Reasons not to fly a VFR only, Single-engined helicopter offshore at night
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: International
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PPRUNE:
Thanks for that - I had missed FAR 135.415. Wonder what happens to the data that is collected, is it published on the FAA Incident Database?
As a matter of interest how many FSDOs look after the GOM? (As all reports have to go to the the FSDO, do they collate regionally?)
Shawn:
From memory the acceptable engine-failure rate for ETOPS is 1x10 -8 (1:100,000,000) and for the second engine 0.3x10 -8 (0.3:100,000,000) per flight hour.
You mentioned earlier that you would accept the SEIMC rate; this is proposed by the ICAO WG for 'very reliable engines' to be 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) per flight hour.
PPRUNE indicates that engine failures are required by FARs to be reported for CAT operations. In Europe, in most States, this is also the case (in the UK turbine failures have to be reported under the Mandatory Occurance Report system).
As for the causes of failure; examination of the evidence (from Europe at least) appears to indicate that the core engine (I won't qualify that as the clever engineers will have a field day) has a failure rate of about 0.2 to 0.5x10 -5 (0.2 - 0.5:100,000) per flight hour.
Yes, as expected, maintenance failures add to that rate as do operational conditions. What do I mean by operational conditions: well in once again in Europe, air pollution appears to cause pitting of the lining or compressor blades which eventually leads to compressor failures (this can be offset by coating the blades and by periodic - splitting the engine - inspections); hot end failures caused mainly by abuse - be it hot starts or exceeding the limits during take-of manouevres (which can be offset by fitting Usage Monitoring System - not HUMS, which is mainly concerned with vibration monitoring - but plain usage in the sense of event parameters).
The combined effect of core engine-failures, maintentance events and operational events take the engine failure rate close to 1x10 -4 (1:10,000). With mitigation - coating the blades, inspection and fitting the UMS (which by the way eliminates hot starts), the rate settles at or slightly above 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) - probably as good as we can achieve given human factors.
The question of surviving the engine-failure is really down to the place where it occurs and includes: the autorotation - which comprises the two factors of environmental conditions and skill; and surviving the time to rescue - which is down to the clothing, and survival equipment (lifejackets, liferafts, survival packs etc).
Finally
Are we still happy with single-engine single pilot operations at night (and when the conditions do not support a safe outcome) with a failure rate of 1:10,000 flight hours?
Not me!
Mind you if you are flying a twin in Class 3 the probability of an engine failure leading to a ditching becomes 1:5,000 at worst and 1:50,000 at best.
Why not check out FTW03FA118 and see if you think those conditions were acceptable.
Thanks for that - I had missed FAR 135.415. Wonder what happens to the data that is collected, is it published on the FAA Incident Database?
As a matter of interest how many FSDOs look after the GOM? (As all reports have to go to the the FSDO, do they collate regionally?)
Shawn:
From memory the acceptable engine-failure rate for ETOPS is 1x10 -8 (1:100,000,000) and for the second engine 0.3x10 -8 (0.3:100,000,000) per flight hour.
You mentioned earlier that you would accept the SEIMC rate; this is proposed by the ICAO WG for 'very reliable engines' to be 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) per flight hour.
PPRUNE indicates that engine failures are required by FARs to be reported for CAT operations. In Europe, in most States, this is also the case (in the UK turbine failures have to be reported under the Mandatory Occurance Report system).
As for the causes of failure; examination of the evidence (from Europe at least) appears to indicate that the core engine (I won't qualify that as the clever engineers will have a field day) has a failure rate of about 0.2 to 0.5x10 -5 (0.2 - 0.5:100,000) per flight hour.
Yes, as expected, maintenance failures add to that rate as do operational conditions. What do I mean by operational conditions: well in once again in Europe, air pollution appears to cause pitting of the lining or compressor blades which eventually leads to compressor failures (this can be offset by coating the blades and by periodic - splitting the engine - inspections); hot end failures caused mainly by abuse - be it hot starts or exceeding the limits during take-of manouevres (which can be offset by fitting Usage Monitoring System - not HUMS, which is mainly concerned with vibration monitoring - but plain usage in the sense of event parameters).
The combined effect of core engine-failures, maintentance events and operational events take the engine failure rate close to 1x10 -4 (1:10,000). With mitigation - coating the blades, inspection and fitting the UMS (which by the way eliminates hot starts), the rate settles at or slightly above 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) - probably as good as we can achieve given human factors.
The question of surviving the engine-failure is really down to the place where it occurs and includes: the autorotation - which comprises the two factors of environmental conditions and skill; and surviving the time to rescue - which is down to the clothing, and survival equipment (lifejackets, liferafts, survival packs etc).
Finally
Are we still happy with single-engine single pilot operations at night (and when the conditions do not support a safe outcome) with a failure rate of 1:10,000 flight hours?
Not me!
Mind you if you are flying a twin in Class 3 the probability of an engine failure leading to a ditching becomes 1:5,000 at worst and 1:50,000 at best.
Why not check out FTW03FA118 and see if you think those conditions were acceptable.
Last edited by Another KOS; 8th Jun 2003 at 22:57.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
Another KOS:
Thanks for the numbers - so why are we happy to accept a failure rate that is so significantly below that used by the airlines? Beats me. Body count is lower, so it gets less attention from the authorities, to be completely frank.
But it shows that extremely high reliability is achievable -- so why aren't we fighting for it?
Sorry, but I don't know what FTW03FA118 is - can someone help?
Thanks for the numbers - so why are we happy to accept a failure rate that is so significantly below that used by the airlines? Beats me. Body count is lower, so it gets less attention from the authorities, to be completely frank.
But it shows that extremely high reliability is achievable -- so why aren't we fighting for it?
Sorry, but I don't know what FTW03FA118 is - can someone help?
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Texas
Posts: 512
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FTW03FA118 is here.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: International
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shawn:
I do apologise I gave you the wrong accident reference - it should have been:
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...21X00247&key=1
Somewhat disingenuously, you were given exactly what you asked for - the engine failure rates!
However, the engine failure rates give only 'likelyhood' of an event; what is also required is 'the consequence' - when we have both elements we are in a position where we can conduct a Risk Analysis - AS/NZS 4360:1999 "a systematic use of available information to determine how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences".
This brings us back to the heart of the question contained in this thread "reasons not to fly a VFR only, single-engine helicopter offshore at night".
In my view there are two inferences we can draw from the question: (1) an engine failure will lead to a night ditching; and (2) a flight conducted with reference to (questionable) 'surface light references'.
Lets examine both of these:
(1) If we accept the data contained in my earlier posting (using European engine-failure rates) there is a 1:10,000 chance that the engine will fail in a flight hour and the consequence - an autorotation at night. Likely outcome, unknown really but likely to be a less than perfect ditching and, provided all occupants get out OK, a search and rescue conducted in the dark.
(2) No data offered for this but even with the mitigation offered by PPrune#1Fan:
experience from analysis of the UK accident data indicates that flying into a reduced Usable Cue Environment (UCE) is in the top echelon of accident causes.
We have now conducted a Risk Analysis and answered the questions set by SASless but we still have to go through one more stage - Risk Evaluation "the process used to determine risk management priorities by comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other critieria".
We are now entering the area of cultural differences - these type of operations are permitted in some areas of the world but not in others. From this we deduce that while such operations are Risk Assessed in the GOM and found to be acceptable - they are not deemed acceptable in Europe or by ICAO (not really surprising as Europe placed a heavy footprint on the Annex 6 Part III development).
The reason for the reference to the accident report earlier in the post; that type of operations is also not permitted in Europe - it being considered as a flight over a hostile environment.
Not to labour a point but flying a twin in the same circumstances but in Performance Class 3 - doubles the probability of an engine failure with the same consequence. The only mitigation that can be offered is that twins appear to be better maintained than singles.
Once again apologies for a too lengthy post.
I do apologise I gave you the wrong accident reference - it should have been:
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...21X00247&key=1
Somewhat disingenuously, you were given exactly what you asked for - the engine failure rates!
However, the engine failure rates give only 'likelyhood' of an event; what is also required is 'the consequence' - when we have both elements we are in a position where we can conduct a Risk Analysis - AS/NZS 4360:1999 "a systematic use of available information to determine how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences".
This brings us back to the heart of the question contained in this thread "reasons not to fly a VFR only, single-engine helicopter offshore at night".
In my view there are two inferences we can draw from the question: (1) an engine failure will lead to a night ditching; and (2) a flight conducted with reference to (questionable) 'surface light references'.
Lets examine both of these:
(1) If we accept the data contained in my earlier posting (using European engine-failure rates) there is a 1:10,000 chance that the engine will fail in a flight hour and the consequence - an autorotation at night. Likely outcome, unknown really but likely to be a less than perfect ditching and, provided all occupants get out OK, a search and rescue conducted in the dark.
(2) No data offered for this but even with the mitigation offered by PPrune#1Fan:
"To those of you unfamiliar with the 'shallow-water" Gulf Of Mexico, it might seem impossible to safely fly offshore at night. In reality there are thousands of platforms. Most manned platforms are lit up like Christmas trees. Many of them have flares burning. Even an abandoned or unmanned platform will still have a navigation light.
We have now conducted a Risk Analysis and answered the questions set by SASless but we still have to go through one more stage - Risk Evaluation "the process used to determine risk management priorities by comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other critieria".
We are now entering the area of cultural differences - these type of operations are permitted in some areas of the world but not in others. From this we deduce that while such operations are Risk Assessed in the GOM and found to be acceptable - they are not deemed acceptable in Europe or by ICAO (not really surprising as Europe placed a heavy footprint on the Annex 6 Part III development).
The reason for the reference to the accident report earlier in the post; that type of operations is also not permitted in Europe - it being considered as a flight over a hostile environment.
Not to labour a point but flying a twin in the same circumstances but in Performance Class 3 - doubles the probability of an engine failure with the same consequence. The only mitigation that can be offered is that twins appear to be better maintained than singles.
Once again apologies for a too lengthy post.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
For the most operators, it's not just that twins are better maintained, they are often flown by a completely different class of operator and pilot (not to put down the guys who fly single engine stuff in a very professional manner).
That makes a big difference in the whole philosophy of what risks they will and won't accept, which further contributes to the safety aspect.
It is obvious that some operators and regulatory authorities have done a lot of thinking about this, and others appear (on the basis of what they are doing) have turned a more or less blind eye to the situation.
If the certifying authorities and the operators and the customers all turn a blink eye, then who is left to make some changes? Insurance companies? Do they listen?
Hmmm.
That makes a big difference in the whole philosophy of what risks they will and won't accept, which further contributes to the safety aspect.
It is obvious that some operators and regulatory authorities have done a lot of thinking about this, and others appear (on the basis of what they are doing) have turned a more or less blind eye to the situation.
If the certifying authorities and the operators and the customers all turn a blink eye, then who is left to make some changes? Insurance companies? Do they listen?
Hmmm.
Shawn - it is not certain that operators or regulators have turned a blind eye to these type of operations. It may well be that they have been assessed under the system alluded to by KOS and deemed them to be acceptable to the target set by the authority (or the operator).
Even if assessed by the regulator, the operator still has a duty of care to satisfy himself, by a risk assessment, that operations can be conducted safely.
Let me take an example (if I have this wrong please let me know): extended overwater operations for helicopters is defined as an operation over water at a horizontal distance of more than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline and more than 50 miles from an off-shore heliport structure. Following a risk assessment, what operator would permit a helicopter to be launched for a flight to an offshore installation of 95 miles, without carrying a liferaft; even though not required by FAR 135.167.
We must also assume that the launching of a twin without single-engine performance must have been risk assessed and considered to be safe (notwithstanding that KOS's engine-failure rates appear to give the possibility of an engine failure every 5,000 hours - KOS's worst case scenario).
If Shawn's contention that insurance rates reflect the assessment of risk is true - how can such an operation wipe its face?
Even if assessed by the regulator, the operator still has a duty of care to satisfy himself, by a risk assessment, that operations can be conducted safely.
Let me take an example (if I have this wrong please let me know): extended overwater operations for helicopters is defined as an operation over water at a horizontal distance of more than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline and more than 50 miles from an off-shore heliport structure. Following a risk assessment, what operator would permit a helicopter to be launched for a flight to an offshore installation of 95 miles, without carrying a liferaft; even though not required by FAR 135.167.
We must also assume that the launching of a twin without single-engine performance must have been risk assessed and considered to be safe (notwithstanding that KOS's engine-failure rates appear to give the possibility of an engine failure every 5,000 hours - KOS's worst case scenario).
If Shawn's contention that insurance rates reflect the assessment of risk is true - how can such an operation wipe its face?
Iconoclast
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
Posts: 2,132
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Failures
Please understand that the predicted rate of failure is based not on the flying hours of one aircraft but on a fleet of aircraft of a given type. If KOS's worst case scenario of 5000 hours is correct a fleet of helicopters can reach 5000 hours in a short period of time and as such would be dropping from the sky at an alarming rate.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Up a sago palm
Posts: 35
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Multi Crew.... will save you....
I feel that the point made earlier regarding the use of two pilots as apposed to single pilot operations is probably the more relevant when discussing the safety aspects of overwater night flights.
Without a doubt the majority of accidents revolve around the fact that the pilot has lost visual cues and has ditched, usually on approach. I can recall at least half a dozen over the past 5 years where this has been the case. I believe the engine failure rates should be an ongoing concern but really the use of single pilot operations, whether VFR or IFR, should have the greater focus. My opinion on this goes as far as to include all EMS operations as well.
If the use of two pilots were incorporated (assuming most know the advantages of two pilots), you may not completely stop these accidents, but you will severely reduce them.
I don’t think this point can be argued by anyone, most of all the regulators.
Cheers
Without a doubt the majority of accidents revolve around the fact that the pilot has lost visual cues and has ditched, usually on approach. I can recall at least half a dozen over the past 5 years where this has been the case. I believe the engine failure rates should be an ongoing concern but really the use of single pilot operations, whether VFR or IFR, should have the greater focus. My opinion on this goes as far as to include all EMS operations as well.
If the use of two pilots were incorporated (assuming most know the advantages of two pilots), you may not completely stop these accidents, but you will severely reduce them.
I don’t think this point can be argued by anyone, most of all the regulators.
Cheers
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: International
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hingeless:
We know that the wish for two pilots is well intentioned but, in the context of this thread what would it achieve?
In the first of the two cases considered - the engine failure case - it would merely add one more to the potential casualties.
In the second - the reduced visual cue environment - the problem would be ameliorated but only in the case where the workload lends itself to task sharing (and, for offshore operations a dual panel fitted). This is true for onshore operations such as HEMS where the pure flying and the HEMS task related items can be separated - without the provision of the dual panel. (In fact this is the case in Europe where HEMS does require a crew of two - either two pilots, or more usual, a pilot and a HEMS crew member. Police operations are similarly crewed).
Surely you are missing the obvious choices with your solution - twin engine helicopters, when flown other than in Performance Class 3, would ameliorate the first case; the use of an IFR certificated helicopter could avoid the second - provided the pilot is well trained and current. (IFR aircraft are, during their certification process, assessed for handling qualities and workload and qualified as two pilot IFR or single pilot IFR (and in the latter case equipped with an autopilot).)
I would also add another item - the fitting of a radalt - which could give a safety net for the unintentional descent into the water and adds a further and invaluable cue for autorative landings on the water (obviously GPWS would provide much more functionality but will have to remain a dream, or Sikorsky only fit - at least for the immediate future).
Lu:
Your point is well made, perhaps we should concentrate on the more probable engine-failure range of 1 to 5:100,000. What is not in dispute is that, if a twin engine helicopter is flown in Performance Class 3, the probability of a failure (for the helicopter) is increased to the range of 2 to 10:100,000. Moving into a different Performance Class would not change the rate but would reduce the consequence (it was tempting to put eliminate but for Performance Class 2, exposure on the take-off and landing still has to be considered).
What are we doing in these series of posts?
Well obviously we are engaged in the very Risk Assessment that was discussed in an earlier post.
What was missed in the earlier post was the method of setting the safety target which could be one of:
We know that the wish for two pilots is well intentioned but, in the context of this thread what would it achieve?
In the first of the two cases considered - the engine failure case - it would merely add one more to the potential casualties.
In the second - the reduced visual cue environment - the problem would be ameliorated but only in the case where the workload lends itself to task sharing (and, for offshore operations a dual panel fitted). This is true for onshore operations such as HEMS where the pure flying and the HEMS task related items can be separated - without the provision of the dual panel. (In fact this is the case in Europe where HEMS does require a crew of two - either two pilots, or more usual, a pilot and a HEMS crew member. Police operations are similarly crewed).
Surely you are missing the obvious choices with your solution - twin engine helicopters, when flown other than in Performance Class 3, would ameliorate the first case; the use of an IFR certificated helicopter could avoid the second - provided the pilot is well trained and current. (IFR aircraft are, during their certification process, assessed for handling qualities and workload and qualified as two pilot IFR or single pilot IFR (and in the latter case equipped with an autopilot).)
I would also add another item - the fitting of a radalt - which could give a safety net for the unintentional descent into the water and adds a further and invaluable cue for autorative landings on the water (obviously GPWS would provide much more functionality but will have to remain a dream, or Sikorsky only fit - at least for the immediate future).
Lu:
Your point is well made, perhaps we should concentrate on the more probable engine-failure range of 1 to 5:100,000. What is not in dispute is that, if a twin engine helicopter is flown in Performance Class 3, the probability of a failure (for the helicopter) is increased to the range of 2 to 10:100,000. Moving into a different Performance Class would not change the rate but would reduce the consequence (it was tempting to put eliminate but for Performance Class 2, exposure on the take-off and landing still has to be considered).
What are we doing in these series of posts?
Well obviously we are engaged in the very Risk Assessment that was discussed in an earlier post.
What was missed in the earlier post was the method of setting the safety target which could be one of:
- Zero Risk: not an option for us unfortunately
- De Minimis: minimised to an acceptable safety target (the JAR-OPS approach to performance)
- Comparative Risk: comparison to conducting the operations by other methods (e.g. by boat)
- As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP): where additional controls are not commercially or reasonably practical
Last edited by Another KOS; 11th Jun 2003 at 19:14.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
Unfortunately, people use the Risk Assessment words, but not the real methodology.
When pressed for the Risk assessment report, they will not be able to produce it "but it was done..." they say.
There is a formal process for Risk Assessment and risk reduction, and it would be nice to see someone (like an insurance company???) demand it be done in a formal method.
When pressed for the Risk assessment report, they will not be able to produce it "but it was done..." they say.
There is a formal process for Risk Assessment and risk reduction, and it would be nice to see someone (like an insurance company???) demand it be done in a formal method.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
Another KOS:
Anyone who says that they have done a 'Risk Assessment' ought to be asked to produce the report showing the methods they used.
Like flight testing - no report = no test done. No Risk assessment report = no Risk Assessment done.
There are formal methods to completing a Risk assessment, and when followed, they are good things. But people use the term too loosely and without discipline.
Anyone who says that they have done a 'Risk Assessment' ought to be asked to produce the report showing the methods they used.
Like flight testing - no report = no test done. No Risk assessment report = no Risk Assessment done.
There are formal methods to completing a Risk assessment, and when followed, they are good things. But people use the term too loosely and without discipline.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: International
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shawn:
Yes, with you 100%.
So under the US Freedom of Information Act - if the FAA states they have Risk Assessed their current Regulations and OpSpecs, you think that assessment should be made available for us to see?
Is it possible that others have a view on this issue, or have Shawn and I killed the thread stone dead?
Do you consider that it has been established that VFR only, single-engined helicopters can be flown offshore at night - to an acceptable (safety) target?
Yes, with you 100%.
So under the US Freedom of Information Act - if the FAA states they have Risk Assessed their current Regulations and OpSpecs, you think that assessment should be made available for us to see?
Is it possible that others have a view on this issue, or have Shawn and I killed the thread stone dead?
Do you consider that it has been established that VFR only, single-engined helicopters can be flown offshore at night - to an acceptable (safety) target?
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: home and abroad
Posts: 582
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Depends on your target. I'm sure that a DC2 can still be a viable airliner today, but when there is so much better equipment for the job available, it all boils down to the standards you set..
Gatvol
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: KLAS/TIST/FAJS/KFAI
Posts: 4,195
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Would you ever consider routinely flying a single-engine helicopter offshore at night? What would be the minimum equipment you would have if you did?
Anyway as mentioned on another thread, I have done plenty of nights in the Virgin Islands into some seriously black holes. And yes in a B206 (series) Hated every minute of it, and just tried to take things a bit
s l o w e r .
One place in particular we used to go into at night was www.peterisland.com or www.neckerisland.com Dark night, maybe an unseen squall and an unlit Helipad was just a way of life.
Radar Altimeter would have been my choice beyond the usual items.
Dam good Rum down there though.........
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: INVERLOCH,VIC,AUSTRALIA
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Some very good discussion and research , but some of it wanders from the point . Is it safe ? If it isn't safe in some circumstances can it be made safe in others .
First my background . I was trained in the military . Flew four engined turbine aircraft internationally . I am a very good instrument pilot on FW and helicopters . I have 12,000 hrs helicopter . On Marine Pilot Transfer operations in Australia my job is to fly single engine helicopters at night over water . We operate under NVFR .
Is single engine helicopter NVFR over water dangerous ? Any helicopter operation can be dangerous unless the pilot is correctly trained and the aircraft correctly equipped . If a pilot has a basic NVFR rating with its 2 hours of instrument training , has low natural instrument flying ability , and minimal dark night experience , and his aircraft has the minimum of NVFR equipment , he can be legal and the possibility of his surviving over water at night is about zero . And that is without complicated operations or emergencies . I will cover twin engines from the equipment point below .
Can it be safe? The MPT operation I am involved with has achieved 35 years accident free and more than a third of our flights are at night [ governed by when high tides occur ]. Why is it safe ? Our aircraft instrumentation , aids , and comms are effectively to IFR standards . We have autopilots , rad alts , Schermully flares , pop out floats , life vests , GPS/406 beacons ,crash location beacons , marine EPIRBs , marine radios , ship AIS , landing light plus swivelling search light , underwater breathing equipment , jettison doors , pop out windows , life raft , medical kit and survival kit . Our maintenance is to a high standard .Our pilots are very good instrument pilots and we fly good instrument procedures . Our pilots are also very good at night visual flight . Our weather conditions are generally benign , the seas warm and the sharks well fed . Why don't we have two engines ? If we operated over less friendly waters and more than 21nm from land , we would . In our operation we start with the EXXON premise that twin engined helicopters are 2% safer than single engined helicopters . We would happily go to the expense of twins to gain that extra 2% safety but there are three problems . Some of our ships are small and the landing is a confined area , and it's an unforgiving confined area . If we clip an obstruction we don't just get a gentle rain of greenery . Our rotor clearance standard , derived from the International Marine Organization rules , is rotor diameter plus 10 mtrs , so we have 5 mtrs clearance each side . Our B206 and EC120 aircraft have good visibility and are light and precise on the controls and these factors aid our confined area ops. Due to size constaints the only twins that fit are the BK105 , EC135 and the Explorer . The BK105 has poor vis and is not light and precise on the controls . The Explorer may have support problems . The EC135 sounds better but I suspect that when I am training a new pilot and crabbing in , he will get to see the ship and I won't . Using a wing down tecnique I would get to see the ship but not how much he is clearing the obstructions by . Apart from visibilty and precise controls there is the down time of the more complex twins . Each time the aircraft is grounded , the marine pilot must travel by pilot boat . This is comparatively dangerous and must be considered in the overall operation . So starting with a 2% advantage , the visibility , controls and availability of twins could erode safety into negative figures .
We fly single pilot which I know is contentious . We know that the problems of an instrument take off and of a night visual approach that has led to impact with the water with other operators has often occurred with two pilots on board . The accident is precipitated by the PIC and it is hoped that the second pilot will save the situation . Trouble is that the second pilot often doesn't achieve the result required .Our attitude is that the pilot must have superior instrument and night abilities so that the problem isn't precipitated in the first place . We insist on very high standards to achieve that result as indicated by our scrub rate . Also , with our singles , it helps to keep the aircraft light .
I would rather auto at night into water than auto at day into trees .
We don't winch because 87% of our ships are suitable for landing on . Winching has its own accident rate . What we don't land on is serviced by a pilot boat .
Please don't think that we are dogmatic about our attitudes . We are aware that other organizations and authorities have different requirements and different ideas and we always try to appreciate their point of view and benefit from it . We half expect that we will eventually be directed to fly twin engined IFR and we will accept the umpires decision . But in the meantime when it comes to our operation we have the results on the board and we look forward to another 35 years accident free .
I am aware that I have left much unsaid and at the same time I have been long winded so I beg your indulgence .
First my background . I was trained in the military . Flew four engined turbine aircraft internationally . I am a very good instrument pilot on FW and helicopters . I have 12,000 hrs helicopter . On Marine Pilot Transfer operations in Australia my job is to fly single engine helicopters at night over water . We operate under NVFR .
Is single engine helicopter NVFR over water dangerous ? Any helicopter operation can be dangerous unless the pilot is correctly trained and the aircraft correctly equipped . If a pilot has a basic NVFR rating with its 2 hours of instrument training , has low natural instrument flying ability , and minimal dark night experience , and his aircraft has the minimum of NVFR equipment , he can be legal and the possibility of his surviving over water at night is about zero . And that is without complicated operations or emergencies . I will cover twin engines from the equipment point below .
Can it be safe? The MPT operation I am involved with has achieved 35 years accident free and more than a third of our flights are at night [ governed by when high tides occur ]. Why is it safe ? Our aircraft instrumentation , aids , and comms are effectively to IFR standards . We have autopilots , rad alts , Schermully flares , pop out floats , life vests , GPS/406 beacons ,crash location beacons , marine EPIRBs , marine radios , ship AIS , landing light plus swivelling search light , underwater breathing equipment , jettison doors , pop out windows , life raft , medical kit and survival kit . Our maintenance is to a high standard .Our pilots are very good instrument pilots and we fly good instrument procedures . Our pilots are also very good at night visual flight . Our weather conditions are generally benign , the seas warm and the sharks well fed . Why don't we have two engines ? If we operated over less friendly waters and more than 21nm from land , we would . In our operation we start with the EXXON premise that twin engined helicopters are 2% safer than single engined helicopters . We would happily go to the expense of twins to gain that extra 2% safety but there are three problems . Some of our ships are small and the landing is a confined area , and it's an unforgiving confined area . If we clip an obstruction we don't just get a gentle rain of greenery . Our rotor clearance standard , derived from the International Marine Organization rules , is rotor diameter plus 10 mtrs , so we have 5 mtrs clearance each side . Our B206 and EC120 aircraft have good visibility and are light and precise on the controls and these factors aid our confined area ops. Due to size constaints the only twins that fit are the BK105 , EC135 and the Explorer . The BK105 has poor vis and is not light and precise on the controls . The Explorer may have support problems . The EC135 sounds better but I suspect that when I am training a new pilot and crabbing in , he will get to see the ship and I won't . Using a wing down tecnique I would get to see the ship but not how much he is clearing the obstructions by . Apart from visibilty and precise controls there is the down time of the more complex twins . Each time the aircraft is grounded , the marine pilot must travel by pilot boat . This is comparatively dangerous and must be considered in the overall operation . So starting with a 2% advantage , the visibility , controls and availability of twins could erode safety into negative figures .
We fly single pilot which I know is contentious . We know that the problems of an instrument take off and of a night visual approach that has led to impact with the water with other operators has often occurred with two pilots on board . The accident is precipitated by the PIC and it is hoped that the second pilot will save the situation . Trouble is that the second pilot often doesn't achieve the result required .Our attitude is that the pilot must have superior instrument and night abilities so that the problem isn't precipitated in the first place . We insist on very high standards to achieve that result as indicated by our scrub rate . Also , with our singles , it helps to keep the aircraft light .
I would rather auto at night into water than auto at day into trees .
We don't winch because 87% of our ships are suitable for landing on . Winching has its own accident rate . What we don't land on is serviced by a pilot boat .
Please don't think that we are dogmatic about our attitudes . We are aware that other organizations and authorities have different requirements and different ideas and we always try to appreciate their point of view and benefit from it . We half expect that we will eventually be directed to fly twin engined IFR and we will accept the umpires decision . But in the meantime when it comes to our operation we have the results on the board and we look forward to another 35 years accident free .
I am aware that I have left much unsaid and at the same time I have been long winded so I beg your indulgence .
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Outback
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I did it a few years, had quite a few frights along the way.
The company I worked for was very thorough in their training and no expense was spared in the maintenence of their aircraft.
One concern was the B206 flight manual definition of night flight limitations.
Now a little wiser, I would have to question the legalities of those flights conducted on those moonless/starless nights.
Don't care what anyone says, but it is IFR and if anyone wishes to tell me otherwise I will take them for a fly on a "black" night.
A few years ago CASA was reviewing the MPT regulations, as usual it was to hard for them and it was put to bed.
The company I worked for was very thorough in their training and no expense was spared in the maintenence of their aircraft.
One concern was the B206 flight manual definition of night flight limitations.
Now a little wiser, I would have to question the legalities of those flights conducted on those moonless/starless nights.
Don't care what anyone says, but it is IFR and if anyone wishes to tell me otherwise I will take them for a fly on a "black" night.
A few years ago CASA was reviewing the MPT regulations, as usual it was to hard for them and it was put to bed.