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-   -   EC 175 (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/281966-ec-175-a.html)

skadi 24th August 2016 13:02

First H175 delivered to Mexico

http://www.helis.com/database/news/h175_pegaso/

skadi

heli1 24th August 2016 16:00

So is there one or two H175s at Esbjerg ....the press release is confusing as it refers to H155s too!

piperpa46 25th August 2016 00:44

More than likely they are plugging the gap from the EC225s. NHV/Dancopter were flying 3 of those which has so far been replaced by two EC155s. On top of that Maersk has been using Bel Air AW189s and AW139s since April.

piperpa46 25th August 2016 15:56

Looking at the schedule Dancopter is flying it looks like they only have on H175 at the moment. There where no helicopters offshore, the hangar was empty and OO-NSI had just landed at 17:15 today.

EESDL 13th October 2016 02:36

Public Service Progress
 
http://www.verticalmag.com/press-releases/airbus-helicopters-launches-flight-test-campaign-h175-public-services-configuration/?utm_source=vertical-daily-news&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=vertical-daily-news-10-12-16

spinner79 13th January 2017 15:41

Ec175 lips
 
Has Airbus recived certification for Lips on the H175 yet?

PlasticCabDriver 13th January 2017 18:40

It has a clearance for flight in limited icing conditions. Such flight requires installation of the Winter Kit (some blanking over the intake grids, plus some adjustments to the engine internally), Windscreen Heater, Ice Detector, AC Alternator and the horizontal stabiliser protection plate.


If that's what you mean by LIPS, then yes, it's certified.

spinner79 15th January 2017 17:09

I wasn't aware it was already approved for flights in known Icing conditions. i only read in verticalmag.com That Airbus was hoping to get the approval in the end of 2016. But I haven’t seen any Easa document regarding approval for flight in limited icing conditions yet. Witch is why I asked ☺ PlasticCabDriver: would you know where I could find the EASA approval?

obnoxio f*ckwit 15th January 2017 19:13

Flight Manual Supplement 4.

spinner79 16th January 2017 11:41

If you look at the type certificate for the H175 issue 2.
It is not approved for flight in icing conditions.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/fi..._18Dec2015.pdf
quote.
11.
Operating Limitations VFR day and night
IFR
Non-icing conditions

So there must be a type certificate issue number 3 with limited flight in icing right ?

jimf671 16th January 2017 12:33

The 189 type cert is recently at issue 7 and includes LIPS and FIPS details as well as various other special conditions and requirements. We might expect a similar approach with the 175. I expect there is a some interim paperwork that may not be available online.

PlasticCabDriver 16th January 2017 14:46

EASA approved Supplement 4 (Flight in Limited Icing Conditions) on November 18, 2016, approval number 10060117.


No idea where the data sheet is.

EESDL 16th February 2017 00:26

Revised limitation
 
Just received Hairbrush update to limit ops <-15 Deg to 7500kgs - thank goodness for that!

steve_oc 17th February 2017 05:07

Type certificate issue 3 now published on the EASA website

https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-...e-certificates

EESDL 7th March 2017 01:27

RFM Noise Levels
 
According to the FM, 175 noise levels have been determined under conditions prescribed in Chapter 8 and Appendix 4 of Annex 16 of ICAO, volume 1 etc etc
Understand using Chapter 8 methods but why Appendix 4?
Appendix 4 is for helicopters NOT EXCEEDING 3175 kg Max Certified TOW.

Or is it a case that they meant to refer to Appendix 2?

212man 7th March 2017 07:37


Originally Posted by EESDL (Post 9698030)
According to the FM, 175 noise levels have been determined under conditions prescribed in Chapter 8 and Appendix 4 of Annex 16 of ICAO, volume 1 etc etc
Understand using Chapter 8 methods but why Appendix 4?
Appendix 4 is for helicopters NOT EXCEEDING 3175 kg Max Certified TOW.

Or is it a case that they meant to refer to Appendix 2?

Where do you see that?

The TCDS says:

ICAO Annex 16, Volume I, Part II, Amdt. 10, Chapter 8 (EASA CS-36, Amdt. 3)
The Noise certificate (https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/fi...0%20Issue2.pdf) says:

ICAO Annex 16, Volume I 6 Edition / Amendment 10 Chapter 8 (8.A.2)
So is clearly referring to Appendix 2.

EESDL 7th March 2017 13:31


Originally Posted by 212man (Post 9698203)
Where do you see that?

The TCDS says:


The Noise certificate (https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/fi...0%20Issue2.pdf) says:


So is clearly referring to Appendix 2.

That is my point - EASA docs and databases refers to Appendix 2 but I am referring to the Regulatory Flight Manual
Page 39 of Section 5 in the RFM refers to "Appendix 4"....
page code 17-06

Latest RFM noise-related update TIPI lists is RN9_RCc dated 9/2/2017 - which updates EPNdb figures but not the header.
What does yours say?
Airbrush H yet to confirm.

Phoinix 23rd September 2017 19:51

Where would a typical BEM stand for 175 in clean config + maybe a hoist??

Cyclic Hotline 23rd April 2021 15:27

Does anyone have an explanation for the incorrect amount of grease being applied and causing a gearbox to make crunching noises? Sounds intriguing.
https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandga...arbox-failure/OIL & GAS / NORTH SEA

‘Crunching sound’ on CHC helicopter in Aberdeen identified gearbox failure


Investigators have raised safety concerns after discovery of a gearbox failure on a CHC helicopter in Aberdeen after a “crunching sound” was heard.By Allister Thomas
23/04/2021, 10:51 am
https://wpcluster.dctdigital.com/ene...file-150px.png© Airbushttps://wpcluster.dctdigital.com/ene...75-846x564.jpg
A CHC-operated H175 helicopter Investigators have raised safety concerns after discovery of a gearbox failure on a CHC helicopter in Aberdeen after a “crunching sound” was heard.

A report from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the problem, found last year on an accessory gearbox while the H175 helicopter was still on ground, would have constituted a “major” safety failing had it been during a flight.

Both CHC and AAIB underlined that the failure would not have led to a loss of control of the aircraft, but would have required pilots to land “as soon as possible”.

The AAIB said it would have led to a “significant erosion of safety margins” during a flight.

The failing, on an accessory gearbox in the helicopter, was found on September 23 in Aberdeen after a “crunching sound” could be heard coming from it, the report said.

It followed a scheduled replacement of the main gearbox, with the issue found during the first “ground run”, which always takes place before any aircraft is released for work.

Investigators said an excess amount of grease being applied led to the issue, despite this being the appropriate amount stipulated in the maintenance manual.

A method used by the maintenance team also played a role, AAIB said, who launched an investigation due to the risk of the component failure occurring during flight.

CHC said it welcomed the report, adding that it worked closely with the AAIB and manufacturer Airbus following the event.

It added that the “anomaly” had been rectified by Airbus and that CHC’s engineering team has “been fully briefed on the AAIB’s report findings to ensure the result of the actions taken are fully understood and followed”.

Airbus issued a safety notice following the incident and updated and clarified the maintenance procedure.

An Airbus spokesman said the AAIB “report is clear on the origin of this incident”, underlining that the incident took place during a ground run prior to the helicopter being released for service.

However, on March 9, the AAIB received a report of a second similar issue elsewhere, after the Airbus safety notice, and that operator has since said it would issue a reminder to its maintenance team.

Jake Molloy, regional organiser of the RMT union, said “it would have been a scary moment for the passengers”.

He added: “Gearboxes in helicopters will forever be the biggest single concern for anybody using helicopters.

“They are very, very complex technical pieces of kit and identifying system failures, such as the one the AAIB has reported on, continues to improve the performance of those gearboxes.

“This particular failure identified during maintenance, reading the report, wouldn’t have brought the aircraft down immediately. The crew would have had to land it somewhere as soon as practically possible.

“It continues to be one of the major concerns in terms of overall safety for offshore workers and, inevitably, will continue that way. It’s an inherent risk which cannot be avoided.”

ApolloHeli 23rd April 2021 22:08


Investigators said an excess amount of grease being applied led to the issue, despite this being the appropriate amount stipulated in the maintenance manual.


Seems a bit contradictory to me...

Twist & Shout 23rd April 2021 23:23


Originally Posted by ApolloHeli (Post 11033099)
Seems a bit contradictory to me...

I’m slightly surprised that Airbus didn’t initially claim they had found the required grease, still in a toolbox.....

vee_why 25th April 2021 22:13

The report provides a bit more context https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...-ec175b-g-emeb


Since the LAGB had successfully run on a test cell for 12 hours without any deterioration detected in the alternator pinion bearings, with a 10 kVA alternator installed, it is likely that the installation of the 10 kVA alternator by the operator directly influenced the F1 bearing failure that occurred after 18 minutes of the post-maintenance ground run.

Examination of the failed F1 bearing and alternator pinion revealed that they had been subjected to a compressive axial load during the ground run. This axial load was greater than the ability of the F1 roller bearing to withstand it, leading to the bearing overheating and causing the PEEK bearing cage to melt, which was then extruded from the bearing. The overheating also caused significant wear of the bearing rollers, releasing bearing debris into the MGB oil system and causing discolouration of the MGB oil.

Testing conducted by the manufacturer showed that an excessive quantity of grease within the alternator shaft link cavity can create a significant compressive axial load on the alternator pinion when the alternator is clamped to the LAGB. This is due to compression of the excess grease and air within the sealed shaft link cavity acting as a hydraulic piston. This loading case was unintended and had not been anticipated when the LAGB components and associated AMM maintenance procedures were developed.

The method of attaching the alternator to the LAGB used by the operator’s LAE meant that the compression of the grease and air within the shaft link cavity was up to four times greater than would have been the case if the method specified in the AMM had been followed.

The manufacturer stated that the reason for filling the alternator pinion cavity with sufficient grease to cause it to overflow was to ensure that grease remained within the alternator pinion splined area during the in-service period between overhauls, to ensure lubrication of the splines.

This large quantity of grease, combined with the sealed design of the alternator shaft link cavity once the alternator driveshaft was inserted, created a latent condition in which an unwanted axial load could be introduced into the alternator pinion and F1 roller bearing..


Twist & Shout 25th April 2021 23:02

It’s disappointing that the OEMs are still producing machines that are vulnerable to common maintenance procedures. (Ti studs that need lube, a prayer, and calming music played while torquing. Over greasing causing catastrophic failure.)

It’s the equivalent of having a door handle that snaps off if you try turning it the wrong way. (And mentioning it once during the type endorsement.)

Mee3 26th April 2021 02:54

unfounded hatred is not helping anyone.

Twist & Shout 26th April 2021 05:39


Originally Posted by Mee3 (Post 11033977)
unfounded hatred is not helping anyone.

Not sure this is aimed at me.

There is nothing unfounded about Ti Studs failing or catastrophic gearbox failures.
Nothing trivial about the multiple fatalities from both either.

But we are drifting off topic - this one failed on the ground, and it sounds like a tiny design change (vent) or specific, non intuitive, maintenance instructions will be a permanent solution.

RVDT 27th April 2021 06:00

G-EMEB?

Apparently, it had another incident offshore recently and while wheeling to one side of the deck to let another machine arrive with a maintenance crew the RH Main gear went through the deck.

Picture links on Helihub.

Cyclic Hotline 27th April 2021 17:19

From the AAIB report.

The helicopter was undergoing scheduled maintenance to replace the main gear box (MGB), which had reached its overhaul life of 800 flying hours.
Did we just go back 50 years in time?

Hot_LZ 28th April 2021 08:00

And there are some that don’t even make it that far...

LZ

barbados sky 28th April 2021 10:57

Cyclic


Did we just go back 50 years in time?
Further than that I think. Airbus previously EC previously Aérospatiale don't have a great history building quality MGBs which are durable and long lasting.

Self loading bear 28th April 2021 19:39

I recall the short TBOH was already rumored just after EC225 disaster in Norway.
I did not believed it then because NHV was also operating 1 or 2 EC175 in Ghana at that moment.
It was then also rumored that Airbus had at least 1 dedicated mechanic stationed at NHV (Den Helder) but makes sense now.

Airbus support must have improved apparently.

Cyclic Hotline 27th September 2021 22:27

There is a very interesting little snippet in the Helihub article today about the CHC/Babcock transaction. https://helihub.com/2021/09/27/compe...on-of-babcock/


Of the UK fleet, one AW139 has been stored for 8 months and one H175 was recently ferried to Airbus for corrosion remedial works which will likely see it out of service for 12 months. Additionally one S92 is still being worked on after suffering a nose wheel collapse in June, and the total includes another S92 pulled out of storage on 10th September. Read more at https://helihub.com/2021/09/27/compe...on-of-babcock/
12 months of corrosion remedial work provides for an enormous workscope, and if the activities are limited to airframe corrosion remediation, there must be virtually nothing left unaffected on this airframe at this stage. Does anyone have any additional insight into what is happening with this machine, or the background to how an almost new helicopter could require such extensive action if it hadn't been ditched in the sea?

Anyone?

tonkaplonka 28th September 2021 02:52


Originally Posted by Cyclic Hotline (Post 11117844)
There is a very interesting little snippet in the Helihub article today about the CHC/Babcock transaction. https://helihub.com/2021/09/27/compe...on-of-babcock/



12 months of corrosion remedial work provides for an enormous workscope, and if the activities are limited to airframe corrosion remediation, there must be virtually nothing left unaffected on this airframe at this stage. Does anyone have any additional insight into what is happening with this machine, or the background to how an almost new helicopter could require such extensive action if it hadn't been ditched in the sea?

Anyone?

As far as I know, this is an earlier machine that was built without the correct corrosion protection applied. The corrosion that resulted was kept in check and repaired as and when but was always planned to go back for remedial work including the maturity mods. It's an ongoing thing with another 175 having returned from Spain earlier this year.

212man 28th September 2021 10:45


Originally Posted by Cyclic Hotline (Post 11117844)
There is a very interesting little snippet in the Helihub article today about the CHC/Babcock transaction. https://helihub.com/2021/09/27/compe...on-of-babcock/



12 months of corrosion remedial work provides for an enormous workscope, and if the activities are limited to airframe corrosion remediation, there must be virtually nothing left unaffected on this airframe at this stage. Does anyone have any additional insight into what is happening with this machine, or the background to how an almost new helicopter could require such extensive action if it hadn't been ditched in the sea?

Anyone?

I don't think you were alone in spotting that! Interestingly, I saw the ferry flight photos on Linkedin but didn't know the purpose

Mee3 28th September 2021 10:54

If those are early build then most probably a warranty. Some of the those had bad application of surface protection and need redo.

212man 28th September 2021 11:04


Originally Posted by Mee3 (Post 11118075)
If those are early build then most probably a warranty. Some of the those had bad application of surface protection and need redo.

I guess they (AH) are a bit new to the offshore/Marine environment, so learning as they go........:E

Mee3 28th September 2021 13:16


Originally Posted by 212man (Post 11118083)
I guess they (AH) are a bit new to the offshore/Marine environment, so learning as they go........:E

that's not the reason. but cant say more.

Apate 28th September 2021 13:29

Damn Chinese aircraft :}

vee_why 28th September 2021 18:54


Originally Posted by Cyclic Hotline (Post 11117844)
There is a very interesting little snippet in the Helihub article today about the CHC/Babcock transaction. https://helihub.com/2021/09/27/compe...on-of-babcock/

12 months of corrosion remedial work provides for an enormous workscope, and if the activities are limited to airframe corrosion remediation, there must be virtually nothing left unaffected on this airframe at this stage. Does anyone have any additional insight into what is happening with this machine, or the background to how an almost new helicopter could require such extensive action if it hadn't been ditched in the sea?

Anyone?

The first three H175s delivered to Babcock did not have the necessary corrosion protection applied during the build process. All three machines were scheduled to go to Albacete in Spain to have remedial works carried out by Airbus, which takes approx 12 months. MCSE was the first to be completed. I believe MCSG has recently arrived in Albacete for the same treatment.

industry insider 29th September 2021 10:42


The first three H175s delivered to Babcock did not have the necessary corrosion protection applied during the build process. All three machines were scheduled to go to Albacete in Spain to have remedial works carried out by Airbus, which takes approx 12 months. MCSE was the first to be completed. I believe MCSG has recently arrived in Albacete for the same treatment.
I hope Airbus is supplying Babcock (CHC) with a free backup aircraft to compensate for 3 cumulative aircraft years of downtime?

PlasticCabDriver 30th September 2021 09:02


Originally Posted by industry insider (Post 11118635)
I hope Airbus is supplying Babcock (CHC) with a free backup aircraft to compensate for 3 cumulative aircraft years of downtime?

They are. It was known this was going to be needed, and was planned for. Must be costing Airbus a pretty penny though.


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