China Airlines taxi-way take-off!
The Reverend
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"Do not EVER (NEVER EVER) say: It couldnīt happen to me!!"
Truer words were never spoken. Happened before and will happen again. A few that come to mind; DC-8 that came to grief on a taxiway takeoff attempt next to RW18 EDDL, Singapore Airlines attempted T/O on RW05R RCTP, Singapore Airlines that just made it over the fence by taking off on (wrong) RW09 YMLL. A few operators, including Qantas who landed at Changi instead of Paya Lebar in the sixties. So, there by the grace of God.....
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>
Truer words were never spoken. Happened before and will happen again. A few that come to mind; DC-8 that came to grief on a taxiway takeoff attempt next to RW18 EDDL, Singapore Airlines attempted T/O on RW05R RCTP, Singapore Airlines that just made it over the fence by taking off on (wrong) RW09 YMLL. A few operators, including Qantas who landed at Changi instead of Paya Lebar in the sixties. So, there by the grace of God.....
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>
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Following is a piece I wrote for our in house publication (safety committee) with references to specific carrier omited. Permision granted for reprint/republication - no copyright.
RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION – THE FAA’S NUMBER ONE SAFETY PRIORITY. . . .15:15:20 TWR Singapore six, Runway zero-five left, wind zero two zero an . .eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff. . .15:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero-five left, Singapore Six.. .15:15:31 CA OK, man… . .15:15:34 FO OK, checks below the line; Cabin Announcement complete. . .15:15:37 FO Packs . .15:15:38 CA OK, norm, eh… . .15:15:39 FO Norm . .15:15:40 FO Strobes on; landing lights all on. . .15:15:44 FO Takeoff clearance. . .15:15:45 CA Obtained, hah… . .15:15:46 FO Obtained, Sir. . .15:15:47 CA OK, thanks. . .15:15:48 FO Before Takeoff checklist completed. . .15:15:50 CAM Sound of click . .15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here. . .15:15:52 CA It going to be very slippery, I am going to slow down a bit, . .turn here. . .15:15:53 FO Turning that… . .15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…. .(Note – The PVD is the “Para Visual Display”, a localizer based low visability takeoff aid that is an option on the 747-400) . .15:16:10 CA Yeah, we gotta line up first. . .15:16:12 OBS We need forty-five degrees. . .15:16:15 FO I see, excellent man… . .15:16:16 CA Yah. . .15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway, . .not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero . .is from the left, lah OK. . .15:16:27 FO OK. . .15:16:30 CAM (Sound of windshield wipers going to HIGH speed) . .15:16:31 FO Ready Sir, zero two zero check OK. . .15:16:33 CA Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh, OK. Cabin . .reported, eh… . .15:16:37 FO Yah, cabin is ready. . .15:16:37 CA OK, thanks. . .15:16:37 FO Yup, thanks. . .15:16:43 FO OK, thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:43 FO Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CA OK, Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CAM (Sound of engines spooling up) . .15:16:54 OBS Hold. . .15:16:54 FO Hold.. . . .15:17:13 FO V 1. . . .15:17:17 CA Something there. . . .Sounds of impact. . . . . . The 747-400 slammed into barricades and construction equipment at the end of the closed runway 05R in Taipei and burst into flames. Eighty-three of the one hundred seventy nine persons onboard died. As reported previously, our gateway personnel and pilots assisted in the rescue of some injured passengers.. . . . And so ends the most recent fatal example of an air carrier runway incursion, defined by the FAA as “any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object in loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land”. The FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, has stated “Runway incursions are the number one safety problem today”. The largest loss of life accident in aviation history, the collision of two B747’s on the runway at Tenerife, was essentially a runway incursion accident, resulting in the death of 583 crew and passengers. . . . . There has been a dramatic increase in the number of runway incursions in recent years (see chart), with pilot deviations being the majority cause of these incursions. The FAA and NASA have embarked on a number of initiatives, both ground and cockpit based, to combat the rising rate of incursions, but many of these involve new technologies and equipment that will take years to design, certificate, and implement. The most pressing issue is what can we do NOW as crewmembers to prevent a runway incursion. Our operation has some unique characteristics that I believe predisposes us more than many passenger carriers to an incursion incident/accident. Majority night operations, the attending fatigue (pilots and controllers), lower visibilities, poorly lit/marked cargo taxiways and ramps all provide more opportunity for the inadvertent incursion. This article will first review our procedures with relation to avoiding an incursion, and then present some techniques culled from some of our pilots and other operators, which may be of assistance in avoiding an incursion.. . . . First, the procedures. In addition to following the guidelines provided in part 91 of the F.A.R.’s and the Airman’s Information Manual, a recent bulletin, now incorporated into the F.O.M., requires crews to conduct a taxi briefing of the expected route from the ramp to the assigned runway for takeoff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all our crews are not always accomplishing this mandated briefing. If there is an incursion, and there has not been a taxi brief, explaining both the incursion and violation of written company policy would be difficult at best. Both pilots are to display the Jeppesen Airport Plan View. If possible, conduct the takeoff briefing prior to block out to prevent it from being a distraction during taxi. Second Officers should monitor taxi progress and be particularly alert during runway crossings. Approach briefings are now required to include an expected taxi route briefing and, once again, both pilots are required to have in view the airport diagram. Briefing of SMGS lighting and special taxi routes are required for low visibility operation.. . . . Now, some techniques that may help in preventing an incursion. These have been solicited from our pilots and pilots of other carriers. My definition of a technique is using a tool that is not procedurally required (F.A.R., F.O.M., or A.O.M.). Some of these items are procedurally required at other airlines.. . . . For those of us who spend time squinting at the airport diagram trying to determine the difference between taxiway E and F on the chart (sometimes harder than the FAA first class eye exam), a suggestion. Enlarge the 10-9 page on a copier (most gateways have one). 130% enlargement of the 10-9 page just about fills an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper. Easier viewing and because it is a copy of a source document, you can mark it up to show closed/restricted taxiways, notes, etc. Another source for taxiway diagrams is on the web. AOPA, in conjunction with the Flight Safety Foundation, sponsor a public web page (no membership required) with over 400 pages of airport diagrams. They may be found at <a href="http://www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/" target="_blank">www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/</a>. . . . Some carriers now recommend/require the use of certain lights when crossing an active runway. Wing inspection and strobes on while crossing an active runway make an aircraft infinitely more visible. Announcement of and visual clearing of both sides of the aircraft when crossing an active runway is imperative.. . . . The act of taxiing a transport aircraft in many minds is a “captain only” event. (Witness the CVR transcript at the beginning of this piece). In all our aircraft except the B747, there is only a tiller on the left side, reinforcing this perception. This sometimes results in the First Officer being not fully in the loop or situationally aware during the taxi. To combat this mindset, some captains let the first officers taxi the aircraft. When the task is shifted to the First Officer, his/her situational awareness is dramatically increased and it allows the captain to monitor rather than perform a sometimes tedious and consuming task. Obviously, the captain will have to make the “tiller turns” in most of our aircraft but for some, this works to make taxiing a safer event.. . . . Our F.O.M. recommends crosschecking heading information when aligned on the runway for takeoff, but another check is helpful. If the runway has a localizer, use it for runway confirmation before takeoff (In the Singapore 006 accident, procedurally it was used, (PVD), but apparently disregarded by the captain). This is especially important in a low visibility environment. In B757/767 aircraft, make sure the aircraft is showing on the center of the runway on the lowest map range (non GPS/Pegasus aircraft may show a very slight displacement dependant on accuracy of position at alignment and drift rate).. . . . One of the many initiatives of the FAA in regard to runway incursions is a proposed “Runway Hot Spot” list and website. The purpose of this site is to list runways that are particularly susceptible to incursion due to their surrounding environment (poor lighting, signage, proximity to other runways, etc.). The safety committee is actively soliciting your submission of confusing/dangerous taxi routes and procedures from our gateways. These will be reported in the (in house pulication) as well as listed on the *** website.. . . . . . As a final note, I would like to say to all First officers and Second officers – please be assertive in your observations/perceptions during taxi. In preparation and research for this article, I have read tens of accident/incident reports where the F/O or F/E recognized and/or announced an impending incursion, and was not assertive enough to stop the progress of the incursion (see transcript above, as well as the Tenerife accident) F/O’s, you may not have a tiller, but you have brakes – if not comfortable prior to the takeoff roll, use them and discuss it later. Taking control of the aircraft from the captain is one of the toughest calls in the business, but history shows it would have prevented a number of incursion disasters.. . . . Be careful out there.. . . . . . . . . . . .(Referenced chart below). . . . . . . . . .Year OE PD VPD Total. .1988 89 68 30 187. .1989 80 83 60 223. .1990 100 119 62 281. .1991 74 102 66 242. .1992 90 92 37 219. .1993 74 84 28 186. .1994 83 66 51 200. .1995 65 125 50 240. .1996 69 146 60 275. .1997 87 132 73 292. .1998 91 183 51 325. .1999 78 182 61 321. .2000 88 257 84 429. .SOURCE: RUNWAY SAFETY PROGRAM OFFICEKEY: OE = Operational ErrorPD = Pilot DeviationVPD = Vehicle / Pedestrian. . . . . . . .Web references and research sources:. . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/</a>. . . . <a href="http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm" target="_blank">http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm" target="_blank">http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm</a>
RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION – THE FAA’S NUMBER ONE SAFETY PRIORITY. . . .15:15:20 TWR Singapore six, Runway zero-five left, wind zero two zero an . .eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff. . .15:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero-five left, Singapore Six.. .15:15:31 CA OK, man… . .15:15:34 FO OK, checks below the line; Cabin Announcement complete. . .15:15:37 FO Packs . .15:15:38 CA OK, norm, eh… . .15:15:39 FO Norm . .15:15:40 FO Strobes on; landing lights all on. . .15:15:44 FO Takeoff clearance. . .15:15:45 CA Obtained, hah… . .15:15:46 FO Obtained, Sir. . .15:15:47 CA OK, thanks. . .15:15:48 FO Before Takeoff checklist completed. . .15:15:50 CAM Sound of click . .15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here. . .15:15:52 CA It going to be very slippery, I am going to slow down a bit, . .turn here. . .15:15:53 FO Turning that… . .15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…. .(Note – The PVD is the “Para Visual Display”, a localizer based low visability takeoff aid that is an option on the 747-400) . .15:16:10 CA Yeah, we gotta line up first. . .15:16:12 OBS We need forty-five degrees. . .15:16:15 FO I see, excellent man… . .15:16:16 CA Yah. . .15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway, . .not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero . .is from the left, lah OK. . .15:16:27 FO OK. . .15:16:30 CAM (Sound of windshield wipers going to HIGH speed) . .15:16:31 FO Ready Sir, zero two zero check OK. . .15:16:33 CA Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh, OK. Cabin . .reported, eh… . .15:16:37 FO Yah, cabin is ready. . .15:16:37 CA OK, thanks. . .15:16:37 FO Yup, thanks. . .15:16:43 FO OK, thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:43 FO Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CA OK, Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CAM (Sound of engines spooling up) . .15:16:54 OBS Hold. . .15:16:54 FO Hold.. . . .15:17:13 FO V 1. . . .15:17:17 CA Something there. . . .Sounds of impact. . . . . . The 747-400 slammed into barricades and construction equipment at the end of the closed runway 05R in Taipei and burst into flames. Eighty-three of the one hundred seventy nine persons onboard died. As reported previously, our gateway personnel and pilots assisted in the rescue of some injured passengers.. . . . And so ends the most recent fatal example of an air carrier runway incursion, defined by the FAA as “any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object in loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land”. The FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, has stated “Runway incursions are the number one safety problem today”. The largest loss of life accident in aviation history, the collision of two B747’s on the runway at Tenerife, was essentially a runway incursion accident, resulting in the death of 583 crew and passengers. . . . . There has been a dramatic increase in the number of runway incursions in recent years (see chart), with pilot deviations being the majority cause of these incursions. The FAA and NASA have embarked on a number of initiatives, both ground and cockpit based, to combat the rising rate of incursions, but many of these involve new technologies and equipment that will take years to design, certificate, and implement. The most pressing issue is what can we do NOW as crewmembers to prevent a runway incursion. Our operation has some unique characteristics that I believe predisposes us more than many passenger carriers to an incursion incident/accident. Majority night operations, the attending fatigue (pilots and controllers), lower visibilities, poorly lit/marked cargo taxiways and ramps all provide more opportunity for the inadvertent incursion. This article will first review our procedures with relation to avoiding an incursion, and then present some techniques culled from some of our pilots and other operators, which may be of assistance in avoiding an incursion.. . . . First, the procedures. In addition to following the guidelines provided in part 91 of the F.A.R.’s and the Airman’s Information Manual, a recent bulletin, now incorporated into the F.O.M., requires crews to conduct a taxi briefing of the expected route from the ramp to the assigned runway for takeoff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all our crews are not always accomplishing this mandated briefing. If there is an incursion, and there has not been a taxi brief, explaining both the incursion and violation of written company policy would be difficult at best. Both pilots are to display the Jeppesen Airport Plan View. If possible, conduct the takeoff briefing prior to block out to prevent it from being a distraction during taxi. Second Officers should monitor taxi progress and be particularly alert during runway crossings. Approach briefings are now required to include an expected taxi route briefing and, once again, both pilots are required to have in view the airport diagram. Briefing of SMGS lighting and special taxi routes are required for low visibility operation.. . . . Now, some techniques that may help in preventing an incursion. These have been solicited from our pilots and pilots of other carriers. My definition of a technique is using a tool that is not procedurally required (F.A.R., F.O.M., or A.O.M.). Some of these items are procedurally required at other airlines.. . . . For those of us who spend time squinting at the airport diagram trying to determine the difference between taxiway E and F on the chart (sometimes harder than the FAA first class eye exam), a suggestion. Enlarge the 10-9 page on a copier (most gateways have one). 130% enlargement of the 10-9 page just about fills an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper. Easier viewing and because it is a copy of a source document, you can mark it up to show closed/restricted taxiways, notes, etc. Another source for taxiway diagrams is on the web. AOPA, in conjunction with the Flight Safety Foundation, sponsor a public web page (no membership required) with over 400 pages of airport diagrams. They may be found at <a href="http://www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/" target="_blank">www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/</a>. . . . Some carriers now recommend/require the use of certain lights when crossing an active runway. Wing inspection and strobes on while crossing an active runway make an aircraft infinitely more visible. Announcement of and visual clearing of both sides of the aircraft when crossing an active runway is imperative.. . . . The act of taxiing a transport aircraft in many minds is a “captain only” event. (Witness the CVR transcript at the beginning of this piece). In all our aircraft except the B747, there is only a tiller on the left side, reinforcing this perception. This sometimes results in the First Officer being not fully in the loop or situationally aware during the taxi. To combat this mindset, some captains let the first officers taxi the aircraft. When the task is shifted to the First Officer, his/her situational awareness is dramatically increased and it allows the captain to monitor rather than perform a sometimes tedious and consuming task. Obviously, the captain will have to make the “tiller turns” in most of our aircraft but for some, this works to make taxiing a safer event.. . . . Our F.O.M. recommends crosschecking heading information when aligned on the runway for takeoff, but another check is helpful. If the runway has a localizer, use it for runway confirmation before takeoff (In the Singapore 006 accident, procedurally it was used, (PVD), but apparently disregarded by the captain). This is especially important in a low visibility environment. In B757/767 aircraft, make sure the aircraft is showing on the center of the runway on the lowest map range (non GPS/Pegasus aircraft may show a very slight displacement dependant on accuracy of position at alignment and drift rate).. . . . One of the many initiatives of the FAA in regard to runway incursions is a proposed “Runway Hot Spot” list and website. The purpose of this site is to list runways that are particularly susceptible to incursion due to their surrounding environment (poor lighting, signage, proximity to other runways, etc.). The safety committee is actively soliciting your submission of confusing/dangerous taxi routes and procedures from our gateways. These will be reported in the (in house pulication) as well as listed on the *** website.. . . . . . As a final note, I would like to say to all First officers and Second officers – please be assertive in your observations/perceptions during taxi. In preparation and research for this article, I have read tens of accident/incident reports where the F/O or F/E recognized and/or announced an impending incursion, and was not assertive enough to stop the progress of the incursion (see transcript above, as well as the Tenerife accident) F/O’s, you may not have a tiller, but you have brakes – if not comfortable prior to the takeoff roll, use them and discuss it later. Taking control of the aircraft from the captain is one of the toughest calls in the business, but history shows it would have prevented a number of incursion disasters.. . . . Be careful out there.. . . . . . . . . . . .(Referenced chart below). . . . . . . . . .Year OE PD VPD Total. .1988 89 68 30 187. .1989 80 83 60 223. .1990 100 119 62 281. .1991 74 102 66 242. .1992 90 92 37 219. .1993 74 84 28 186. .1994 83 66 51 200. .1995 65 125 50 240. .1996 69 146 60 275. .1997 87 132 73 292. .1998 91 183 51 325. .1999 78 182 61 321. .2000 88 257 84 429. .SOURCE: RUNWAY SAFETY PROGRAM OFFICEKEY: OE = Operational ErrorPD = Pilot DeviationVPD = Vehicle / Pedestrian. . . . . . . .Web references and research sources:. . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/</a>. . . . <a href="http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm" target="_blank">http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm" target="_blank">http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm</a>
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I've seen this kneejerk action so many times, and it does not work. Before long the crews are talking constantly about what they are doing and seeing and what they are intending to do, to the point that the flying pilot has to tune it all out in order to concentrate on what is important to him at the time. Witness the number of times the reponse of "SET" is made when the flap, gear, hydraulic etc is not in fact set. And the number of times a routine call is made and it is not understood. It may be acknowledged, but that does not mean it is understood.
As a voice in the wilderness, I plead for you all to put away the claptrap and go back to using the manufacturer's procedures, which include callouts. If the non-flying pilot says ANYTHING it should be IMPORTANT and the flying pilot will then know that he must pay attention. During critical procedures (takeoff, approach and landing) the non-flying pilot should maintain silence unless he sees something that is not right, and then he should call out in a loud clear voice.
Calling the FMA, EICAS etc when the messages are routine, is a waste of time and distracting. It concentrates the attentionm on something that is operating normally and might prevent the pilots from seeing something going wrong, in enough time to prevent the accident.
The continuous chatter I have to put up with is annoying, at the least, and those of you who do not notice it are, I suggest, tuning it out. If there was some nugget of good information in there, you would miss it.
Briefing the taxi route is an example of this. In most cases, you are taxiing on your own home airport, which you know very well. Or the point of takeoff can be seen from the parking position, there is only one way to get to the takeoff point, etc. In these cases, nothing need be said (including the utterly stupid instruction to "make standard calls"). If the route is different, or new, or there might be a possibility of confusion, then brief accordingly (see the Boeing TM for details). And how do you know you are going to get the shortest route? You might be sent along some different path, and what happens to your briefing then?
Some runways do not have the number painted on them, or the displaced threshold is too far from the numbers to see them, or they might be covered in light snow. What happpens then to those of you who cannot think without talking, or who need to be told what to think? Gimme a break.
(If the airplane has an ND, then look at the Map to be sure you are in the right general position, and use the airport diagram to make sure it is the right runway. This should be normal procedure and does not require a reminder, or a briefing).
Whenever you open your mouth, make sure you are telling the other guy what he needs to know, and discourage the verbal diahhrea.
You cannot legislate safety. It comes from experience and training, and needs a good application of intelligence. For you managers out there: You have to be able to give your pilots the best training you can, and then leave them to do their job. Stop trying to look over their shoulder all the time. What would you rather have, automatons who cannot think outside the box, or intelligent, well trained pilots who will be able to handle anything that comes at them?
As a voice in the wilderness, I plead for you all to put away the claptrap and go back to using the manufacturer's procedures, which include callouts. If the non-flying pilot says ANYTHING it should be IMPORTANT and the flying pilot will then know that he must pay attention. During critical procedures (takeoff, approach and landing) the non-flying pilot should maintain silence unless he sees something that is not right, and then he should call out in a loud clear voice.
Calling the FMA, EICAS etc when the messages are routine, is a waste of time and distracting. It concentrates the attentionm on something that is operating normally and might prevent the pilots from seeing something going wrong, in enough time to prevent the accident.
The continuous chatter I have to put up with is annoying, at the least, and those of you who do not notice it are, I suggest, tuning it out. If there was some nugget of good information in there, you would miss it.
Briefing the taxi route is an example of this. In most cases, you are taxiing on your own home airport, which you know very well. Or the point of takeoff can be seen from the parking position, there is only one way to get to the takeoff point, etc. In these cases, nothing need be said (including the utterly stupid instruction to "make standard calls"). If the route is different, or new, or there might be a possibility of confusion, then brief accordingly (see the Boeing TM for details). And how do you know you are going to get the shortest route? You might be sent along some different path, and what happens to your briefing then?
Some runways do not have the number painted on them, or the displaced threshold is too far from the numbers to see them, or they might be covered in light snow. What happpens then to those of you who cannot think without talking, or who need to be told what to think? Gimme a break.
(If the airplane has an ND, then look at the Map to be sure you are in the right general position, and use the airport diagram to make sure it is the right runway. This should be normal procedure and does not require a reminder, or a briefing).
Whenever you open your mouth, make sure you are telling the other guy what he needs to know, and discourage the verbal diahhrea.
You cannot legislate safety. It comes from experience and training, and needs a good application of intelligence. For you managers out there: You have to be able to give your pilots the best training you can, and then leave them to do their job. Stop trying to look over their shoulder all the time. What would you rather have, automatons who cannot think outside the box, or intelligent, well trained pilots who will be able to handle anything that comes at them?
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charterguy ..... you are so right ..... take off clearance is granted by ATC from an agreed position on a specified runway ...... if signage at this position cannot confirm to the crew that they are in the agreed position for take off then it should be abandoned (close the Bxxxxxy airport if necessary) ...... after reading the various posts on this subject yesterday I went down to our local airport at lunchtime and watched a whole bunch of 330's and a MD11 take off for the U.S. ...... the thought of any of these guys rolling on the wrong runway and perhaps in the wrong direction just makes me feel ill!!!
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Taiwan airline grounds three pilots for wrong-way takeoff
TAIPEI, Monday January 28, 6:36 AM
Taiwan's China Airlines (CAL) grounded three pilots today for taking off on a wrong taxiway in Alaska on Friday, a mistake which could have caused serious consequences.
"This is a warning signal. CAL will step up flight safety training for its pilots," flight safety officer Yeh You-ching said.
CAL flight CI-011, an Airbus A-343, took off in the wrong direction and on a taxiway instead of a runway from Anchorage International Airport.
The plane departed safely carrying 226 people.
CAL - Taiwan's largest airline - has had a dozen fatal accidents since 1970.
TAIPEI, Monday January 28, 6:36 AM
Taiwan's China Airlines (CAL) grounded three pilots today for taking off on a wrong taxiway in Alaska on Friday, a mistake which could have caused serious consequences.
"This is a warning signal. CAL will step up flight safety training for its pilots," flight safety officer Yeh You-ching said.
CAL flight CI-011, an Airbus A-343, took off in the wrong direction and on a taxiway instead of a runway from Anchorage International Airport.
The plane departed safely carrying 226 people.
CAL - Taiwan's largest airline - has had a dozen fatal accidents since 1970.
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Actually HotDog...it was SQ on runway 27 at Melbourne....was on nightstop at the time...so I know. Get your facts straight....planned for 34 but headed to 27...lucky for them it "drops off" at the end. The tower mentioned they....went out of sight, and then slowly climbed away...weeds were found in the tail on landing in S'pore.. .Lucky boys, indeed. The Captain was sent back to the right seat...for a looooong time.. .My question is...why cannot "common sense" be introduced to the flight deck (for some operators)?. .Many lessons to be learned...from others' mistakes.
411A, Yet you still want the cheapest pilots you can get! When are you going to grow up and work with the pilots instead of against them?
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: BusyB ]</p>
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: BusyB ]</p>
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Shore Guy: Good info. Jeppesen also could improve its airport diagrams. For one thing it would help by colorizing more of its charts and putting the taxiway and intersection identifiers over the pavements rather than beside it. It would provide easier identification, especially with parallel, intersecting taxiways. . .I don't know current conditions at ANC, but I have been on snow covered airports where taxi lights were plowed over and where runway markings were not visible. Nevertheless, it always helps to have the Heading Bug on runway heading before spooling up for takeoff. <img src="frown.gif" border="0">
The Reverend
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You have hit the nail on the head, boofhead. We all started off with the manufacturers Flight Manuals, which al worked fine and refelected the training on the type. Invariably, within six months or a year, there would be several dozen amendments published to "improve" the manufacturers procedures. Then, if a new fleet manager or chief training captain got promoted, a new pile of amendments to the amendments were sure to follow. Glad I'm retired,in a way.
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>
[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>
Trash du Blanc
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Their heading bug was probably on 300 deg. for the departure turn.
I shall go back to putting runway heading on the bug for takeoff. FMS is great, but some of the old ways are still the best....
I shall go back to putting runway heading on the bug for takeoff. FMS is great, but some of the old ways are still the best....
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This may, or may not, belong on the current thread, but it's the aftermath of this incident.
Airport ill-prepared for major accident. .Airplane near-disaster focuses attention on problems.
By Zaz Hollander, Anchorage Daily News . .(Published: January 27, 2002)
[quote]A China Airlines airplane that narrowly avoided disaster early Friday in Anchorage handed the latest reality check to rescuers who say they're ill-prepared to save mass victims of a plane crash in Cook Inlet.
Federal and state officials say the incident at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport highlights the need for a large-scale rescue plan for the Inlet to prepare for the time when a pilot isn't so lucky.
"This thing that happened early (Friday) morning just reinforced that, in the most dramatic way short of killing someone," said Lt. Chuck Lamica, the Alaska State Troopers' statewide search-and-rescue coordinator.
Instructed by air traffic controllers to take off on a northbound runway just before 3 a.m., China Airlines pilots instead steered for a westbound takeoff on a taxiway that gave them 6,000 feet of asphalt instead of nearly 11,000. The takeoff was so close that the plane's landing gear left furrows in a snow berm at the taxiway's end.
The flight landed safely in Taipei with about 250 people aboard.
The airport presents some unusual rescue challenges. It sits next to a body of water bounded by mud flats that will drown a victim in glacial silt in summer. In winter, huge slabs of ice piled as high as 6 feet block passage by most rescue vehicles.
Because the China Airlines plane was flying low and slowly over flat terrain, "this could have been a very survivable accident," said Jim LaBelle, Alaska chief for the National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating. "But you're still in harm's way. You . . . need to be rescued in a timely fashion."
Emergency equipment on commercial airliners doesn't always work, LaBelle said. Evacuation slides can become too damaged to double as a life raft; cold water quickly eats away at a passenger's grip on a seat cushion.
Passengers in the water risk death from hypothermia within an hour, officials say.
Had the China Airlines plane crashed Friday, it would have taken some rescuers at least an hour to arrive, Lamica said.
Describing a scenario of post-crash events, he explained why:
Victims would be out of the reach of firetrucks and ambulances first on scene. The troopers' helicopter would arrive in about an hour, because the pilot would have to get to the hangar from home. Several Air National Guard helicopters launched from the Rescue Coordination Center at Fort Richardson could take up to two hours to get airborne.
A new hovercraft at the airport can't travel over ice slabs taller than 3 feet. Lamica said the only craft that could is something like the 100-foot-long hovercraft the Canadian Coast Guard bought for about $6 million.
"This crash . . . would have taxed us to the utmost," he said.
Nearly a dozen rescue agencies and others -- military, the Alaska Air Carriers Association, Anchorage police and fire departments, federal aviation officials and investigators -- met Jan. 18 to talk about Cook Inlet rescue preparedness. They realized they were unprepared for large-scale rescues after October's Era Aviation helicopter crash in Cook Inlet near the airport that killed three and injured two.
The group discussed the need to develop a comprehensive rescue plan that divides duties among agencies and how to get around logistical problems posed by the Inlet's unique conditions, questions that came disturbingly close to a test Friday, Lamica said.
"That is a problem that's going to require the assistance of many, many different groups and agencies. It's going to be a daunting task."<hr></blockquote>
Airport ill-prepared for major accident. .Airplane near-disaster focuses attention on problems.
By Zaz Hollander, Anchorage Daily News . .(Published: January 27, 2002)
[quote]A China Airlines airplane that narrowly avoided disaster early Friday in Anchorage handed the latest reality check to rescuers who say they're ill-prepared to save mass victims of a plane crash in Cook Inlet.
Federal and state officials say the incident at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport highlights the need for a large-scale rescue plan for the Inlet to prepare for the time when a pilot isn't so lucky.
"This thing that happened early (Friday) morning just reinforced that, in the most dramatic way short of killing someone," said Lt. Chuck Lamica, the Alaska State Troopers' statewide search-and-rescue coordinator.
Instructed by air traffic controllers to take off on a northbound runway just before 3 a.m., China Airlines pilots instead steered for a westbound takeoff on a taxiway that gave them 6,000 feet of asphalt instead of nearly 11,000. The takeoff was so close that the plane's landing gear left furrows in a snow berm at the taxiway's end.
The flight landed safely in Taipei with about 250 people aboard.
The airport presents some unusual rescue challenges. It sits next to a body of water bounded by mud flats that will drown a victim in glacial silt in summer. In winter, huge slabs of ice piled as high as 6 feet block passage by most rescue vehicles.
Because the China Airlines plane was flying low and slowly over flat terrain, "this could have been a very survivable accident," said Jim LaBelle, Alaska chief for the National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating. "But you're still in harm's way. You . . . need to be rescued in a timely fashion."
Emergency equipment on commercial airliners doesn't always work, LaBelle said. Evacuation slides can become too damaged to double as a life raft; cold water quickly eats away at a passenger's grip on a seat cushion.
Passengers in the water risk death from hypothermia within an hour, officials say.
Had the China Airlines plane crashed Friday, it would have taken some rescuers at least an hour to arrive, Lamica said.
Describing a scenario of post-crash events, he explained why:
Victims would be out of the reach of firetrucks and ambulances first on scene. The troopers' helicopter would arrive in about an hour, because the pilot would have to get to the hangar from home. Several Air National Guard helicopters launched from the Rescue Coordination Center at Fort Richardson could take up to two hours to get airborne.
A new hovercraft at the airport can't travel over ice slabs taller than 3 feet. Lamica said the only craft that could is something like the 100-foot-long hovercraft the Canadian Coast Guard bought for about $6 million.
"This crash . . . would have taxed us to the utmost," he said.
Nearly a dozen rescue agencies and others -- military, the Alaska Air Carriers Association, Anchorage police and fire departments, federal aviation officials and investigators -- met Jan. 18 to talk about Cook Inlet rescue preparedness. They realized they were unprepared for large-scale rescues after October's Era Aviation helicopter crash in Cook Inlet near the airport that killed three and injured two.
The group discussed the need to develop a comprehensive rescue plan that divides duties among agencies and how to get around logistical problems posed by the Inlet's unique conditions, questions that came disturbingly close to a test Friday, Lamica said.
"That is a problem that's going to require the assistance of many, many different groups and agencies. It's going to be a daunting task."<hr></blockquote>
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Well BusyB, salary does not always get the best guys...but it helps.. .Our guys are selected from prior companies that we know...and their predominate request is for....time off for vacations.. .Recall a few years ago was offered extra pay...or vacation days due...took the days (103) because you can never replace time off, unless you have kids in university...which I don't.. .Also have to agree with those that advocate a silent flight deck...unless something is...WRONG.. .Pro guys do NOT need the constant dialogue that was started by...AirBus.
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Some of the suggestions sound reasonable, but how much would it cost to have a couple of guys employed to 'guide' aircraft at unfamiliar fields to the active runway (especially at off peak times and in cr4p weather) - surely better for an airport to spend $100000 a year on this than the cost of cleaning up the almighty mess and aftermath.
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Hi all,. .Who still believes that any China Air or Korean Air, or similar, have a three man crew, it's always what the captain says goes, and the other two have to/will always go along regardless, might as well have rubber blow-up dolls in the other two seats for all the good they are!
Until that 'face saving' stupid approach is gotten around, these sorts of things will continue to occur.
Until that 'face saving' stupid approach is gotten around, these sorts of things will continue to occur.
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All,. . Check out <a href="http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0102/27/news.shtml" target="_blank">http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0102/27/news.shtml</a>
It has a graphic/picture of cleared vs. actual path.
It has a graphic/picture of cleared vs. actual path.
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The local English-speaking paper in Taipei, says that the cockpit voice recorder will not be any use, because it has a 2-hour life, and was in continuous use for the remainder of the flight. The Anchorage ATC recordings will be the only source.
[ 29 January 2002: Message edited by: newswatcher ]</p>
[ 29 January 2002: Message edited by: newswatcher ]</p>
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From flight intl back in Aug 1999 :. ." Every aircraft in the fleet has a flight operation data analysis system and each flight is automatically downloaded and reviewed. If any irregularity shows up, the pilot is interviewed, and if necessary, grounded for retraining" it goes on ....CAL boss says " There's nothing personal involved- it's all business" - from Liu himself.
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The CAL's Flight Safety office took and extraordinary decision, to set up flight safety training for its pilots. I wonder what have they been doing during all these past years? The big problem is Who are they going to start with? If, in the Anchorage A-340 were a DE(Designated Examiner) an Instructor Pilot and the F/O. . .If an airline can not guarantee a safe flight with this kind of team, what can be expected from line pilots? Something must be really wrong behind all this operations.. .Let's see, HotDog mentioned about the manuals being amended to often, right, there are changes to the SOPs every week. This has made the pilots wonder what is right and what is wrong. When they have to take a decision the first thing in their minds is, as Tg910 mentioned, the FODAS. This wonder of tecnology, which is used, in CAL, for punishment, not for airmanship improvement. There have been a lot of pilots fire and bunch more punished, but the same mistakes keep appearing.. .Something deep must be done.. .For Glueball, Jeppesen can make the most colourfull diagrams, but if the DE, CP, IP (which most of the times believes to be god), tells the F/O,don't worry I know this airport, I've been here thousand times, just turn here and here and...., it does't matter what kind of diagram you have, you must use it.. .If somebody have really good sugestions they will be welcome, or maybe new methods of punishment, these guys seem to love it.