not exposed to engine idling efflux, re-freeze in the ambient temps).
Water remains liquid until aircraft turns across the surface wind (or downwind) in the hold position, whereupon it re-freezes in 20 deg F temps (no hot air)
Lined up and on take-off roll, any wind would be taking the exhaust further rearwards before rising (i.w. wouldn't re-melt ice)
On take-off pilot detects the ice restriction at rotate and is forced to abort/reject shortly after (understandably)
Theory holds only for the actual ability of the elevator hingeline (or a recess) to hold liquid slush (??)
Theory
Snow accumulates on horizontal stabilizer overnight
Pilots would need ladder to check on that (stab's top surface). Some operators leave hoz stab in LE fully up posn overnight for wind.
FBO staff brush any snow off wings before crew arrives to man up
Pilots check wings by touch (in accordance with NTSB's recent rec - which doesn't mention tail surfaces anywhere)
Wings are found to be clean by pilots - so pilots agree on no need for de-icing (as did many other a/c that morning)
After start up, idling hot air exhaust rises and gradually melts snow on hoz stab which runs back and collects in elevator hinge area or,
because of dihedral/relative wind, runs in and collects in the hinge-line and on inboard elevator areas, but up against the vert fin.
Pilots check elevator controls on taxi during checks and they're OK. Something as simple as the full and free check could cause water/slush
to flow to areas it wouldn't otherwise access (and there, not exposed to engine idling efflux, re-freeze in the ambient temps).
Water remains liquid until aircraft turns across the surface wind (or downwind) in the hold position, whereupon it re-freezes in 20 deg F temps (no hot air)
Lined up and on take-off roll, any wind would be taking the exhaust further rearwards before rising (i.w. wouldn't re-melt ice)
On take-off pilot detects the ice restriction at rotate and is forced to abort/reject shortly after (understandably)
Theory holds only for the actual ability of the elevator hingeline (or a recess) to hold liquid slush (??)
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Okay folks, here's some food for thought regarding the controls.
After thinking about this (we had a late sn 600 we operated for 11 years, now in the 604), we wondered if the autopilot might have inadvertently been engaged. If so, the airplane would have tracked alright down the runway if the heading bug was aligned, but when he went to rotate he wouldn't have been able to.
In the 600 you taxi, takeoff and land with the yaw damper engaged. Every now and then (in the 600, the 601, and 604 have a different system) the yaw damper will kick off during the taxi, or takeoff roll. Has something to do with what the yaw damper perceives when you hit a bump (on the taxiway or runway) a certain way, can't remember all the details now, it's been awhile since I've been in a 600 (never does this in the air though).
The Master Caution will flash and the Flight Controls light on the 8/10 overhead panel will come on. With experience in the 600 the PNF will just reach down and re-engage the yaw damper which kills the Master Caution.
Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.
Just stuff we were thinking about yesterday.
CL
After thinking about this (we had a late sn 600 we operated for 11 years, now in the 604), we wondered if the autopilot might have inadvertently been engaged. If so, the airplane would have tracked alright down the runway if the heading bug was aligned, but when he went to rotate he wouldn't have been able to.
In the 600 you taxi, takeoff and land with the yaw damper engaged. Every now and then (in the 600, the 601, and 604 have a different system) the yaw damper will kick off during the taxi, or takeoff roll. Has something to do with what the yaw damper perceives when you hit a bump (on the taxiway or runway) a certain way, can't remember all the details now, it's been awhile since I've been in a 600 (never does this in the air though).
The Master Caution will flash and the Flight Controls light on the 8/10 overhead panel will come on. With experience in the 600 the PNF will just reach down and re-engage the yaw damper which kills the Master Caution.
Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.
Just stuff we were thinking about yesterday.
CL
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Well, we've had two different sets of rules apparently for the B737NG, which are not entirely in agreement. The one VK quotes allows it. the one None quotes does not.
Personally, I would not fly on any aircraft with ice or frost on the upper surface, and if I saw it while seated as a pax would draw crew attention to it.
If they showed no signs of concern I would deplane myself, regardless of how upset the cabin crew or airline got. I have no desire to die as a pax when I know the aircraft is in a fundamentally unsafe condition. I regard my life as worth far more than the cost of a ticket on a different airline.
Personally, I would not fly on any aircraft with ice or frost on the upper surface, and if I saw it while seated as a pax would draw crew attention to it.
If they showed no signs of concern I would deplane myself, regardless of how upset the cabin crew or airline got. I have no desire to die as a pax when I know the aircraft is in a fundamentally unsafe condition. I regard my life as worth far more than the cost of a ticket on a different airline.
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>>If they showed no signs of concern I would deplane myself, regardless of how upset the cabin crew or airline got.
I'm sure you'd be more comfortable on the train...
>>Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.<<
LNAV and VNAV on the Boeings are implemented the same way, similar buttons next to each other. On a heavyweight takeoff at night with turbulence it is easy to hit the wrong one after takeoff giving you a power reduction when you least need it. Not that I've ever done that...
Will the autopilot engage on the ground in the CL?
I'm sure you'd be more comfortable on the train...
>>Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.<<
LNAV and VNAV on the Boeings are implemented the same way, similar buttons next to each other. On a heavyweight takeoff at night with turbulence it is easy to hit the wrong one after takeoff giving you a power reduction when you least need it. Not that I've ever done that...
Will the autopilot engage on the ground in the CL?
Sims Fly Virtually
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Due to our location, we tanker LOTS of fuel
!!!!!!Thanks for the "very mini-bash" last summer - seem to have lost your email addy - it sure was a relief!!!
Interesting theory about the slush/ice on the high tail (why do they still put the tail on the top of the fin, with all the problems that has caused in the past?)
Obviously we have to wait for the results of the inquiry, but that sort of thing gets us thinking . . .
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Upper wing ice due to fuel? Very nervous indeed.
I should go find the NRC report, it's pretty sobering reading for anyone thinking about wing contamination.
If the choice were to fly with a dangerous wing state or take the train, you bet your life I'd take the train. "bet your life" not being a phrase chosen by accident.
There's enough ways to die on an aircraft without adding to them needlessly.
I should go find the NRC report, it's pretty sobering reading for anyone thinking about wing contamination.
If the choice were to fly with a dangerous wing state or take the train, you bet your life I'd take the train. "bet your life" not being a phrase chosen by accident.
There's enough ways to die on an aircraft without adding to them needlessly.
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Thanks to CL-Driver for posting some intelligent and obviously experienced comments regarding this type. I seriously doubt that critical surface contamination will be an issue in this one.
It will be most interesting to see how the FDR recorded any flight control checks during the pre-take-off checklist, and if this apparent failure to achieve any signifcant elevator movement during rotation is in fact genuine.
Obviously runway 06 at TEB is not overly long for a CL-600 operation so it wouldn't need much of an excursion beyond V! while the crew determined the aircraft was unflyable before an over-run accident was inevitable.
It will be most interesting to see how the FDR recorded any flight control checks during the pre-take-off checklist, and if this apparent failure to achieve any signifcant elevator movement during rotation is in fact genuine.
Obviously runway 06 at TEB is not overly long for a CL-600 operation so it wouldn't need much of an excursion beyond V! while the crew determined the aircraft was unflyable before an over-run accident was inevitable.
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Without prejudice on cause, just trying to end some wild speculations on CL600 systems.
1. There are no gust locks on any Challenger (or RJ). The Elevators are powered by triplicated hydraulic power drive units.
2. Even if the (Sperry) Autopilot was engaged, it should be possible to manually overpower it - there is a break-out clutch in the mechanical circuit between the AP servo and the cable drum. This is a test that the authorities regularly repeat for themselves during certification.
3. The lack of FDR data is explained by a lot of recorders only being turned on when the logic goes weight off wheels and off when back on ground. Production systems on later CL604s & RJs also turn on when the R Engine starter (604) or any strobe light is switched on (RJ) so that the FDR is running (or should be) during engine start and then for the duration of the flight. The CVR should be on from initial power up but may have only 30 minutes duration before recordings are overwritten.
1. There are no gust locks on any Challenger (or RJ). The Elevators are powered by triplicated hydraulic power drive units.
2. Even if the (Sperry) Autopilot was engaged, it should be possible to manually overpower it - there is a break-out clutch in the mechanical circuit between the AP servo and the cable drum. This is a test that the authorities regularly repeat for themselves during certification.
3. The lack of FDR data is explained by a lot of recorders only being turned on when the logic goes weight off wheels and off when back on ground. Production systems on later CL604s & RJs also turn on when the R Engine starter (604) or any strobe light is switched on (RJ) so that the FDR is running (or should be) during engine start and then for the duration of the flight. The CVR should be on from initial power up but may have only 30 minutes duration before recordings are overwritten.