SQ006 Revisited
Guest
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The PVD requires that the LOC be tuned, and the PVD turned on. It makes more sense to simply check the Nav Display to see if the FMC position is located on the runway symbol. If it is not, then either the FMC position is wrong or the wrong runway is being used. This method does not require any specific action by the flight crew and can be used on any runway. It quickly becomes second nature. Keep it Simple.
Of course it only works if the airplane has GPS, which I assume the accident airplane did have.
And in case some of you remember the incorrect datum used at Taipei, that problem was fixed several years ago and the positions shown in the data base are accurate.
Of course it only works if the airplane has GPS, which I assume the accident airplane did have.
And in case some of you remember the incorrect datum used at Taipei, that problem was fixed several years ago and the positions shown in the data base are accurate.
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Insider,
I totally agree with the gist of your earlier posting re Tenerife. I was merely objecting to your claim that the KLM F/O (Meurs) strongly protested his captain's (van Zanten's) decision to take off. If indeed Meurs was satisfied they had takeoff clearance, it was probably because of van Zanten's actions and mindset. When Meurs requested clearance, they had already completed the turn on the runway to face in the direction of takeoff, so they were lined up for takeoff. Meurs hardly had the chance raise an objection, as van Zanten began the takeoff roll before Meurs had finished the readback of the route clearance. During the takeoff roll, two transmissions between the tower and Pan Am concerning Pan Am clearing the runway are audible in the KLM flight deck, prompting the KLM F/E to question if Pan Am is still on the runway. Van Zanten emphatically declares the runway is clear. The collision occurred some 15 seconds later.
My source is a photocopy of the official report of the investigation, as published in Aviation Week & ST of 1978. I note that Aerovision has provided a Website reference to the CVR transcript.
I can see some parallels between Tenerife and SQ006 but, unlike Gladiator, I remain to be convinced that SQ "cockpit culture" was a major factor contributing to the Taipei accident. How concerned was Choong's co-pilot, Cyrano, that they were apparently not on the runway centreline? I admit, however, that I've not been able to download the interview of Cyrano by the investigators.
Rockhound
I totally agree with the gist of your earlier posting re Tenerife. I was merely objecting to your claim that the KLM F/O (Meurs) strongly protested his captain's (van Zanten's) decision to take off. If indeed Meurs was satisfied they had takeoff clearance, it was probably because of van Zanten's actions and mindset. When Meurs requested clearance, they had already completed the turn on the runway to face in the direction of takeoff, so they were lined up for takeoff. Meurs hardly had the chance raise an objection, as van Zanten began the takeoff roll before Meurs had finished the readback of the route clearance. During the takeoff roll, two transmissions between the tower and Pan Am concerning Pan Am clearing the runway are audible in the KLM flight deck, prompting the KLM F/E to question if Pan Am is still on the runway. Van Zanten emphatically declares the runway is clear. The collision occurred some 15 seconds later.
My source is a photocopy of the official report of the investigation, as published in Aviation Week & ST of 1978. I note that Aerovision has provided a Website reference to the CVR transcript.
I can see some parallels between Tenerife and SQ006 but, unlike Gladiator, I remain to be convinced that SQ "cockpit culture" was a major factor contributing to the Taipei accident. How concerned was Choong's co-pilot, Cyrano, that they were apparently not on the runway centreline? I admit, however, that I've not been able to download the interview of Cyrano by the investigators.
Rockhound
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Rockhound is absolutely correct in the details he provides about the Tenerife disaster in '77. The KLM junior F/O never raised any doubts about their having a clearance for T/O. In fact he supported his Captains affirmation that the runway was clear when F/E Schreuder expressed his uncertainty on the matter. There's no doubt that the strong presence of senior Capt Van Zanten was a major factor here. (Details can also be found at http://www.airdisaster.com/special/special-pa1736.shtml ).
In the SQ-006 case the cockpit dynamics seem a little different, although a parallelism certainly exists. We all agree that the CRM concept should be extended to a management/pilot relationship as well.
The question is whether the Company/regional culture was an important contributing factor here. In other words, would the accident have happened in a similar environment if the airline had been another one, or may be from another part of the world?
Any safety experts around?
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 26 February 2001).]
In the SQ-006 case the cockpit dynamics seem a little different, although a parallelism certainly exists. We all agree that the CRM concept should be extended to a management/pilot relationship as well.
The question is whether the Company/regional culture was an important contributing factor here. In other words, would the accident have happened in a similar environment if the airline had been another one, or may be from another part of the world?
Any safety experts around?
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 26 February 2001).]
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WSSS on 28 February 2001 10:54 wrote:
" The green lights referred here would have been the taxiway lights leading into Rwy 05R.
Could the crew have assumed the "follow the greens" system in operation like at WSSS and therefore were not looking for further greens along taxiway N1?? "
____________________________________________
The Taiwanese report stated the following:
" 1.10.12 Taxiway Center Line Lights:
.....On straight sections of taxiways, the centerline lights are found to be spaced 30m apart, while taxiway centerline lights on curved segments are at 7.5m spacing......
For aircraft taxiing onward: .........
(b) towards Runway 05L, there are 4 taxiway center line lights are provided along the straight segment of Taxiway N1 up to the Runway 05L holding position. These taxiway center line lights are located at a distance of 30m, 55m and 116m respectively from the point of tangency (where the curved taxiway center line marking from Taxiway NP meets Taxiway N1).
During site survey(on Nov 4, 2000), it was noted that the first taxiway center line light after the point of tangency was unserviceable while the second light was less intense than the other lights. (See Figure 10-13) ...."
Furthermore,section 1.10.8 covering Taxiway Center Line Marking had this:
"Generally, yellow taxiway centerline markings of 20cm width are provided at CKS Airport. However, a segment of the straight portion of the taxiway center line marking on Taxiway N1 providing guidance in the direction of the entry point to Runway 05L was missing. This missing segment of the taxiway center line marking was located between the end of the curved portion providing lead-in guidance from Taxiway NP to Taxiway N1 and the end of the curved portion of the taxiway center line marking providing lead-in guidance from Runway 05R/23L to the northern part of Taxiway N1. Reference is made to Figure10-7 and10-8 and the figure shown in Figure 10-20. "
Does look like the taxiway-lightings and absence of proper markings may be one of the factors for the inadvertent transition onto 05R.
Cheers
" The green lights referred here would have been the taxiway lights leading into Rwy 05R.
Could the crew have assumed the "follow the greens" system in operation like at WSSS and therefore were not looking for further greens along taxiway N1?? "
____________________________________________
The Taiwanese report stated the following:
" 1.10.12 Taxiway Center Line Lights:
.....On straight sections of taxiways, the centerline lights are found to be spaced 30m apart, while taxiway centerline lights on curved segments are at 7.5m spacing......
For aircraft taxiing onward: .........
(b) towards Runway 05L, there are 4 taxiway center line lights are provided along the straight segment of Taxiway N1 up to the Runway 05L holding position. These taxiway center line lights are located at a distance of 30m, 55m and 116m respectively from the point of tangency (where the curved taxiway center line marking from Taxiway NP meets Taxiway N1).
During site survey(on Nov 4, 2000), it was noted that the first taxiway center line light after the point of tangency was unserviceable while the second light was less intense than the other lights. (See Figure 10-13) ...."
Furthermore,section 1.10.8 covering Taxiway Center Line Marking had this:
"Generally, yellow taxiway centerline markings of 20cm width are provided at CKS Airport. However, a segment of the straight portion of the taxiway center line marking on Taxiway N1 providing guidance in the direction of the entry point to Runway 05L was missing. This missing segment of the taxiway center line marking was located between the end of the curved portion providing lead-in guidance from Taxiway NP to Taxiway N1 and the end of the curved portion of the taxiway center line marking providing lead-in guidance from Runway 05R/23L to the northern part of Taxiway N1. Reference is made to Figure10-7 and10-8 and the figure shown in Figure 10-20. "
Does look like the taxiway-lightings and absence of proper markings may be one of the factors for the inadvertent transition onto 05R.
Cheers
Guest
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I've now managed to plough through the bulk of the Taiwanese ASC report (although the Appendices have eluded me - can anyone tell me if these can be downloaded?) and cannot agree with Gladiator and others that this accident can be ascribed to SIA's corporate/cockpit culture, Singaporean or Asian attitudes, the failings of overworked and underpaid crews, etc. It seems to me that all three cockpit crewmembers were satisfied that they were on the correct runway (the fact that they were all wrong is something else). The captain was appropriately concerned by the weather but all three pilots agreed that conditions were within limits; this was subsequently confirmed by all concerned. All three crewmembers were well rested. All three were aware that the PVD indicated a discrepancy but, as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory. This brings up the matter of the article in the Taipei Times of Feb 22 (to which InitRef drew attention), which alleged (even to the point of quoting him) that Cyrano had warned Choong that the ND indicated they were out of position but was interrupted by an overbearing captain. Surely the CVR and the interview with Cyrano show this is all complete and utter garbage.
Clearly, the crew erred grievously, with tragic results, but, surely, this accident could have happened at any airline. Or am I missing something?
Rockhound
Clearly, the crew erred grievously, with tragic results, but, surely, this accident could have happened at any airline. Or am I missing something?
Rockhound
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Rockhound:
15:14:40 FO The next one.
15:14:41 FO The next one is 'November one.'
15:14:42 CA OK, second right.
15:14:44 FO Second right; that's right.
15:14:47 CA In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one, you know.
15:14:50 FO Next one this one.
15:15:51 CA Yah…ha ha.
15:14:52 CA Australian.
15:14:53 CA I think the best is to say 'second right, ah 'first right,' 'second
right,' ah…
This is not the type of conversation I would have expected in such critical circumstances. As the crew thought they were on the correct runway then maybe it is because they weren't paying enough attention. Somehow I fail to see, given the CVR, how a u/s and dim taxiway light would have made any difference. They all knew that they required the second right and yet still took the first right.
Yes you are right in that this could have happened to any airline - if the crew wasnt paying attention. Maybe I stand alone, but I refuse to support pilots because they are "fellow pilots". I totally agree with others that the SIA culture has a role to play here. But where does the buck stop for FOs/SOs not having the courage to challenge their Captains? Where is the line drawn between "captain your heading bug is one degree out" and "captain, if you take-off we will all die"? It is THIS line that changes between airline to airline. Surely it is better to err towards the "picky" FO than one silenced with fear. Maybe this is also the reason why command training takes 8 months at SIA, because it takes this long to train the FOs to speak up and make decisions.
15:14:40 FO The next one.
15:14:41 FO The next one is 'November one.'
15:14:42 CA OK, second right.
15:14:44 FO Second right; that's right.
15:14:47 CA In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one, you know.
15:14:50 FO Next one this one.
15:15:51 CA Yah…ha ha.
15:14:52 CA Australian.
15:14:53 CA I think the best is to say 'second right, ah 'first right,' 'second
right,' ah…
This is not the type of conversation I would have expected in such critical circumstances. As the crew thought they were on the correct runway then maybe it is because they weren't paying enough attention. Somehow I fail to see, given the CVR, how a u/s and dim taxiway light would have made any difference. They all knew that they required the second right and yet still took the first right.
Yes you are right in that this could have happened to any airline - if the crew wasnt paying attention. Maybe I stand alone, but I refuse to support pilots because they are "fellow pilots". I totally agree with others that the SIA culture has a role to play here. But where does the buck stop for FOs/SOs not having the courage to challenge their Captains? Where is the line drawn between "captain your heading bug is one degree out" and "captain, if you take-off we will all die"? It is THIS line that changes between airline to airline. Surely it is better to err towards the "picky" FO than one silenced with fear. Maybe this is also the reason why command training takes 8 months at SIA, because it takes this long to train the FOs to speak up and make decisions.
Guest
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titan posted 28 February 2001 23:51
" Somehow I fail to see, given the CVR, how a u/s and dim taxiway light would have made any difference. They all knew that they required the second right and yet still took the first right."
Hi...that part of the CVR was when they were taxying down taxiway NP,and occured just before the aircraft came abeam of taxiway N2.The u/s and dim taxilights were on taxiway N1,whose yellow markings led directly to 05R,with the continuing section to 05L missing.
Cheers
" Somehow I fail to see, given the CVR, how a u/s and dim taxiway light would have made any difference. They all knew that they required the second right and yet still took the first right."
Hi...that part of the CVR was when they were taxying down taxiway NP,and occured just before the aircraft came abeam of taxiway N2.The u/s and dim taxilights were on taxiway N1,whose yellow markings led directly to 05R,with the continuing section to 05L missing.
Cheers
Guest
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titan, not like you to take things out of context!
Preaching about what you would or would not have done in the same circumstances is a very dangerous area for pilots to venture into. Holier than thou and all that.
Don't forget that at the home base for these guys the standard for taxi is "Follow the greens" and this appears to be what they've done. I don't think you can take the actions of the pilots in isolation from the airport conditions at the time, and I'm not referring to just the weather.
If you set up a situation where it can happen then someone is going to do it. If these guys hadn't then someone else would. Just a maater of time.
Preaching about what you would or would not have done in the same circumstances is a very dangerous area for pilots to venture into. Holier than thou and all that.
Don't forget that at the home base for these guys the standard for taxi is "Follow the greens" and this appears to be what they've done. I don't think you can take the actions of the pilots in isolation from the airport conditions at the time, and I'm not referring to just the weather.
If you set up a situation where it can happen then someone is going to do it. If these guys hadn't then someone else would. Just a maater of time.
Guest
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I think Rockhound is correct in that the circumstances leading to SQ-006 accident were not unique to SIA or the Asia/Pac region. I couldn't be farther from SIN and yet I must admit that I could have easily made the same mistake.
We have a Capt that has a handful of a taxi. A heavily loaded 744, fierce winds, wet surface, rain, poor vis... You want to use the aircraft's momentum to coax it into a 90º turn on to the rwy, line it up correctly, all the while not wasting an inch of concrete. The twy is dark up ahead and you don't want to get into a dead end. And there's other concerns: How's the T/O going to be conducted in the gusty winds nearing the limit, slippery surface, windshear, what's the SID, and how you'll avoid the worst of the wx...It's all too easy to get lulled into the wrong runway by a curving path of green centerline lights.
Perhaps we as pilots should take this opportunity to demand a fresh, clearer, WORLDWIDE set of new regulations about surface movements/lights/markings and unified taxi procedures. Although conforming to ICAO standards, airports tend to develop their own microcosm of particular designs, markings, customs, style, procedures, LVPs...
and expect us pilots from all over the world to adapt to their idiosyncrasies,(CDG comes into mind) unduly increasing crew workload at critical periods and so mistakes are being made (No wonder the apalling number of rwy incursions).
But back to SQ-006. Insider hit one point in his thoughtful posts. Why the decision to launch in the first place when in view of the wx the flight could have been cancelled. A landing back at CKS should have been extremely difficult -beyond autoland limits, low ceiling, below CAT-I minima...- was there a suitable alternate in case of a dire emergency (think of SR-111)?. And there were also other airlines operating: CX and CAL are heard in the CVR.
Capt Kong was obviously in a hurry to set off. Sometimes the pressure (corporate or otherwise) is not conspicous, but it's there in the back of your mind. Here's a question for you SQ guys: What would have happened if the Capt had decided not to depart from Taipei?
My apologies for the long post.
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 01 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 01 March 2001).]
We have a Capt that has a handful of a taxi. A heavily loaded 744, fierce winds, wet surface, rain, poor vis... You want to use the aircraft's momentum to coax it into a 90º turn on to the rwy, line it up correctly, all the while not wasting an inch of concrete. The twy is dark up ahead and you don't want to get into a dead end. And there's other concerns: How's the T/O going to be conducted in the gusty winds nearing the limit, slippery surface, windshear, what's the SID, and how you'll avoid the worst of the wx...It's all too easy to get lulled into the wrong runway by a curving path of green centerline lights.
Perhaps we as pilots should take this opportunity to demand a fresh, clearer, WORLDWIDE set of new regulations about surface movements/lights/markings and unified taxi procedures. Although conforming to ICAO standards, airports tend to develop their own microcosm of particular designs, markings, customs, style, procedures, LVPs...
and expect us pilots from all over the world to adapt to their idiosyncrasies,(CDG comes into mind) unduly increasing crew workload at critical periods and so mistakes are being made (No wonder the apalling number of rwy incursions).
But back to SQ-006. Insider hit one point in his thoughtful posts. Why the decision to launch in the first place when in view of the wx the flight could have been cancelled. A landing back at CKS should have been extremely difficult -beyond autoland limits, low ceiling, below CAT-I minima...- was there a suitable alternate in case of a dire emergency (think of SR-111)?. And there were also other airlines operating: CX and CAL are heard in the CVR.
Capt Kong was obviously in a hurry to set off. Sometimes the pressure (corporate or otherwise) is not conspicous, but it's there in the back of your mind. Here's a question for you SQ guys: What would have happened if the Capt had decided not to depart from Taipei?
My apologies for the long post.
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 01 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 01 March 2001).]
Guest
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Hey, Gladiator, you're changing your tune. Now it's bad visibility first, SQ company culture second. I quote from your post of Feb 25:
I my opinion the contributing factors are:
1- SIA's lack of proper air carrier culture, safety first, profits next.
2- The fear installed into the crewmembers by management. If you delay a flight, there will be hell to pay, promotions stalled, etc.
3- The F/O fears the Captain/bad or no CRM.
4- The Asian culture, "the supervisor is always right".
5- Crews are overworked, fatigue is rampant.
6- Crews are under paid, low morale.
7- SIA's famous attitude, "I am invincible".
8- Bad visibility.
As for Titan's comment, I still don't see the evidence for a browbeaten F/O cowed into submission by an overbearing captain but, admittedly, I speak as a non-aviator, so may be way out in left field on this one.
Re TE RANGI's suggestion that the flight should have been cancelled due to weather, Capt Choong seems to have been concerned but overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going? (After all, he took the time to make a slow turn to line up for the T/O).
Finally, Lee's assertion that crew rest was a factor. I don't see that from the ASC report but, again, as a non-professional, I am open to correction.
And can anyone tell me if the Appendices of the ASC report are downloadable?
I my opinion the contributing factors are:
1- SIA's lack of proper air carrier culture, safety first, profits next.
2- The fear installed into the crewmembers by management. If you delay a flight, there will be hell to pay, promotions stalled, etc.
3- The F/O fears the Captain/bad or no CRM.
4- The Asian culture, "the supervisor is always right".
5- Crews are overworked, fatigue is rampant.
6- Crews are under paid, low morale.
7- SIA's famous attitude, "I am invincible".
8- Bad visibility.
As for Titan's comment, I still don't see the evidence for a browbeaten F/O cowed into submission by an overbearing captain but, admittedly, I speak as a non-aviator, so may be way out in left field on this one.
Re TE RANGI's suggestion that the flight should have been cancelled due to weather, Capt Choong seems to have been concerned but overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going? (After all, he took the time to make a slow turn to line up for the T/O).
Finally, Lee's assertion that crew rest was a factor. I don't see that from the ASC report but, again, as a non-professional, I am open to correction.
And can anyone tell me if the Appendices of the ASC report are downloadable?