RAF announces Puma Replacement plan
Joined: Jul 2000
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From: Used to be God's own County
A simulator at a joint venture between Airbus, Thales and DCI that is available for dry lease isn’t equivalent to what Boeing provide for Apache and Chinook training or what they provide for the Australian Military Training. That's fully understood, but please don't forget why/how BDUK was 'awarded' the latest Apache training contract. The company doing the previous training had been well received.
What is so woeful about the EASA approved Level D FFS? - lag, inertia, visuals, reliability - approached head of Airbus ops/trg at the time - she told me that as it had already paid for itself, to spend money on any upgrades would be a difficult proposition to put to shareholders. I note that Thales didn't make the same mistake again and sub-contract INDRA to provide the H160 sim...
Who was going to provide AceHawk’s training solution?
What is so woeful about the EASA approved Level D FFS? - lag, inertia, visuals, reliability - approached head of Airbus ops/trg at the time - she told me that as it had already paid for itself, to spend money on any upgrades would be a difficult proposition to put to shareholders. I note that Thales didn't make the same mistake again and sub-contract INDRA to provide the H160 sim...
Who was going to provide AceHawk’s training solution?
Joined: May 2012
Posts: 248
Likes: 38
From: Parts Unknown
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/l...ence-relations
Polish built S70i Blackhawk it is then!
Joined: Sep 2006
Posts: 259
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From: Netherlands
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicop...152345.article
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicop...152345.article
Leonardo Helicopters confirms UK NMH schedule slip
UK defence officials appear to have delayed the next phase of the ongoing New Medium Helicopter (NMH) contest,
otentially pushing back the service-entry target for the Puma replacement platform.
Having down-selected bidders in September last year,
the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) was supposed to issue the invitation to negotiate (ITN) to the three remaining contenders by the end of the first quarter 2023,
according to the most recent schedule.
However, the ITN – essentially the detailed specification, quantity and budget for the procurement – is now unlikely to arrive before mid-year 2023,
according to Leonardo Helicopters.
tefano Villanti, senior vice-president of sales and marketing at Leonardo Helicopters,
says the ITN is now expected to be released in May or June 2023,
although the MoD “has not specified an exact date”;
contract award is now anticipated in 2024, he adds.
Under the MoD’s initial schedule,
eliveries were meant to begin in 2025
allowing the progressive retirement of the Royal Air Force’s fleet of Puma HC2 transports.
But Villanti says the date for the first delivery was not specified at the industry day.
“The process has dragged on for longer [than expected] so 2025 is going be a challenge,” he adds.
UK defence officials appear to have delayed the next phase of the ongoing New Medium Helicopter (NMH) contest,
otentially pushing back the service-entry target for the Puma replacement platform.
Having down-selected bidders in September last year,
the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) was supposed to issue the invitation to negotiate (ITN) to the three remaining contenders by the end of the first quarter 2023,
according to the most recent schedule.
However, the ITN – essentially the detailed specification, quantity and budget for the procurement – is now unlikely to arrive before mid-year 2023,
according to Leonardo Helicopters.
tefano Villanti, senior vice-president of sales and marketing at Leonardo Helicopters,
says the ITN is now expected to be released in May or June 2023,
although the MoD “has not specified an exact date”;
contract award is now anticipated in 2024, he adds.
Under the MoD’s initial schedule,
eliveries were meant to begin in 2025
allowing the progressive retirement of the Royal Air Force’s fleet of Puma HC2 transports.
But Villanti says the date for the first delivery was not specified at the industry day.
“The process has dragged on for longer [than expected] so 2025 is going be a challenge,” he adds.
Joined: Dec 2003
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From: The South
Joined: Feb 2006
Aviation Qualifications: LAME
Posts: 36,137
Likes: 5,738
From: Falling off the end of the thread
I remember about the time the Puma MRGB's were cracking up and spares were generally not forthcoming from France, a visit revealed empty racks for spares due to be sent out to French military and rack after rack stuffed to the gills with spares supposedly to be sent out to the UK military and a very anti Anglophile French storeman running the goods out department.
Joined: Jul 2000
Posts: 1,735
Likes: 21
From: Used to be God's own County
I remember about the time the Puma MRGB's were cracking up and spares were generally not forthcoming from France, a visit revealed empty racks for spares due to be sent out to French military and rack after rack stuffed to the gills with spares supposedly to be sent out to the UK military and a very anti Anglophile French storeman running the goods out department.
……and to say otherwise is crazy when there are so many occasions UK Airbus drivers have been waiting at the shorty end of the stick for spares. Sticking a Union Jack on it does not make it British, just like adding ‘UK’ at the end of company name doesn’t make it a British company.
Then AHUK are only following the form book as they think sticking an ‘M’ after 175 makes it a military helicopter !
Joined: Feb 2000
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Being registered in UK?
Having its Headquarters in UK?
Employing hundreds of UK employees?
Paying UK corporation tax?
….or is there something I’m missing?
This is a genuine question - Does having a non-uk parent company disqualify an organization from being British?
What is the preferred answer?
To only buy helicopters from a ‘truly British company’ that was started and owned by ‘real’ Brits with no foreign involvement…. Like Leonardo?
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
Likes: 1,072
From: Downeast
How many "British" helicopter manufacturers are there today that build uniquely British designed, built, and sold helicopters?
I rule out Aircraft that are built "under license" from non-British companies.
I rule out Aircraft that are built "under license" from non-British companies.
Joined: Dec 2005
Posts: 1,581
Likes: 73
From: England
Skeeter, Sycamore, Belvedere, Lynx
Last edited by ericferret; 10th March 2023 at 18:53.
Joined: Jul 2000
Posts: 1,735
Likes: 21
From: Used to be God's own County
so what would make it a British company in your eyes?
Being registered in UK?
Having its Headquarters in UK?
Employing hundreds of UK employees?
Paying UK corporation tax?
….or is there something I’m missing?
This is a genuine question - Does having a non-uk parent company disqualify an organization from being British?
What is the preferred answer?
To only buy helicopters from a ‘truly British company’ that was started and owned by ‘real’ Brits with no foreign involvement…. Like Leonardo?
Being registered in UK?
Having its Headquarters in UK?
Employing hundreds of UK employees?
Paying UK corporation tax?
….or is there something I’m missing?
This is a genuine question - Does having a non-uk parent company disqualify an organization from being British?
What is the preferred answer?
To only buy helicopters from a ‘truly British company’ that was started and owned by ‘real’ Brits with no foreign involvement…. Like Leonardo?
Leonardo is majority owned by Italian government and has a history of doing things the ‘Italian’ way - rather than the ‘British’ way - whatever that is.
I guess the ‘Italian’ way is to say that the helicopters for British SAR were being built in Britain - repeatedly - when they were built in Italy. We know this because Bristow had to send manpower to Italy to oversee the work.
It’s great that Yeovil employs UK workforce but the taxpayer has paid a heavy price to subsidise it. I suggest that Yeovil still
only exists as long as the Group makes money from UK - remember the threats at the start of NMH campaign about putting its future in jeopardy if they didn’t win the contract - cheeky, arrogant fuc7ers!
Joined: Dec 2005
Posts: 1,581
Likes: 73
From: England
However you look at it the most successful production runs have been from licence built aircraft.
I have to say I am In the Blackhawk corner.
Having spent the last 12 years working on Leonardo aircraft 169/139 I just think the technology is not suitable for a military aircraft that will be operating mainly in the field.
Joined: Nov 2004
Posts: 378
Likes: 26
From: Australia
I'm with you ericferret having worked on Black Hawk, 139 and 175 , as a combat assault machine 139 (149 similar construction) and 175 are not even close no ballistic tolerance (like to see either take hits from .50 let alone 23mm like BH, no multi backup flight control & hyd systems , no tail wheel U/C to assist in safe brownout/whiteout landings etc , but we all know it won't be what the RAF want (and have wanted the last 20 years) it will be a politically selected UK assembled machine , I just feel sorry for the RAF guys if they ever have to go into combat in a 149 or 175.
Joined: May 2012
Posts: 248
Likes: 38
From: Parts Unknown
There needs to be some accountability and the MoD should insist on it (but they won’f) When a crew is lost due to small arms fire etc in these plastic, non-combat ready aircraft, the company executives should be liable and should be required to provide testimony and empiric proof to support their statements as to the ballistic protection of their aircraft.
If (when) it transpires that their claims of battlefield survival abilities were exaggerated or untrue, they they should be charged with corporate manslaughter. This should also apply to those in the UK who make the decision. If they truly believe the 175 or 149 are combat capable and survivable, then let them put their money where their mouth is.
Make this a requirement of the contract award and get the bidders to agree to it. If LH and Airbus are really telling the truth, then why would they hesitate?
Oh, this would apply to Sikorsky as well, but we all know it is the only properly designed and constructed combat helicopter in the NMH contest.
If (when) it transpires that their claims of battlefield survival abilities were exaggerated or untrue, they they should be charged with corporate manslaughter. This should also apply to those in the UK who make the decision. If they truly believe the 175 or 149 are combat capable and survivable, then let them put their money where their mouth is.
Make this a requirement of the contract award and get the bidders to agree to it. If LH and Airbus are really telling the truth, then why would they hesitate?
Oh, this would apply to Sikorsky as well, but we all know it is the only properly designed and constructed combat helicopter in the NMH contest.
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
Likes: 1,072
From: Downeast
A brief history of how the US Army came to buy the Sikorsky Black Hawk.
A comparison to that and the way the British MoD is going about its replacement of the Puma (a tactical combat helicopter) would suggest once again the UK MoD is screwing the pooch!
https://www.globalsecurity.org/milit...raft/uttas.htm
A comparison to that and the way the British MoD is going about its replacement of the Puma (a tactical combat helicopter) would suggest once again the UK MoD is screwing the pooch!
https://www.globalsecurity.org/milit...raft/uttas.htm
Joined: Mar 2007
Posts: 1,017
Likes: 165
From: Hobe Sound, Florida
SAS, the quoted article history wise is pretty much accurate as to the process the Army employed to arrive at design requirements, but it has one absolute error of substance and another, huge error of missing but critical information re flyoff results.
The error of substance relates to the performance shortcoming quoted for the YUH-60A. That shortcoming was actually true early in development, but remedied prior to the fly-off. I can’t recall if the last main blade change we made, to extend the tip cap to meet the hover and climb performance requirement ( which it did ), was on the ship when the Army did their preliminary evaluation in Sept/Oct 1975. In any case, it was on all of the ships for the fly-off, and that blade configuration was unchanged, going to production.*
During the operational evaluation part of the fly-off, two events occurred which indicated that the Sikorsky prototype possessed an approximate 2000 lb hover performance advantage over the Boeing model. One at FT. Rucker, Shell Field and one at FT. Campbell, op eval site.
1. FT. Rucker. Shell Field. Each competitor had to train/qualify 10 Army pilots to perform the op eval test program. Part of that syllabus was of course external sling loads. On the day in question, Sikorsky was up first. The Army had prepared seven 55 gal. drums full of concrete/iron which weighed 1000 lbs and had an attachment built in. They also supplied a collector cable , enabling the carry of one thru seven drums. We started with seven, picked up the seven, climbed away vertically and did the same for all ten trainees with I think 2 refuelings during the morning.
Boeing then started, also with seven drums. But they couldn’t budge the seven, so they unhooked one and tried that. Couldn’t pick up 6000 either. Unhooked another drum. Now at 5000 lbs the YUH-61 finally got that load airborne, to maybe 3-4 ft. Then in order to get going, trundled along not gaining any altitude until they got to 20 kts or so and then started climbing. I watched this from about 40 yards away. Note: the Boeing main rotor diameter was I believe 48 ft whereas the Sikorsky main rotor was 53’8”.
2. Ft. Campbell. The Army has a new infantry vehicle called the Gamma Goat, which weighed 7100 lbs and they were anxious to see that the UH-1 replacement could carry it. The op eval was now under way and all the flying was done by the trained Army pilots. Sikorsky was first and, with full fuel and standard crew and field configuration ( which is to say, all seats etc. ) picked up the Goat climbed out, flew a pattern and landed it where it had been. The Boeing YUH-61 did the same thing except that the ship had only 400 lbs of fuel, no troop seats and minimum radio gear. Following their landing of the Goat, they went to the fuel farm to refuel. This was reported in detail by one of the Army maintenance test pilots assigned to the program ( two were assigned and each had been trained by the respective contractor at FT. Rucker ).
*The article makes no mention of the hover performance difference, NOR, that the Boeing Production Proposal for the YUH-61 included larger rotors.
Maintenance Differences. Can’t comment on the data in the article, but can add this fact: During the op eval period at Ft Rucker, the Army maintenance troops working the Boeing machines worked every weekend, while the troops working on the Sikorsky ships did not have to work one weekend.
Enough re the flyoff.
With re to the question of design features requirements for an aircraft that operates in harms way, there are several requirements that applied to both the UTTAS and AAH programs ( and two interesting ones that were on the Sikorsky UH-60 but not the AH-64 ).
Crashworthiness. The experiences in Vietnam led to the development of a Helicopter Mil Standard for Crash Resistance 1290. There is a Table 1 which defines the survivable crash conditions and it starts with a vertical impact at 42 ft/sec ( fixed landing gear ) and includes longitudinal, lateral and combined axes. In another section, it addresses the Engines transmission and rotor heads, requiring that these need to remain in place, so as not to hazardous to occupants under a crash condition of 20G vertically, 20G longitudinally and 18G laterally. Fuel systems shall be designed to contain fuel under the conditions in Table 1. Doesn’t allow leaks.
Anecdote: In order to prove compliance with 1290, we had to build a copy of the tank enclosure structure containing the main fuel tank and associated valves, fill the tank and drop it from 65 ft-no leaks. I have seen a picture of an AH-64 crash where the tank was ripped out of the aircraft and sitting on the ground apart from the wreckage-no leaks.
Ballistic Tolerance. As I recall and simply stated, the UTTAS was required to be invulnerable to 7.62 caliber weapons, the control system up to 51 caliber weapons and the blades to 23mm HEI. Components, including the blades ( and redone with the composite blades ) were subject to live fire tests.
I mentioned two items which were not required but were installed on each new UH-60A.
The error of substance relates to the performance shortcoming quoted for the YUH-60A. That shortcoming was actually true early in development, but remedied prior to the fly-off. I can’t recall if the last main blade change we made, to extend the tip cap to meet the hover and climb performance requirement ( which it did ), was on the ship when the Army did their preliminary evaluation in Sept/Oct 1975. In any case, it was on all of the ships for the fly-off, and that blade configuration was unchanged, going to production.*
During the operational evaluation part of the fly-off, two events occurred which indicated that the Sikorsky prototype possessed an approximate 2000 lb hover performance advantage over the Boeing model. One at FT. Rucker, Shell Field and one at FT. Campbell, op eval site.
1. FT. Rucker. Shell Field. Each competitor had to train/qualify 10 Army pilots to perform the op eval test program. Part of that syllabus was of course external sling loads. On the day in question, Sikorsky was up first. The Army had prepared seven 55 gal. drums full of concrete/iron which weighed 1000 lbs and had an attachment built in. They also supplied a collector cable , enabling the carry of one thru seven drums. We started with seven, picked up the seven, climbed away vertically and did the same for all ten trainees with I think 2 refuelings during the morning.
Boeing then started, also with seven drums. But they couldn’t budge the seven, so they unhooked one and tried that. Couldn’t pick up 6000 either. Unhooked another drum. Now at 5000 lbs the YUH-61 finally got that load airborne, to maybe 3-4 ft. Then in order to get going, trundled along not gaining any altitude until they got to 20 kts or so and then started climbing. I watched this from about 40 yards away. Note: the Boeing main rotor diameter was I believe 48 ft whereas the Sikorsky main rotor was 53’8”.
2. Ft. Campbell. The Army has a new infantry vehicle called the Gamma Goat, which weighed 7100 lbs and they were anxious to see that the UH-1 replacement could carry it. The op eval was now under way and all the flying was done by the trained Army pilots. Sikorsky was first and, with full fuel and standard crew and field configuration ( which is to say, all seats etc. ) picked up the Goat climbed out, flew a pattern and landed it where it had been. The Boeing YUH-61 did the same thing except that the ship had only 400 lbs of fuel, no troop seats and minimum radio gear. Following their landing of the Goat, they went to the fuel farm to refuel. This was reported in detail by one of the Army maintenance test pilots assigned to the program ( two were assigned and each had been trained by the respective contractor at FT. Rucker ).
*The article makes no mention of the hover performance difference, NOR, that the Boeing Production Proposal for the YUH-61 included larger rotors.
Maintenance Differences. Can’t comment on the data in the article, but can add this fact: During the op eval period at Ft Rucker, the Army maintenance troops working the Boeing machines worked every weekend, while the troops working on the Sikorsky ships did not have to work one weekend.
Enough re the flyoff.
With re to the question of design features requirements for an aircraft that operates in harms way, there are several requirements that applied to both the UTTAS and AAH programs ( and two interesting ones that were on the Sikorsky UH-60 but not the AH-64 ).
Crashworthiness. The experiences in Vietnam led to the development of a Helicopter Mil Standard for Crash Resistance 1290. There is a Table 1 which defines the survivable crash conditions and it starts with a vertical impact at 42 ft/sec ( fixed landing gear ) and includes longitudinal, lateral and combined axes. In another section, it addresses the Engines transmission and rotor heads, requiring that these need to remain in place, so as not to hazardous to occupants under a crash condition of 20G vertically, 20G longitudinally and 18G laterally. Fuel systems shall be designed to contain fuel under the conditions in Table 1. Doesn’t allow leaks.
Anecdote: In order to prove compliance with 1290, we had to build a copy of the tank enclosure structure containing the main fuel tank and associated valves, fill the tank and drop it from 65 ft-no leaks. I have seen a picture of an AH-64 crash where the tank was ripped out of the aircraft and sitting on the ground apart from the wreckage-no leaks.
Ballistic Tolerance. As I recall and simply stated, the UTTAS was required to be invulnerable to 7.62 caliber weapons, the control system up to 51 caliber weapons and the blades to 23mm HEI. Components, including the blades ( and redone with the composite blades ) were subject to live fire tests.
I mentioned two items which were not required but were installed on each new UH-60A.
- · The AFCS computer incorporated a separate chip which was in effect a flight data recorder. Not crash or fire proof, but better than nothing. This was the brainchild of the Chief of the Electronic Flight controls group. No cost.
- · A tail rotor control quadrant, which was actually a mechanism located at the input to the tail rotor primary servo, with a very strong spring such that if either of the input cables lost tension for whatever reason, the pilot will retain directional control by flying the functioning cable against the spring. Wasn’t required but it went in. Saved one Turkish Hawk that I know of.