Pilots suspended after North Sea helicopter lands on wrong platform
 

Pilots suspended after North Sea helicopter lands on wrong platform
STV 26 August 2014
I/C

Deleted following MM's comments below - my initial google search showed what must have been the initial exploratory semi-sub, not the platform!

Buzzard is actually a complex of 3 bridge linked fixed platforms. There may have been a jack up rig over the top of the wellhead platform.

It does seem a little careless but then again no doubt there will be list of contributory factors all coming together.

There are of course a few permanent ones that we are so used to they barely impinge, such as pilots having to change destination mid flight (you can imagine the outcry if airline chappies had to do that!), the name on the side of the rig often obscured or faded, or confusing (block number instead of name), the name on the deck, in any case only visible very late in the approach, covered in ****ehawk****e, and names of installations ridiculously similar.

So yes a bit careless but hardly worthy of front page P&J. The oil companies like to get hysterical when this happens but as soon as you suggest improving the name signs they are suddenly no longer interested. Yes it is theoretically a bit of a safety hazard but pretty minor in the great scheme of things.

I speak as someone who did once land on the wrong rig, early 80s, me copilot on the S61, off to land on a semisub under tow, the days of Decca. We broke cloud at the expected place and there was the rig under tow, 100 miles out from Abz or whatever. We called them up, "they" answered with deck clearance so we duly landed. Then a different voice came on the radio... Yes, it was the wrong rig under tow, the correct rig under tow was a few miles away also in the middle of no-where. Fortunately in those days no-one was that bothered but it did seem SO UNFAIR!

Buzzard:

http://www.offshore-technology.com/u...uzzard%20l.jpg

However, if the Ensco 120 is still drilling in the Golden Eagle field, then there are arguably certain visual similarities:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3874/...35c3d026_m.jpg

(That photo was taken in May 2014: http://www.flickr.com/photos/22673279@N08/14398971935).

How can this possibly happen? A crew delivering one passenger to a platform land on a jackup nine miles away.

It is pretty obvious why it happened, the North sea culture is so subordinate to automation that the crew have lost the ability to assess when things are going wrong. You program the autopilot/FMS and when you arrive at where it says you are you land, no arguments, it's company policy.

The crew are being hung out to dry. Landing at the wrong rig? Easy; I was demonstrated that on my second line training trip in the North Sea. Never ever did it myself.

Conjecture would suggest that the L2 at Sumburgh was initiated by the crew overtly relying on the automatic systems in the aircraft. Have we come to the stage where company policies and training system are being directed to automation rather than basic piloting skills and airmanship?

FED, folk have been landing on the wrong rig ever since the N Sea was invented. And now it is suddenly the fault of new fangled automation? Yea, right!

Your hidden agenda is leaking out!

GPS is such a useless tool.....and not accurate at all is it?:(

Looking out of the window to verify where you're going seems to have gone out of fashion. If you can't read the helideck markings for guano, you might at least let the rig crew know.

Crew suspended for landing on wrong rig
 

Yea, right! How did they end up nine miles from their destination The only landings on the wrong deck that I have heard about have been in the same field complex.

Clearly then you haven't heard of many. And anyway, 9 miles is within an "inter field" distance is it not?

But as I said, and as you would know if had an overview, this is nothing new so nothing has "gone out of fashion". In fact I suspect it happens less frequently these days now that it has become a sacking offence. And on the guano thing, once you have filed a few ASRs and nothing at all has happened, you tend to lose interest in trying to "fix it".

Do you two guys have any idea at all what you are talking about or do you just like criticising others for the sake of it?

A little bit of both, thanks.

Edited to add; there's a Bond S-92 pilot of long-standing acquaintance who, when we were going through flying training in 1982 picked-up the nickname "Blind Pew". I wonder....

At least they didn't make a balls-up of the approach - the P&J would have had a field-day.

At least they escaped the old tradition of being sent home with an indelible reminder of the errors of their ways :p

http://i.imgur.com/EYzcsyM.jpg

http://i1228.photobucket.com/albums/...psbd337b66.jpg

Same here, lot & lots & lots in five continents. As far as automation is concerned I was monitoring coupled ILSs in 1962. That was before I flew piston helicopters with wooden blades.

That wouldn't be before you were born, would it?

No, it wouldn't. Although it's interesting to note that you think being very old gives you some superiority in this matter. Anyway the difference between you and me is that I am not still living in 1962.

It would be interesting to know Bond's current SOPs. For Bristow it has been mandatory for some time to have the next destination in the GPS and to cross check it on short finals.

Of course semisubs are not in the database and have to be added by the pilots as user waypoints, so there might (or might not) be an issue with providing pilots with up to date location information. Oh that reminds me, one to add to my initial list of issues - airports that move! What would airline pilots think of that I wonder?

Edit: Oops, it was headed for the Buzzard so my "user waypoint" point is pointless - in this particular case at any rate.

I wonder how many offshore pilots have never landed on the wrong deck during their carrier ? .... as HC has said above, many contributory factors put together, make this mistake understable to those who really know the job. It's a bit like a gear up landing on fixed wings (and helicopters sometimes!)
The last barrier being the name reading on the hull or deck, it is not always visible or clear depending the approach configuration and the time of of the day (was it 7pm in this case ?)

HeliComparator:


En-route change? too easy. Try it at 200' in a B747 overshooting from JFK in a snowstorm and heading off to a place you have never even seen before!
(and dealing with US ATC and 400 pax at the same time).


You seem to have a bit of a hang up over fixed-wing flying? Jealous maybe?


And before you ask, yes back in the sixties I flew the WS55-III to rigs with no working nav aids at all!
(Just to add, landing on the wrong rig or platform in those days would simply cost a lot of beer, no inquiry).

Helicopters have to divert too. No big deal. But imagine being within 10 mins or so of your destination only to be told that the pax would quite like to land at a different destination also about 10 mins away, and then another, and then another, each within 5 mins flying time.

If I were jealous of FW flying I would have taken it up, well presuming you don't mean the real fw flying aka gliding that I do? No, my point was that in heli-world we put with difficulties that other branches of aviation wouldn't accept.

No working navaids? But surely you had the ball of string to wind back in again to find "home"?

I cannot believe some of the criticism of the crew OR that. Their management choose to suspend them.

Wrong rig landings usually occur from a mindset that starts early in the flight or planning.

While it seems incredulous, giving the very poor labelling of rigs, very short visual acquisition time during landing available to the PF and the myriad of distractions to the crew during landing its a wonder we do not have more of them.

I feel very sorry for this crew and wish them best luck. Have been there......almost on several occasions over the past few decades and only saved by radio call from the destination rig.

Big flipping deal. No one died. No one got injured just the poor crews pride. Come on Bond grow a pair and accept that the offshore crews have a difficult task to do and sometimes they make mistakes.

DB

HC,

I would imagine using an offset Waypoint routine from a known point in the Database would be out of the question would it?

We will never get away from finger error but double checking entries before punching "Direct" would help I assume.

Landing on the wrong Deck is not the same as landing on the wrong Airport as Airports usually stay pretty much in the same place. Granted Platforms don't wander about very often either.

Rigs, Boats, Barges, and Ships are a slightly different matter.


Ah yes.....400 Pesky peeved Pax.....gets rather crowded in a 74's Cockpit then I would assume!

Takes but a second of your time to mention the issue to the HLO and the RO, or, if you're taking a workparty to a normally unmanned installation, the guys you're carrying. Takes ten minutes to pressure-wash a helideck until it's squeeky-clean.

AIS
 

There is technology available these days to enable ships to identify each other by electronic means. The marine version of the aviation transponder is called AIS and it is fitted on nearly all vessels. If an AIS receiver was installed in all offshore helicopter cockpits, and integrated with the radar display, a positive identification of the installation could be achieved electronically before every landing. Problem solved.
An AIS (receiver) should be an OGP equipment standard.

DB
 

Do you not think the customer paying for two possibly 80K+ pilots might not expect a little better prior planning as you mention, more situational awareness, and less complacency? They certainly seem to be the party describing these WDL's as unacceptable.

Another piece of machinery possibly .... but which code, which name - ICAO, IATA, maritime or FMS ..... plenty of scope there for error as well. Rig plate photos showing the actual markings are a help - as ever the Mk 1 eye-ball still acts as the final defence at present .... markings, helideck crew in position etc?

This may well be a case of "everything went well under disguise".
I thought there were more than merely visual procedures in place to prevent this from happening, what about radio contact with the destination.
Weather permitting, a notorious customer requires a full 360 degress flight around the structure before landing.
Weather not permitting, if shooting an ARA, the destination has to be matched by the radar target.
Did the crew actually get a green deck or permission to land before landing?
I think there were likely other people sleeping at the wheel rather than just the pilots.

This could have been a potentially disastrous error had the structure been flaring or venting or some of the other stuff they do offshore when they do not want helos around.

Their destination, Buzzard, was 30 n.m. from Peterhead which is probably where they coasted out. It was a clear day so depending on their height they could well have seen their destination at that point. The jackup, where they landed instead of a platform, was nine miles from their destination. Should that have been laterally offset that would mean that they departed offshore with an 18 degrees track error, if it was in line it would have been a 4 minute timing error. Dinosaurs like me were taught that on leaving an en-route point you checked that you were on the right track and the next ETA was as expected. I suppose nowadays the autopilot or FMS are so infallible there is no point in looking out.

There's a saying that an offshore pilot has either landed on the wrong rig or is going to. That's a myth. The only time when it is possibly excusable is during a multi platform shuttle where they fly leg 12 instead of leg 11 which was when it was demonstrated to me. I cannot remember more than one or two occasions where somebody has landed on the wrong installation having departed from a land base and they then got their arse severely kicked.
Since my particular episode I not have only ensured that it was the right helideck but also that the deck crew were present. I have had enough experience of getting deck clearance whilst the deck crew were being mustered.

I'm sorry that this old fogy has to comment like this. Homo Sapiens in it's present form is only 55,000 years old. We dinosaurs lasted for 135 million years. It was not our fault that a chunk of high speed rock decided to create the Caribbean.

It would be nice if we could wait for the conclusion of the investigation rather than hanging these guys out to dry without knowing the facts first? :ugh:
and no, I don't work for Bond, but I am a professional doing the same job, and although I have never had the misfortune of landing on the wrong rig,I have nearly done that...Line training newbie, ****e weather, no name visible on deck due to some guano,coupled with mist, no name on side, other platform(nui) so close, looks the same and just beyond first target, last minute change by client to go to first nui then to second(when bus stopping was allowed) struggling co-jo...short finals, deck clearance given (by other rig HLO) not being able to see us etc...bang, very short finals, *ollocks, going around...
No doubt there would be some on here that would be calling for my head not knowing the circumstances, facts or how difficult it can be line training, etc. Now I don't know the facts of this case, I am not saying the weather was crap or they were training etc we don't know the reasons yet so give the guys a break.
I count myself as a good aviator, conciencious and professional and never take any risks, BUT, for those calling for their heads, we ALL are capable of mistakes, just think carefully back in your careers when you did something wrong and "just " got away with it!!!!!

Do you know that they were routing directly from ABZ to the Buzzard?

Or, are you just making yet more assumptions? :hmm:

I was trying to think in my foxed wing world what would be the best method of stopping a recurrence.

Yes we could change the SOP's etc etc which is what the NAA will want.

But realistically.

Public humiliation in front of their peers.

Followed by a weekend washing aircraft would be far more effective ensuring nobody will do it again.

TISTISNOT

The one time I nearly did it we planned to land at X, lots of considerations for X and then at the last minute changed to destination Y a few miles away, rush rush slightly fatigued. Outbound lots of changes and information. Brain still geared to landing on X. Made approach to X. Both me and P2 convinced we were OK until HLO......er aren't you coming to us at Y you seem to approaching X. Opps!

That's the kind of thing that happens when repetition, dynamics, fatigue and change management conspire to shaft you.

The crew will have had something conspire to screw them up one way or the other.

No doubt the desk jockeys will get their pound of leash out of the crew.

What the f***k happened to the no blame culture in offshore operations?

its not no blame culture any more in the fixed wing world its "Just culture"

I thought most companies (like Bristow), these days have a just culture, which is very different from a no-blame culture. Even with a supposedly just culture, I've heard that certain Bristow Nigeria managers have said 'nobody puts a serviceable helicopter in the water on my watch and gets away with it' and 'the next crew to land on the wrong deck will be sacked' :ugh:

I'm sure that Bond will be operating a just culture model and if that's the case, even if the crew are found to be in some way to blame, as long as it was not malicious, they will not be sacked (though they may have their Captaincy removed for a period of time and/or be subject to additional training).

As has been said, people should wait for the result of the investigation which I'm sure is already underway, before throwing stones at the crew.

KN,

I suppose it is "Just" so long as it is a published policy and is followed through on when said event occurs. After all, fair warning had been given.

That beats the old policy of Secret Handshakes and Management supporting Management even when Management knew Management was wrong.

What's the odds of this particular Crew ever making the same kind of mistake again if they only endure a week long suspension and a Hats On-No Tea interview with the Boss Fellah and being told to go back to Work?

What is more important is everyone else who was not in that Cockpit learning a lesson from what happened. We might laugh at the poor guy's but deep down we should fully understand it could be us next time unless we pay better attention to what we are doing.

Boudreaux Bob
 

Passengers get very snotty if you don't talk to them very soon after a GA, when you would much rather be doing more important things, they write nasty letters to management etc., say they were 'ignored', 'no one told us anything', 'we were all frightened', 'never fly your airline again' etc. etc. :)


(Sorry for the side track guys and gals).

The problem is that the modern safety culture wants HAZOBS which are conducted before a campaign. In these sessions, the oil company SMEs are expected to put barriers in place to show that Hazard A or B is managed to ALARP.

Landing on an unmanned helideck is seen as a big sin "what happens if the helicopter lands on the deck and the crane is moving or it crashes and there is no helideck crew"

The oil company aviation adviser, busily trying to defend himself, the pilots and the helicopter company against an ever increasing number of self appointed armchair experts dreaming up ever more ridiculous scenarios has to trot out the usual barriers, FMS, flight planning, positive ID on final approach, etc.

The facilitators (paid by the word probably) then try to encourage the group to think of even more ridiculous scenarios to justify why landing on the wrong deck is a sin just short of murder. No one to man the fire monitors for the helicopter coming in to land if it's on fire, or the wheels won't come down etc. they don't realise that helicopters don't land offshore with known problems unless there is no alternative.

So the facilitators wind up the non experts who want to be experts because they once flew a model helicopter and before you know it, everyone is an expert and landing on the wrong helideck is immortalised as a sin, it self perpetuates over a few HAZOBS and we are where we are.

That's why the crew is suspended. As HC says, no big deal, a red face and bruised pride but it's not the sin it is made out to be. But because of the number of instant experts, even the strongest oil company Aviation Advisor finds it hard to reduce the hysteria.

terminus mos
 

But surely your SMS or safety case considers exactly the same - and puts your own barriers in place before the nasty aviation advisor has to point it out ..... you just won't escape it in this modern era whether you like it or not

I think parabellum has put his finger on what's wrong with the aviation industry in the year 2014.

I hope than when the word "suspended" is used by the company it really means just placed off roster to enable interviews to take place. And with any luck, the investigation will go along the line of why did this crew believe they were in the correct place? Did the company's method foresee this possibility? Were the company's SOPs a help or a hindrance? Who else saw that this was going pear shaped? What systems are in place to prevent this from happening? Did the rig see their approach? Unless we can see things from this crew's perspective, we will learn little. And the hang'em high brigade can do us all a favour and remain in their mud huts - they have no place in the modern world. I also do hope these guys go straight back to work, should they wish to do so. Suspension, demoting, fining, "retraining" will do nothing to prevent reoccurrence - it only pleases myopic idiots and Daily Mail readers.

PM