S92s grounded by Canadian Helicopters Offshore
Rumour and I say again Rumour so take with big grain of salt; is they missed on the IFR approach to the rig got briefly visual, Captain then did a big hyuca turn towards the pad but went IMC again, lost SA and recovered at 20 ft AGL by pulling 140 %. The machine did 2 360's after LTE
I think the only thing that won't need to be replaced on that machine is the cover for the cockpit ash tray.
Anyway pretty bad if that is what happened and happy to be corrected if someone else has better info
I think the only thing that won't need to be replaced on that machine is the cover for the cockpit ash tray.
Anyway pretty bad if that is what happened and happy to be corrected if someone else has better info
Sounds like you have a reliable source....
Rumour and I say again Rumour so take with big grain of salt; is they missed on the IFR approach to the rig got briefly visual, Captain then did a big hyuca turn towards the pad but went IMC again, lost SA and recovered at 20 ft AGL by pulling 140 %. The machine did 2 360's after LTE
Sorry, I had assumed from reading the initial report that they had landed. From the anecdotal account of what happened in more detail, you are right. If they had gone around from the approach, albeit somewhat erratically, then returning to base would be the obvious choice.
Sorry, I had assumed from reading the initial report that they had landed. From the anecdotal account of what happened in more detail, you are right. If they had gone around from the approach, albeit somewhat erratically, then returning to base would be the obvious choice.
If they had Rig Approach, the aircraft would have performed an automatic go around and they probably wouldn't have touched it.
I was always taught never to second guess a go around decision, stay on the gauges, climb to MSA and either go to the alternate or have another go. Murphy always says that you will get into a clear patch just as you pull power or hit the GA button.
I was always taught never to second guess a go around decision, stay on the gauges, climb to MSA and either go to the alternate or have another go. Murphy always says that you will get into a clear patch just as you pull power or hit the GA button.
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Unfortunately for CHO, sounds like they will not get an opportunity to resume flights. Customer(s) have decided to cancel their contract early in Halifax. Contract has been awarded back to their direct competitor. Rumour has it, the company has had a rash of issues leading up to the accident and the customer had already issued an EOI for the remaining work prior to the event.
The accident probably sealed their fate but after chatting with a few guys apparently there has been an extremely high rate of turn over in the pilots and engineers. Quick s92 job search makes this quite clear ... they were looking for a s92 chief pilot, assistant chief pilot, captains, FOs, avionics engineers, maint engineers. That’s a lot of open positions for a small company. Was also told that there has been a long on-going labour dispute that sounded like the company had no intentions of settling, which explains the turn over. Guess they don’t have to worry about that anymore, as I believe Halifax was their only operation.
Got the general feeling that it has been a very mismanaged company and in fact, there has even been some recent turn over in that department as well.
Too bad for the guys there, hopefully there will be room for most in the new operator.
The accident probably sealed their fate but after chatting with a few guys apparently there has been an extremely high rate of turn over in the pilots and engineers. Quick s92 job search makes this quite clear ... they were looking for a s92 chief pilot, assistant chief pilot, captains, FOs, avionics engineers, maint engineers. That’s a lot of open positions for a small company. Was also told that there has been a long on-going labour dispute that sounded like the company had no intentions of settling, which explains the turn over. Guess they don’t have to worry about that anymore, as I believe Halifax was their only operation.
Got the general feeling that it has been a very mismanaged company and in fact, there has even been some recent turn over in that department as well.
Too bad for the guys there, hopefully there will be room for most in the new operator.
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A source shared this with me - I am looking for corroboration ...
“... shot 2 approaches and missed then saw rig through fog - tried to descend through - lost it then lost control. NR hit 70% lost tail rotor effectiveness spun a bunch of times 6 ft from the water before regaining control. “. There is a TSB investigation ongoing: Air transportation safety investigation A19A0055 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada. There was NO CADOR report. Shortly after operations were suspended and the contract cancelled and awarded to Cougar Helicopters as evidenced by a slew of job postings. I can’t believe that the oil workers on this flight haven’t been more vocal.
“... shot 2 approaches and missed then saw rig through fog - tried to descend through - lost it then lost control. NR hit 70% lost tail rotor effectiveness spun a bunch of times 6 ft from the water before regaining control. “. There is a TSB investigation ongoing: Air transportation safety investigation A19A0055 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada. There was NO CADOR report. Shortly after operations were suspended and the contract cancelled and awarded to Cougar Helicopters as evidenced by a slew of job postings. I can’t believe that the oil workers on this flight haven’t been more vocal.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
Shock Horror! - Over-reliance on automation leads to crew 'cock-ups' - no great surprise there.
Otherwise we chuck the baby out with the bath water. Autopilots are amazing, when deployed appropriately and within their design limitations. Even the dodgy one on my B412 does me proud when I need it. Then again I am a skygod!
DB
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If the rumours supplied thus far are accurate then it is a sad state of affairs that after all these years HOFO Commanders still carry the gene that makes them ignore the limits and rules at the most critical phase of flight. All in the belief that they are "helping" the client and their Company.
As the Century rolled over and the new breed of tosspot operational managers appeared, I cannot count how many times I stood my ground to avoid flying in lightning, thunderstorms and weather below the limits. Around me at the time operated those brave Commanders who did not believe the rules applied to them and they were "getting the job done".
The Job, is to follow the rules, apply the limits and fly on when both requirements are in compliance.
If, and it is an if, the OM in this case was correctly drafted, and these rumours prove to be true, the Commander should carry the can for this.
As the Century rolled over and the new breed of tosspot operational managers appeared, I cannot count how many times I stood my ground to avoid flying in lightning, thunderstorms and weather below the limits. Around me at the time operated those brave Commanders who did not believe the rules applied to them and they were "getting the job done".
The Job, is to follow the rules, apply the limits and fly on when both requirements are in compliance.
If, and it is an if, the OM in this case was correctly drafted, and these rumours prove to be true, the Commander should carry the can for this.
Very, very lucky not to spank in! The report chimes with your comment on the Kobe Bryant crash, 212man, regarding the use of cyclic trim release in DVE.
Fundamentally a failure to fly the aircraft.
Fundamentally a failure to fly the aircraft.
I was taught...”It is the third approach that will get you. 2 approaches max then go to your alternate.”
I think someone wrote a learned treatise on the subject but darned if I can find the reference.
I think someone wrote a learned treatise on the subject but darned if I can find the reference.
Torquetalk
“Two instrument approaches were attempted at the platform but both were unsuccessful due to low clouds and poor visibility. During the second missed approach, the flight crew acquired visual contact with the platform and elected to carry out a visual approach. Shortly after they commenced the visual approach, a high-rate-of-descent and low-airspeed condition developed in low-visibility conditions. During the descent, the helicopter’s engines were overtorqued, reaching a maximum value of 146%. The crew regained control of the aircraft and arrested the descent at approximately 13 feet above the water.”
They overshot from 2 IMC approaches but then attempted a visual.
“Two instrument approaches were attempted at the platform but both were unsuccessful due to low clouds and poor visibility. During the second missed approach, the flight crew acquired visual contact with the platform and elected to carry out a visual approach. Shortly after they commenced the visual approach, a high-rate-of-descent and low-airspeed condition developed in low-visibility conditions. During the descent, the helicopter’s engines were overtorqued, reaching a maximum value of 146%. The crew regained control of the aircraft and arrested the descent at approximately 13 feet above the water.”
They overshot from 2 IMC approaches but then attempted a visual.
Torquetalk
“Two instrument approaches were attempted at the platform but both were unsuccessful due to low clouds and poor visibility. During the second missed approach, the flight crew acquired visual contact with the platform and elected to carry out a visual approach. Shortly after they commenced the visual approach, a high-rate-of-descent and low-airspeed condition developed in low-visibility conditions. During the descent, the helicopter’s engines were overtorqued, reaching a maximum value of 146%. The crew regained control of the aircraft and arrested the descent at approximately 13 feet above the water.”
They overshot from 2 IMC approaches but then attempted a visual.
“Two instrument approaches were attempted at the platform but both were unsuccessful due to low clouds and poor visibility. During the second missed approach, the flight crew acquired visual contact with the platform and elected to carry out a visual approach. Shortly after they commenced the visual approach, a high-rate-of-descent and low-airspeed condition developed in low-visibility conditions. During the descent, the helicopter’s engines were overtorqued, reaching a maximum value of 146%. The crew regained control of the aircraft and arrested the descent at approximately 13 feet above the water.”
They overshot from 2 IMC approaches but then attempted a visual.
The “visual“ approach was rushed, with inadequate definition, role switching and poor monitoring. A CRM dog‘s dinner. Not the first one like that to go bad.