Will H225 return offshore?
I found Airbus’s actions after this tragedy to be reprehensible. Throwing blame and accusations in every direction.
I had been told in no uncertain terms when, on course, I called one a PUMA that the 225LP was not a Puma but a new aircraft…..after the accident Airbus started to refer to the “Safety Record of the PUMA family”.
On another note they kept talking about the wonderful emergency lube system, which when actually activated, indicated a system failure of the system that led to 2 ditchings. Has it ever been used successfully?
Don’t get me going on the fuel system. If you were PNF you spent 25% of your time checking fuel xfer. especially if using the external aux tanks.
I freely admit it was far from my favourite aircraft.
I had been told in no uncertain terms when, on course, I called one a PUMA that the 225LP was not a Puma but a new aircraft…..after the accident Airbus started to refer to the “Safety Record of the PUMA family”.
On another note they kept talking about the wonderful emergency lube system, which when actually activated, indicated a system failure of the system that led to 2 ditchings. Has it ever been used successfully?
Don’t get me going on the fuel system. If you were PNF you spent 25% of your time checking fuel xfer. especially if using the external aux tanks.
I freely admit it was far from my favourite aircraft.
I think one thing that may be forgotten is this;
On Tues/ Weds 26/27th April 2016 I was chatting to the 225 accident captain about technical things at the CAE Sim Centre in Oslo. On the Friday 29th April, we got the shocking news of the accident followed by learning the names of the crew [who we knew]. There was much discussion of what could cause the main rotor to detach and 'fly' to the ground. We all agreed that it would take a while to ascertain what had happened [ 225s were soon grounded by the Norwegian and Brit CAAs]
.
However, on the following Monday morning Airbus released a statement effectively stating that the there was no fault with the 225 and hinting that there may have been a maintenance problem involved in the cause. On that basis they were happy for continued operations with no requirement to consider a temporary grounding [ this had echoes of their responses to the 2 EM lube ditchings years earlier........no one was injured because of luck in those incidents]. I was astonished [but not entirely surprised] as there was no way they could have known at this point what caused the accident.
I printed off the Airbus statement and showed it to some CHC crews at CAE Oslo as I thought Airbus were being very irresponsible and I wanted their opinions. They all agreed with me.
So......one of the underlying reasons for the 225 not being in the North Sea since, was that element of distrust of not just the aircraft, but also the Airbus organisation..
On Tues/ Weds 26/27th April 2016 I was chatting to the 225 accident captain about technical things at the CAE Sim Centre in Oslo. On the Friday 29th April, we got the shocking news of the accident followed by learning the names of the crew [who we knew]. There was much discussion of what could cause the main rotor to detach and 'fly' to the ground. We all agreed that it would take a while to ascertain what had happened [ 225s were soon grounded by the Norwegian and Brit CAAs]
.
However, on the following Monday morning Airbus released a statement effectively stating that the there was no fault with the 225 and hinting that there may have been a maintenance problem involved in the cause. On that basis they were happy for continued operations with no requirement to consider a temporary grounding [ this had echoes of their responses to the 2 EM lube ditchings years earlier........no one was injured because of luck in those incidents]. I was astonished [but not entirely surprised] as there was no way they could have known at this point what caused the accident.
I printed off the Airbus statement and showed it to some CHC crews at CAE Oslo as I thought Airbus were being very irresponsible and I wanted their opinions. They all agreed with me.
So......one of the underlying reasons for the 225 not being in the North Sea since, was that element of distrust of not just the aircraft, but also the Airbus organisation..
The certification requirement is for 30 mins, hence that is what it says in the EOPs (and what you should do) but the system was tested for 52 mins. So there is some reserve, although one must still obey the EOP 30 minutes.
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So with a Vy of 80 kts and providing the emergency lube system works. It is best to have a place to land within 35-40 Nm given zero winds. If not near a rig or the shore at least you have lots of time to look for a passing ship, flat iceberg, etc., brief the pax and get SAR enroute to your probable splash down area. ( we used to joke in the Persian Gulf that the biggest danger in a ditching was to be hit by or hitting a huge tanker. )
The meaning and intention of term “Land or Ditch Immediately” can’t be stressed enough.
It is not meant to save the aircraft but to save as many lives as possible in a very bad situation regardless of what is underneath the helicopter be it jungle, mountain, stormy seas or 5* resort where the Swedish Bikini Team is in training.
A horrible decision for a Capt. to have to make but it must be made.
My only experience with this kind of thing was engine failures in single engine machines where no decision making upon my part was required. I was very lucky in all events. Thank the aviation Gawds for excellent training.
As one great instructor once told me : “When something goes wrong you should be disappointed but not surprised.”
I trust Vladimir Putin more than I trust the AH leadership team.
AH care about selling helicopters; their safety and through life support, supply chain etc seem to be after thoughts. The H175 should be excluded from the NMH competition until AH can satisfy operators (military and civil) that the culture leading up to, and following, the Turoy accident have been addressed.
AH care about selling helicopters; their safety and through life support, supply chain etc seem to be after thoughts. The H175 should be excluded from the NMH competition until AH can satisfy operators (military and civil) that the culture leading up to, and following, the Turoy accident have been addressed.
Addressed or terminated for cause?
