AA MD82 Landing Incident?
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at my carrier, in conditions of reduced RVR or ceilings below CAT I it is manditory to be configured @ the marker with a monitored appr technique in use.
I don't know if AA uses monitored appr, but really, a ceiling of 100' and a g/s intercept @ 500'-600'?
WTF were they thinking!
I don't know if AA uses monitored appr, but really, a ceiling of 100' and a g/s intercept @ 500'-600'?
WTF were they thinking!
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Don't know if these 80's have glass cockpits. But the thing I like most about glass and the moving map display is that you can see a crap vector the instant you turn the heading bug.
A hard turn, excessive speed or held high at the marker shows itself in no uncertain turns. I don't think I could go back and fly those steam gage dinosaurs with any confidence.
I love my 737-800, the only way to fly!
A hard turn, excessive speed or held high at the marker shows itself in no uncertain turns. I don't think I could go back and fly those steam gage dinosaurs with any confidence.
I love my 737-800, the only way to fly!
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Shaman,
AA does not use the monitored type approach. Used to but that changed with the introduction of the B737 because the HUD is only available on the CA's side and so procedures across the fleets were changed in order to standardise this.
Cat 2 and 3 are now wholly flown from the left seat.
411A clearly forgets we've ALL been learning form the Wright Brother's and others experiences.I guess he/she was born a perfect pilot. Lucky him/her.
Statistically, the world's largest airline will likely incur the greatest number of incidents, everything else being equal.
Remember, Concorde was the safest airplane in the world until....
Also note, the NTSB statement has a disclaimer regarding the preliminary report's accuracy.
I re-viewed the DFDR data on Monday.
We will continue to learn from other's experiences (unless of course we feel we already know it all).
DD
AA does not use the monitored type approach. Used to but that changed with the introduction of the B737 because the HUD is only available on the CA's side and so procedures across the fleets were changed in order to standardise this.
Cat 2 and 3 are now wholly flown from the left seat.
411A clearly forgets we've ALL been learning form the Wright Brother's and others experiences.I guess he/she was born a perfect pilot. Lucky him/her.
Statistically, the world's largest airline will likely incur the greatest number of incidents, everything else being equal.
Remember, Concorde was the safest airplane in the world until....
Also note, the NTSB statement has a disclaimer regarding the preliminary report's accuracy.
I re-viewed the DFDR data on Monday.
We will continue to learn from other's experiences (unless of course we feel we already know it all).
DD
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I think Few Cloudy has it right.
While it is clear these guys screwed the pooch, we should all not be so fast to critique and say, "I would never do that" remember, the time that elapses between a routine flight and a crash is typically only a few seconds. We should all take notice of this incident and remember it the next time we find ourselves in a situation that is deteriorating.
Nobody wakes up in the morning and thinks to themselves, "I'm going to crash a plane today".
I'm just glad no one got hurt.
While it is clear these guys screwed the pooch, we should all not be so fast to critique and say, "I would never do that" remember, the time that elapses between a routine flight and a crash is typically only a few seconds. We should all take notice of this incident and remember it the next time we find ourselves in a situation that is deteriorating.
Nobody wakes up in the morning and thinks to themselves, "I'm going to crash a plane today".
I'm just glad no one got hurt.
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I think some people are forgetting a few things...
1. From May 25, 1979 until December 20th, 1995 American Airlines operated over 15,000,000 flights without a single passenger fataility. On December 19th, 1995 AAL had operated more fataility free flights than any airline in the history of the industry. At the time, SWA had completely just over half that number of flights in their entire existance. (Does anyone know if they've passed the 15,000,000 mark by now?)
2. From September 20, 1989 until September 8, 1994, a period of just under five years, US Air had five crashes (LGA, LAX, LGA, CLT, PIT) with passenger fatailities--one per year--yet have managed to fly the past decade without a single passenger fatality.
3. The day that Valujet crashed into the everglades, valuejet's accident rate would have proceduced a major crash every third or fourth day if applied to AAL, DAL or UAL's number of daily flights.
Random events due to space themselves out nice and even. They occur in bunches followed by long periods where they appear rarely or not at all.
1. From May 25, 1979 until December 20th, 1995 American Airlines operated over 15,000,000 flights without a single passenger fataility. On December 19th, 1995 AAL had operated more fataility free flights than any airline in the history of the industry. At the time, SWA had completely just over half that number of flights in their entire existance. (Does anyone know if they've passed the 15,000,000 mark by now?)
2. From September 20, 1989 until September 8, 1994, a period of just under five years, US Air had five crashes (LGA, LAX, LGA, CLT, PIT) with passenger fatailities--one per year--yet have managed to fly the past decade without a single passenger fatality.
3. The day that Valujet crashed into the everglades, valuejet's accident rate would have proceduced a major crash every third or fourth day if applied to AAL, DAL or UAL's number of daily flights.
Random events due to space themselves out nice and even. They occur in bunches followed by long periods where they appear rarely or not at all.
Some rather subjective statements in this thread. If data from airdisaster.com is to be believed:
- MD80 is 'safer' than the 737 (.45 versus .62 per million cycles)
- Continental is 'not as safe' as AA (0.63 versus 0.59, not a statistically significant difference)
So why are people being rude about AA and the MD80?
- MD80 is 'safer' than the 737 (.45 versus .62 per million cycles)
- Continental is 'not as safe' as AA (0.63 versus 0.59, not a statistically significant difference)
So why are people being rude about AA and the MD80?
Union Goon
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411a has an ax to grind with AA for whatever reason.
Furthermore, as was just pointed out above, he has not demonstated an ability to balance incidents with total numbers of flights (the largest airline in the world SHOULD have the most incidents in total if everyone was the same) to actually develope a meaningfull comment on the safety of one airline vs. another.
Cheers
Wino
Furthermore, as was just pointed out above, he has not demonstated an ability to balance incidents with total numbers of flights (the largest airline in the world SHOULD have the most incidents in total if everyone was the same) to actually develope a meaningfull comment on the safety of one airline vs. another.
Cheers
Wino
Psychophysiological entity
We all know the famous quote about statistics, but this thread seems to be moving towards the acceptance of a statistically safe flight.
I would suggest that such a flight is a worthy long term goal, but each item of SLF has the right to expect that, on his or her flight, that they would not be relying on statistics, but the accumulated knowledge gained from this data being applied on their day. One of the more important lessons learnt, time and time again, has been the importance of a stabilized approach.
I would suggest that such a flight is a worthy long term goal, but each item of SLF has the right to expect that, on his or her flight, that they would not be relying on statistics, but the accumulated knowledge gained from this data being applied on their day. One of the more important lessons learnt, time and time again, has been the importance of a stabilized approach.
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Sorry to disappoint you Wino, old boy, but I have no axe to grind with AA except their very poor ability (as a company) to remember the incidents/accidents from the past, and actually learn from them.
Good 'ole Larry in TN pointed out that AA was accident-free from 25 May '79 til 1995.
Lets concur for the moment that this is correct.
But look at the more recent record.
In Cali, the AA 757 rushed into a straight in approach, descended rapidly toward the hills (due to an improper FMS input) and when the GPWS alerted the crew that their actions were inappropriate, they tried to climb away...with the spoilers extended.
Ask yourself, does this sound like a reasonable and safe flight conduct?
The unmistakable answer is NO.
Then, in Little Rock, the Captain (a Chief Pilot no less) insists on conducting an unstabilized approach, with a thunderstorm overhead the airfield, and runs off the end.
This doesn't look to me like SAFE flight operations either.
The A300-600 accident is another.
It has been positively known for many years that the aggresive use of the rudder in swept-wing jet transport aircraft is very bad news, yet we find the First Officer pedaling the rudder like a bicycle.
Totally inappropriate, yet this is what he apparently has been taught by American Airlines.
And now Denver, with the crew conducting a totally unstabilized approach, and the result is landing short, with damage to the aircraft and ground equipment.
In all of these accidents, it was totally inappropriate pilot actions that caused the difficulty.
NO aircraft systems were found to be performing sub-standard.
There seems to me to be a common thread with all these, and that is American Airlines cannot, or will not, learn from the past, and apply safety of flight actions now.
AA does not deserve an air operators certificate, until they can demonstrate more prudent operations.
Good 'ole Larry in TN pointed out that AA was accident-free from 25 May '79 til 1995.
Lets concur for the moment that this is correct.
But look at the more recent record.
In Cali, the AA 757 rushed into a straight in approach, descended rapidly toward the hills (due to an improper FMS input) and when the GPWS alerted the crew that their actions were inappropriate, they tried to climb away...with the spoilers extended.
Ask yourself, does this sound like a reasonable and safe flight conduct?
The unmistakable answer is NO.
Then, in Little Rock, the Captain (a Chief Pilot no less) insists on conducting an unstabilized approach, with a thunderstorm overhead the airfield, and runs off the end.
This doesn't look to me like SAFE flight operations either.
The A300-600 accident is another.
It has been positively known for many years that the aggresive use of the rudder in swept-wing jet transport aircraft is very bad news, yet we find the First Officer pedaling the rudder like a bicycle.
Totally inappropriate, yet this is what he apparently has been taught by American Airlines.
And now Denver, with the crew conducting a totally unstabilized approach, and the result is landing short, with damage to the aircraft and ground equipment.
In all of these accidents, it was totally inappropriate pilot actions that caused the difficulty.
NO aircraft systems were found to be performing sub-standard.
There seems to me to be a common thread with all these, and that is American Airlines cannot, or will not, learn from the past, and apply safety of flight actions now.
AA does not deserve an air operators certificate, until they can demonstrate more prudent operations.
Last edited by 411A; 25th Nov 2004 at 17:49.
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The argument that "we have more airplanes, so we'll have more crashes" doesn't wash and is probably slowing the pace of reform at AA.
AA has had more accidents recently than anyone else. What are you going to do about it? Sweeping it under the rug by chanting the mantra that "we are the biggest and the best" will only ensure a continuation of the trend.
One of the clues to AA's problems is what dallas dude said about the elimination of monitored approaches. They were sacrificed on the alter of "standardization". AA is not the first to experience this mistaken desire to have proceedures on every airplane in the fleet be nearly identical.
Problem is, it doesn't work. Eliminating monitored approaches because one, relatively small fleet type won't work with them is absurd. Have an overall theme and standardize where possible but don't compromise safety to accomplish it.
Another problem at AA is that Flight Ops. is on the same bureaucratic level as all other departments. Bull$!t! The company is an airline. The major aspect of the business revolves around operating aircraft. Flight Ops. should be at or near the top of the pyramid.
At AA, marketing is the tail wagging the dog.
This accident was a cluster. But look at it for what it was--a failure of the Captain to COMMAND and CONTROL the flight. I always hated taking the approach and landing when it was the FO's leg if the weather was too bad. But I was much more afraid of bending metal than I was of hurting the FO's feelings. Plus, I always paid them back either with beer or extra legs.
AA earned the title of "Sky nazis" because of their attitude. It's time for them to take stock of what has happened over the past 10 years(accidents, incidents and violations, too), lose the superiority complex and figure out what they have to do to get back on track--just like every other airline did when they experienced a "bad streak".
Don't just keep brushing it under the rug...TC
AA has had more accidents recently than anyone else. What are you going to do about it? Sweeping it under the rug by chanting the mantra that "we are the biggest and the best" will only ensure a continuation of the trend.
One of the clues to AA's problems is what dallas dude said about the elimination of monitored approaches. They were sacrificed on the alter of "standardization". AA is not the first to experience this mistaken desire to have proceedures on every airplane in the fleet be nearly identical.
Problem is, it doesn't work. Eliminating monitored approaches because one, relatively small fleet type won't work with them is absurd. Have an overall theme and standardize where possible but don't compromise safety to accomplish it.
Another problem at AA is that Flight Ops. is on the same bureaucratic level as all other departments. Bull$!t! The company is an airline. The major aspect of the business revolves around operating aircraft. Flight Ops. should be at or near the top of the pyramid.
At AA, marketing is the tail wagging the dog.
This accident was a cluster. But look at it for what it was--a failure of the Captain to COMMAND and CONTROL the flight. I always hated taking the approach and landing when it was the FO's leg if the weather was too bad. But I was much more afraid of bending metal than I was of hurting the FO's feelings. Plus, I always paid them back either with beer or extra legs.
AA earned the title of "Sky nazis" because of their attitude. It's time for them to take stock of what has happened over the past 10 years(accidents, incidents and violations, too), lose the superiority complex and figure out what they have to do to get back on track--just like every other airline did when they experienced a "bad streak".
Don't just keep brushing it under the rug...TC
Not to cast stones, but I've wondered about AA training. In addition to incidents mentioned previously, AA 1572 touchdown way short of runway at KBDL (Hartford, CT) in 1995. Similar conditions to Little Rock and Denver.
Link to above accident report.
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/AAR9605.pdf
Link to above accident report.
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/AAR9605.pdf
If a common thread of pilot error runs through AAs accident record, then that is a weakness they need to address. But in the real world any airline will have weaknesses it needs to address. And overall, AA doesn't seem to have a better (or worse) accident rate than its peers.
Similarly the MD80 seems to have a similar accident rate to the B737, which is about the same as the (admittedly newer) A319/A320/A321.
If some some of the practioners feel this thread is being hijacked by statistics perhaps that is because they would rather rely on blind prejudice than facts.
Ducks under the seat, confident the bullet proof door that now divides us works both ways!
Similarly the MD80 seems to have a similar accident rate to the B737, which is about the same as the (admittedly newer) A319/A320/A321.
If some some of the practioners feel this thread is being hijacked by statistics perhaps that is because they would rather rely on blind prejudice than facts.
Ducks under the seat, confident the bullet proof door that now divides us works both ways!
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Quite valid points, SLF3, but then again, for how many years has it been positively known by jet transport operators worldwide, that un-stabilized approaches can quite easily lead to accidents?
I personally learned this first hand at PanAmerican B707 training in 1973....over thirty years ago.
Yet, at AA, they have demonstrated a unique ability of conducting these very same approaches...time after time.
One wonders just how many times some of their pilots have gotten away with these, without incident.
Time for a detailed safety audit...pronto, me thinks.
I personally learned this first hand at PanAmerican B707 training in 1973....over thirty years ago.
Yet, at AA, they have demonstrated a unique ability of conducting these very same approaches...time after time.
One wonders just how many times some of their pilots have gotten away with these, without incident.
Time for a detailed safety audit...pronto, me thinks.
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Didn't they also have a 727 which landed short at ORD a few years back (late 90s, I think); it was written off and because of AA's strapline at the time, it was nicknamed "something special in the mud".
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Dear AA717driver (& other AA Commanders):
Possibly there's a management questioning when a go-around is made? Nobody has the macho "Me-Big-Balls Me-Can-Land" idea anymore, but marketing people, plus other bean-counters, can pressure Flight Ops people into questioning pilot decisions concerning things like....extra fuel requests, go-arounds, wx delays, wx diversions....is there an ambiance at AA, due to fiscal restraints, or whatever, to 2nd-guess pilots, and 'influence' them to make the 'extra effort for the sake of the team', that results in 99 questionable 'successful' arrivals, and the hundreth 'failure'?
These influences, rather than training deficiencies, seem indicated by the most recent attempts to salvage marginally safe approaches. Am I right? Off base?
Sad Sam
Possibly there's a management questioning when a go-around is made? Nobody has the macho "Me-Big-Balls Me-Can-Land" idea anymore, but marketing people, plus other bean-counters, can pressure Flight Ops people into questioning pilot decisions concerning things like....extra fuel requests, go-arounds, wx delays, wx diversions....is there an ambiance at AA, due to fiscal restraints, or whatever, to 2nd-guess pilots, and 'influence' them to make the 'extra effort for the sake of the team', that results in 99 questionable 'successful' arrivals, and the hundreth 'failure'?
These influences, rather than training deficiencies, seem indicated by the most recent attempts to salvage marginally safe approaches. Am I right? Off base?
Sad Sam
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Sad Sam,
While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.
AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.
It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.
I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.
dd
While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.
AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.
It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.
I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.
dd
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Guilty until proven innocent?
All very well, dallas dude, but American Airlines' pilots (and indeed the company) seem completely unable to learn from past errors.
A bad combination.
A bad combination.
Union Goon
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411A
i am trying to figure out how to scan something in to this website,
but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.
So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)
Someone else did hit the nail on the head about standarization. American has been bowing before that false god for a VERY long time. While it is important to be standard within a fleet it is neither desireable nor smart to standarize procedures across disimilar fleets, and that is something American tries to do.
Standardizing disimiliar aircraft leads to bringing VERY bad habits and assumptions from one aircraft to another where they are not appropriate.
AA is not the first airline to do that, nor the last, several European carriers that I worked for exhibited similar problems.
Cheers
Wino
i am trying to figure out how to scan something in to this website,
but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.
So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)
Someone else did hit the nail on the head about standarization. American has been bowing before that false god for a VERY long time. While it is important to be standard within a fleet it is neither desireable nor smart to standarize procedures across disimilar fleets, and that is something American tries to do.
Standardizing disimiliar aircraft leads to bringing VERY bad habits and assumptions from one aircraft to another where they are not appropriate.
AA is not the first airline to do that, nor the last, several European carriers that I worked for exhibited similar problems.
Cheers
Wino
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And for those who doubt, the following shows American crews can do it right;
NTSB Identification: CHI04IA260
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
Incident occurred Thursday, September 16, 2004 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N253AA
Injuries: 112 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 16, 2004, at 1415 central daylight time, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-82, N253AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1374, encountered a flock of birds after takeoff from runway 4L at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. Damage resulted in a left engine fire which was successfully extinguished by the flight crew. The captain declared an emergency and the flight returned to ORD, landing on runway 32L at 1419. Chicago Fire Department personnel reported that the engine fire had been extinguished when they first observed the aircraft on landing rollout. The domestic air carrier flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. No injuries were reported by the 5 crew members and 107 passengers. The flight departed ORD with an intended destination of Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Just goes to show that we only remember the bad stuff.
NTSB Identification: CHI04IA260
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
Incident occurred Thursday, September 16, 2004 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N253AA
Injuries: 112 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 16, 2004, at 1415 central daylight time, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-82, N253AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1374, encountered a flock of birds after takeoff from runway 4L at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. Damage resulted in a left engine fire which was successfully extinguished by the flight crew. The captain declared an emergency and the flight returned to ORD, landing on runway 32L at 1419. Chicago Fire Department personnel reported that the engine fire had been extinguished when they first observed the aircraft on landing rollout. The domestic air carrier flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. No injuries were reported by the 5 crew members and 107 passengers. The flight departed ORD with an intended destination of Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Just goes to show that we only remember the bad stuff.