Report on 1999 B757 crash at Girona finally published
NOsigbreak, listen to Backtrack.
Fact, the Captain DID fly again, subsequently retired on PHI and pension after some medical problems, related to a head injury in the incident. Good luck to him.
Fact. F/O is still flying.
I myself was in ALC earlier that same day, the CB's were huge and widespread. B***ard of a day, anywhere in that area.
Please can we stop the what ifs, so what hindsight is wonderful isn't it.
EGGW.
Fact, the Captain DID fly again, subsequently retired on PHI and pension after some medical problems, related to a head injury in the incident. Good luck to him.
Fact. F/O is still flying.
I myself was in ALC earlier that same day, the CB's were huge and widespread. B***ard of a day, anywhere in that area.
Please can we stop the what ifs, so what hindsight is wonderful isn't it.
EGGW.
EGGW
Bad news. F/O HAS gone, as of a few days ago. Was due to be starting command course, so company (and everyone else) thought him able and capable enough. Great guy, and more able than me.
Will be missed. (and I'm not even looking at my roster!!)
Bad news. F/O HAS gone, as of a few days ago. Was due to be starting command course, so company (and everyone else) thought him able and capable enough. Great guy, and more able than me.
Will be missed. (and I'm not even looking at my roster!!)
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Some posters seem to be apportioning some of the blame to the inexperience of the FO. Short of questioning the Cpts decision to do another approach what could the FO have done differently? IMHO he did his job well providing good support to the Cpt. The report mentions this by stating that the crew worked well as a team.
I cannot see why the controller gets criticised by some posters either. It is a small regional airport with limited facilities. She did her best within the resources available to her. Some posters have obviously not read the report. She sounded the alarm 40 seconds after the crash (the alarm did not work so she telephone the emergency services a few seconds later). Perhaps somebody in the ramp thought that the A/c had diverted, ATC and the emergency services didn't. It would be great if they had a fully working Heathrow airport everywhere we go, just for us, just for 20 aircraft a day three months of the year. Life is not like that. We as pilots must take all the factors influencing the flight into account.
It all turned to **** with that full nose down elevator. After that it was never going to be easy. Fatigue must have been a factor at that point
Can we now paste this thread into the one about 'overpaid bus drivers....'
I cannot see why the controller gets criticised by some posters either. It is a small regional airport with limited facilities. She did her best within the resources available to her. Some posters have obviously not read the report. She sounded the alarm 40 seconds after the crash (the alarm did not work so she telephone the emergency services a few seconds later). Perhaps somebody in the ramp thought that the A/c had diverted, ATC and the emergency services didn't. It would be great if they had a fully working Heathrow airport everywhere we go, just for us, just for 20 aircraft a day three months of the year. Life is not like that. We as pilots must take all the factors influencing the flight into account.
It all turned to **** with that full nose down elevator. After that it was never going to be easy. Fatigue must have been a factor at that point
Can we now paste this thread into the one about 'overpaid bus drivers....'
The purpose of accident investigation is to find out what happened and why - NOT to apportion blame.
Pilots are human beings and by definition are capable of "error" but to blame any accident on the pilot is far too simplistic. Accidents are a product of the entire "system". Error chains can start anywhere and with this one it might be argued that such a chain started with the (permitted) FTL schemes that exist (this is no criticism of Britannia) or with a fuel policy which promotes "economy" rather than "safety".
I recall on one CRM course I attended the facilitator talked about the "poor judgement chain" - once one poor judgement is made then the probability is that more will follow at an ever increasing rate. I am not criticising the aircraft commander (there but fot the grace of God go I etc) but once the decision had been made to take only an extra 15 minutes holding then the odds were beginning to be stacked in the wrong direction. Poor judgements chains can only be broken by questioning their starting point and acting accordingly.
My experience is that crews are rarely given any training and guidance as to how much extra fuel to take when appropriate. As a training captain some years ago who often operated to GRO and the like I taught crews to look critically at the destination and alternate forecasts especially when either were close to minima and if there was any doubt to load more rather than less. I know that excess fuel carriage can be a contentious issue in some companies but such policies are, I repeat, part of the potential error chain. It is also important that crews understand the ramifications of terms such as TEMPO etc.
This type of accident could have happened to virtually any operator but we have to ask ourselves, as professional pilots, how WE as individual crew members in whatever role can prevent a similar accident in the future.
Pilots are human beings and by definition are capable of "error" but to blame any accident on the pilot is far too simplistic. Accidents are a product of the entire "system". Error chains can start anywhere and with this one it might be argued that such a chain started with the (permitted) FTL schemes that exist (this is no criticism of Britannia) or with a fuel policy which promotes "economy" rather than "safety".
I recall on one CRM course I attended the facilitator talked about the "poor judgement chain" - once one poor judgement is made then the probability is that more will follow at an ever increasing rate. I am not criticising the aircraft commander (there but fot the grace of God go I etc) but once the decision had been made to take only an extra 15 minutes holding then the odds were beginning to be stacked in the wrong direction. Poor judgements chains can only be broken by questioning their starting point and acting accordingly.
My experience is that crews are rarely given any training and guidance as to how much extra fuel to take when appropriate. As a training captain some years ago who often operated to GRO and the like I taught crews to look critically at the destination and alternate forecasts especially when either were close to minima and if there was any doubt to load more rather than less. I know that excess fuel carriage can be a contentious issue in some companies but such policies are, I repeat, part of the potential error chain. It is also important that crews understand the ramifications of terms such as TEMPO etc.
This type of accident could have happened to virtually any operator but we have to ask ourselves, as professional pilots, how WE as individual crew members in whatever role can prevent a similar accident in the future.
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Things have happened and only lessons can be drawn from these events.
Basic common sense tells you; if you have no visual cue’s to land from at the latest at DA or MAP, you make a go around!
But visual cues are not the only thing that may fail.
A thorough knowledge of ILS systems reveals that although LOC and G/S may well be centered it does NOT mean the Aircraft is within the limits or centered with the runway center line.
Some Airlines allow the F/O to continue an autopilot coupled approach (on the condition the LOC and G/S are centered) even if the Capt does NOT react at DA or MAP assuming incapacitation.
The logic behind this is that it is far safer to continue on the Autopilot than to carry out a missed approach with the autopilot by the F/O only.
Edited:
The logic behind this is that it is far safer to continue on the Autopilot and land than to carry out a missed approach with the autopilot monitored by the F/O only.
Another issue is that of extra fuel, 15 minutes is nothing!
If you take extra fuel, then you take plenty and not what I call some kind of psychological fuel of 15 min but at least 30 min if not 60 min.
Not so long ago there was a 757 cargo in LIME with TS all around the place and the same scenario nearly developed.
Again the crew took ONLY 15 min extra, all this causes a tremendous amount of stress and leads to errors.
Considering the small amount of extra burn due to the uplift there is no valid reason why this extra burn should not be considered as an insurance premium against tragedy.
It can only be explained as either reckless behaviour and/or bad company policy.
It is not a question of training but of common sense, only!
There are no clear criteria set out but if you check the WX and you see TS at your destination the you go and look how widely spread they are.
If it is confirmed that they are all over the place and not in a confined area only, then you know what your chances are.
Far too often, do we think that aviation is state of the art technology, perfectly regulated and controlled all this creates a blind confidence in the system.
Everybody with some years in the industry knows for a fact that it is far from perfect
Basic common sense tells you; if you have no visual cue’s to land from at the latest at DA or MAP, you make a go around!
But visual cues are not the only thing that may fail.
A thorough knowledge of ILS systems reveals that although LOC and G/S may well be centered it does NOT mean the Aircraft is within the limits or centered with the runway center line.
Some Airlines allow the F/O to continue an autopilot coupled approach (on the condition the LOC and G/S are centered) even if the Capt does NOT react at DA or MAP assuming incapacitation.
The logic behind this is that it is far safer to continue on the Autopilot than to carry out a missed approach with the autopilot by the F/O only.
Edited:
The logic behind this is that it is far safer to continue on the Autopilot and land than to carry out a missed approach with the autopilot monitored by the F/O only.
Another issue is that of extra fuel, 15 minutes is nothing!
If you take extra fuel, then you take plenty and not what I call some kind of psychological fuel of 15 min but at least 30 min if not 60 min.
Not so long ago there was a 757 cargo in LIME with TS all around the place and the same scenario nearly developed.
Again the crew took ONLY 15 min extra, all this causes a tremendous amount of stress and leads to errors.
Considering the small amount of extra burn due to the uplift there is no valid reason why this extra burn should not be considered as an insurance premium against tragedy.
It can only be explained as either reckless behaviour and/or bad company policy.
It is not a question of training but of common sense, only!
There are no clear criteria set out but if you check the WX and you see TS at your destination the you go and look how widely spread they are.
If it is confirmed that they are all over the place and not in a confined area only, then you know what your chances are.
Far too often, do we think that aviation is state of the art technology, perfectly regulated and controlled all this creates a blind confidence in the system.
Everybody with some years in the industry knows for a fact that it is far from perfect
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The practice of putting a student pilot in the right seat of a commercial jetliner is troubling and its implications need addressing.I dont agree with it and yet I know many airlines get away with it year after year.Aircraft are so reliable these days.Its not just that the poor guy is woefully unprepared for the huge workload and cognitive decision-making in the event of a LHS incapacitation.The real issue is that it creates a steep gradient between left and right seat.All US majors reject this model and for good reason.For CRM to function as IT WAS INTENDED WAY BACK WHEN,the gradient should be shallow enough to ensure that:
i)the "junior" pilot has a database of knowledge and experience which enables him/her to communicate any concerns about the flight.This communication can vary between timely and helpful advice to direct contradiction.
ii)the "senior" pilot,mindful of the experience of his/her colleague,will readily and confidently use and manage the resources of the right seat.
This model represents the perfect CRM model and I dont pretend that it exists in all US majors,but they certainly aspire to it.This model,when manifested in its purest form,will in fact perform miracles,as in the case of the DC-10 crash at Sioux city,where 182 people escaped certain death.
Increasingly,there seems to be a new model; communication of the type given in (i) is now based on the desire to conform to a politically-correct flightdeck(an anathema to pure CRM).Advocacy and assertion is there but now there's no database to back it up.Or alternatively,the communication is not forthcoming at all,because quite rightly,the first officer feels he/she is ill-equipped to advocate or assert anything.
Pilots wanted:college grad,3000 hours,1000 turbine,must have seen a bit of life.
i)the "junior" pilot has a database of knowledge and experience which enables him/her to communicate any concerns about the flight.This communication can vary between timely and helpful advice to direct contradiction.
ii)the "senior" pilot,mindful of the experience of his/her colleague,will readily and confidently use and manage the resources of the right seat.
This model represents the perfect CRM model and I dont pretend that it exists in all US majors,but they certainly aspire to it.This model,when manifested in its purest form,will in fact perform miracles,as in the case of the DC-10 crash at Sioux city,where 182 people escaped certain death.
Increasingly,there seems to be a new model; communication of the type given in (i) is now based on the desire to conform to a politically-correct flightdeck(an anathema to pure CRM).Advocacy and assertion is there but now there's no database to back it up.Or alternatively,the communication is not forthcoming at all,because quite rightly,the first officer feels he/she is ill-equipped to advocate or assert anything.
Pilots wanted:college grad,3000 hours,1000 turbine,must have seen a bit of life.
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Rananim
You have my blessing.
CRM has evolved into some talk show and has become a way to select pilots NOT on what they know “Database” but on the, are they “Nice” criteria like a kind of “Would I like to sit next to this guy for 8 Hrs”
For many years, models have been developed to select pilots and when Competent and Experienced recruiting staff uses it, they can get it right.
I prefer a young F/O with a solid educational background that challenges his Capt with questions over the one that is nice and that keeps quiet.
It keeps me up to speed, the flight is far from boring.
But the essence of the story is often: “How do you as a captain use your F/O as efficiently as possible” or in other words Crew Management. You can invite the F/O to get more involved yourself.
Certainly; when an approach gets difficult you want to use all resources and in my opinion in the case of this Gerona mishap “A MONITORED APPROACH”
You have my blessing.
CRM has evolved into some talk show and has become a way to select pilots NOT on what they know “Database” but on the, are they “Nice” criteria like a kind of “Would I like to sit next to this guy for 8 Hrs”
For many years, models have been developed to select pilots and when Competent and Experienced recruiting staff uses it, they can get it right.
I prefer a young F/O with a solid educational background that challenges his Capt with questions over the one that is nice and that keeps quiet.
It keeps me up to speed, the flight is far from boring.
But the essence of the story is often: “How do you as a captain use your F/O as efficiently as possible” or in other words Crew Management. You can invite the F/O to get more involved yourself.
Certainly; when an approach gets difficult you want to use all resources and in my opinion in the case of this Gerona mishap “A MONITORED APPROACH”
"the "junior" pilot has a database of knowledge and experience which enables him/her to communicate any concerns about the flight."
Ranamim - did that include the Southwest that visited the gas station?
Yes we do it slightly different over here in Europe, but that does not mean either of us are getting it wrong. I have never had any problems flying with Cadets, if they are not happy with something they will always speak up.
Ranamim - did that include the Southwest that visited the gas station?
Yes we do it slightly different over here in Europe, but that does not mean either of us are getting it wrong. I have never had any problems flying with Cadets, if they are not happy with something they will always speak up.
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The practice of putting a student pilot in the right seat of a commercial jetliner is troubling and its implications need addressing
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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Typically, those that 'prefer' to argue about their revulsion at having 'young' inexperienced First Officers are the same ones that most Captains, young or old, experienced or inexperienced, can't stand spending long periods with on the flight deck. You only have to listen to Cap56 and you'd think he was an experienced jet CAPTAIN! 
There can be little worse for anyone, Captain or First Officer to have to listen to someone pontificating from a position they don't have the credibility to claim to be coming from. A bit like listening to a "Jack of all trades, master of none"!
As has been pointed out already and suitably ignored by those that like the sound of their own voices, the F/O had two years of experience on the B757. Where he started from is irrelevant and yet we have 'pseudo experts' trying to tell us how terrible it is to have to fly with a cadet pilot. If the F/O had been only just released from line training, maybe, just maybe, there may have been a point to be raised but in this instance the F/O performed appropriately and according to the book.
So, would the pontiff (and I think we all know who we are talking about) please go back to lambasting other airlines about how to fly into Johannesburg on a hot night. The lecture on cockpit gradient (an inverse one in this case) would be better applied to a situation where an F/O was driving his Captain to distraction with his self deduced gospel about how he thinks it should all be done.
The Gerona accident was just that, an accident. It wasn't one single causal factor but a number of them, as in just about all accidents. We, as pilots hope to learn from them. Anyone who tries to use the information to pontificate about how it should be done will probably find themselves being knocked off their pedestals. This accident could have happened to any one of us, including the pontificators. Line up enough holes in the Swiss Cheese and, as we have learnt from this one, the brown stuff can and will hit the fan. Third night flight in a row is not where you want to be when you can see through the cheese.
There can be little worse for anyone, Captain or First Officer to have to listen to someone pontificating from a position they don't have the credibility to claim to be coming from. A bit like listening to a "Jack of all trades, master of none"!As has been pointed out already and suitably ignored by those that like the sound of their own voices, the F/O had two years of experience on the B757. Where he started from is irrelevant and yet we have 'pseudo experts' trying to tell us how terrible it is to have to fly with a cadet pilot. If the F/O had been only just released from line training, maybe, just maybe, there may have been a point to be raised but in this instance the F/O performed appropriately and according to the book.
So, would the pontiff (and I think we all know who we are talking about) please go back to lambasting other airlines about how to fly into Johannesburg on a hot night. The lecture on cockpit gradient (an inverse one in this case) would be better applied to a situation where an F/O was driving his Captain to distraction with his self deduced gospel about how he thinks it should all be done.
The Gerona accident was just that, an accident. It wasn't one single causal factor but a number of them, as in just about all accidents. We, as pilots hope to learn from them. Anyone who tries to use the information to pontificate about how it should be done will probably find themselves being knocked off their pedestals. This accident could have happened to any one of us, including the pontificators. Line up enough holes in the Swiss Cheese and, as we have learnt from this one, the brown stuff can and will hit the fan. Third night flight in a row is not where you want to be when you can see through the cheese.
Throughout this thread I've been wondering what the Captain and the FO thought of the final report and of the 20/20 hindsight comments hereon. I would only hope that the positivve comments of ex-colleagues outweigh, for them and by a long shot, the censure expressed by those who don't know them and weren't there. Particularly with regard to the FO, apparently leaving of his own accord shortly after the report was published, no indication as to whether he's off to another flying job, entering a new career or just contemplating the future. Whatever his course, best wishes.
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It is interesting that the subject of low hour f/0's is being mixed in with the Girona topic.
This leads to the impression that the Girona f/o was in some way lacking. The majority of posters cannot know that.
My original post herein lambasted low hour f/o's straight from training school. OK, so I've flown with f/o's with over 10000 hours who should'nt be allowed in a cockpit, but they are few and far between. The big problem (and I am in a position to speak from experience) is low hour f/o's with little experience, maturity, humility and all of the other ingredients which go to make up a colleague who helps rather than hinders.
For goodness sake, some of the guys I've seen can't land the aeroplane anything but roughly on a calm, CAVOK day. Throw in some wind, heaven forbid a crosswind, and watch out!
The system needs sorting out by the CAA (wishful thinking, then).
Sorry to go off topic (or is it?).
This leads to the impression that the Girona f/o was in some way lacking. The majority of posters cannot know that.
My original post herein lambasted low hour f/o's straight from training school. OK, so I've flown with f/o's with over 10000 hours who should'nt be allowed in a cockpit, but they are few and far between. The big problem (and I am in a position to speak from experience) is low hour f/o's with little experience, maturity, humility and all of the other ingredients which go to make up a colleague who helps rather than hinders.
For goodness sake, some of the guys I've seen can't land the aeroplane anything but roughly on a calm, CAVOK day. Throw in some wind, heaven forbid a crosswind, and watch out!
The system needs sorting out by the CAA (wishful thinking, then).
Sorry to go off topic (or is it?).
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CRM has evolved into some talk show and has become a way to select pilots NOT on what they know “Database” but on the, are they “Nice” criteria like a kind of “Would I like to sit next to this guy for 8 Hrs”
Very sensible and balanced editorial in Flight International this week, it's well worth reading and I have copied it below, the last sentence is particulary pertintent.
Sometimes an accident warrants examining because it is extraordinary. The Girona report needs study because it is ordinary
If Professor James Reason was looking for the ideal real-life example to demonstrate his famous "Swiss cheeses" model of what enables accidents to happen in a basically safe system, the just-published report on the September 1999 Boeing 757 accident at Girona in Spain has it all.
Now the investigators reveal a web of interacting forces, circumstances and influences, even including what secular insurers still call an act of God. Gamblers would call it a wild card.
It is worth using an event like Girona to examine whether, just sometimes, things like this are bound to happen and we have to accept it, or whether something could - or should - have been done that might have blocked the chain of events. Although this 757, with 245 people on board, careered off the runway at high speed with almost all its controls disabled or malfunctioning, only one person died as a result. Even the low toll in human life could be considered a matter of luck.
This aircraft set off from the UK for Girona, knowing its destination and all its alternates were affected by a band of stormy, frontal weather - but it was the type that might delay a landing until a storm cell passed rather than prevent it. The captain loaded an additional 15min of fuel above standard company diversionary minima to allow for this. On calling Girona it was clear that a storm cell was close to the airfield, but it was dark and its precise location was not communicated. The wind - not strong - had shifted from southerly to northerly, so the captain decided on a runway 02 non-precision approach rather than a precision approach on to 20 with a tailwind. The trouble with 20 is that it has a strong downslope - just above the International Civil Aviation Organisation recommended maximum. And the runway - adequate but not generously long at 2,400m (7,900ft) - was going to be wet, so the captain opted for the risk of a non-precision approach rather than the alternative risk of a tailwind landing on runway 20. He also took over as the pilot flying at that point. But the VOR/DME approach did not go well, the tower/approach controller advised during it that the storm cell was now over the airfield, and the captain carried out a go-around. Meanwhile, the wind was shifting again to southerly, making an ILS to runway 20 plausible for the second attempt. Then the aircraft flight management system advised the crew they were approaching company fuel minima, so the captain was under pressure to make a decision whether to divert or not. It was dark, turbulent and the rain over the airfield was "torrential", but had they diverted to any of the alternates it might have been the same. As they established on the ILS for runway 20, the "must land" mindset would have been a tempting one to adopt. The approach was turbulent and not stable relative to the glideslope, but the runway lights were visible before decision height and, despite a sink-rate warning from the ground proximity warning system on short final, the captain clearly thought the landing could be safe.
Then fate played the wild card. The runway lights went out for 11s just as the captain needed them to judge the final descent and flare. The report says a contributory factor in the very hard, nose-down landing that followed was "the effect of shock or mental incapacitation on the pilot flying at the failure of the runway lights, which may have inhibited him from making a decision to go-around". Most pilots have experienced an unexpected loss of visual contact with runway lights at the last moment - usually due to a patch of fog caused by a local micro-climate effect - but by the time the pilot has registered the loss of contact the lights usually reappear again.
A pilot is "the system's goalkeeper", and this one got past the 757's crew. So where else did the defences fail? Girona, with its steeply sloping runway, is scarcely perfect, but that was a known part of the risk management calculation. With hindsight, 15min of extra fuel was not enough. A recommendation that go-around manoeuvres below decision height should be a mandatory part of recurrent training seems useful because it would help pilots override a "must land" mindset. Another recommendation - that more precise real-time weather information should be immediately available to controllers - would have helped the captain with decision making. There's plenty else - the report is a gift for nitpickers.
The Girona report should be required reading for airline and airport safety committees, because there is no "silver bullet" solution for this one. It was an ordinary situation that got out of hand, and all operators can face challenges like these at any time.
Sometimes an accident warrants examining because it is extraordinary. The Girona report needs study because it is ordinary
If Professor James Reason was looking for the ideal real-life example to demonstrate his famous "Swiss cheeses" model of what enables accidents to happen in a basically safe system, the just-published report on the September 1999 Boeing 757 accident at Girona in Spain has it all.
Now the investigators reveal a web of interacting forces, circumstances and influences, even including what secular insurers still call an act of God. Gamblers would call it a wild card.
It is worth using an event like Girona to examine whether, just sometimes, things like this are bound to happen and we have to accept it, or whether something could - or should - have been done that might have blocked the chain of events. Although this 757, with 245 people on board, careered off the runway at high speed with almost all its controls disabled or malfunctioning, only one person died as a result. Even the low toll in human life could be considered a matter of luck.
This aircraft set off from the UK for Girona, knowing its destination and all its alternates were affected by a band of stormy, frontal weather - but it was the type that might delay a landing until a storm cell passed rather than prevent it. The captain loaded an additional 15min of fuel above standard company diversionary minima to allow for this. On calling Girona it was clear that a storm cell was close to the airfield, but it was dark and its precise location was not communicated. The wind - not strong - had shifted from southerly to northerly, so the captain decided on a runway 02 non-precision approach rather than a precision approach on to 20 with a tailwind. The trouble with 20 is that it has a strong downslope - just above the International Civil Aviation Organisation recommended maximum. And the runway - adequate but not generously long at 2,400m (7,900ft) - was going to be wet, so the captain opted for the risk of a non-precision approach rather than the alternative risk of a tailwind landing on runway 20. He also took over as the pilot flying at that point. But the VOR/DME approach did not go well, the tower/approach controller advised during it that the storm cell was now over the airfield, and the captain carried out a go-around. Meanwhile, the wind was shifting again to southerly, making an ILS to runway 20 plausible for the second attempt. Then the aircraft flight management system advised the crew they were approaching company fuel minima, so the captain was under pressure to make a decision whether to divert or not. It was dark, turbulent and the rain over the airfield was "torrential", but had they diverted to any of the alternates it might have been the same. As they established on the ILS for runway 20, the "must land" mindset would have been a tempting one to adopt. The approach was turbulent and not stable relative to the glideslope, but the runway lights were visible before decision height and, despite a sink-rate warning from the ground proximity warning system on short final, the captain clearly thought the landing could be safe.
Then fate played the wild card. The runway lights went out for 11s just as the captain needed them to judge the final descent and flare. The report says a contributory factor in the very hard, nose-down landing that followed was "the effect of shock or mental incapacitation on the pilot flying at the failure of the runway lights, which may have inhibited him from making a decision to go-around". Most pilots have experienced an unexpected loss of visual contact with runway lights at the last moment - usually due to a patch of fog caused by a local micro-climate effect - but by the time the pilot has registered the loss of contact the lights usually reappear again.
A pilot is "the system's goalkeeper", and this one got past the 757's crew. So where else did the defences fail? Girona, with its steeply sloping runway, is scarcely perfect, but that was a known part of the risk management calculation. With hindsight, 15min of extra fuel was not enough. A recommendation that go-around manoeuvres below decision height should be a mandatory part of recurrent training seems useful because it would help pilots override a "must land" mindset. Another recommendation - that more precise real-time weather information should be immediately available to controllers - would have helped the captain with decision making. There's plenty else - the report is a gift for nitpickers.
The Girona report should be required reading for airline and airport safety committees, because there is no "silver bullet" solution for this one. It was an ordinary situation that got out of hand, and all operators can face challenges like these at any time.
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Very sobering indeed.
I would be very interested to read Appendix 3 to see how many hundreds of others would have ended up in the same position, albeit in the sim.
Goes to show just how few holes there are in the Swiss cheese to line up these days... courtesy of the beancounters.
'The only time you have too much fuel is when you are on fire' was one of the first rules of flight planning ...back in the days when flight crew had complete control of the safe operation of an a/c.
I would be very interested to read Appendix 3 to see how many hundreds of others would have ended up in the same position, albeit in the sim.
Goes to show just how few holes there are in the Swiss cheese to line up these days... courtesy of the beancounters.
'The only time you have too much fuel is when you are on fire' was one of the first rules of flight planning ...back in the days when flight crew had complete control of the safe operation of an a/c.
Last edited by Traffic; 13th Sep 2004 at 04:19.
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Huh?
...back in the days when flight crew had complete control of the safe operation of an aircraft."
Hmmm, the license these flight crew held certainly required the full authority for carrying more fuel, yet the Captain chose not to do so.
Quite frankly, having operated into Girona more than a few times (yes, at night, stormy weather etc), it would seem that the operating crew in question stuffed it up rather badly...a lesson for all, to actually pay attention to what the hell they are doing.
A bit more experience in the RHS wouldn't hurt either.
Hmmm, the license these flight crew held certainly required the full authority for carrying more fuel, yet the Captain chose not to do so.
Quite frankly, having operated into Girona more than a few times (yes, at night, stormy weather etc), it would seem that the operating crew in question stuffed it up rather badly...a lesson for all, to actually pay attention to what the hell they are doing.
A bit more experience in the RHS wouldn't hurt either.