MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax
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Flywell,
river and dicky both have a point.
1.It is not possible to feel grief over someone you didnt know ..fact.To do so is has a diluting effect on the event.
you may empathise but not eulogise. To do so cheapens the genuine grief.I knew two of the crew but dont feel the need to publicise my shock.
2.If fatigue/duty could be written off as a factor, then why and how does a company operate out of manston but feel the need to be registered in west africa?Maybe its more leinient, maybe not , but it would be a line of enquiry, assuming the records and laws of the west african state are available for scrutiny...yeah right. Flags of convenience indicate one thing...plyable laws and scrutiny...why do the uk caa allow this to happen
as i saidI knew a couple of the crew, but i've seen many people die in this job for reasons that could have been avoided. A shiney website and good guys doesnt exonerate the owners from liability, and dare i say it , the crew also.
Some good men are dead now is not the time to shy away from the facts.
river and dicky both have a point.
1.It is not possible to feel grief over someone you didnt know ..fact.To do so is has a diluting effect on the event.
you may empathise but not eulogise. To do so cheapens the genuine grief.I knew two of the crew but dont feel the need to publicise my shock.
2.If fatigue/duty could be written off as a factor, then why and how does a company operate out of manston but feel the need to be registered in west africa?Maybe its more leinient, maybe not , but it would be a line of enquiry, assuming the records and laws of the west african state are available for scrutiny...yeah right. Flags of convenience indicate one thing...plyable laws and scrutiny...why do the uk caa allow this to happen
as i saidI knew a couple of the crew, but i've seen many people die in this job for reasons that could have been avoided. A shiney website and good guys doesnt exonerate the owners from liability, and dare i say it , the crew also.
Some good men are dead now is not the time to shy away from the facts.
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regarding runway used.....
"Responding to renewed questions about where the aircraft started its takeoff run, Fowler said it's believed the jet used all but the first 60 metres of Runway 24."
http://www.canada.com/news/national/...1-2c89b0a5658b
"Responding to renewed questions about where the aircraft started its takeoff run, Fowler said it's believed the jet used all but the first 60 metres of Runway 24."
http://www.canada.com/news/national/...1-2c89b0a5658b
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To me, all the characteristics of this kind of accident happening in Halifax would have immediately drawn suspicion to a possible failure to de-ice.... except for the fact that of course it did not actually happen in weather that was even remotely close to Winter. My personal suspicion is that there was some failure regarding flap configuration.
Meanwhile, The Globe & Mail is reporting that two engines of this 747 were replaced just weeks before the accident. Here is the article:
Crashed jet had engines replaced
Canadian Press
Halifax — The cargo jet that crashed in flames off the end of a Halifax runway last week had two engines replaced in the weeks leading up to the accident, investigators revealed Saturday.
The new information has raised questions about the engines and maintenance history of the Boeing 747-200 operated by MK Airlines of Britain.
Bill Fowler, an investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, said he didn't know why the engines had been replaced or where the work had been done.
"We'll get the facts . . . and see if there's any indication of a systemic issue with this aircraft or these engines," Mr. Fowler told a news conference at the Halifax International Airport.
All seven people aboard the plane were killed Thursday morning after the huge jet crashed into a wooded area near the airport as it tried to take off.
It was the fourth time an MK Airlines jet has crashed in the past 12 years.
Fowler said the jet had a major maintenance inspection in Jakarta, Indonesia, in September. Since the inspection, two engines had been changed.
There are typically four engines on 747s, as well as an auxiliary power unit in the tail of the aircraft.
"There could be any number of reasons why you'd change an engine," Mr. Fowler said.
"We're trying to find out the circumstances around each engine and what was it that required it to be changed."
Capt. John Power, operations manager for MK Airlines, said the 747 typically uses all four engines during takeoff.
However, 747 crews are expected to factor in the possibility of one engine failing.
Investigators have struggled in their search through the plane's wreckage in recent days, as heavy rain has drenched the crash site.
Meanwhile, gawkers continue to make their way to the debris field, causing problems for the RCMP.
Camera equipment and camping gear was seized from one group that entered the secure area, said RCMP Insp. Peter Lepine.
Meanwhile, Mr. Fowler confirmed the bodies of the seven crew members had been recovered.
But investigators were still searching for the jet's data and voice recorders.
Responding to renewed questions about where the aircraft started its takeoff run, Mr. Fowler said it's believed the jet had used the majority of Runway 24, although he said it may have started shortly after the beginning of the runway.
Under ideal circumstance, the shortened run would still have given the aircraft enough room to take off, Mr. Fowler said.
When asked whether a shorter run and an engine problem could have contributed to the crash, Fowler suggested it was possible.
"It's obviously going to affect performance," he said. "Runway length is an element, the weight of the aircraft, the environmental circumstances and of course the condition of the aircraft — the amount of thrust that's being produced."
Meanwhile, The Globe & Mail is reporting that two engines of this 747 were replaced just weeks before the accident. Here is the article:
Crashed jet had engines replaced
Canadian Press
Halifax — The cargo jet that crashed in flames off the end of a Halifax runway last week had two engines replaced in the weeks leading up to the accident, investigators revealed Saturday.
The new information has raised questions about the engines and maintenance history of the Boeing 747-200 operated by MK Airlines of Britain.
Bill Fowler, an investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, said he didn't know why the engines had been replaced or where the work had been done.
"We'll get the facts . . . and see if there's any indication of a systemic issue with this aircraft or these engines," Mr. Fowler told a news conference at the Halifax International Airport.
All seven people aboard the plane were killed Thursday morning after the huge jet crashed into a wooded area near the airport as it tried to take off.
It was the fourth time an MK Airlines jet has crashed in the past 12 years.
Fowler said the jet had a major maintenance inspection in Jakarta, Indonesia, in September. Since the inspection, two engines had been changed.
There are typically four engines on 747s, as well as an auxiliary power unit in the tail of the aircraft.
"There could be any number of reasons why you'd change an engine," Mr. Fowler said.
"We're trying to find out the circumstances around each engine and what was it that required it to be changed."
Capt. John Power, operations manager for MK Airlines, said the 747 typically uses all four engines during takeoff.
However, 747 crews are expected to factor in the possibility of one engine failing.
Investigators have struggled in their search through the plane's wreckage in recent days, as heavy rain has drenched the crash site.
Meanwhile, gawkers continue to make their way to the debris field, causing problems for the RCMP.
Camera equipment and camping gear was seized from one group that entered the secure area, said RCMP Insp. Peter Lepine.
Meanwhile, Mr. Fowler confirmed the bodies of the seven crew members had been recovered.
But investigators were still searching for the jet's data and voice recorders.
Responding to renewed questions about where the aircraft started its takeoff run, Mr. Fowler said it's believed the jet had used the majority of Runway 24, although he said it may have started shortly after the beginning of the runway.
Under ideal circumstance, the shortened run would still have given the aircraft enough room to take off, Mr. Fowler said.
When asked whether a shorter run and an engine problem could have contributed to the crash, Fowler suggested it was possible.
"It's obviously going to affect performance," he said. "Runway length is an element, the weight of the aircraft, the environmental circumstances and of course the condition of the aircraft — the amount of thrust that's being produced."
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Firstly, might I add my name to the list of people expressing their condolences - the loss of someone in our aviation fraternity is always hard to accept and one often wonders why these things happen. Life is so hard on occassions.
I am led to believe that the aircraft had recently come out of a C check/service. They might have had an engine failure on the one side, with possible ingestion by the other engine. The subsequent yaw possibly resulted in some of the cargo coming loose and moving which would have affected the C of G and subsequent related effects on the control of the aircraft.
Any thought on this one?
I am led to believe that the aircraft had recently come out of a C check/service. They might have had an engine failure on the one side, with possible ingestion by the other engine. The subsequent yaw possibly resulted in some of the cargo coming loose and moving which would have affected the C of G and subsequent related effects on the control of the aircraft.
Any thought on this one?
The Reverend
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That is unusual. The FDR & CVR are located in the aft equipment centre E8, just aft of the main cargo door but within the pressurized cabin area, considered to be the most survivable section in a crash.
Goldfish, I very much doubt if any yawing moment would compromise the pallet locks on the cargo deck. Have you ever operated a 747F? Are you familiar with the loading system? Most unlikely to have a load shift, especially with a professional load master in the crew.
Goldfish, I very much doubt if any yawing moment would compromise the pallet locks on the cargo deck. Have you ever operated a 747F? Are you familiar with the loading system? Most unlikely to have a load shift, especially with a professional load master in the crew.
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Folks....
The temptation to speculate what happened is great, (I do it myself), but I do believe its best not to publicise my opinions when the only availible (Mis-?)information we get is from the media, who screw it up well enough on a good day.
I don't know any of the guys who lost their lives, but still they were kindred spirits who deserve to be given the dignity and respect any of us would want.
Remember, opinions are like A-holes,, we all have one and most of the time they stink.
Why don't we wait for the report and in the meantime mourn the loss of kindred spirits and another airplane?
The temptation to speculate what happened is great, (I do it myself), but I do believe its best not to publicise my opinions when the only availible (Mis-?)information we get is from the media, who screw it up well enough on a good day.
I don't know any of the guys who lost their lives, but still they were kindred spirits who deserve to be given the dignity and respect any of us would want.
Remember, opinions are like A-holes,, we all have one and most of the time they stink.
Why don't we wait for the report and in the meantime mourn the loss of kindred spirits and another airplane?
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AN2 Driver,
I think you'd be surprised how many Ops guys understand little about route planning and computerised flight planning, many have been trained only to tap the right buttons without understanding the theory behind it.
To put the amount of work in to producing the flight plan you suggest might be 1 hour's work, fine if the guy has got nothing better to do but we're talking about a fleet of some 13 aircraft.
Also, this aircraft was on a multi-sector trip, the flight plan could have been delivered to the crew before they left USA so the data used would have been even moreso out of date.
I know little about the performance of a B747F's but I do know about DC8F's and with a heavy DC8 (40,000K+ payload) it would have enough problems getting off that length of runway on a transatlantic sector without adding additional weight.
I think we can put the idea of tankering fuel to bed.
I think you'd be surprised how many Ops guys understand little about route planning and computerised flight planning, many have been trained only to tap the right buttons without understanding the theory behind it.
To put the amount of work in to producing the flight plan you suggest might be 1 hour's work, fine if the guy has got nothing better to do but we're talking about a fleet of some 13 aircraft.
Also, this aircraft was on a multi-sector trip, the flight plan could have been delivered to the crew before they left USA so the data used would have been even moreso out of date.
I know little about the performance of a B747F's but I do know about DC8F's and with a heavy DC8 (40,000K+ payload) it would have enough problems getting off that length of runway on a transatlantic sector without adding additional weight.
I think we can put the idea of tankering fuel to bed.
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FF
I agree with your posting I think it's time the managers and owners of the airline answered some serious questions.
Ops Manager Power is quoted in a newspaper as saying "MK have an excellent safety record"
What dream is this man living in????
Time to stop, take a step back and face the facts!!!!!
I agree with your posting I think it's time the managers and owners of the airline answered some serious questions.
Ops Manager Power is quoted in a newspaper as saying "MK have an excellent safety record"
What dream is this man living in????
Time to stop, take a step back and face the facts!!!!!
I'm perplexed why replacing engines (which surely have been tested in service) should attract so much attention in the press. It is a very low probability that this detail had anything to do with the accident.
Also, so what? if there was a single engine failure of any of the 4 engines assuming that the speeds vs VR and runway length vs gross weight had been calculated correctly.
If the numbers are correct than you need at least two major system failures to take it out of a routine training syllabus and to postulate two independent engine failures beyond V1 is statistically extremely remote.
Waiting for more data
Also, so what? if there was a single engine failure of any of the 4 engines assuming that the speeds vs VR and runway length vs gross weight had been calculated correctly.
If the numbers are correct than you need at least two major system failures to take it out of a routine training syllabus and to postulate two independent engine failures beyond V1 is statistically extremely remote.
Waiting for more data
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The aircraft actually left Ostend saturday
don't you think that if there was any problems
with overhauled engine(s) they would have had
problems before, being the aircraft would without
doubt been loaded going over to Halifax?
don't you think that if there was any problems
with overhauled engine(s) they would have had
problems before, being the aircraft would without
doubt been loaded going over to Halifax?
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GlueBall
As you know the Lufthansa was a 747-100 certified for about 333 tons MTOW and according to the 1976 report weighed an estimated 254,576kg when it took off, and the MK aircraft is a 747-200F certified for a much higher MTOW: 369,224kg according to the INTAG.
While I don't know if the MK Airlines aircraft was fully laden, any disruption or anomaly in the aircraft's high lift devices would have had far greater implications on the plane's ability to leave the ground than on the fateful Lufthansa flight. And ofcourse, as you know 2700m isn't a whole lot of runway for a 747 that is about to cross the Atlantic with 53 tons of lobsters and fish and an unknown load of lawn tractors in its cargo hold. I imagine it would have been very close to the maximum permissible takeoff weight for that runway in those conditions.
Desperate measures
A-FLOOR The configuration anomaly at NBO (D-ABYB) was further compounded upon leaving ground effect due to higher density altitude/high elevation airport. (5300+ feet).
If Vr appears to be long in coming and if the end is near, an unwritten technique of last resort would be to immediately "firewall" the throttles and extend flaps another notch...just to get off the pavement intact. But if leading edge flaps had stayed retracted at YHZ, as you had theorized in one scenario, then this desperate last minute survival measure would have made no difference either.
A-FLOOR The configuration anomaly at NBO (D-ABYB) was further compounded upon leaving ground effect due to higher density altitude/high elevation airport. (5300+ feet).
If Vr appears to be long in coming and if the end is near, an unwritten technique of last resort would be to immediately "firewall" the throttles and extend flaps another notch...just to get off the pavement intact. But if leading edge flaps had stayed retracted at YHZ, as you had theorized in one scenario, then this desperate last minute survival measure would have made no difference either.
While I don't know if the MK Airlines aircraft was fully laden, any disruption or anomaly in the aircraft's high lift devices would have had far greater implications on the plane's ability to leave the ground than on the fateful Lufthansa flight. And ofcourse, as you know 2700m isn't a whole lot of runway for a 747 that is about to cross the Atlantic with 53 tons of lobsters and fish and an unknown load of lawn tractors in its cargo hold. I imagine it would have been very close to the maximum permissible takeoff weight for that runway in those conditions.
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But what everyone seems to overlook is the fact that
if the leading edges were not extended the config warning
would be sounding as soon as he advanced the throttles
even during the initial breakaway power before taxi.
And if this was the case, heavy or not ,any pilot would correct
the cenario prior to take off
if the leading edges were not extended the config warning
would be sounding as soon as he advanced the throttles
even during the initial breakaway power before taxi.
And if this was the case, heavy or not ,any pilot would correct
the cenario prior to take off
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If the 747's aural takeoff configuration warning system was indeed modified as recommended (not demanded) by the authorities in the 1976 report, then indeed that would be the case. 
Does anyone know if this was the case? On the 747-400 they have, but I'm not sure about the 747-200 in question. One would think it was, as the plane was built in 1980.
Does anyone know if this was the case? On the 747-400 they have, but I'm not sure about the 747-200 in question. One would think it was, as the plane was built in 1980.
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A-FLOOR: Haven't read the probable cause as to the Lufty scenario at NBO, but one could image that the F/E had the engine bleed valves turned off while the flaps were set, off for extra thrust at a high altitude airport. The leading edge flaps, being pneumatically operated, didn't extend and the absence of the "LE" green light wasn't noticed. Do you know the details of that accident?
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GlueBall & SNAM
Some more details (weights, times, pictures, CVR transcript and investigative findings & recommendations) here:
http://www.esparacing.com/sport%20pi...20pages/76.htm
edit:
According to A.net the MKJ had a round-dial flightdeck (as opposed to tape-style):
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/608835/L/
I found that on tape-style 747 flightdecks (including a simulator I frequently work on) the LE lights on the tape style flaps gauge on the CM1 side of the engine instruments are so tiny that any misconfig could easily go unnoticed if they aren't in the aural warning logic. On round-dial flightdecks these lights are slightly larger and on the CM2 side under the two flaps gauges.
Although it's pointless to do so, I would assume something was indeed wrong with the high-lift devices and that this is the reason the aircraft couldn't get airborne. The fact that this plane didn't get airborne at all as opposed to the 1974 Lufthansa flight (which flew for about 1km past the runway threshold) could be attributed to the weight (254,576kg vs. a likely 369,224kg) and the damage incurred when the tail struck the embankment. The forward shift in CG and the loss of elevator "downforce" by the tail breaking off caused the rest of the plane to lurch forward very rapidly and as it struck the ground clipped the power lines to the airport
But let's wait for more info from the people who do this for a living
Some more details (weights, times, pictures, CVR transcript and investigative findings & recommendations) here:
http://www.esparacing.com/sport%20pi...20pages/76.htm
edit:
According to A.net the MKJ had a round-dial flightdeck (as opposed to tape-style):
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/608835/L/
I found that on tape-style 747 flightdecks (including a simulator I frequently work on) the LE lights on the tape style flaps gauge on the CM1 side of the engine instruments are so tiny that any misconfig could easily go unnoticed if they aren't in the aural warning logic. On round-dial flightdecks these lights are slightly larger and on the CM2 side under the two flaps gauges.
Although it's pointless to do so, I would assume something was indeed wrong with the high-lift devices and that this is the reason the aircraft couldn't get airborne. The fact that this plane didn't get airborne at all as opposed to the 1974 Lufthansa flight (which flew for about 1km past the runway threshold) could be attributed to the weight (254,576kg vs. a likely 369,224kg) and the damage incurred when the tail struck the embankment. The forward shift in CG and the loss of elevator "downforce" by the tail breaking off caused the rest of the plane to lurch forward very rapidly and as it struck the ground clipped the power lines to the airport
But let's wait for more info from the people who do this for a living
Last edited by A-FLOOR; 17th Oct 2004 at 17:39.
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I normally don't comment on tragedies such as this as I am not an investigator, nor was I there. So please don’t think I’m trying to “jump on the bandwagon”.
I was talking to a friend of mine who works handling planes (and that one) in YHZ. Although he himself wasn’t working that night many of his close friends/co-workers were and these were some of the points he mentioned to me. Take them as you will.
The plane was fully loaded with the exception of 2 small spots at the rear of the plane, unusually large load. Also a large amount of fuel was taken on as the cost of fuel was cheaper in YHZ then there destination.
On push back the tug operator made a comment that the plane was “really heavy” as the HUF was having a hard time pushing it back. It should be noted that 3 sources (pilots, loadmaster, and line crew) confirmed the load and albeit heavy, on paper was not over weight and within C of G. The newspaper was incorrect as to load, there was more fish then reported (30,000 pounds more) and there weren’t tractors on board but these little 6 wheels amphibious ATV’s, which are fairly light, among other stuff.
It was thought by the ground crew that an intersection departure was made either Echo or Delta, not 100% sure on which.
I know next to nothing about the 747, but I assume a reduced power T/O is the norm and as such the line crew are used to what noise level those engines make. Apparently some point down the T/O roll, the engines powered up to such a point that everyone had noticed and turned to look, indicating Full power. Line crews were noted as saying they’ve never heard the 747 make that much noise on takeoff.
Then as mentioned the tail struck, was dragged, the nose went higher as the end of RWY 24 came, the tail broke off, the power to the airport was cut off, all lights went out, then the fire ball.
A few of the line crew raced to the scene, in an attempt to find survivors. You all know the rest.
Again, not making any assumptions, just sharing some of what was told to me by someone who knows/works with the eyewitnesses.
But the truth of what actually happened will only be known when the investigation is complete.
I was talking to a friend of mine who works handling planes (and that one) in YHZ. Although he himself wasn’t working that night many of his close friends/co-workers were and these were some of the points he mentioned to me. Take them as you will.
The plane was fully loaded with the exception of 2 small spots at the rear of the plane, unusually large load. Also a large amount of fuel was taken on as the cost of fuel was cheaper in YHZ then there destination.
On push back the tug operator made a comment that the plane was “really heavy” as the HUF was having a hard time pushing it back. It should be noted that 3 sources (pilots, loadmaster, and line crew) confirmed the load and albeit heavy, on paper was not over weight and within C of G. The newspaper was incorrect as to load, there was more fish then reported (30,000 pounds more) and there weren’t tractors on board but these little 6 wheels amphibious ATV’s, which are fairly light, among other stuff.
It was thought by the ground crew that an intersection departure was made either Echo or Delta, not 100% sure on which.
I know next to nothing about the 747, but I assume a reduced power T/O is the norm and as such the line crew are used to what noise level those engines make. Apparently some point down the T/O roll, the engines powered up to such a point that everyone had noticed and turned to look, indicating Full power. Line crews were noted as saying they’ve never heard the 747 make that much noise on takeoff.
Then as mentioned the tail struck, was dragged, the nose went higher as the end of RWY 24 came, the tail broke off, the power to the airport was cut off, all lights went out, then the fire ball.
A few of the line crew raced to the scene, in an attempt to find survivors. You all know the rest.
Again, not making any assumptions, just sharing some of what was told to me by someone who knows/works with the eyewitnesses.
But the truth of what actually happened will only be known when the investigation is complete.
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SNAM
Well, don't get me wrong, but on large aircraft you look at the light and if the light says your LE flaps are out, then they are out. Simply because there are so many safety features in these systems making an erroneous indication highly impropable and ofcourse because of the fact that visually checking the LE flaps position would have been near impossible on a Boeing 747 at 3AM.
I was referring to the aural warning as something that might have prevented the Lufthansa tragedy, as a safety net for a crew that for whatever reason failed to recheck the LE flap position, not as something to solely rely upon. As I said before, on the 747 classic the LE lights are easy to be missed or even misinterpreted as there are two of them right next to each other: one to indicate the LE flaps are travelling and one to indicated they are all deployed correctly.
On the 747-400 when you apply power with the flaps out of their takeoff positions a clear EICAS message appears and the red warning light and associated aural warning comes on, forcing the crew to abort the takeoff. The question is whether the 1976 recommendation following the 1974 Lufthansa crash were followed by an A/D and the leading edge flaps were included in the warning logic of the older 747 classics.
Well, don't get me wrong, but on large aircraft you look at the light and if the light says your LE flaps are out, then they are out. Simply because there are so many safety features in these systems making an erroneous indication highly impropable and ofcourse because of the fact that visually checking the LE flaps position would have been near impossible on a Boeing 747 at 3AM.
I was referring to the aural warning as something that might have prevented the Lufthansa tragedy, as a safety net for a crew that for whatever reason failed to recheck the LE flap position, not as something to solely rely upon. As I said before, on the 747 classic the LE lights are easy to be missed or even misinterpreted as there are two of them right next to each other: one to indicate the LE flaps are travelling and one to indicated they are all deployed correctly.
On the 747-400 when you apply power with the flaps out of their takeoff positions a clear EICAS message appears and the red warning light and associated aural warning comes on, forcing the crew to abort the takeoff. The question is whether the 1976 recommendation following the 1974 Lufthansa crash were followed by an A/D and the leading edge flaps were included in the warning logic of the older 747 classics.