Thanks ummmmmm

Good post!

Garfs - you said that, not me.

Considering the Spain, it is an European Country, so Spanish Operators shall take seriously training, safety and all other aeronautical aspects.
Spain is under EASA regulations that are very strict!

EASA.... Wah wah wah wah.... of course the standards are higher than everywhere else... My arse :ugh:

I totally agree that Savoia's table is too simplistic; those who have been involved in the exercises to re-consider recent accidents (IHST, EHEST etc.) will confirm that each consisted of a large number of factors which contributed in some way.

The introduction of HFACS to the European model has illustrated that human factors is always involved - even when the most important contributory cause is the failure of a mechanism, part or design.

Probably the single most biased statement is the one that attributes 'pilot error' as the cause of the accident (as was the case in several entries in the table at one time). The fact is that the pilot is almost always there when the aircraft crashes. It is always far more complex than that.

Equally the statement (sorry to quote you 'aegir') that is all too simplistic. In no European State are Operations yet conducted under the auspices of EASA Operational Regulations - they are not yet finalised nor accepted and, even when they are, SAR will still be regulated by the State, not EASA!

Without prejudice to the Spanish accident; what needs to be examined is not the set of rules under which operations are performed but the safety culture within the organisation. Those of us who have been following these accidents will be extremely interested in the examination of all human aspects with respect to the HFACS model posted by 'Umm...lifting'.

Like a number of others, I welcome the discussion of these accidents - if only to improve the knowledge of those who fly the aircraft and who perform similar operations. What I would caution against is simplistic entry in a table which concludes the cause of the accident - in my opinion, no useful purpose is being served there.

I am not advocating the closure of the thread but let it serve the same purpose at those for the EC225 and S92 - a tool for education not a device for allocating blame or short-cutting due process.

Jim

A table is a table and I am surprised that anyone would consider it a substitute for a report or rational debate in which hopefully fact-based details are espoused.

Perhaps for those frequently engaged in 139 operations or who have followed the fleet's operational history over some time, including accidents, this is old hat and woefully inadequate but .. the table is for those readers who, like myself, are not involved with 139 operations, know little or nothing of the type's operational history but are keen to get a grasp on what has happened in recent years.

As I say, those who have been following the 139's history from the outset may yawn but newcomers, unfamiliar with even the basic details surrounding 139 incidents, will doubtless appreciate the tabled summary. When someone writes about a specific accident newbies (and perhaps even some infrequent readers) may not readily recall the basic details of the event. Now that there have been several more 139 accidents a 'quick reference' should come in handy for those wishing to locate 139-related incidents within the context of the type's accident history.

Moving on, if these discussions should be fruitful, then might I pose a question regarding the extent of the 139's 10 day factory course given that one Rotorhead has communicated his conviction that the existing course is inadequate. For those environments/cultures (corporate that is) where training is perhaps in question wouldn't this be a starting point in reinforcing 139 operational efficiency. I mention 'starting point' as there are clearly numerous measures required in establishing and sustaining safe and professional operations but, strengthening initial proficiency might be a place to begin. Is the 10 day course sufficient and how effective are the methods used to measure this sufficiency on a person by person basis?

Reliable aircraft???
 

When a pilot crashed an aircraft in a CFIT accident,I do not see how we could blame anybody else!whatever conditions we have,when you are at the control,it is up to us to avoid accidents and very easy to blame anybody else.It is like when our media are saying an aircraft was down because of weather,well the reality is, the pilot who decide to fly in this conditions was not able to manage it.
Yes,it is a complicated aircraft,but the main problem is,it is not reliable.The number of Caution lights we got on this machine is creazy.The worst is,you shut it down and restart it and the light goes off.How can you trust this machine? We had one of our machine down for a week because they had to verify all electrical connections,it was not done properly at the factory(well,Agusta blamed another company who was doing the job???)So,you can have multiple failure created by the computer system who make your life difficult at the wrong time.

Arcal76 - the 'logic' in your first para could be undermined by your second para. In this day an age I'd hope we don't just blame a pilot after a CFIT but try to find and fix all the reasons it happened which might include aircraft system problems, inadequate training, fatigue due to a poor roster and so on.

Savoia - it might be a simplistic table but it still has a use - so thanks for taking the time to collate it. It would be great if it had a hyperlink to the investigation reports available.

@Epiphany

Maybe not, but it was definitely implied...

Reliable Helicopter
 

To have a good picture if AW139 is or not a reliable machine perhaps we should compare with other helicopters accidents history.
Try to check S76 A B C D.... with the missing MR blades or S365 and his fenestron, Puma, S92, EH101.

Perhaps by the end of that history record will find out that AW139 is a very reliable A model.

AB 139
 

Folks,

Just putting this out there for discussion, but how come we have heard virtually NIL about problems with this type in the USA? They have been operating it in the GOM for what, 10 years and no accidents?

Please correct me if I'm missing something, but were they not originally manufactured in the states under the wing of good old BELL?

Does that perhaps tell us something, or am I just the devil in disguise :E

Where's that good old reliable 412 gone :{

AW139 Production
 

SN: 31001 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 31201 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 41001 on - Assembled in the USA

Cheers, TP

Jolly Green

I could say it was your assumption. I have worked as a helicopter pilot in many parts of the world (including many of the countries where these accidents occurred) and my knowledge of safety and training throughout the helicopter industry is based on experience. That includes maintenance standards.

aegir

Does this mean that INAER are no longer using non-type rated co-pilots on two pilot contracts?

I don't know if Inaer are working unfair, in that case the Authority "should" intervene (in a perfect world, I know).
But what about the other Spanish Operators? Are all outlaw or we have someone the think safety it's important?

I didn't say that, but, compared to FAA for example in HEMS operations, EASA are more strict! The standard are high, sometimes too high and working it's not very simple...

My question still stands; can one assist those immersed in operating cultures where safety and performance standards are more challenging to meet and maintain by ensuring that initial type conversion for both drivers and mechanics is adequate?

One PM I received says that the ten-day factory course is insufficient. Who determines that a driver has adequately absorbed the lessons on the course? Would a more in-depth conversion/induction be appropriate or a more rigorous method of assessing student understanding of the training delivered?

Finally, what is the client's role in this: ie. Petrobras, would they have a flight standards officer or if not, how about bodies such as OGP, do they make any distinction between the method of operation between some of the legacy operators such as Bristows and CHC and other regional (local) operators and would it (could it) be their role to proffer recommendations in this area if it is felt there is need to raise the standard of 139 initial induction courses?

aegir,

The whole point of my comment was, that the "lack of training" of SAR pilots in Inaer was discussed in depth after the fatal 139 crash in Spain under EASA rules and requirements....

I believe there were some very strong opinions expressed at the time.

Would appreciate continuing recommendations as to the text used in the following (more detailed) table, in particular colums e, f and g. If you have more appropriate (but sensible) suggestions, please let me know.

FIRST DRAFT
https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-8...T%2525206a.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-a...T%2525206b.png

Notes:

1. This Table is not intended to replace or substitute factual accident reports. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of AW 139 accidents to-date.

2. This Table is compiled for the convenience of members of the Rotorheads community who subscribe to the professional aviation forum PPRuNe.

3. Columns 'e', ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with the assistance from members from the Rotorheads community and are a product of the recommendations and suggestions tendere

Indeed, but, there are precious few reports available (that I can find). Of the nine AW139 accidents seven of them seem to have occurred within the past 18 months or so. The only report I can locate is an 'Interim Statement' from the Spanish authorities relating to the Inaer operated ship.

In the meantime I have drawn-up a list of the accident threads on Rotorheads:

1. UAE 2 JUN 2008: PPRuNe Thread

2. QATAR 25 AUG 2009: PPRuNe Thread

3. SPAIN 21 JAN 2010: PPRuNe Thread / Interim Statement

4. HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010: PPRuNe Thread

5. SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011: PPRuNe Thread

6. QATAR 2 MAY 2011: PPRuNe Thread

7. MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011: PPRuNe Thread

8. CHINA 17 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread

9. BRASIL 19 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread

Com'on Sav,

Line 1 should read Abu Dhabi aviation, Abu Dhabi :{

DBX RF will definitely take offence :E

ah, yes! I perfectly remenber the discussion.

and this is the interim report of Hong Kong accident