Caverton AW139 incident in Jan 2024
The overwrite of the CVR is a gem. Malpractice by both pilots and managers in this regard needs some serious attention and penalties by authorities, including those well North of Nigeria.
I think the referred to IMC conditions means something less than VMC and short of being in cloud. Or they would all be dead.
Not sure this counts as “expertise“ 212man, but the gang bar cuts all the electrics for pretty much everything that the pilots care about, except the engines. But the aux batt is still supplying power to the CMC and recording data until physically disconnected. It‘s just the BATT BUS that is offline.
The overwrite of the CVR is a gem. Malpractice by both pilots and managers in this regard needs some serious attention and penalties by authorities, including those well North of Nigeria.
I think the referred to IMC conditions means something less than VMC and short of being in cloud. Or they would all be dead.
The overwrite of the CVR is a gem. Malpractice by both pilots and managers in this regard needs some serious attention and penalties by authorities, including those well North of Nigeria.
I think the referred to IMC conditions means something less than VMC and short of being in cloud. Or they would all be dead.
There used to be a `get -out-of -jail card`,called a standby AI/AH.Usually a 4"diameter representation of the outside world and a 3 position switch annotated `ON`/off/EMERG`,powered by the battery,and a small emergency battery,in case the `battery` failed,after everything else.A length of coloured cord on the windscreen also helped..Cost...next to nothing in a million-$ helo...Don`t they have those any more...???
The aircraft could have RIPS. Standard after a certain s/n. Remote Independant Power Supply just for the FDR/CVR. Can’t remember when it became std, but before s/n 500.
CB
CB
I can understand the FDR receiving power, but how is it getting data from the AHRS etc if they were off then realigning?
No doubt some significant interrupts in the data. This would compliment the lack of data from the CVR. Whoops. How could such a thing happen? Again. And again.
[QUOTE=Collective Bias;11621700]The aircraft could have RIPS. Standard after a certain s/n. Remote Independant Power Supply just for the FDR/CVR. Can’t remember when it became std, but before s/n 500.
microphone (
This is from the AAIB accident report to G-LBAL S/N 31421
"The CVFDR was fitted with Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS) designed to keep
the audio recording of the cockpit area microphone working for 10 minutes after the loss
of the main source of electrical power to the CVFDR. "
microphone (
This is from the AAIB accident report to G-LBAL S/N 31421
"The CVFDR was fitted with Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS) designed to keep
the audio recording of the cockpit area microphone working for 10 minutes after the loss
of the main source of electrical power to the CVFDR. "
Last edited by ericferret; 22nd Mar 2024 at 22:48.
Hopefully the use of the gangbar is just a reporting error, as I am astounded that the Captain (or any half competent pilot) would do this in IMC and remove all electrical power, and thus all instruments.
That is suicide in IMC and reflects no system knowledge and dangerous training deficiencies if it is actually the case.
I agree with TorqueTalk, they must have had some sort of visual reference or they would have been dead.
The ONLY time to use the Gangbar is on the ground.
That is suicide in IMC and reflects no system knowledge and dangerous training deficiencies if it is actually the case.
I agree with TorqueTalk, they must have had some sort of visual reference or they would have been dead.
The ONLY time to use the Gangbar is on the ground.
The ONLY time to use the Gangbar is on the ground.
I refer you to my earlier reference to the AirAsia accident. Plus, the anecdotal information that they pulled 4g recovering - which points to being fully IMC until they came out the cloud bottoms.
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but how does that “reflex” happen in flight without crew coordination?
I got this - oops
You don’t exist - oops
Commander knows best - oops
Let’s do something - oops
Was this really a simple non-critical malfunction that nearly killed everyone due to crew ineptness? Amazing and dismal in equal proportions.
And they have a company simulator? So what do they train? The things that the regs require but which are rarely, if ever implicated in helicopter PT cock-ups?
And they have a company simulator? So what do they train? The things that the regs require but which are rarely, if ever implicated in helicopter PT cock-ups?
Most half competent crews can manage engine failures before and after TDP and they can work their way through a fire drill, but throw them an AHRS fail or a niggling ADS malfunction and then you’ll sort the wheat from the chaff.
Personally, I believe we aren’t getting the balance right.
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Having seen too many of these type of incidents recently, my attitude to the traditional sim 'let the PM initiate the UA and the PF recover' has changed. I now initiate the UA sequence with the APs off and challenge the PF to remain adequately stabilised for 10 seconds before switching the APs back on. Some guys almost immediately enter their own UA.If they are good, I will ask them to look at the AP panel for 10 seconds or close their eyes until it occurs. Then ask the PM to reselect both APs and the PF can recover. I also repeat the ex in SAS mode without ATT to recover. Everyone forgets to use their feet! This tends to remind crews of the importance of a quick scan and quick crew actions to get the APs back ASAP after getting it 'back in the ballpark'.
Switching off the gang bar in IMC is tantamount to attempted suicide. No SAS, no instruments, no ICS, no AWG, no chance. AHRS can take up to 60 seconds to realign and considering the rates of likely pilot input, probably longer.
Switching off the gang bar in IMC is tantamount to attempted suicide. No SAS, no instruments, no ICS, no AWG, no chance. AHRS can take up to 60 seconds to realign and considering the rates of likely pilot input, probably longer.
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For me there is an element of doubt about the whole thing. I know the 139 has AP issues and that is fair enough but when you look at the timings of the incident and then how long they spent on the ground it just doesn't sound like normal behaviour. By staying on the ground with the CVR on for 47 minutes it allows it to restart the 2 hour cycle and wipe all voice recordings of the incident.
Maybe something in it, maybe not, maybe just the musings of a Southern North Sea jockey.
Maybe something in it, maybe not, maybe just the musings of a Southern North Sea jockey.
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That would be the case if they had lost all the data but the CVR had recorded two hours worth of data. The long delay on the ground caused the loop to start again omitting the incident.
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That would be plausible if the whole thing was wiped but the incident happened about 2 hours 10 minutes before the power was shut off, the crew sat on the ground for 47 minutes. The CVR records on a 2 hour loop and by waiting 47 minutes then it gives about 10 minutes allowance to make sure it was wiped. I think there is more to this than meets the eye.
Imagine putting electrical power into a wreck, causing a short and having residual fuel or wiring harnesses etc.burst into flame not to mention various computers and screens having a meltdown or a wx radar start emitting.
If the aircraft has had a significant safety event, all parties involved should be quite cognisant that data needs to be preserved. When that doesn’t happen, it smells mighty fishy right away.
Two examples that come to mind involved the crew erasing the CVR in one instance and a corrupt manager ensuring overwrite in another.
It happens. And it happens in organisations with all the right bits of paper and post holders. None of it is worth a fart if the players have poor ethics and there is weak oversight.
Two examples that come to mind involved the crew erasing the CVR in one instance and a corrupt manager ensuring overwrite in another.
It happens. And it happens in organisations with all the right bits of paper and post holders. None of it is worth a fart if the players have poor ethics and there is weak oversight.
