PIC is PM, CO-pilot is PF. Absolutley agree. Geoffers, I take your point for an AC with the AP mode selection panel on the inter console. Ergonomically that may make sense for PF to call for and PM to push the button. On AC where the PF has the AP controls in front of him. The situation is changed, for the better in my view.

However I see no merit in the PM changing the trajectory, i.e. Turning an active heading bug. This is PFs role 100 % with PM monitoring.

On an AC where the RADAR image can be displayed on an MFD in front of PF, with no loss of primary flight display, it's the quickest reaction to target avoidance.

Bear in mind, in these modern AC the AP is doing the actual flying. The PF ideally controlling the AP in response to his SA, whether visual IMC or negotiating a RADAR target.

Sunnywa, you state as PIC you should not be monitoring 90% absolutley agree with you. YOU SHOULD BE MONITORING 100% and another 50% capacity in addition for constant contingency planning. If the PIC cannot cope with this workload he's in the wrong job.

Geoffers, principles are just that. However, at 200 feet tracking towards the coast BOTH PILOTS SHOULD have the RADAR image on their respective mission screens. TAWS is the virtual world, database driven and as we see from this accident not fit for purpose in terrain avoidance. Setting up the MFDs must be logical and responsive the the mission and phase of flight.

Moving map and TAWS are advisory systems. The RADAR is the ONLY tool able to see solid objects in front of the helicopter. It's madness not to have that vital, critical and accurate information right in front of the pilot driving the helicopter, AND the pilot monitoring the flight path, WHENEVER below MSA over the ocean.

It hasn't changed. RAAF SAR co-pilot was my guess as to the position currently occupied by Sunnywa.

Have any of you thought about the family reading this forum? Yes fully understand the technical aspect of it and learning points that have arisen. However, who should have done this and who should have done that doesn't help the relatives and friends.Think it's time to put a sock in it.

Sonas, I do not agree with your statement, but I will defend the right for you to say it. No disrespect intended.

This is a forum site. Enough said......or not.

The associated notes to the APBSS chart are clearly going to be critical - what did they say, and were they read. Given that these were standard notes presumably available to all flight crew and others across a four base IRCG SAR operation over the last 5 years, and are also considered likely to be legacy notes created many years ago and therefore used by quite a few other pilots, I assume there are quite a few reading this thread who know exactly what these notes say. And what they were intended for. Anyone care to comment?

Sonas, This is a website forum for Professional pilots to discuss whatever issues they see fit. No-one wants to upset relatives but we do a serious job of work and some, not all, of this forum is provided by pilots and crew who never want this kind of accident to happen again. Sure the official reports and investigations run their course but that should not inhibit us from talking about the issues and provoking each others thoughts with one aim in mind. To help us not to make the same mistakes as others, no mater if they are perceived or not.

You have you opinion and it is right and proper you should air it freely.

Gods forbid If I am ever a subject of one of these threads feel free to tear my performance apart. If it helps someone else then maybe some good comes of it!

Having flown stuff that now sits in museums, I was slowly introduced to increasing levels of automation. So far, the automation is still "dumb" in that it does everything you tell it to, very smoothly but with a profound lack of SA. You as the pilot will have to provide the SA.
Which is why I hardly ever use NAV mode. The AP will happily fly me into a rock of a thunderstorm blindly following the signals it is designed to follow. Whenever there might be a need to adjust track for avoidance purpuses, HDG is my preferred mode as it only takes a simple turn of the knob or a flick to the coolie hat to move into the desired direction, usually away from potential trouble. Especially low level I want to have full and immediate control over where we are going. And when there is doubt, there is no doubt: Go around and try again. Better to arrive a bit late in this life than much too early in the next one..

I generally agree... but IMHO both pilots (PIC/COP) should be able to fly (act as a PF) an ARA to a minima and initiate a go-around if needed... same applies with cruise/low level flight... It is not that difficult to fly a modern SAR helicopter if you have got a proper training and you are "current" (you have practised ARA's / SAR missions recently)... I mean, most of the SAR operators have "all the bells and whistles" in the helicopters and the pilots usually
fly 3 cue / 4 axis coupled with the SAR modes when the visibility is poor... they can reduce the groundspeed e.g. to10 kts, if downwind is less than 10 kts ;) if needed in order to change the course and avoid the obstacle. I consider an ARA as a quite simple/basic task... You just follow the SOP's and respect your minima!
Btw. our company SAR ARA minima is 0,2 nm/100ft AGL (day/night).

This aspect is absolutely critical to unravel. Does the Primus radar system store information in non-volatile memory that can be downloaded for review, particularly the tilt and gain settings, and maybe the images that were being rendered? Whilst the radar may have been set up correctly, or not, I doubt the images were being interpreted correctly. With appropriate tweaking of the gain/tilt, low lying rocks will be surrounded by sea clutter returns, whereas a big cliff in-front of you may have sea clutter in-front of it, but will have no sea clutter behind it. You should never fly into a big black void behind a red (weather) or magenta (ground map) return because that area is potentially very hazardous.

The RAAF SAR aircraft are single pilot capable, right? As far as I know they are fitted with the Honeywell SPZ-7600 autopilot system with SAR option, which is certified for single pilot MOT operation, right? I suspect the co-pilot is required by the client, not by the configuration and equipment in the helicopter? Unless on NVG at night. I'm trying to contemplate the step up from that simple installation to that which was fitted to the accident aircraft, which I'm to understand is considerably more capable. The difficulty I'm grappling with is capability, how it is that increasingly capable aircraft are showing up in accidents more than less capable aircraft. Or so it seems. As capability increases it seems that life for the pilots is being made more difficult, not less. Or is automation making life too easy for the pilots and they aren't remaining alert enough to keep up with situational awareness?

My opinion on which pilot should be monitoring and which should be flying during any particular stage of flight should entirely be the prerogative of the PIC, and not enshrined in SOP in any way. There's no way to sugar-coat it, but the PIC is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft, and the final disposition of it.

Beat me to it. It's staggering that Captains in civilian SAR are paid what they are yet seem to be hamstrung by procedures (often driven by the level/capability of modern automation and commercial pressures).

Surely the responsibility for safety of the aircraft/crew is that of the Captain? They should be empowered with the flexibility to achieve that in the most appropriate manner. The entire crew should be trained to a standard that best supports that.

Its called captaincy, airmanship and crew resource management.

Well said gulliBell! :ok:

My ex-squadron left two helicopters between 2014 and 2015. Seven crewmembers died in the two accidents. I knew all of them. When I read the investigation report of the first one, I couldn't believe it. Some relevant information regarding the pilots was not in the report. I guess nobody told to the investigators in order not to hurt the families. The outcome of this is a "wrong" and not conclusive report. And families still claiming for an answer and in an spiral of conspiracy theories and self-destruction.

Putting shocks doesn't help at the long term. This is my opinion. And sorry for my English. :(

Pilot's prerogative.....why not?

Just remember there needs to be some SOP's that grant flexibility but also provide some structure so everyone is on the same page and each knows what the other is supposed to be doing with the idea of making sure nothing gets overlooked or there be confusion as to who is supposed to be doing a particular task.

Anyone remember that infamous BA Memorandum about Change of Duties during a Missed Approach.....the one written Tongue in Cheek but very clearly pointed out how confusing some things can be?

You 92 Drivers out there....two FMS control Pads....one for each Pilot...one by the Left Knee of the Right Seat Pilot and the other by the Right Knee of the Left Seat Pilot?

Is there not a Collective Switch that affords either pilot the ability to change Heading settings?

What about a Cyclic Button (Coolie Hat)....is there one of those?

Just how many ways are there of altering the "Heading" or "Course Flown" by a Pilot flying a 92?

gullibell/llamaman

Good to see a bit of common sense amidst all this esoteric stuff on radar operation and crew responsibilities.

What stands out from all this is that we have the nonsense of a crew probably thinking they needed to descend to the highly risky height of 200ft at night to nominally be VFR according to SOPs (or maybe just did so because it was normal SAR technique) and then clout a 300ft rock - because of course it was night and they weren't VFR at all. There was full cloud cover and there was poor vis. All this debate about radar technique (which shouldn't have been essential if they were VFR) just proves that the risks of mis-interpretation and misuse were far greater than the risk of hitting anything descending in IMC with a normal profile, navigating with reference to GPS, planned by looking at VFR charts before they departed (which presumably didn't happen) to give maximum clearance to charted and known obstacles. And if they knew they weren't going to be VFR why on earth descend to 200ft? Just do a normal IMC let down profile, to keep as high as possible for as long as possible.

I may turn out to be wrong, but I'm pretty sure this accident need never had happened if the crew had not been hamstrung with SOPs and just used their intelligence to perform a sensible let down procedure for what was after all just a refuel to a well established base. And if regulations didn't allow it they should be changed. They weren't searching for a life raft in the dark ocean for goodness sake.

I feel some posting here can't see the wood for the trees. I'm the first to admit, I've no SAR Experience so welcome any alternative views from those that do.

rotorspeed

Have you ever flown in an operation that can deliver a different copilot every day? If so you will know and understand the value of SOP's. There will always be enough slack in the system to allow some discretion for the PIC, especially in the SAR world.

G

More than 100 divers in sub-sea search for helicopter crew
Survey thought to be largest dive exercise of its type in efforts to find R116 winch crew missing for six weeks

More than 100 divers in sub-sea search for helicopter crew

As long as HDG is coupled to the flight director, heading may be altered by rotating a knob on the RIC - a small panel on the pedestal, and by pressing either cyclic coolie hat. At low speeds in SAR mode, heading is altered by pressing a switch on either collective.

Example of S92 MFD NAV screen.
Radar 10NM range, GMAP2, manual gain, slightly tilted down, a/c height 500 feet, oil rig target at just under 2NM, about 15 degrees offset, active waypoint symbol overlapping the radar return.

https://preview.ibb.co/dyh4MQ/IMG_4907.jpg

Was always a two pilot affair as far as I'm aware. SOP when you were in that neck of the woods was copilot flew from RHS as PF, PIC in the left as PM conducting the orchestra. Single pilot capable though I think.

Geoffers

No I haven't! Don't get me wrong, I fully recognise the importance of SOPs, but I'm just trying to think of some reason as to why the flight crew opted for a much hazardous approach than necessary. It is obvious the risk of obstacles - and uncharted ones - is always going to be greater the lower you are, and the longer you're there. It's clear you've loads of experience - any ideas on why they did?

A good example of correctly tuned radar. The point I was making earlier about interpretation of the radar information is clearly shown, with sea clutter appearing behind the target in-front of you. If the oil rig was instead a 500' cliff there would be a very deep arc absent of sea clutter behind the target, which should flag a big warning in the pilot SA loop.

The radar on the accident aircraft, if correctly operated and interpreted, should have provided a warning sign of what was ahead even if the active waypoint marker sat directly on top of the Blackrock radar return. If they send an S92 out to re-fly the accident mission profile I'd like to see what the radar image looks like.

What rate does it turn you at, 6 degrees/sec?

They were flying too low.

"As long as HDG is coupled to the flight director, heading may be altered by rotating a knob on the RIC - a small panel on the pedestal, and by pressing either cyclic coolie hat. At low speeds in SAR mode, heading is altered by pressing a switch on either collective."

Of course, the pilot could also simply move the controls in the traditional manner in order to override the autopilot - which, if the PF had fully appreciated the proximity of the rock and the tech crewman's urgency, would probably have been a more appropriate course of action.

The picture of the MFD NAV screen does seem to point at why they didn't notice the rock - it's all very well to say they should have noticed the absence of returns beyond the rock but you are asking them to notice something is missing from a display which is far easier said than done.

The 3rd generation helicopter seems to have a problem of too much information and perhaps the SOP should be to have the simple radar picture on the MFD without the FMS overlay.

HDG change
 

Re HDG change

See page 13 paragraph 4 of AAIU report

Thanks Pltnorway for that informative illustration. It shows my initial concern that priority given to the symbol, along with the outline needed to distinguish it, hides the return at that display range.

It is important to understand such limitations when setting the MFD for a particular task.

No, it's easy to do, and it's essential knowledge which must be applied for proper use of the radar. I never paid any attention to this aspect of using the radar until I watched the Honeywell weather radar training video, which was a great resource for understanding what the radar was telling you.

It probably is easy when it is the only thing you have to do. When you are multi-tasking then you will tend to react to the information that is presented to you rather than try to interpret what isn't being shown to you.

Can anyone post a link to this Honeywell weather radar training video? Apologies if done already.

I'm guessing by your logic Crab that all multi-crew aircraft should still have dedicated flight engineers and navigators?

Hardly, I'm just suggesting that vital information (which that radar picture is in those circumstances) should be absolutely clear rather than having extra information overlaid on top of it.

I don't have a problem with new technology (not that those MFDs are) but there is a temptation to put lots of information on the screen just because you can rather than because it is needed.

When not in critical stages of flight then have as much junk as you want on the screen but at 200' in the dark have a clear and well presented radar picture since it is the only thing that can stop you bumping in to things.

Fair comment. Any system is only as good as the operator; and the operator is only as good as his/her training and currency allow them to be.

Can you please elaborate on the quote Crab.

I think the temptation is to put too much on one display, rather than have to change between different formats.

There are lots of weather radar training videos on YouTube, for example:

https://youtu.be/xmRYNIghm9M

dclbydalpha - I just meant that MFDs are not new technology and I agree that it is too easy to have too much information on one scree.

It would be interesting to see what the display looks like on. 2.5nm setting. Maybe the Black Rock return would have been be bigger than the BLKMO overlay and more visible to the crew?