Quote:
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling

Given that the a/c is designed to advertise which engine is affected, I would come off the rig at Vy and cruise at 50'/100' (day/night) whilst stabilising the fire. IF it couldnt be contained it would mean a very short trip into wind and a controlled ditching. Fires do give pilots a little time to sort their lives out, but a real (uncontained) one "probably" wouldn't allow you to get away with a climb to 500' and back again to sea level.

Bravo 73 wrote: "You haven't flown offshore, have you, TC? "
:eek:

Attention - all personnel within viewing distance to don helmets and get behind hard cover..................

Sounds like you offshore guys need to have a conference and bash this out properly.

Then get an industry standard.

I thought we had, and it was simply as I stated back on the first page with pauses to confirm fire indications. Bear in mind the majority of offshore pilots don't actually post on here.

Si

The RAF's Puma HC1s had an interim mod in the late 70s/early 80s, to slightly extend the cold weather operating envelope. Rear view mirrors were fitted, which allowed us to look into the engine intakes for signs of ice.

When the Polyvalent intakes mod was fitted, the engineers began to remove the mirrors. We (the pilots) tried to retain them, because they were so useful. We could see down the whole sides of the aircraft and beyond the tail. The engineering answer was a resounding "No". Stupid, totally stupid. But there was seldom any squadron pilot input allowed in any engineering decision. :rolleyes:

Engine Fire After Take Off
 

For what it is worth, during my flying career, I suffered two indications of engine fire, both at opposite ends of the spectrum, one real and one spurious.

The first occurred when I was working in the Middle East, single pilot, flying a Bell 212. I had just departed an offshore platform and was levelling at 2500 ft when I heard a muffled thump from the rear of the aircraft. The CWP showed a chip light on the No 1 engine. I checked the instruments, saw that the No 1 ITT was a little warm, indicating 1200 degrees. I closed the No 1 throttle to flight idle, the ITT dropped to 1100 degrees, and as I looked at the No 1 Fire Warning light, guess what, it illuminated!!

I shut the engine down in accordance with the Bell flip cards, put out a Pan call and turned towards shore. As the fire was still showing after engine shutdown, I fired the first bottle. Some 45 seconds later, (yes, I started the stopwatch) it was still burning, so I commenced a descent and fired the second shot. About two minutes after that, still with a positive fire indication, I put out a Mayday call and landed on the water. The seven passengers were quite relieved as I shut everything down.

As I landed on the water, the Fire Warning was still illuminated and smoke was still coming from a hole in the top of the engine cowling.

Once the aircraft had been recovered back to base, and the engine stripped, it was found that something had gone through the free turbine blades. It actually looked like the blade of a circular saw.

The aircraft flew again some 6 months later.

The second incident happened when I was flying an S61N in the Falklands. I was the commander, my copilot was the Base Manager, the Loadmaster was the Base Senior Loadmaster and we had the Company General Manager onboard.

We were on west Falkland and had just departed from Hill Cove refuel site heading west. As we levelled at 1000 ft, the number 1 Fire warning illuminated. At that time, a new procedure was being introduced concerning the No 5 bearing failure and involved resetting a circuit breaker. It did not, at that time, indicate how many times you could reset the breaker. Legal jargon, I know. (This has now been amended)

We turned back to Mount Pleasant on east Falkland, looking for fire indications as we went, (there were none) and constantly resetting the CB. Once we had crossed Falkland Sound I told the P2 to close down the engine and put out a Pan call. Funny old thing, the Pan wasn't received until we could actually see MPA (Mount Pleasant Airfield).

After an uneventful landing, it was discovered that an electrical short had caused the problem.

That was part of the 330J anti icing fit; instigated by me. When Bristow started using the 332L we ex 330J pilots complained because there were not any mirrors that we were used to. We were told to wind our necks in as this was a SUPER PUMA and a certain chairman's son had decreed that their weight was superfluous.

Doogle had a double engine failiure owing to the chip baskets icing up. One week later all the mirrors were on.

The most amusing spurious fire warning I had was a double fire warning on a Puma in Northern Ireland.

Early Pumas had ventilated engine cowlings with ribbed ventilators along the top to keep the engine bay temperature down. Some noddy had decreed that this would reduce the efficiency of the fire extinquishers so they were blanked off. The result off this was that the engine bay temperatures increased and in certain conditions, hovering or ground running downwind, the fire lights would come on.

This day I was operating in South Armagh with an aircraft that was very prone to this and I also had a VERY senior officer in the jump seat who was coming along to see how the chaps were getting on. I swung into the LZ at Crossmaglen and as usual it was a downwind approach and landing and as I landed both fire lights came on.

There then followed five minutes during the troop changeover when this senior officer was shouting at me because the fire lights were on and I was shouting at him to shut up because I already knew about it.

As soon as we got airborne and took off into wind both lights went out.

He didn't even say thank you when we got back to Aldergrove.

Fortyodd: A few years ago - yes maybe..........:E {how are you anyway}.

Bravo73: Now what information did you glean from my contribution, to reach that conclusion son?:=

Perhaps because the idea of "cruising" at 50-100 ft on a black wild North Sea winter night whilst dealing with an engine fire sounds a little naive?

Why? don't you have a height hold? If the fire doesn't go out and you have to ditch - better to do that quickly from 100' than all the way from 500'.

As a standard exercise I give an engine fire at 200' in the cruise (IMC or night) over the water so the pilot can trans down whilst dealing with the fire. If it goes out then trans up, if it doesn't you are in a perfect place to ditch from 50'. If you wait for the prescribed time (30 secs on the SK) after the second bottle goes in, it will still take you a further 20 secs to get the aircraft on the water, even from 50'.

I believe that historically the 500ft figure came from the fear of the second engine following the first. This was especially so when an engine fire was normally the result of an engine disintergrating. With two close coupled engines there was felt to be a good chance of the result being no engines because of collateral damage. 500 ft gave you the time to gather it together to make a reasonable engine off possible.

With CRAB on that one, modern cabs with 'automatics' allow that option. It should be a regular training drill. SAR units practise it a lot and certainly discuss EOP drills often. O & G has the potential to draw from the 'low level' operators in their companies.

76fan: So now we are adding a "black wild winter night" to the equation, eh?
What happened to the rest of the majority of the year then?
Why don't you add water spouts/wind farms/gas carriers and hoar fog?

Perhaps Bravo, when he said "offshore" meant the taxi drivers route between rig and shore, no? Hands up, I've never worked the oil rigs as you know it.

I have however flown and instructed MCT techniques, conducted carrier ops at night for weeks on end between still calm mill pond no horizon and SS 10 storm force. Operated as SAR off newfie and the arctic. Flown the caribbean during water spout season. Oh, and flown NVD in the Norwegian Fjords.
So perhaps I am a little naive when it comes to fires and how to deal with them on heavies, LL over water - sorry.

Let me try to understand where people are coming from here: They experience a major engine bay warning. Statistically the evidence provides for the vast majority of fire warnings to be spurious. But, because we are professionals, we treat it for REAL. There are real jets of very hot gas running out of control just yards behind your head and inches above the pax.
In my experience there is very little or NO reason to identify the wrong engine during a fire warning (There may be helos out there that are poorly designed - please advise). Why then would you aggravate the situation by climbing to 500' or above whilst STILL trying to stabilise the fire????
By all means deal with the aftermath at height, but IF you can't put the fire out, why on God's earth would you climb and then decide: Ooops we have a permanent fire onboard, best we ditch???? You have just come from the safest place on earth: 70kts/100'.
Get real guys - think about this (for 2 seconds!).

[Does anyone out there (taking 76Fan's setting) think that conducting a DEF with fire, from 500' on a dark pitch black north sea night, result in a smooth safe landing - ermmm, :eek: I think you would ALL die violently. (even if you were into wind).
Naive eh.......................................................... .......

It is all very well quoting years of experience crawling about the waves all over the world but we are talking about commercial offshore operations. They continue the climb to height because it says so in the checklist. The pilots are paid to abide by the checklist and SOPs. The company that enploys them has an AOC because it has SOPs to cover forseeable emergencies. Last but not least; the aircraft is only INSURED if it is flown IAW the AOC.
Anything else; the captain is responsible.

Perhaps then the SOPs need a review?

TC.

Perhaps you have not yet realized that you are not the only one with worldwide flying "experience" and that some of us here may have actually had you as one of their students. I take it that you are not self-taught. Some of us have also done all or most of what you have done, perhaps more, and flown in times when we did not have autopilots but had to fly hands-on at all times. Your description of being a "taxi driver" between rig and shore indicates that you lack knowledge and experience in that field of operation......Okay laddie?

Oh, goody. I've been patronised by TC.:rolleyes:

I was just as intrigued about the comment about coming off the deck at Vy (ie 80kts). Now, maybe it was a typo, or maybe I was just reading it a bit too literally, but 80kts? Really? 8kts maybe, not 80kts. It's a helideck, not a bleeding runway.

If you pulled your stunt, apologies, 'profile' in the sim, I imagine that you would have a nice long de-brief with the TRI, followed by some re-training. If you did it for real, I imagine that the de-brief would probably come from your Chief Pilot and your Head of Training. Followed by some re-training. As FarEastDriver has so eloquently described, SOPs are there for a reason. What you suggest is some way outside what would be considered an SOP.

When I first read the comment, I thought that it would have been more likely to come from one of your arch-nemeses, nigelh or chopc*ck. But what it really did was to highlight either a) your (no doubt, considerable) age or b) your ignorance. From your subsequent post, it would appear to have been b).

I think TC was talking about getting to Vy after leaving the deck as you will need to establish a safe single engine condition before you T handle the one that is on fire.

So your TRE is happy that you slavishly follow your super SOP and that you leave the deck and immediately get the engine fire warning, climb to 500' (engine still burning) carry out the drills (engine still burning) use both bottles (engine still burning) and then decide to get down (in the dark) from 500 feet to ditch (engine still burning).

Frankly I would rather take the bollocking and get the aircraft in the water before the fire takes out the controls/hyds/TR drive but what do I know, I'm not an offshore pilot?

Crab. You have had a lot of flak over the years and generally I have, if not in posts because I am not a professional SAR pilot, but in thought, sympathised with your views and opinions. With respect; you know damned all about civil offshore helicopter operations apart from being an interested observer.

These SOPs have been in force for at least 45 years to my personal knowledge and have yet to be caught out in any situation.

How do you cruise at 200' when the helidecks you are traveling between are 200/250 AMSL?

What about the passengers? It is all very well you and TC talking about flogging about the oggin at 50' but you only have pingers or winch crew on board. You haven't got a fuselage packed with humanity that are already celebrating their trip home. Have you smelt the aftershave and deodorent? A military aircraft only does half it's T/Os at MAUW; an offshore helicopter does them ALL at MAUW and the first thing it goes for is VTOSS. That is secondary to any emergency. Should you have any emergency you still go into the climb profile because you need SPACE. Space to assess what is happening. Space to warn the passengers so they have time to zip up their suits and arrange there rebreathers. Space to allow the flotation gear to inflate properly so that it does turn you upside down by not being properly inflated. Space to orientate yourself and brief the other pilot so that there is the best chance of surviving. Trying to do it all from 50' will only end in tears.

Especially your bank manager's.

Love
 

Would love to get you all into a SIM and prove each of you right or wrong depending on my scenario. What a hoot. If I win the lottery, I 'll send out the invite. Just stay :cool: even if it involves FIRE; and have a nice X-MAS and no FIRE.