Chas Sheriff's 407 Mishap
Thread Starter
Chas Sheriff's 407 Mishap
Mishap was 1 Aug. Should he have been able to run this one on.
Charleston Sheriff's helicopter missing parts when it crashed, preliminary report says | News | postandcourier.com
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/v...374348f9a.html
Charleston Sheriff's helicopter missing parts when it crashed, preliminary report says | News | postandcourier.com
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/v...374348f9a.html
Top Answer
17th Aug 2023, 11:47
Join Date: Jul 2021
Location: Southern United States
Posts: 122
Likes: 0
Received 60 Likes
on
30 Posts
I suppose the original poster thought the better of his post(hopefully) or the moderators took it down(thankfully), but I saw it and feel the sentiment he expressed needs addressed.
The gist of the now deleted post was “from my experience, some country bumpkin mechanic was probably responsible for this accident in this backwater airport”
I grant that the original poster may have a strongly held opinion based on experience that informs his opinion of the southern United States. However, as we should all know by now, Human Factors accidents know no geographical, cultural, political etc boundaries. Humans are humans everywhere, and as long as we are in the chain, we can mess up, no matter how sophisticated we may think we are.
As humans we all fall victim to our own feelings of superiority, I know I surely was when I composed what I was originally going to say regarding that now deleted post!
But that stuff doesn’t do anybody any good. The facts are, somebody(possibly more than one) made a great big mistake that will possibly cost them their job and that nearly cost somebody their life, regardless of how well/poorly they did their job up til this point.
The only thing I know about this incident, as a mechanic who also flies as a crewmember: I don’t ever want to feel what either one of those individuals is feeling right now.
And I don’t ever want to be so arrogant that I believe that it can’t happen to me.
FltMech
The gist of the now deleted post was “from my experience, some country bumpkin mechanic was probably responsible for this accident in this backwater airport”
I grant that the original poster may have a strongly held opinion based on experience that informs his opinion of the southern United States. However, as we should all know by now, Human Factors accidents know no geographical, cultural, political etc boundaries. Humans are humans everywhere, and as long as we are in the chain, we can mess up, no matter how sophisticated we may think we are.
As humans we all fall victim to our own feelings of superiority, I know I surely was when I composed what I was originally going to say regarding that now deleted post!
But that stuff doesn’t do anybody any good. The facts are, somebody(possibly more than one) made a great big mistake that will possibly cost them their job and that nearly cost somebody their life, regardless of how well/poorly they did their job up til this point.
The only thing I know about this incident, as a mechanic who also flies as a crewmember: I don’t ever want to feel what either one of those individuals is feeling right now.
And I don’t ever want to be so arrogant that I believe that it can’t happen to me.
FltMech
Lots of questions begged (based upon the extremely detailed news article and its quoted sources) that might bear answering at some point in the future when the Lawyers get to nosing around in the feed trough.
I would love to be a bug on wall when the various folks get quizzed upon their actions that had a bearing upon the event.
I would love to be a bug on wall when the various folks get quizzed upon their actions that had a bearing upon the event.
It is amazing he survived that - it was a proper crash!
I wonder if he just let the airspeed drop off a little too much on his approach - ground rush tends to do that to pilots - but his subsequent reaction should have been to go around carefully and reposition for another attempt rather than end up in almost a high hover running out of ideas
Wonder how much TR control/failure training he had done.
I wonder if he just let the airspeed drop off a little too much on his approach - ground rush tends to do that to pilots - but his subsequent reaction should have been to go around carefully and reposition for another attempt rather than end up in almost a high hover running out of ideas
Wonder how much TR control/failure training he had done.
A good pre-flight inspection will prevent most crashes, after “routine maintenance” I struggle to understand why you wouldn’t put your fingers on every bolt/nut that was tampered with!
The following users liked this post:
If there was an engineering error in this case then the individuals, systems and working practices need to be investigated to find out where it went wrong.
Join Date: Jul 2021
Location: Southern United States
Posts: 122
Likes: 0
Received 60 Likes
on
30 Posts
I suppose the original poster thought the better of his post(hopefully) or the moderators took it down(thankfully), but I saw it and feel the sentiment he expressed needs addressed.
The gist of the now deleted post was “from my experience, some country bumpkin mechanic was probably responsible for this accident in this backwater airport”
I grant that the original poster may have a strongly held opinion based on experience that informs his opinion of the southern United States. However, as we should all know by now, Human Factors accidents know no geographical, cultural, political etc boundaries. Humans are humans everywhere, and as long as we are in the chain, we can mess up, no matter how sophisticated we may think we are.
As humans we all fall victim to our own feelings of superiority, I know I surely was when I composed what I was originally going to say regarding that now deleted post!
But that stuff doesn’t do anybody any good. The facts are, somebody(possibly more than one) made a great big mistake that will possibly cost them their job and that nearly cost somebody their life, regardless of how well/poorly they did their job up til this point.
The only thing I know about this incident, as a mechanic who also flies as a crewmember: I don’t ever want to feel what either one of those individuals is feeling right now.
And I don’t ever want to be so arrogant that I believe that it can’t happen to me.
FltMech
The gist of the now deleted post was “from my experience, some country bumpkin mechanic was probably responsible for this accident in this backwater airport”
I grant that the original poster may have a strongly held opinion based on experience that informs his opinion of the southern United States. However, as we should all know by now, Human Factors accidents know no geographical, cultural, political etc boundaries. Humans are humans everywhere, and as long as we are in the chain, we can mess up, no matter how sophisticated we may think we are.
As humans we all fall victim to our own feelings of superiority, I know I surely was when I composed what I was originally going to say regarding that now deleted post!
But that stuff doesn’t do anybody any good. The facts are, somebody(possibly more than one) made a great big mistake that will possibly cost them their job and that nearly cost somebody their life, regardless of how well/poorly they did their job up til this point.
The only thing I know about this incident, as a mechanic who also flies as a crewmember: I don’t ever want to feel what either one of those individuals is feeling right now.
And I don’t ever want to be so arrogant that I believe that it can’t happen to me.
FltMech
The following 12 users liked this post by 60FltMech:
It's easy to armchair-quarterback any accident. Pompous pilots say, "Well, what *I* would have done..." or "What he should have done..." Yeah, yeah...you weren't in the cockpit with him, so shut up. It's a tough situation when the aircraft does not do what you want it to do. Adrenaline starts pumping. It's hard to be as cool and calm as a test pilot, and we tend to want to just get the dang thing on the ground because we don't know what *else* is going to go wrong. The 407 did have a history of tail rotor problems.
The pilot reported that it felt like the pedals weren't connected to anything, indicating a loss of t/r pitch control. So, not a complete loss of thrust, but a "stuck pedal" situation. The report says that of the *two* levers that control the tail rotor, one was disconnected and the other was loose. Are they referring to the "dogbone" pitch-change links? If so, a running landing would have been called for, and that's what it looks like he was attempting. But it went "pear-shaped" as our British friends like to say. Oh well, we can't all be Yeager. The pilot is alive and I'm sure Bell will happily sell them a new 407.
But I'm curious. If it *was* one of the p/c dogbone links that became disconnected... Hmm. That would mean that the hardware securing the p/c links must have been both loose and unsaftied. I have to ask the uncomfortable question: Could that not have been caught on preflight? And, more importantly, would *I* have caught it on preflight?
The pilot reported that it felt like the pedals weren't connected to anything, indicating a loss of t/r pitch control. So, not a complete loss of thrust, but a "stuck pedal" situation. The report says that of the *two* levers that control the tail rotor, one was disconnected and the other was loose. Are they referring to the "dogbone" pitch-change links? If so, a running landing would have been called for, and that's what it looks like he was attempting. But it went "pear-shaped" as our British friends like to say. Oh well, we can't all be Yeager. The pilot is alive and I'm sure Bell will happily sell them a new 407.
But I'm curious. If it *was* one of the p/c dogbone links that became disconnected... Hmm. That would mean that the hardware securing the p/c links must have been both loose and unsaftied. I have to ask the uncomfortable question: Could that not have been caught on preflight? And, more importantly, would *I* have caught it on preflight?
The following users liked this post:
It's a tough situation when the aircraft does not do what you want it to do. Adrenaline starts pumping. It's hard to be as cool and calm as a test pilot, and we tend to want to just get the dang thing on the ground because we don't know what *else* is going to go wrong. The 407 did have a history of tail rotor problems.
If you have never trained for such a scenario then you will be poorly placed - and most likely panic if it doesn't go right as per the video.
If you have trained for it, there is no guarantee you will get it safely on the ground but you stand a far higher chance of applying some basic techniques to maximise your chance of survival.
If you have no idea how to deal with TR malfunctions, you really shouldn't have a licence.
The following 2 users liked this post by [email protected]:
If the NTSB report's nomenclatures are close or correct, there is one "lever" that could cause complete loss of T/R control and be associated with a scheduled inspection task. The lever (walking beam) is located in the aft hatrack area where the TR servo attaches on one end and the TR long control tube on the other. And is not visible at all once the aircraft is closed up.
And just to reiterate what FltMech said: It can happen to anyone regardless of skill, experience, and even 135/121 ops with all the rules. Nothing worse than the gut punch you feel when something like this happens from a maintenance perspective.
And just to reiterate what FltMech said: It can happen to anyone regardless of skill, experience, and even 135/121 ops with all the rules. Nothing worse than the gut punch you feel when something like this happens from a maintenance perspective.
The following 2 users liked this post by wrench1:
If the NTSB report's nomenclatures are close or correct, there is one "lever" that could cause complete loss of T/R control and be associated with a scheduled inspection task. The lever (walking beam) is located in the aft hatrack area where the TR servo attaches on one end and the TR long control tube on the other. And is not visible at all once the aircraft is closed up.
I can see how these things happen. I had *two* tail rotor failures during my time at PHI - driveshaft couplings came apart. Both were after maintenance had been performed and were in areas that were not preflightable (under the t/r driveshaft cover). The first happened right after the skids touched down on an offshore oil platform. Good timing, I'd say. The second one happened just after I'd lifted off to a hover in preparation for departing an oil platform. There was a bang and suddenly the world started spinning sideways. 30 seconds later and I would've been well into my takeoff. So, good timing again, I guess. Made me glad I wasn't one of those "yank and go" guys we often see.
Hands up....who routinely practiced Tail Rotor failures on six monthly Base Checks...where you actually manipulated the Throttle(s) and adjusted the collective setting to control yaw and did landings to the ground as part of the practice?
Or was that box checked following a verbal discussion with no actual hands on allowed or provided?
Or was that box checked following a verbal discussion with no actual hands on allowed or provided?
Done a million of them over the years. When I transitioned to the S76B, I did the endorsement training and later went to Flight Safety in West Palm for the sim training.
When it came to tail problems, the instructor insisted that only an auto should be attempted, demo'd one, and I then did one. I then asked him to back it back up the glideslope while I showed him how we dealt with them. I flew the approach to a slow, gentle controlled run-on straight ahead. He was flabbergasted, said "do it again", so I did.
He grinned, and said "I'll lose my job if I teach that, so now we go back to the auto."
When it came to tail problems, the instructor insisted that only an auto should be attempted, demo'd one, and I then did one. I then asked him to back it back up the glideslope while I showed him how we dealt with them. I flew the approach to a slow, gentle controlled run-on straight ahead. He was flabbergasted, said "do it again", so I did.
He grinned, and said "I'll lose my job if I teach that, so now we go back to the auto."
The following users liked this post:
Lynx and Sea King sim every year (from TR failures in most stages of flight to TR control failures in every pedal position), AS 365 every sim trip plus practising TR control malfunctions regularly in the aircraft to fast running landings on the runway, 412 sim every sim ride.
The stuck pedal practice in the 365 backed up the teachings in the sim - it's all about training.
The stuck pedal practice in the 365 backed up the teachings in the sim - it's all about training.
The following users liked this post:
AC,
The FSI Instructor told you straight....the policy is to only teach FSI approved curriculum.
I know that from first hand involvement in such discussions where improvements were endorsed but not yet approved by the Standards Department.
That process at times could be like moving mountains but did ensure standardization on what was being taught by each Instructor.
Current 407 Pilots might compare this text to current RFM language for accuracy......
The FSI Instructor told you straight....the policy is to only teach FSI approved curriculum.
I know that from first hand involvement in such discussions where improvements were endorsed but not yet approved by the Standards Department.
That process at times could be like moving mountains but did ensure standardization on what was being taught by each Instructor.
Current 407 Pilots might compare this text to current RFM language for accuracy......
COMPLETE LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR THRUST
1. Uncontrollable Yawing to Right ( Left Side Slip)
2. Nose down tucking
3. Possible roll of fuselage
Hovering - Close Throttle and perform a hovering Auto landing. A slight rotation can be expected on touchdown.
In-Flight - Reduce Throttle to idle, immediately enter autorotation, and maintain a minimum AIRSPEED of 55 KIAS during descent.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - HOVER
Do not close throttle unless a severe right yaw occurs. If pedals lock in any position at a hover, landing from a hover can be accomplished with greater safety under power-controlled flight rather than by closing throttle and entering autorotation.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - IN-FLIGHT, LEFT PEDAL APPLIED
In a high power condition, helicopter yaw to left when power reduced. Power and AIRSPEED should be adjusted to a value where a comfortable yaw angle can be maintained. If AIRSPEED is increased, vertical fin will become more effective and and an increased left yaw attitude will develop. To accomplish landing, establish a power-on approach with sufficiently low AIRSPEED (zero if necessary) to attain a rate of descent with a comfortable sideslip angle. (A decrease in NP decreases tail rotor thrust .) As collective is increased just before touchdown left yaw will be reduced.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - IN-FLIGHT, RIGHT PEDAL APPLIED
In cruise flight or reduced power situation, helicopter will yaw to right when power is increased. A low power run-on type landing will be necessary by gradually reducing throttle to maintain heading while while adding collective to cushion landing. If right yaw becomes excessive, close throttle completely.
1. Uncontrollable Yawing to Right ( Left Side Slip)
2. Nose down tucking
3. Possible roll of fuselage
Hovering - Close Throttle and perform a hovering Auto landing. A slight rotation can be expected on touchdown.
In-Flight - Reduce Throttle to idle, immediately enter autorotation, and maintain a minimum AIRSPEED of 55 KIAS during descent.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - HOVER
Do not close throttle unless a severe right yaw occurs. If pedals lock in any position at a hover, landing from a hover can be accomplished with greater safety under power-controlled flight rather than by closing throttle and entering autorotation.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - IN-FLIGHT, LEFT PEDAL APPLIED
In a high power condition, helicopter yaw to left when power reduced. Power and AIRSPEED should be adjusted to a value where a comfortable yaw angle can be maintained. If AIRSPEED is increased, vertical fin will become more effective and and an increased left yaw attitude will develop. To accomplish landing, establish a power-on approach with sufficiently low AIRSPEED (zero if necessary) to attain a rate of descent with a comfortable sideslip angle. (A decrease in NP decreases tail rotor thrust .) As collective is increased just before touchdown left yaw will be reduced.
FIXED TAIL ROTOR PITCH FAILURE - IN-FLIGHT, RIGHT PEDAL APPLIED
In cruise flight or reduced power situation, helicopter will yaw to right when power is increased. A low power run-on type landing will be necessary by gradually reducing throttle to maintain heading while while adding collective to cushion landing. If right yaw becomes excessive, close throttle completely.
Join Date: Jul 2021
Location: Southern United States
Posts: 122
Likes: 0
Received 60 Likes
on
30 Posts
Forgive my ignorance on how the T/R controls work on the 407 and the nomenclature of the components in the system, I did a brief stint on the OH-58D back in 2008 which I think would have had a similar setup as the 407, but I don’t think I ever saw the installation of the controls that is being mentioned here.
Would the emergency procedures still apply if the tail rotor controls were completely disconnected/severed as in this case? Would the effect of this be the same as a “jammed” T/R control?
Or to ask in another way, would this still be a “fixed pitch” type situation, where I would assume the hydraulic servo would drive in one direction or another due to there not being equal pressure applied to the control rod that moves the servo pilot valve?
Thanks to anyone who can clarify, especially with pictures!
FltMech
Would the emergency procedures still apply if the tail rotor controls were completely disconnected/severed as in this case? Would the effect of this be the same as a “jammed” T/R control?
Or to ask in another way, would this still be a “fixed pitch” type situation, where I would assume the hydraulic servo would drive in one direction or another due to there not being equal pressure applied to the control rod that moves the servo pilot valve?
Thanks to anyone who can clarify, especially with pictures!
FltMech
discussions where improvements were endorsed but not yet approved by the Standards Department
That's great when your Standards Dept are leading the way with the most up to date teaching and techniques - if not.............
Do RAF CFI's/QHI's teach whatever they fancy or are they expected to conform to approved standardized methods, procedures, and practices as a part of a formal curriculum and course of instruction?
Why would you think it odd for FSI or any other training system to use a similar method to formallze training standards and exercise a careful consideration when changing or altering those standards?
Aviation is an endeavor that involves change and progress as a constant......it takes time to effect useful and provident change.