Mark Six, how do you know ? Have you seen the feathers and bird guts on the TR ?
Your guess is as good as anyone's, Savoia included.

Savoia: A7-GHC=Mechanical failure due Pilot error & maintenance error:ugh::ugh::ugh:

"Mark Six, how do you know ? Have you seen the feathers and bird guts on the TR ?
Your guess is as good as anyone's, Savoia included."

ReverseFlight, I'm not guessing anything, just stating that bird strike is still under consideration "as far as I know", because this was the original theory and I haven't seen or heard anything further which discounts it as a cause.

From a letter sent to AW owners:

"... Immdeiately after the notification of the event, based on the reported conditions of the aircraft, AgustasWestland started a detailed analysis and a complete review of the Tail Rotor log reports; no aircraft issues were found.

Furthermore, based on the first examination of the recovered aircraft it appears that the incident effects are fully compatible with an external Foreign Object Damage (FOD), which caused a tail rotor imbalance damaging the components of the anti-torque system."

AW139's in service
 

Truly Perplexing

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

These are alarming reports on this Helicopter, does any one know how many AW139s there are in service?

I believe that there are now 400 in service as of AUG 2011 :ok:

139 Accident Table

With the assistance of a number of Rotorheads I have been able to up-date and, where appropriate, amend the accident log.

As mentioned earlier, a Rotorhead with reliable information alerted me to the fact that the second Doha incident involved a mechanic who had failed to remove some type of lock prior to an engine start and that this might therefore be beter described as 'mechanic error'.

Similarly, if VEMD or anyone else has useful information which can assist in making the 'basic cause' more accurate then please either post or PM me and I will make the necessary changes.

I am still looking for:

- The date of the Spanish and Brasilian tragedies
- Any details of the South Korean crash
- The markings/registration of the Chinese Police 139

The second Doha incident may or may not have been caused by 'mechanic error'. The link is tenuous. I'm told the 'tool left on the aircraft' event was well over 12-months before the TRB separation occurred.

South Korea - 23 Feb
Spain - 21-01-2010

Brazil - Aug 19 2011

Thanks to those who have contributed additional details.

Herewith is the latest version:

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-E...AT%2525204.png

I think you should also track incidents, ERA tail crease, engine failures, early removal of components, and a real evaluation of the training. What I am saying is let's prevent the accident, and don't rely on Agusta for post accident data which could be inconclusive, through no fault of there own.

Chinese Police AW139 is listed as G-110011 on Aviation-Safety.net

Two independent hydraulic systems. A single failure is not likely to render the aircraft uncontrollable. Lacking any facts of the condition of the aircraft, I would keep an open mind as to the actual cause since there are other system failures which could be involved in a loss of control.

02 jun 2008 - dubai - a6bbb - not disclosed

Actual Pilot was in the back seat, the VIP was flying and liked to scare fisher man with low Fly by:mad::mad:!!!!!:mad::mad::mad::mad::mad::mad:

Mmmmm....

Captain 139 .... re: A6-BBB if you only disclose part of the whole story (andI accept the whole story does get a bit complex) you run the risk of compromising your integrity. Best not say anything and leave this accident well enough alone.

:=

Not just Pilot Error
 

The Spain's accident causes are not so simple. At least should be said Crew Error, but it would be unfair too. Look at the company procedures, training, management... That tragic event ( not accident) was anounced, and had many root causes, not just the pilot. You should write INAER policy as the main cause of those three deaths.

I have received quite a number of PM's in relation to the Accident Table, some in appreciation for helping bring the 139's accident history into perspective, others offering caution over the potential misinterpretations which could arise from such a list.

I have also been invited to redefine the Basic Cause for a number of the accidents and which recommendations I have embraced without exception. The Table is therefore a collaborative effort among those members of Rotorheads who have tendered useful information for the purpose of enhancing its accuracy.

The recent flurry of 139 accidents has caused concern, especially among the unlearned, over the type's technical reliability but one thing I believe the Table has done is to highlight the number of 'human error' components which have been present in many of these episodes.

A point firmly driven home in one adeptly written PM I received, highlighted the technical complexity of the 139 stating:

"A ten day factory course is not nearly enough the LEARN this airframe. It is highly complex. The learning curve is a straight line upwards. I have been involved in the 139 for five years now, I learn something different every day I sit in that chair, I fly it with confidence armed with knowledge. I have taught myself well, am I an expert? Not hardly."

And also:

"The pilots are flying two main computers, that monitor every aspect of the aircraft, the software programs are complex and no one knows with certainty EXACTLY what happens when moving a switch or pushing a button. There are so many things that are not taught at the factory school. All information on the Agusta 139 is propriatory in nature."

And again:

"I fear there may yet be more "pilot error" accidents on this airframe. Prime cause, insufficient training, either lack of because the cost is prohibitive, or due to a risk matrix in which management personnel are making poor decisions, because the "numbers" are not aligned."

I think if anything the Table has (for me) highlighted the fact that the 139 is an aircraft which demands 'diligent operation' in that it would appear that some of the craft's systems represent a departure from 'the norm' (ie. the operation of less sophisticated aircraft) and therefore, for some, a step change from their existing experience.

I have received conflicting information over the Hong Kong incident. There is a post confirming FOD on or around the tail and I have PM's stating that this was a TRGB failure totally unrelated to any external influence - we will have to wait and see; as indeed is the case with the more recent accidents.

I still have no information whatsoever on the South Korean accident.

Herewith is the up-dated Table taking into account the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Spanish tragedy:

https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-I...%252520AT5.png

UAE, Qatar, China, Spain, South Korea, Brasil, Macau, Malaysia.......

Concerning - perhaps. I fly the AW139 and feel very safe in it, perhaps because I fly for one of the larger operators in a part of the world where safety and training are taken seriously and there are no 'cultural' issues. When these larger operators start having accidents with the AW139 then I will begin to get worried. Until then - no.

Mods, can we get this thread back on topic? This accident timeline should be moved to the general 139 thread.

Not sure if I agree training and safety are not taken seriously in all the countries mentioned above.