Originally Posted by Torquetalk
(Post 10295744)
A towering take-off is a SE profile. You wouldn’t normally do one in a ME helicopter unless there was an issue with power available, in which case, you might be asking what went wrong at the planning stage. If you were power limited and used a towering take-off, you would clearly run out of acceleration from ground effect before being able to safely gain forward airspeed in that environment. If you had the power to climb out, there is no advantage of that profile over a steady vertical climb at a weight and power setting allowing you to climb OGE.
Onyl partly understood. In both towering and Cat-A, you are at nil or negative horizontal speed and need to pick up forward speed to try and flare. I merely suggested the towering (vertical) takeoff to reduce risk of drift at night, (which definitely is an issue with Cat-A backwards climb). I must admit I don't know the crosssection of such a stadium: when the inner roof tips are arched far inwards then climbing in any other location than smack dab in the middle of the stadium would be asking for building contact, I can see that.
Originally Posted by Torquetalk
(Post 10295744)
The biggest risk of choosing a far end departure would be of losing situational awareness and hitting the roof of the stadium with a part of the aircraft you cannot see. The lateral and vertical references are not close in so there is a considerable risk of drift. The pilot of the incident aircraft had the pitch markings for lateral reference (and probably cockpit indication of drift too). He would also have been able to control the angle of his departure from these reference on the ground. If you are already well back and drift backwards unwittingly during the take-off, the distance to the obstacles behind and above would be further reduced increasing the obstacle collision risk. Objectively, this is probably the biggest risk during such a departure. One other consideration is that the AW169 would have been able to conduct a controlled rejected take-off in the event of power loss and do this with less distance required than an S300.
My take is that climbing vertically or Cat-A style for whatever reason into a tailwind location nils TR failue recovery. With the TR "gone", MR torque and tailwind will do to the airframe whatever they see fit, nullifying any Cat-A dep. "recovery options". That is if there are any "recovery" options at all for "serious TR loss at the end of a Cat-A climb in confined locations", I doubt that, any takers? So taking one step back, I'd say this accident is a case of "vanity killed the cat", considering that right outside his stadium there are plenty of better, not confined takeoff spots. Given that fact that even the PPRuNe pros here have confirmed that in this kind of scenario a serious TR failure is next to impolssible to recover, and comparing alternatives right outside the stadium one can't help but wonder why this kind of showing-off departure got green lighted in the first place. |
How many AW169's are operating in the UK?
Have any AW169 operators received an AD from Augusta Westland relating to checking the TR or transmission drive train since the crash? A brief search of previous AW169 AD's didn't bring up much with it being a new type. Nothing related to the TR or drive train that I could see? The second AD AD 2018 -0197 was published on the 5th Sept 2018, and relates to the Emergency Exit Windows. B/E Aerospace Fischer GmbH Attendant Seats and Pilot https://services.casa.gov.au/airwort.../2017-0255.pdf https://services.casa.gov.au/airwort.../2018-0197.pdf https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-201...2018-19736.pdf |
Very little is known about this accident so I am not going to engage with your speculation about variables which may or may not have contributed. But you did ask a question about the profile, which I chose to answer. For what it is worth I will also rise to the bait on your comment that a take-off inside the stadium was influenced by vanity rather than good decision-making: The stadium was a well-lit, large, controlled environment with a flat, well- prepared surface. Got a lot going for it over the options outside the stadium I would say. |
Originally Posted by DOUBLE BOGEY
(Post 10295764)
AOX. its a rumour network! Rumours are OK...……..apparently!
The much speculated tail rotor has been anything between failed and already stationary while still in the air, or damaged by hitting the ground while still turning. The hero pilot has been fighting the controls until the last moment, avoiding hitting the huge crowds, despite that the takeoff is about an hour after the end of the match, by which time most of them are at home, in the pub, or a few miles away by car ... Proper accident diagnosis doesn't involve rumour. |
Originally Posted by Torquetalk
(Post 10295793)
The stadium was a well-lit, large, controlled environment with a flat, well- prepared surface. Got a lot going for it over the options outside the stadium I would say.
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The Daily Mail has just published this, apparently new, CCTV footage:
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...ter-crash.html |
Landing Pad Risk Analysis
Originally Posted by Reely340
(Post 10295776)
Onyl partly understood. In both towering and Cat-A, you are at nil or negative horizontal speed and need to pick up forward speed to try and flare. I merely suggested the towering (vertical) takeoff to reduce risk of drift at night, (which definitely is an issue with Cat-A backwards climb). I must admit I don't know the crosssection of such a stadium: when the inner roof tips are arched far inwards then climbing in any other location than smack dab in the middle of the stadium would be asking for building contact, I can see that. My take is that climbing vertically or Cat-A style for whatever reason into a tailwind location nils TR failue recovery. With the TR "gone", MR torque and tailwind will do to the airframe whatever they see fit, nullifying any Cat-A dep. "recovery options". That is if there are any "recovery" options at all for "serious TR loss at the end of a Cat-A climb in confined locations", I doubt that, any takers? So taking one step back, I'd say this accident is a case of "vanity killed the cat", considering that right outside his stadium there are plenty of better, not confined takeoff spots. Given that fact that even the PPRuNe pros here have confirmed that in this kind of scenario a serious TR failure is next to impolssible to recover, and comparing alternatives right outside the stadium one can't help but wonder why this kind of showing-off departure got green lighted in the first place. |
Well done the Daily Mail, the preceding advert was at least in bad taste. It certanly shows a normal back up, then loses sight of the machine before it reappears out of control. I’d recommend caution before viewing. It is not nice. SND |
Originally Posted by Sir Niall Dementia
(Post 10295820)
Well done the Daily Mail, the preceding advert was at least in bad taste. It certanly shows a normal back up, then loses sight of the machine before it reappears out of control. I’d recommend caution before viewing. It is not nice. SND Having watched the video again following replies below, I would agree, it looks like the aircraft lights. |
Originally Posted by bbrown1664
(Post 10295835)
It also appears that the aircraft was on fire before it hit the ground
It's bright from other background lighting as it climbs, and about the same descending. There's a much brighter flicker, but this could be a forward facing landing light lining up with the camera for an instant. Think of a lighthouse on the coast, and watch again. |
Originally Posted by aox
(Post 10295847)
I didn't assume that.
It's bright from other background lighting as it climbs, and about the same descending. There's a much brighter flicker, but this could be a forward facing landing light lining up with the camera for an instant. Think of a lighthouse on the coast, and watch again. |
Originally Posted by bbrown1664
(Post 10295835)
It also appears that the aircraft was on fire before it hit the ground
I think the theory of a tailwind influence could also been ruled out , as the helicopter seems to be on a normal climbout way above the arena. skadi |
Looks like something went catastrophically wrong close to TDP.
At least it seems to prove the Pilot did not hit the Stadium on the way back. Sobering video as a lot of us do this technique everyday, in one form or another. |
Originally Posted by bbrown1664
(Post 10295835)
It also appears that the aircraft was on fire before it hit the ground
Landing and nav lights can appear this way on cctv cameras in low light mode. The large light flare is accompanied by a seperate and distinct flare on the tail. mjb |
Originally Posted by anchorhold
(Post 10295648)
OvertHawk... Are you saying that for this flight a flight plan would not be filled?
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Originally Posted by gulliBell
(Post 10295554)
To my untrained eye that TR looks like it's whacked something whilst under power.
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....48c27acda7.png But that on its own doesn't help. The picture alone can't explain if the damage was; a potential cause of the accident, or simply caused by the accident. The impact with the ground will also have been very violent and it could for example have been sheered off by the main rotor blades. For the picture to be meaningful we need to know when it happened and what it hit. The AAIB will be able to determine the correct sequence of events as there will be traces of whatever it hit on both the rotor and external objects. |
Also studying the picture I keep asking why the TGB is orientated to the bottom of the aircraft, you can even see one blade bent over what is either the stab or a small wall / lip. I guess this could have happened on impact but worse is that it came detached in flight, perhaps the blade damage could have been an impact with the H-stab?
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The footage has steered me away from the tailwind theory I must admit. As rare as they are it does look like a TR failure I must admit. Hopefully there will be an early initial report especially if the CVFDR is sound. |
As for the discussion re departure from stadiums v Carpark etc - The risk assessment and sop for this regular site will be in the operators’ Part NCC Ops Manual. Personally, if I had the performance I’d opt for large secure lit stadium rather than a crisp-packet strewn car park anytime |
Originally Posted by aox
(Post 10295847)
I didn't assume that.
It's bright from other background lighting as it climbs, and about the same descending. There's a much brighter flicker, but this could be a forward facing landing light lining up with the camera for an instant. Think of a lighthouse on the coast, and watch again. That's not easy to watch, something catastrophic happened out of frame, unlikely anyone would have survived that impact. |
I have today spoken to a friend who is a freelance cameraman for BT sport who although did witness the collision with the ground did not pay that much notice to the helicopter lifting off as such a regular thing at Leicester games. But he does clearly remember a noise before it went out of control which he described as a grinding noise like when you try and put a car into reverse while driving along he has confirmed that BT do have more footage of it lifting out of the stadium which has been passed to the Police
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Very tragic result, which I fear the AAIB will find several areas of concern. Unless Leonardo have a different CAT A confined area profile from the AW139, then he was in between that profile and a back-up profile(something that would not have worked going out of that stadium. Stadium top obstacles? Wind direction? Why the gear up before VTOSS? At a crucial stage of flight the Pilot selected gear up(collective hand used) If he didn’t select the gear up, then a non-rated ‘passenger’ in the left seat, reach across the center console to make the selection? Swiss cheese model.... plus bad luck. Damned bad luck. |
Originally Posted by aox
(Post 10295746)
Jesus wept, why are so many people trying to play amateur detective?
The ground it is on appears to be flat concrete, perhaps half derelict for a while, with pieces of broken concrete and some plant matter (such as might grow up through joints in old concrete) nearby. But I'd distrust even that cursory look at one picture and it may turn out to be quite flat compacted soil. Any impact can produce witness marks on both items, such as scratches in the rotor which may match scrapes on the other object, with paint fragments left on one or both objects. I say again, leave it to the professional investigators, with access to far better evidence than a telephoto lens picture, video from a different day, fourth rate guesses based on third hand rumour of what some unidentified person may have said, miscellaneous other stuff. I know the limitations of what a picture can offer, but I see in that picture evidence that offers alot of information to the possible cause, and alot for post incident. |
He was into the wind...Look at the flags on the video......
And beside that, nobody does a Cat A take-off tailwind, it is head wind, crosswind with a head wind component.... You can climb to 400ft like that.....the confined area is 100ft to 400 ft TDP.... And it is a stadium, do you need something bigger when you have a huge flat surface with all reference you need to land????? All those PPruners who can already determine everything..... Painful ! |
If it is indeed a TR failure, does it beg the question on new FADEC types, the need for a crash handle to cut the engines to give you half a chance? Centrifugal forces trying to unguard those tiny switches? Sad day! |
Originally Posted by rotorgoat
(Post 10296045)
If it is indeed a TR failure, does it beg the question on new FADEC types, the need for a crash handle to cut the engines to give you half a chance? Centrifugal forces trying to unguard those tiny switches? Sad day! |
Originally Posted by rotorgoat
(Post 10296045)
If it is indeed a TR failure, does it beg the question on new FADEC types, the need for a crash handle to cut the engines to give you half a chance? Centrifugal forces trying to unguard those tiny switches? Sad day! I’ll also step in and comment on the building concept that a vast soccer stadium is somehow a ‘confined area’; I don’t agree. It has plenty of visual clues, is a massive open space and is in no way a confined area: that’s a small clearing surrounded by high obstacles, usually 3-4 rotor diameters or less. Departure profiles are i.a.w. the manufacturer profiles as published, not made up on the spot. Second guessing by some here is not helpful to the understanding of what happened when they foster a false belief to visitors and press who reference Rotorheads whenever there is a serious accident such as this. |
I agree with previous posts on the reverse departure .I would be looking for tail rotor strike marks on the stadium structure.
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I've formed some theories on this too, but more important to me is a step back at a larger picture in terms of avoidance. My flight-time was in the armed forces. I never flew in combat, or anything close to it. All training sorties, and some general ferrying of people here and there, with the obvious check-rides. Much later in life, I taught a course in business ethics at the undergrad level. I found that what it came down to was what I term 'situational ethics'. Applying some of the means-test to this flight and crash, I'd like to bring up a couple of things surrounding the decision-making of the flight in question.
1. What profiles I would fly during training, and check-ride would be far more discrete and cautious than the profile I would choose in a combat situation(would the mission likely fail if the profile were not flown?). In the case of this flight, I would want to know the pressure for completing this flight from the pilots perspective concerning his job, and his continued position. i.e. if he should decide the profile is not suitable for the mission what would happen to him for rejecting the flight profile? 2. If this profile were an established recurring run, and they had not had any issues previous, was the profile the best-case to complete the mission? 3. What cost-benefit would there be to an alternate landing site, and what customer impact would that have? 4. Knowing the risk of the low/slow regime of flight that helicopter pilots typically minimize, the greater exposure here would the pilot have done more prior to the flight approach to accept or reject based on; day/night, wind, visibility, weight, time to alternate. Maybe some other critical path decisions that I'm not familiar with on this ship, relating to how it handles the unusual(or normal, if that is the case) flight regimes. These are the things that everyone who pulls pitch would probably consider, but the most important to me would be the perceived, or potential pressure to complete the flight, given the risks that are present, and the alternatives available. One of the tests I was given on a check ride was the choice to drop materiel right on the defensible position and NOT pick up casualties, or to fly another 250-300 meters, and land in a suitable(but still tight) LZ, offload smartly, and pick up what I could to get out of harm's way. It was one of the tests which got me thinking along the lines of alternatives, and the risks, which seem to be increasing, or might have been rationalized along the way as the flight profile was done repeatedly. If the previous 6 or 8 or 15 flights had been made with this profile successfully, there is every reason to believe that this one would work out. However, it is no guarantee that the next profile would proceed much better in terms of escape actions, should the feces hit the rotational air moving device, at the worst possible time(backward flight, OGE, non-translation speed, paying pax, night, wind, etc). I will say with no illusions that based on what I've read here, and seen on the few videos, this profile gives me the willies. I don't like having the willies with a stick between my legs, and my feet on the pedals. |
How safe is helicopter flying
I posted on here several months ago as I had lost friends in the Grand Canyon accident where an incident would have been survivable had the helicopter not turned into a fireball on impact. On the face of it this seems another accident where the fatalities are caused, not by the impact but the subsequent fireball! Did this helicopter have a self sealing fuel system installed? Would it have been a survivable accident if it had not turned into an inferno immediately on impact? How many more people have to be lost before EASA insists that it is retro fitted? This seems to be a known issue that is not being addressed. I cannot believe that if this was a problem on fixed wing pax carrying a/c it would have been addressed by now. The Manchester B737 disaster caused a rethink on all aspects of A/C susceptibility to fire issues. I would hope that this might cause a rethink over mandating self sealing fuel systems on ALL helicopters. |
Anything from Leonardo yet, statement, inspection or AD? Is the type grounded in the EU or UK? Any labor union passengers, or the seemingly at risk “wealthy class”, refusing to fly in it? |
Jeez, there's some real guff being posted on here by so called 'experts'. The flight manual gives you a handful of profiles that will work in pretty much all normal situations and the pilot flies them, as he appeared to do CORRECTLY on the video (only an guess). He doesn't make it up as he goes along because it isn't a check ride FFS. The EC135 has a modified profile that fits a stadium type departure perfectly, I guess the 169 does as well.
It's a single pilot aircraft, so the copilot is a red herring on all your wacky theories. Those pilots who DO THIS JOB understand the reason that single pilot aircraft have copilots that are non type rated. It's common practice in the industry when customers request a 2nd crew member in the front. Lowering the lever pretty much removes the torque, but engines down is a big bonus. The fact is that this helicopter had a critical failure at the worst possible moment; I would hazard a guess that HEMS pilots, Corporate pilots Offshore pilots, or any pilots! would struggle to get away with this one. I for one would not fancy my chances. Remember the Sully Hudson River incident?? It could be done, but the startle effect would work against you. Sometimes life just deals you a sh*t hand and even the best can fail to pull it off |
Non survivable accident
You need to look at the video again. The helicopter dropped out of the sky from somewhere between 300ft and 400ft agl . The subsequent fire had nothing to do with the survivability of the crew and passengers.
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Originally Posted by hargreaves99
(Post 10295868)
I seem to remember a few AW139 tail rotor issues early in it's life?
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Originally Posted by dingo9
(Post 10295985)
The footage has steered me away from the tailwind theory I must admit. As rare as they are it does look like a TR failure I must admit. Hopefully there will be an early initial report especially if the CVFDR is sound. What I find a bit strange is that it didn't seem to start accelerating into a forward direction even after being already quite high above the stadium. It seems to have come down several seconds later relatively close to where it left the picture of the CCTV. |
Originally Posted by 63000 Triple Zilch
(Post 10296127)
On the face of it this seems another accident where the fatalities are caused, not by the impact but the subsequent fireball! Did this helicopter have a self sealing fuel system installed? . Survivable??? At that RoD? No way. |
Originally Posted by henra
(Post 10296169)
Does neither look like it hit something on climbout nor does it look like a tailwind hitting when leaving the 'Bowl' caused it.
What I find a bit strange is that it didn't seem to start accelerating into a forward direction even after being already quite high above the stadium. It seems to have come down several seconds later relatively close to where it left the picture of the CCTV. I’ve seen relatively minimal damage to TRBs which completely severed a TRDS so I’d be surprised if it made contact with the stadium and continued the climb. |
Originally Posted by 63000 Triple Zilch
(Post 10296127)
..Would it have been a survivable accident if it had not turned into an inferno immediately on impact?.. Looking at the CCTV video the helicopter had ample climb performance coming out of the stadium, there did not appear to be any downwind, there appeared to be ample clearance from obstacles, the helicopter disappears out of view and then reappears, spinning to the right, nose pitched down, and dropping like a stone. That is sudden TR drive failure at high power setting, probably with the collective full down after the failure. The pilot wasn't steering that thing away from anything, absolutely impossible at that rate of rotation. Probably not enough time to shut down the engines before impact, or even find/reach the switch to do it. |
Originally Posted by gulliBell
(Post 10296191)
I don't think so. Look at the sink rate. Impact with the ground at that vertical speed is probably not survivable, even in a helicopter with impeccable crash-worthy design.
Looking at the CCTV video the helicopter had ample climb performance coming out of the stadium, there did not appear to be any downwind, there appeared to be ample clearance from obstacles, the helicopter disappears out of view and then reappears, spinning to the right, nose pitched down, and dropping like a stone. That is sudden TR drive failure at high power setting, probably with the collective full down after the failure. The pilot wasn't steering that thing away from anything, absolutely impossible at that rate of rotation. Probably not enough time to shut down the engines before impact, or even find/reach the switch to do it. |
Auto cut
Originally Posted by rotorgoat
(Post 10296045)
If it is indeed a TR failure, does it beg the question on new FADEC types, the need for a crash handle to cut the engines to give you half a chance? Centrifugal forces trying to unguard those tiny switches? Sad day! |
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