SQ AKL tailstrike report released
With all the technology and electronics available in modern civil/military a/c, surely a strain-gauge system on the undercarriage could determine the true weight and CofG of the aircraft instantaneously and feed it to the FMC and any input errors would be readily apparent..
Sycamore.
Sycamore.
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RRAAMJET,
Thank you for your insight. Nevertheless, clearly, even the CX of yesteryear would not have taken lightly the decision to fire one of their captains for allowing a tailstrike of the SQ@AKL variety. Akerosid was exaggerating, I'm sure. The subject of punishment and penalties for pilot error interests me and I once tried to get a debate going on PPRune but was unsuccessful, probably because, being regarded as an interloper from outside the shop, I often get frozen out by you professionals. So, what have I got to lose, here goes...
I understand that the QF skipper who botched the landing at BKK in Sept/99 and virtually wrote off an entire 744 continued on as a captain with the company. Fair?
The CAL clowns who took off from a taxiway at right angles to their assigned runway at ANC in Jan/02 were not demoted, as far as I know. Fair?
I don't think it's fair that the handling crew of SQ6 (TPE Oct/00) were dismissed but I do understand that the company had no viable alternative (because fatalities were involved?).
Do you or anyone else wish to comment?
Rockhound
Thank you for your insight. Nevertheless, clearly, even the CX of yesteryear would not have taken lightly the decision to fire one of their captains for allowing a tailstrike of the SQ@AKL variety. Akerosid was exaggerating, I'm sure. The subject of punishment and penalties for pilot error interests me and I once tried to get a debate going on PPRune but was unsuccessful, probably because, being regarded as an interloper from outside the shop, I often get frozen out by you professionals. So, what have I got to lose, here goes...
I understand that the QF skipper who botched the landing at BKK in Sept/99 and virtually wrote off an entire 744 continued on as a captain with the company. Fair?
The CAL clowns who took off from a taxiway at right angles to their assigned runway at ANC in Jan/02 were not demoted, as far as I know. Fair?
I don't think it's fair that the handling crew of SQ6 (TPE Oct/00) were dismissed but I do understand that the company had no viable alternative (because fatalities were involved?).
Do you or anyone else wish to comment?
Rockhound
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"The CAL clowns who took off from a taxiway at right angles to their assigned runway at ANC in Jan/02 were not demoted, as far as I know. Fair?"
You can be assured that those involved with this incident were all permenately removed from flying duties after they landed from the flight. The FO is still with the company in a non flying, non operational capacity.
CAL has recently been very quick to deal with safety issues like this.
You can be assured that those involved with this incident were all permenately removed from flying duties after they landed from the flight. The FO is still with the company in a non flying, non operational capacity.
CAL has recently been very quick to deal with safety issues like this.
"The INTRODUCER"
The old Air Bridge Merchantmen (Vickers Vanguards) had just such a system donkeys years ago. I have watched them on many occasions stopping on the taxiway while they check-weighed themselves.
I have often wondered why the idea didn't catch on but I suppose we would have to ask the bean-counters that question.
I have often wondered why the idea didn't catch on but I suppose we would have to ask the bean-counters that question.
Thanks ALGY, unfortunately I can`t open the details, but at least its good to know someone is working on it, as it`s been around for about 100 yrs.!!!
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Interesting stuff. So many of the newbies I trained came up with the idea, but I was told by some engineers that such systems were not terribly accurate since the stiffness of the oleo compression action would cause it to stick until the force was great enough to 'jog it'. Ultimate accuracy required zero friction.
But for the purpose of red-flagging serious discrepencies, I suppose it has its merits. I always thought big pressure pads strategically located at holding points near the threshold would have worked, but cost and durability would be difficult as would persuading every airport to install such a system.
I still think well trained and experienced load controllers are the way to go, even if such systems are used to back them up and reduce obvious errors.
But for the purpose of red-flagging serious discrepencies, I suppose it has its merits. I always thought big pressure pads strategically located at holding points near the threshold would have worked, but cost and durability would be difficult as would persuading every airport to install such a system.
I still think well trained and experienced load controllers are the way to go, even if such systems are used to back them up and reduce obvious errors.
Tail scrape
With increasing technology today’s crew are more remote from the workings of systems (the total system: FMS, aircraft, other crew) and thus they are more vulnerable to any safety threat or error potential. Similarly the crew has less contact with reference manuals and paper work; training has evolved to meet the current needs that have reduced the focus on manual / mental calculation.
Therefore, agreeing with RRAAMJET, it is necessary to seek more defenses to the threats cause by these changes; the defenses are many and varied - CRM, airmanship, personal culture or general treat and error management. In the spirit of seeking a safe new year I offer a few operating tips that kept me scrape free:
Avoid the use of ‘cross fill’ between FMS as it removes the opportunity to check for erroneous entry that can be detected by comparison – “mine is bigger than yours” routine!
Additional knowledge (a requirement of good airmanship) can provide rules of thumb about takeoff weight and speed; in my aircraft these were:
VR approx 2 kt / ton above the basic 100 kts at MZFW, applicable for all three takeoff flap settings.
V1 approx VR-10.
V1 ‘wet’ max VR-20, but not below Vmcg (always know Vmcg for the aircraft type; it does not usually vary with weight).
V2 approx VR+10, but within a range of +7 to +15
Calls and communication are always a threat area. Defenses in this area require well thought out procedures and personal discipline. Beware the ‘parrot speak’ error; parrots cannot evaluate and compare, where as humans can; thus they must take part in a dual checking system. Only call the speed / bug that is indicated on the instrument; this means reading the instrument (and understanding the context), only call what you see. One aid in this area is to state the value of a sped bug when setting it i.e. “V1 set 103 kts”. This communication enables another crew member to detect an error either in his or your calculation / setting. Use this concept in other checks, don’t just call “checked” or “set”; these are meaningless as error detecting checks.
Any other good tips out there?
Therefore, agreeing with RRAAMJET, it is necessary to seek more defenses to the threats cause by these changes; the defenses are many and varied - CRM, airmanship, personal culture or general treat and error management. In the spirit of seeking a safe new year I offer a few operating tips that kept me scrape free:
Avoid the use of ‘cross fill’ between FMS as it removes the opportunity to check for erroneous entry that can be detected by comparison – “mine is bigger than yours” routine!
Additional knowledge (a requirement of good airmanship) can provide rules of thumb about takeoff weight and speed; in my aircraft these were:
VR approx 2 kt / ton above the basic 100 kts at MZFW, applicable for all three takeoff flap settings.
V1 approx VR-10.
V1 ‘wet’ max VR-20, but not below Vmcg (always know Vmcg for the aircraft type; it does not usually vary with weight).
V2 approx VR+10, but within a range of +7 to +15
Calls and communication are always a threat area. Defenses in this area require well thought out procedures and personal discipline. Beware the ‘parrot speak’ error; parrots cannot evaluate and compare, where as humans can; thus they must take part in a dual checking system. Only call the speed / bug that is indicated on the instrument; this means reading the instrument (and understanding the context), only call what you see. One aid in this area is to state the value of a sped bug when setting it i.e. “V1 set 103 kts”. This communication enables another crew member to detect an error either in his or your calculation / setting. Use this concept in other checks, don’t just call “checked” or “set”; these are meaningless as error detecting checks.
Any other good tips out there?
Last edited by alf5071h; 31st Dec 2003 at 21:20.
The 744 does have the option of the Weight and Balance Computer (WBC) which weighs the aircraft from the pressure sensed in the oleos and also computes C of G. I asked in an earlier thread if Singapore had the WBC option and the answer was in the affirmative. The crew must have therefore ignored the EICAS message.
Tailstrike Woe
As I suggested earlier on this topic, electronic and automatic generated data is great, but surely this still requires a final manual check. On the SQ at AKL, it appears all three of the guys on the flight deck did not appreciate or `twig on`, that the figures and V speeds they were about to use were incorrect. I would strongly assert that, had a manual check been completed someone would have noticed the mistake. On my last aircraft the F/O normally calculated the T/O data and speeds etc directly from the tables, the card was then passed to the F/E who ran a complete recalculation on the F/Os figures. Only after it was agreed that both sets of figures matched totally, were these used for the take off. When the take off was very limiting indeed and quite often as a matter of course, the Captain also ran a manual check.This sounds a bit drawn out I know, but in fact on the DC10 the whole two calculations normally took no more than about six minutes. I would say this was time very well spent indeed. Electronic and automatic data for performance calculations must be checked manually, otherwise how do know what you are seeing on the card is correct.
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The comment made above regading BA or CX management reaction in a similar situation by sacking those involved I think would be highly unlikely. Having worked for BA for 32 years, my impression is that if those involved were prepared to be as constructive as possible in the investigation, they would lose large chunks of seniority and the Captain his command for a period. The culture was very much one of expecting you to admit to your infallibility and assisting in the prevention of a similar situation in the future. BALPA was very much involved in such serious investigations, one of its more useful functions in it's BA directed activities.
Having said that, as someone else pointed out, there had to have been a massive loss of SA by all three pilots for the various glaring warning signs to have gone unnoticed.
Having said that, as someone else pointed out, there had to have been a massive loss of SA by all three pilots for the various glaring warning signs to have gone unnoticed.
Tailscrape
Some related safety articles
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...ous_story.html
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...y/tr01txt.html
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...ous_story.html
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...y/tr01txt.html
