Tackling Engine Fire After Take Off in Multi Engine Heli
 

This must have been discussed many time before..just bear with me! Let us say we have bad luck and there is a No 1 Eng Fire warning just after rotation on take off from the rig. Normal Emergency operating procedures will be to continue the take off, get the Vtoss, Vy , climb and fly the established profile before handling the emergency. At what altitude would you do the fire drill bearing in mind that the take off brief is " No engines to be secured below 500 ft".
Many years ago the brief was "No engines to be secured below 500 ft except in the case of engine on fire where I will initiate the drill". This was modified to avoid speedy gonzales from securing the wrong engine (Think of a worst case scenerio...night, marginal weather, some turbulence and a BRAND NEW co pilot!)
One school of thought is that Fire is very serious so you have to contain it straight away. The other school of thought is this fire is an external fire so you still get power from the affected engine so make use of it first to avoid getting into deeper trouble. Both are right to a certain extent. What are your views on this subject?

If something is on fire, I don't want the fire to get any worse or to spread elsewhere. I would want to fight it ASAP.

Establish the aircraft in a safe OEI configuration (PF), fly the profile (PF) whilst the PM runs the engine fire drill. Good crew CRM and training (ie confirmation of which switch or handle is being pulled) should avoid the wrong engine being shut down.

That's what I do and it is what I am taught to do, fly the aircraft first whilst making sure full power is applied and look for positive rate of climb and airspeed.

Once I am climbing I ask the non handling to put their hand on SSL #1.

Look to confirm the correct SSL is being touched.

Ask for the SSL to be retarded to flight idle (or idle if its FADEC).

Retard and pause to confirm indications and the other engine is taking the load, THEN go through the remainder of the drill. Boost pumps, fuel shut off etc and fire the bottle.

Just my thoughts as I apply them to my flying.

Si

Do you have any idea of why the fire occurred?

In the history of helicopter aviation....how many simple engine fires have there ever been? By simple....I mean something like a fuel line leak that does not affect the Engine beyond causing a fire.

Commonsense would suggest the crew makes a decision based upon aircraft performance and any other factor that plays into the decision making process....and as soon as possible secure the Engine by means of the approved procedure.

That being said....are you sure the fire can be contained/extinguished by means of the approved procedure? What damage was caused by the fire? Has that damage harmed the aircraft to an extent continued flight is not a good idea?

Your question is way too limited.....beginning with the assumption you do in fact actually have a fire when you may only have a faulty sensing system.

I have had lots of Fire Lights illuminate....but have never had a Fire....and do not know anyone that has ever had a Fire. They are a bit uncommon unless something really ugly happens to the engine first.

500 ft has probably been chosen becuase it is an easy figure to remember which will ensure that the aircraft has achieved a stabilised climb. However, it is still a bit of an arbitrary figure. If the aircraft is stabilised in the climb at Vy at 300 or 400 ft, I dont see any benefit in waiting till 500 before securing the engine.

Fixed wing pilot here.

The way we are trained is that even though the engine is on fire its still producing power so better to use the performance to get away from the ground and get some speed on then shut it down.

500ft is our nominal acceleration altitude away from V2 to Vyse this does vary with aircraft type and also local terrain performance.

Sorry to join in if I am not welcome I saw the thread on the main page and although we practise it in the sim etc and its interesting to see the way the rotary world deal with it.

Hi Mad Jock..you are most welcome to join here.I had actually discussed this with airline pilots from various airlines and what you say is true..Squeeze the available power and get some altitude before reacting to the fire. In fact most of the multi crew offshore flying CRM is tailored towards airline sort of flying. Gone are the days when the pilot's quick decision and actions are always correct. I have to go back to bush flying to enjoy that again!
Nowadays our machines are fitted with HOMS and whatever we do right from control movements to things that we don't know are recorded. The reason I put this thread up is in case the people drinking hot coffee while looking at the HOMS and doing post incident investigations point out.."Oh ...he reacted so fast and he was barely 350 ft when he pulled the eng back. Now what does our policy say?" !!!

SASless..I think you are right about the number of false fire warning to the actual fire warning incident in helicopters. Maybe based on this some one might have said "Lets get to 500 ft" before we react! I have personally know of two incidences where there was a Fire warning and they pulled the wrong engines. One was on a S 61 (military) many years ago and another was on a Bell 212(single pilot) at night. Both were fatal.

I must admit I was quite lucky and my intial type rating instructor was a bit of a star.

He gave a couple of us fresh meat FO's a couple of "sim calibration" sessions.

In these sessions we got to try the none SOP methods and pretty much proved that the SOP's were the best method of dealing with certain situations even though natural instinct said you either had to deal with it sooner or by a different method.

His training has proved invaluable over the years.

And to be honest I have had an injector pipe come loose on a garrett TP331. Fuel was pissing out of the hot section on shutdown big puddle of it at the bottom and loads of white vapour coming out of any vent it could find. Also had a hydralic pump "blow" and dump the whole of the hydralic tank into the hot section as well. Don't know if I was just lucky but no fire.

With a fire warning it is unfortnuately very difficult to work out whether it is a false warning, how severe it is etc. Therefore I am of the opinion that a "solid" fire warning (as opposed to an intermittent one which, by its nature is most probably a false warning) should be dealt with immediately. If you wait until something else goes visibly wrong in the cockpt, it may well be too late.

To mad-jock I would say that perhaps things are slightly different for fixed wing for a few reasons such as the physical separation of one engine from the other, and from the wider distribution of flight-critical elements such as control runs. In a helicopter, if the firewall between the engine and the main transmission is breached by the fire, it can well take out all the hydraulics etc. So the first thing you would know, apart from the fire warning, would be complete loss of control, upside down in a second and dead in 5.

Ultimately I think it would come down to how the aircraft was certified against the requirements for dealing with fire. There is probably some presumption in the certifcation rules that the pilot will carry out the fire drill within x seconds of the fire warning (where x is not very long!) and the airworthiness of the aircraft will be based around that. So if you delay, you are into uncharted territory and flying on a wing and a prayer.

Its true that false alarm rate exceeds the real fire rate by a large factor, and that shutting down an engine near the surface is a high-risk thing to do, however this is why we have 2 pilots and lots of training! In a modern heli such as the EC225, the pilot just has to press the GA button and then there is nothing left to do except the fire drill - the heli will be climbing and accelerating whether on one or two engines. Therefore whether the drill is carried out at 500' or straight away at say 150' seems to make little difference to me in terms of ensuring a safe flight path. However hanging on blazing away until 500' could be fatal (ask the pilots of Concorde!).

That is why in Bristow we teach "nothing shut down below 500' except in case of a fire..."

Edited to mention that the EC225 has a little trick up its sleeve which is that if for example you operate the training idle switch, the engine runs down to idle at the maximum rate (ie very quickly!). However, if you move the engine control switch to idle, the engine slows to idle much more gently over several seconds. Thus if on that bad day you do move the wrong switch, you get a second or so to change your mind before significant power is lost from that engine.

I hope Instructors, Captains, and Mentors have passed on the very most important Trait of a Pilot during Emergency Operations....."THINK!", "FLY THE AIRCRAFT", "NAVIGATE".....then One can deal with Emergencies, Checklists, and Procedures.


The example I use is Bell 212/412 Single Engine Failure.....shy of a Catastrophic Engine Failure (say a Powerturbine Wheel coming apart and sending shrapnel about the place...and starting a big fire)....if One did nothing but fly the aircraft and ignore all the switches and affected engine throttle....thus not making the mistake of shutting down the last remaining engine by mistake....what would it matter in reality.

Being Slaves to Procedure can kill you too!

Prime example of that was the American Airlines DC-10 crash at Chicago after the engine departed the wing. The Crew applied the procedure called for by their SOP....reduce airspeed to gain max rate of climb. Never mind it was a stark clear beautiful day and there were no obstacles in front of them that demanded the extra rate of climb that provided. They did not know the engine had taken out the leading edge devices on that side of the wing.....and that the aircraft would stall and roll over to that side because of that damage. Had they accepted the rate of climb they had...maintained their airspeed....they would be here today.

Never think the EP's cover all possibilities.

Two very Senior TRE/IRE's I know learned that lesson despite being told their SOP for Engine Problems after LDP did not do so. Fortunately it was a 212 Sim they crashed.

I thought when they design helicopters they are to follow a set of regulations in their design criteria that says something like this:

§ 29.861 Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts.
top

Each part of the structure, controls, and the rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to controlled landing and (for category A) flight that would be affected by powerplant fires must be isolated under §29.1191, or must be—

(a) For category A rotorcraft, fireproof; and

(b) For Category B rotorcraft, fireproof or protected so that they can perform their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.

So surely the helicopter MAY NOT fall out of the sky in the extra minute to climb to say 500 ft! But then again I believe some common sense may be the deciding factor to keep us alive. if I do smell smoke or burning or if the smoke has penetrated the cabin then I will not hesitate to apply the Fire Drill straight away. If the smoke is so thick and toxic that the pilots are likely to be intoxicated by continue flight (even though I have the speed and altitude) I may elect to ditch/ land immediately.

Different circumstances demand different captaincy decisions. If it's just a fire warning light (!) it's probably less urgent that a big bang followed by a warning light.

As has already been stated, the most important priority is to fly the aircraft. Twenty five years ago I watched two pilots "kill" themselves due to incorrect diagnosis and actions following a fire warning in a twin engined helicopter. Thankfully this was only in the simulator!

I gave one a fire warning light (which was a spurious warning). The pilot, an overconfident ab initio, had just turned downwind. In his haste to carry out the full FRC Fire drills, without confirming anything, he lowered the lever far too much and then allowed the aircraft to fly him straight to the scene of the crash, still on the downwind leg. He was most most annoyed at me, his instructor, as he was convinced I'd failed both engines on him. I had done nothing except put on the fire warning light! I'd also taken the precaution of recording the whole thing (he was overconfident and tended to be "mouthy" in debriefs) and told him to sit back and watch the recording. He was astounded as the sim replicated his every move. Hopefully he learned his lesson; I'm sure he did because he went on to make Group Captain.

The second pilot was more worrying because he was more experienced. He was also prone to being far too rapid on the shutdown drills without correctly diagnosing the failure. Given a fire warning light on one engine, he closed down the wrong engine. Even worse, on a different sortie he shut down both when there was no need to do so. On that occasion he lowered the lever far too much for a single engine problem, watched the engines back off, and incorrectly assuming they had both failed, he went for the double engined emergency shutdown and failed to carry out a satisfactory EOL!

He was suitably debriefed and retrained. He later admitted that he had been criticised in his past for rushing emergency drills. Hopefully the sim training sorted him out once and for all. :ok:

....and it always has been that way....But at each stage; thottle closing; fuel shut off; there is a double check to assess whether the engine is actually on fire before you fire the bottle. When I started flying single jet fixed-wing aircraft engines disassembling on you was quite a common occurence and believe me you KNOW when a gas turbine catches fire.

I have had innumerable false fire warnings though I was never complacent enough to treat one automatically as a spurious warning but the overwhelming chances are that if there is a fire warning without any other signs of distress from the associated engine the worse thing you can have is a gas leak.

I had young 1st officer having kittens because we had had a fire light come on just after take off and I had just throttled the engine back whilst returning to the airfield. No point in having no engines if the other one decides to take a walk.

Years ago the RAF operated the Meteor as an advanced trainer. There was carnage because of the procedure of practising single engine recoveries with one engine shut down. If they had just ignored the possibility and told any pilot to bail out if he had an engine stop they could have saved hundreds of lives.

As previous posters have pointed out. Why construct your own crash when with a little bit of thought it's an incident.

The most frightening engine fire warning I had was just after lift off after a rotors running refuel, where some fuel had overflowed, when it could be argued that a fire is more likely than at other times. It also the first sortie of the years after a long Christmas break; just what you don't need on your first day back.

I landed on with both engines running, shut both down then rapidly diagnosed that there was no actual fire at all, so we also saved the fire bottle (we only had one bottle between two engines, typical MOD cost-cutting :rolleyes: ). The nut and washers securing the wiring to an engine bay fire detector (bi-metallic strip type) had come off. The wiring had dropped down and earthed out, putting on the FIRE light.

Check for positive signs of fire - if you only rely on the firewire then you do risk panicking for no reason. If you have mirrors, use them - if you have a crewman get him to check - if not put in a turn and look behind you for smoke.

I have seen the effect of a fuel line fire in a Lynx and it burns so fiercely that the aluminium of the airframe starts to melt - now if you want to climb to 500' and sort it out well fine but I would be looking for a quick circuit back to the rig in case it doesn't go out when I pull the T handle or-worst case setting up for a ditching.

gnow, your quote from CS29 indicates that para 1191 can apply - ie the need for a firewall. 1191 doesn't give much info about what a firewall must be (maybe its in the AMC?) but surely the sorts of firewalls on helicopters are only superficially fireproof, and if the fire gets hot enough (and bearing in mind you are still pumping fuel into the area) I am sure it could eventually melt, or certainly conduct enough heat to ignite something on the other side. I suspect that the presence of fire detection and protection is used as a means to comply with the rules, but that presumes they will actually be used in a timely manner.

Assuming something other than a SeaKing.....perhaps it might be a different system altogether....like an Infrared detection system that just loves some Sun Light shining through an opening on the fuselage or engine compartment.


Crab.....Landing a burning helicopter on an Oil Rig is NOT an option....ever! Likewise....if your bird is so damaged you need to land immediately....it is the Oggin you take it too....not a Rig.

HeliComparator, are you deviating from EOP's in that one, with use of a training switch?...no good in the AW139, both engines are still going, it's just a 'pretend' shut down.

Agree with ' except in the case of a fire', (hence the confirm drills) couple up asap, when over the sea as long as you have a safe track/heading no point climbing to FL nosebleed as you may need to return to the surface if said fire isn't contained.

NRDK - I think you have misunderstood my intent. I was in no way suggesting that the training idle switch should be used during a fire drill. Merely pointing out that the software has been designed to give a fairly gentle deceleration when IDLE (on engine control switch) is selected, rather than going for a max rate deceleration. This makes selecting idle on the wrong engine slightly less disasterous!

The original question was on rotation from a rig take off, hence normally no obstructions as the sea is relatively flat. Thus the priority SURELY must be to fly the aircraft (using automatics or mandraulic) then once going up fight the fire.

One thought about a hot gas leak, we pause at each movement of the SSL to confirm signs of fire and to diagnose if it is a hot gas leak. If the warning goes out at idle then likely a hot gas leak, but what now? A wise TRE suggested to me that a hot gas leak @ a couple of hundred degrees C can still cause a fire so shut it down anyway. I believe in his outlook and would rather recover one engine with much less fire hazards than to keep it going and risk further fire. This of course means you cannot restart the engine if it does indeed have a hot gas leak so it's time for a single engine landing. Not your day if that all becomes a problem.

Si

The problem with wise old TREs is that they are not going to be on your aeroplane if whatever you talking about happens.

HC
 

Why mention the trick? Surely just sticking to the EOP drill is all that is required. I appreciate that TRE's 'discover' quite a few oddities here and there, but keeping us on the straight and level standard is the priority. After all, most of us are simple creatures hoping to get it right on the day (K.I.S.S) and not have one of these 'funnies' pop into our head during that OMG moment.:ok:

I think Nick said regarding fire in another thread, a long time ago, that certification regulation for FAR 29 cat A demands each engine bay to withstand something like 1100 degrees C for 15 minutes. Shawn might know.

CB

NRDK - Why not mention the trick? The point is that every little helps to make the HMI more error-tolerant. The more error tolerant a system is, the less of a "big deal" it is to carry related drills out near the surface.

If you imagine that "stick to the EOP" is all that is required from a manufacturer, you don't understand human nature, which is to err.

Sorry but if you suspect that this tiny piece of information will distract you during execution of an emergency drill, I don't think you should be flying.

Collective - so that is fine provided the temperature doesn't exceed 1100!

Quick 180 turn, Look for smoke, If on fire LAND NOW. On the rig or in the sea, You have seconds, Seen an aircraft burn up in flight less than a minute, All dead, Better a controled landing now than having a smokin hole later.

I may have missed it but are there helos out there that DON't show which engine has the fire: T handles / associated fire wires/ lights?
This being the case (ie: ambiguity regarding which engine) I can understand a height climb whilst identifying the cause/source. BUT in helos which immediately indicate which engine is "on fire" why would any sane pilot climb away from the biggest fire extinguisher in the world?

Given that the a/c is designed to advertise which engine is affected, I would come off the rig at Vy and cruise at 50'/100' (day/night) whilst stabilising the fire. IF it couldnt be contained it would mean a very short trip into wind and a controlled ditching. Fires do give pilots a little time to sort their lives out, but a real (uncontained) one "probably" wouldn't allow you to get away with a climb to 500' and back again to sea level.

Something that occasionally goes unnoticed is a post shut down fire where T4/PTIT/outlet temp is rising. This is an internal fire and cannot normally be extinguished by onboard fire suppression systems as these are directed at the fire bay (external). The only way to deal with this is engine starter blow thru and hope it extinguishes the fire - or else you're back to uncontained fire.

What have you guys got in the hot section to burn?

Is the hydrualics and oil etc in there or is everything outside the fire wall and shut off valves block inlet/outlets?

HC.
Come on now..as a wise TRE you should know that you shouldn’t belittle a pilot for sticking to EOP’s!..... err, that would be wrong, wouldn’t it?:rolleyes:

After TDP/Before LDP on a dark, poor viz night flight, Sticking to the manufacturers RFM procedures and Company SOP’s EOP’s and ECL drills is just what you should do. For the sake of standards and CRM. If you do and that still isn’t enough then so be it. If you don’t and it goes ‘Pete Tong’ then you’ll be hung out to dry if you survived.


I appreciate your lateral ideas as an experienced pilot and see where you are coming from. Having a good systems knowledge and ideas about how to tackle the subsequent what if scenarios is fine up ones sleeve. Just advocating a point for the sake of those lesser mortals hanging on the words of the wise.:ok:

TC..Has the right idea.

NRDK - I have at no point suggested that SOPs / EOPs should not be adhered to. So I think you are finding argument where there is none.

My point had moved on slightly, and it was that thoughtful aircraft system design should consider being error-tolerant where possible, since humans are fallible. By having error tolerant system design and procedures, operating switches etc near the surface can become less of an issue.

If a manufacturer simply says "stick to the EOPs" without regard to how easy that is, and how error tolerant those EOPs are, it is failing in its duty to design good HMI. When it all goes wrong due to poor design and a pilot mistake, the bad manufacturer can then just blame "pilot error" and hope to get away with it, at least that's how it was in the olden, less intelligent, days.

I found it rather strange that you felt that any additional information over and above the bare minimum to carry out the drill, might cause you to malfunction. I am sure you didn't really mean that.

mad-jock - each engine is in its own firewalled enclosure - apart from the cowlings of course, but I guess they are dispensible! However it you look at the nature of the firewalls, they never look that substantial to me, and just behind them is the main gearbox / flight control jacks and all hydraulic systems. Just underneath them is the passenger cabin.

Of course the firewall is to an approved standard, and will deal with the "standard" fire whatever that is, but trouble is the fire doesn't know what the standard is!

I recall a rotorbrake fire back in the early 80s, caused by carrying out a groundrun with the rotor brake on. The carbon brake disc became incandescent white, the caliper softened so the pistons popped out and sprayed hydraulic fluid over the white-hot brake disc. The resulting fire caused moulten titanium to drip into the cabin. Fortunately all this was on the ground, but the pilot knew nothing about it until he was walking away from the aircraft wondering why the rotor brake didn't work when he shut down, and what the smell and fuss was. (no transmission area fire detection in the UK reg AS332L).
Edited to add that the melting point of titanium is around 1650 deg C, so the 1100 deg C "standard" fire was clearly well exceeded.

You haven't flown offshore, have you, TC?

On 14 July 1982 (I remember it because it was Bastille Day :}), I was in a Bell 212 departing a drill ship 60 miles north of Port Said with 2 crew, 13 passengers, 35 degrees celsius and light wind and just as I had lowered the nose and committed to departure, the number one engine ran slowly down to idle followed by the fire T handle illuminating, my heart beat increasing in inverse proportion to the Nr decrease and the anal sphincter being put under some strain :}. My co-pilot immediately carried out the fire drill, pulling the T-handle, shutting down the engine and broadcasting a Mayday call whilst I was trying to fly away with the Nr somewhere around 82% decreasing, less than 20 knots and descending slightly through about 20 feet. At about this point the number 2 engine chip light illuminated, and the copilot assuming I was going to ditch, manually inflated the floats. Unfortunately as our Haskel booster was not working properly, the float bottle pressure was a bit low and the floats only partially inflated, but they did look very attractive fluttering in the breeze and made an already interesting day even more interesting :}. Just after this, the number 1 engine fire warning again illuminated and the one remaining shot was discharged into the engine bay. Luckily, this worked and I eventually managed to gain enough airspeed and Nr to climbed to 1000 feet, though I was unable to cruise at more than 60 knots, so the flight to Port Said, El Gamil airport left plenty of time to carry out the after take-off checks and 'subsequent actions', reflecting that the whole incident had been something out of Gerard Hoffnung's monologue, 'The Bricklayer's Story' :uhoh:. Heli-Onion kindly scrambled their Alouette 3 from El Gamil and we were relieved to hear the cheery voice of Guy who arrived to escort us in and assure us that there did not appear to be any major damage, though there was paint missing.

After safely landing, for some inexplicable reason, I slipped whilst disembarking and ended up sitting on my bruised bum on the taxi-way with lots of chalk dust from the floats on my trousers! One of our Newfie passengers produced a bottle of Seagram's VO and poured a large slug into my coffee to help revive my spirits :E. That evening, being Bastille Day I attended a party at the Forasol base manager's apartment, where after imbibing plenty of celebratory draughts of deliciously refreshing Cypriot Keo Othello red wine, then moving on to the slightly less refreshing Retsina and ouzo, our host revealed his tour de force; a case of French champagne, his sabre à champagne and educated us in the art of opening the bottles by sabrage :\ . It took me some days to recover my composure :}.

However, I digress. There was obvious fire damage to the aircraft, with paint having burnt off the engine and gearbox cowlings. It was subsequently discovered that the locking nut on the engine oil filler cap had sheared off its thread and the filler cap at some stage during the take off had come off. The lack of lubrication caused the engine to run down and shortly after, the oil on the outside of the combustion chamber must have reached its flash point. Evidently, although the first shot of the fire bottle had extinguished the initial fire, there was still enough oil to start a second fire.

I've always treated engine fire warnings seriously since then :). One excellent outcome was being presented with a beautiful engraved silver tankard tankard by Alan Bristow, which made the whole episode most worthwhile :cool:

I know this topic is going to be like a can of worms with each of us coming up with his own views and experiences. Now , if we are to write some thing in black and white in the company ops manual for EVERY PILOT to follow that is going to be very different. Some sort of figures has to come out. Most of the Cat A profile take offs ( at least for EC 225) calls for climb at V toss to 200 ft AGL then accelerate to Vy maybe I should say we proceed with the Fire Drill after 200 ft and above Vy might be a good idea.Of course very good CRM has to be displayed to prevent shutting down the wrong engine.
I did a very naughty thing at Helisim on the EC 225 sim recently. I asked for a Eng Fire emergency and did NOTHING about it while continuing with the other ex excises. Can anyone guess how long it took for the sim to crash?

Tackling Engine Fire After Take Off in Multi Engine Heli
 

Soggy,

Great story.......

One of our Newfie passengers produced a bottle of Seagram's VO and poured a large slug into my coffee to help revive my spirits ......

Mmmm.... Enroute through main base en route Newfieland and time off.....too funny but yep, typical Newfie, they haven't changed, I'm an honoury Brit Newfie ha ha....live in StJohns, love it......

Last time I used the Helisim IOS, a fire on its own would not have caused a crash - but maybe it's changed? Regardless, real world fires can be very fierce and cause catastrophic damge very quickly, as this example shows:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_503163.pdf

I believe the MGB was collapsing through the roof within 3 minutes of the initial warning, but others here will be nearer the detailed facts I'm sure.

Hi all,

as an engineer :8 I can appreciate all POV's from aircrew's regarding fires.

A visual aid would be of great help in these types of testing times for example.

I work with a fleet of AW139's and they all have a camera mounted on the verticle fin, so gives a great view looking forward from the tail and can be easily accessed via the displays in the cockpit. Would be a useful visual aid when presented with a fire warning.

I would think that from a commercial POV that this type of kit (which is a kit from the manufacturer) would possibly lower insurance premiums...and/or pay for themselves so to speak?

Just a thought.

Gnow, I suggest that if you want to tie this down, you just require the airspeed to be above Vtoss before actioning the fire drill. If coming off a rig you clearly don't want to shut down the engine until you reach OEI climb speed, and getting to that speed and starting to climb is the critical flight period. After that, what difference does it make whether you are at 200 or 100'? The aircraft will be flying itself, and carrying out the fire drill on the wrong engine would be a disaster whether at 100 or 200'.

212man you are right the time elapsed was about 3 minutes as I recall also, scary and the crew did a good job to land on an MOD playing field thus allowing MOD police to instantly secure the area. Thankfully no one was playing at the time.

Si

We fitted them to our S92s too - because of too many spurious fire warnings!!