Hingeless:
We know that the wish for two pilots is well intentioned but, in the context of this thread what would it achieve?
In the first of the two cases considered - the engine failure case - it would merely add one more to the potential casualties.
In the second - the reduced visual cue environment - the problem would be ameliorated but only in the case where the workload lends itself to task sharing (and, for offshore operations a dual panel fitted). This is true for onshore operations such as HEMS where the pure flying and the HEMS task related items can be separated - without the provision of the dual panel. (In fact this is the case in Europe where HEMS does require a crew of two - either two pilots, or more usual, a pilot and a HEMS crew member. Police operations are similarly crewed).
Surely you are missing the obvious choices with your solution - twin engine helicopters, when flown other than in Performance Class 3, would ameliorate the first case; the use of an IFR certificated helicopter could avoid the second - provided the pilot is well trained and current. (IFR aircraft are, during their certification process, assessed for handling qualities and workload and qualified as two pilot IFR or single pilot IFR (and in the latter case equipped with an autopilot).)
I would also add another item - the fitting of a radalt - which could give a safety net for the unintentional descent into the water and adds a further and invaluable cue for autorative landings on the water (obviously GPWS would provide much more functionality but will have to remain a dream, or Sikorsky only fit - at least for the immediate future).
Lu:
Your point is well made, perhaps we should concentrate on the more probable engine-failure range of 1 to 5:100,000. What is not in dispute is that, if a twin engine helicopter is flown in Performance Class 3, the probability of a failure (for the helicopter) is increased to the range of 2 to 10:100,000. Moving into a different Performance Class would not change the rate but would reduce the consequence (it was tempting to put eliminate but for Performance Class 2, exposure on the take-off and landing still has to be considered).
What are we doing in these series of posts?
Well obviously we are engaged in the very Risk Assessment that was discussed in an earlier post.
What was missed in the earlier post was the method of setting the safety target which could be one of:
- Zero Risk: not an option for us unfortunately
- De Minimis: minimised to an acceptable safety target (the JAR-OPS approach to performance)
- Comparative Risk: comparison to conducting the operations by other methods (e.g. by boat)
- As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP): where additional controls are not commercially or reasonably practical
This discussion is extremely timely in the context of proposed changes to the industry due to the extant ICAO process.