NYC helicopter crash 10th June 2019
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The TAC and heli charts can be had here in PDF format:
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig..._products/vfr/
I think he'd have to stay below 700AGL in the Special Flight Rules Area to stay in Class G and enjoy 1/2 mile-clear-of-clouds minimums. I'm sure someone with NYC experience (not me) will chime in.
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig..._products/vfr/
I think he'd have to stay below 700AGL in the Special Flight Rules Area to stay in Class G and enjoy 1/2 mile-clear-of-clouds minimums. I'm sure someone with NYC experience (not me) will chime in.
A-109E Auto Pilot
A few years back I received a SPIFR qualification in the A-109E. At the time, the specific autopilot installed by Agusta had a limitation on the use of the take off/go around mode. Specifically, a placard limited the use to airspeeds greater than 120 KIAS. Attempted use at 70KIAS resulted in some very extreme attitude excursions. Has anyone one else experienced this?
I'm not sure the fact the aircraft was flown into cloud after flying out of it definitively shows a medical event. It may indicated this. It may also be that the pilot did not know how to fly appropriately in that situation or had used techniques like dives to regain visual reference in the past. As someone else mentioned maybe there were other personal stresses like losing a new job because of making an emergency landing on the water front or fear of regulatory restrictions or repercussions. Just because the pilot was flying an exec 109 does not mean that he would not make what may seem an irrational mistake.
Having no idea what the Pilots experience is I would not presume it was not medical or mechanical but you also can not ignore the fact that based off previous examples there is a reasonable chance it was inadvertent IMC. I mean no disrespect to the Pilot or his family and perhaps if I knew him and his background and experience I might be stating it was clearly medical too. It seems in this instance it would be good to keep an open mind until the accident report is released. Given the post accident fire I suspect the report will state that medical incapacitation could not be determined or ruled out.
Did anyone else see the article claiming the Pilot had radioed he was lost shortly before the impact? Could be poor or sensational reporting, also could be an actual leak.
Having no idea what the Pilots experience is I would not presume it was not medical or mechanical but you also can not ignore the fact that based off previous examples there is a reasonable chance it was inadvertent IMC. I mean no disrespect to the Pilot or his family and perhaps if I knew him and his background and experience I might be stating it was clearly medical too. It seems in this instance it would be good to keep an open mind until the accident report is released. Given the post accident fire I suspect the report will state that medical incapacitation could not be determined or ruled out.
Did anyone else see the article claiming the Pilot had radioed he was lost shortly before the impact? Could be poor or sensational reporting, also could be an actual leak.
Yes Helimutt, I’m sure a lot of us agree. While many of us have had at least a few hundred in a Robbie, some may have a few ON a Robbie as they have stated. Possibly in the spare room on a second hand tailboom with a saddle on while looking in a mirror.....and reminiscing about how good our buddies told us we once were, in between prolific spells of posting that is. I’ve never owned a Robbie (other makes yes) but they are a helicopter. And for those not able to pursue the military route, a lot of skills were hopefully learnt that made them better drivers of bigger (and supposedly superior) machines.
I mean seriously, nobody goes from a Robby directly to a 109!
Several of these students were every bit as good as the ex-Military, turbine-all-the-way candidates for whom we offered the last 2 of the courses I mentioned above. Notwithstanding the limitations of the Robinson family, what it CAN produce is pilots with an acute awareness of power limitations, the importance of RRPM control and a constant need to monitor the situation/plan for the worst. I've never flown the type myself, and don't wish to, but I acknowledge that it has been the choice of some very good pilots who will go on to be the future of our industry.
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Please Ladies and Gentlemen,
This thread is based around a very serious incident, the cause of which willl probably never be proven and speculation will continue.
That aside maybe this this thread is not one that we would wish to drag any Robinson criticism into, weather it be the aircraft or training. Yes I and others have views, but I don’t think they are in anyway relevant on this thread .
This thread is based around a very serious incident, the cause of which willl probably never be proven and speculation will continue.
That aside maybe this this thread is not one that we would wish to drag any Robinson criticism into, weather it be the aircraft or training. Yes I and others have views, but I don’t think they are in anyway relevant on this thread .
I had the privilege while working for my previous employer of training several pilots who came to us from their CPL(H) training on R22s, often in the States, to do their turbine, twin and IR training. In our case they flew EC135s, but a school at the same airfield offered precisely the same types of course on the A109.
Several of these students were every bit as good as the ex-Military, turbine-all-the-way candidates for whom we offered the last 2 of the courses I mentioned above. Notwithstanding the limitations of the Robinson family, what it CAN produce is pilots with an acute awareness of power limitations, the importance of RRPM control and a constant need to monitor the situation/plan for the worst. I've never flown the type myself, and don't wish to, but I acknowledge that it has been the choice of some very good pilots who will go on to be the future of our industry.
Several of these students were every bit as good as the ex-Military, turbine-all-the-way candidates for whom we offered the last 2 of the courses I mentioned above. Notwithstanding the limitations of the Robinson family, what it CAN produce is pilots with an acute awareness of power limitations, the importance of RRPM control and a constant need to monitor the situation/plan for the worst. I've never flown the type myself, and don't wish to, but I acknowledge that it has been the choice of some very good pilots who will go on to be the future of our industry.
However, anyone can fly anything at a school, where they are paying to fly.
Chief Bottle Washer
Why are some Rotorheads choosing to wreck this thread with such off topic posts?
Fair warning: time off for anyone continuing such rants.
Fair warning: time off for anyone continuing such rants.
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You would be surprised. If a developing country thinks it should have a helicopter service, it rounds up a bunch of police/army/air force recruits, sends them to Florida to learn English/ get a CPL(H). Next stop - type rating course for the big shiny new machines at the factory.
It can be a bit stressful for the TRI who has got to get them to an acceptable level of competence in the hours allocated. (There may not always be a skill test as an independent check, because we are not talking about FAA or EASA here)
It can be a bit stressful for the TRI who has got to get them to an acceptable level of competence in the hours allocated. (There may not always be a skill test as an independent check, because we are not talking about FAA or EASA here)
You would be surprised. If a developing country thinks it should have a helicopter service, it rounds up a bunch of police/army/air force recruits, sends them to Florida to learn English/ get a CPL(H). Next stop - type rating course for the big shiny new machines at the factory.
It can be a bit stressful for the TRI who has got to get them to an acceptable level of competence in the hours allocated. (There may not always be a skill test as an independent check, because we are not talking about FAA or EASA here)
It can be a bit stressful for the TRI who has got to get them to an acceptable level of competence in the hours allocated. (There may not always be a skill test as an independent check, because we are not talking about FAA or EASA here)
Sad thing is, we'll probably never know what really happened.
The first dive out of the clouds (from one of the cell phone videos taken over the East River) appeared to show a steep descent angle, but not inverted. Supposedly the wreckage pattern on the roof indicates the aircraft was inverted, or at least impacted over 90 degrees from level.
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NTSB Preliminary Report:
Location: New York, NY
Accident Number: ERA19FA191
Date & Time: 06/10/2019, 1340 EDT
Registration: N200B
Aircraft: Agusta A109
Injuries: 1 Fatal Flight
Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Executive/Corporate
On June 10, 2019, about 1340 eastern daylight time, an Agusta A109E helicopter, N200BK, was destroyed when it impacted the roof of a building in New York, New York. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the corporate flight, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The flight departed from the East 34th street heliport (6N5), New York, New York, about 1330 and was destined for Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey.
On the morning of the accident, the pilot and a pilot-rated passenger departed the Bel-Aire heliport (NY46), Amenia, New York, about 1030. They stopped briefly at Hudson Valley Regional Airport (POU), Poughkeepsie, New York, for fuel, then flew to 6N5 and arrived about 1130. According to the pilot-rated passenger, the flight was uneventful.
According to personnel at Atlantic Aviation, the fixed-base-operator at 6N5, the pilot-rated passenger was at the controls as the helicopter landed. He departed the heliport by car, while the accident pilot remained at 6N5. The accident pilot waited in the lounge for about 2 hours. While there, he was continuously checking weather conditions using his tablet computer. Prior to departing, he mentioned to the staff that he saw a "twenty-minute window to make it out."
According to preliminary tracking data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the helicopter departed 6N5 and initially few south over the East River, before changing course northward. About 5-7 minutes after departure, the pilot contacted Atlantic Aviation and made a request to return to the heliport. He was advised to land on pad No. 4. The pilot then radioed that he "did not know where he was." The helicopter flew erratically over the East River, changed course and altitude several times before making a 270° turn, which approached 6N5 from the west. About 500 ft west of 6N5, at an altitude of 600-700 ft mean sea level (msl), the helicopter reversed course, and flew erratically over Manhattan, before impacting a roof of the 54-story building at 787 7th Avenue. The last recorded position of the helicopter was about 0.1 nautical mile southeast of the building at an altitude of about 1,570 ft msl. The overall height of the building above the street was about 790 ft msl, with the roof section where the helicopter came to rest (below the exterior walls and catwalks surrounding the perimeter of the roof), at an altitude of about 765 ft msl.
A witness recorded video of a portion of the flight as the helicopter was flying in and out of clouds. The helicopter descended rapidly from the clouds in a nose down pitch attitude, appeared to initially transition to a level pitch attitude before climbing into the overcast cloud ceiling and out of view.
Examination of the wreckage on the rooftop revealed that all major components of the helicopter were present at the accident site and were confined to an area approximately 100 ft long and 20 ft wide, oriented on a heading of about 300° magnetic. Small pieces of debris were recovered from the 50th floor level and street level. The helicopter was severely fragmented and partially consumed by a post-impact fire. All four main rotor blades were fragmented. Remnants of two main rotor blades remained attached to the rotor hub, the other two blades were separated from the hub. All exhibited leading edge damage. The main rotor gearbox was impact damaged, partially fragmented, and could not be turned by hand. The tail rotor blades, hub, and gearbox remained largely intact. One tail rotor blade exhibited a leading-edge gouge, the other blade tip was fracture separated and exhibited thermal damage. The tail rotor driveshaft was fractured in several locations; an 8 ft section remained attached to the tail rotor gearbox. The tail rotor shaft and blades rotated freely when turned by hand. While most of the flight control components were identified, flight control continuity could not be determined due to impact damage and extreme fragmentation of the airframe. All three landing gear actuators were in the down position.
The left engine was broken into two sections at the reduction gearbox. The compressor impeller rotated freely by hand, several blades exhibited leading edge damage and several blade tips were bent in the direction opposite of rotation. The power turbine shaft was fractured, consistent with overload and exhibited twisting features and rotational scoring. The fuel management module was damaged, separated from the engine control gearbox, and its control was oriented in the "flight" position.
The right engine was mostly intact and exhibited thermal damage. The compressor impeller would not rotate; its blades exhibited leading edge damage and were not bent. Debris was found ingested downstream of the compressor discharge area, consistent with engine operation. The driveshaft between the right engine and the main gearbox was fracture separated in a twisted pattern. The fuel management module was damaged, partially separated from the engine control gearbox, and its control was oriented in the "flight" position.
The throttle quadrant was found loose and separated from its mount. The control cable ends were not found. Although both levers were found in the "MAX" position, their position at the time of impact could not be confirmed.
The twin engine, 7-seat helicopter was manufactured in 2000. It was equipped with two 549horsepower, Pratt & Whitney Canada PW206C engines. The most recent documented inspection was completed on May 21, 2019, which was a 50 hour/30-day inspection. At that time the helicopter had accrued a total of 3,939 flight hours. Both engines had accrued about 570 hours since overhaul.
According to FAA airman records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a helicopter rating, which was issued on September 24, 2004. He also held a flight instructor certificate with helicopter rating, which was issued on June 20, 2018. He did not have an instrument rating. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on May 15, 2019, at which time he reported 2,805 hours of total flight experience.
At 1351, the weather conditions at a reporting station located in Central Park about 1 mile northeast of the accident site, at an elevation of 156 ft msl, included an overcast ceiling at 500 ft above ground level, visibility 1.25 statute miles in rain and mist, temperature 18° C, dew point 7° C, wind from 070° at 8 knots, altimeter setting 30.05 inches of mercury. According to 14 CFR Part 91.155, basic visual flight rules weather minimums for helicopters operating from the surface to 1,200 ft msl were 1/2-statute mile visibility, and remain clear of clouds.
The helicopter was retained for further examination.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information Aircraft Make: Agusta Registration: N200BK Model/Series: A109 E Aircraft Category: Helicopter Amateur Built: No Operator: N200bk Inc Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions Condition of Light: Day Observation Facility, Elevation: NYC, 156 ft msl Observation Time: 1351 EDT Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles Temperature/Dew Point: 18°C / 17°C Lowest Cloud Condition: Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 8 knots / , 70° Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 500 ft agl Visibility: 1.25 Miles Altimeter Setting: 30.05 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None Departure Point: New York, NY (6N5) Destination: Linden, NJ (LDJ)
Wreckage and Impact Information Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal Aircraft Damage: Destroyed Passenger Injuries: N/A Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A Aircraft Explosion: None Total Injuries: 1 Fatal Latitude, Longitude: 40.761667, -73.981944
Administrative Information Investigator In Charge (IIC): Douglass P Brazy Additional Participating Persons: David Gerlach; FAA/AVP-100; Washington, DC Christopher Lemieux; Leonardo Helicopters; Philidelphia, PA Merryn Spielman; Pratt & Whitney of Canada; Longueuil, QC Note: The NTSB traveled to the scene of this accident.
Accident Number: ERA19FA191
Date & Time: 06/10/2019, 1340 EDT
Registration: N200B
Aircraft: Agusta A109
Injuries: 1 Fatal Flight
Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Executive/Corporate
On June 10, 2019, about 1340 eastern daylight time, an Agusta A109E helicopter, N200BK, was destroyed when it impacted the roof of a building in New York, New York. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the corporate flight, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The flight departed from the East 34th street heliport (6N5), New York, New York, about 1330 and was destined for Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey.
On the morning of the accident, the pilot and a pilot-rated passenger departed the Bel-Aire heliport (NY46), Amenia, New York, about 1030. They stopped briefly at Hudson Valley Regional Airport (POU), Poughkeepsie, New York, for fuel, then flew to 6N5 and arrived about 1130. According to the pilot-rated passenger, the flight was uneventful.
According to personnel at Atlantic Aviation, the fixed-base-operator at 6N5, the pilot-rated passenger was at the controls as the helicopter landed. He departed the heliport by car, while the accident pilot remained at 6N5. The accident pilot waited in the lounge for about 2 hours. While there, he was continuously checking weather conditions using his tablet computer. Prior to departing, he mentioned to the staff that he saw a "twenty-minute window to make it out."
According to preliminary tracking data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the helicopter departed 6N5 and initially few south over the East River, before changing course northward. About 5-7 minutes after departure, the pilot contacted Atlantic Aviation and made a request to return to the heliport. He was advised to land on pad No. 4. The pilot then radioed that he "did not know where he was." The helicopter flew erratically over the East River, changed course and altitude several times before making a 270° turn, which approached 6N5 from the west. About 500 ft west of 6N5, at an altitude of 600-700 ft mean sea level (msl), the helicopter reversed course, and flew erratically over Manhattan, before impacting a roof of the 54-story building at 787 7th Avenue. The last recorded position of the helicopter was about 0.1 nautical mile southeast of the building at an altitude of about 1,570 ft msl. The overall height of the building above the street was about 790 ft msl, with the roof section where the helicopter came to rest (below the exterior walls and catwalks surrounding the perimeter of the roof), at an altitude of about 765 ft msl.
A witness recorded video of a portion of the flight as the helicopter was flying in and out of clouds. The helicopter descended rapidly from the clouds in a nose down pitch attitude, appeared to initially transition to a level pitch attitude before climbing into the overcast cloud ceiling and out of view.
Examination of the wreckage on the rooftop revealed that all major components of the helicopter were present at the accident site and were confined to an area approximately 100 ft long and 20 ft wide, oriented on a heading of about 300° magnetic. Small pieces of debris were recovered from the 50th floor level and street level. The helicopter was severely fragmented and partially consumed by a post-impact fire. All four main rotor blades were fragmented. Remnants of two main rotor blades remained attached to the rotor hub, the other two blades were separated from the hub. All exhibited leading edge damage. The main rotor gearbox was impact damaged, partially fragmented, and could not be turned by hand. The tail rotor blades, hub, and gearbox remained largely intact. One tail rotor blade exhibited a leading-edge gouge, the other blade tip was fracture separated and exhibited thermal damage. The tail rotor driveshaft was fractured in several locations; an 8 ft section remained attached to the tail rotor gearbox. The tail rotor shaft and blades rotated freely when turned by hand. While most of the flight control components were identified, flight control continuity could not be determined due to impact damage and extreme fragmentation of the airframe. All three landing gear actuators were in the down position.
The left engine was broken into two sections at the reduction gearbox. The compressor impeller rotated freely by hand, several blades exhibited leading edge damage and several blade tips were bent in the direction opposite of rotation. The power turbine shaft was fractured, consistent with overload and exhibited twisting features and rotational scoring. The fuel management module was damaged, separated from the engine control gearbox, and its control was oriented in the "flight" position.
The right engine was mostly intact and exhibited thermal damage. The compressor impeller would not rotate; its blades exhibited leading edge damage and were not bent. Debris was found ingested downstream of the compressor discharge area, consistent with engine operation. The driveshaft between the right engine and the main gearbox was fracture separated in a twisted pattern. The fuel management module was damaged, partially separated from the engine control gearbox, and its control was oriented in the "flight" position.
The throttle quadrant was found loose and separated from its mount. The control cable ends were not found. Although both levers were found in the "MAX" position, their position at the time of impact could not be confirmed.
The twin engine, 7-seat helicopter was manufactured in 2000. It was equipped with two 549horsepower, Pratt & Whitney Canada PW206C engines. The most recent documented inspection was completed on May 21, 2019, which was a 50 hour/30-day inspection. At that time the helicopter had accrued a total of 3,939 flight hours. Both engines had accrued about 570 hours since overhaul.
According to FAA airman records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a helicopter rating, which was issued on September 24, 2004. He also held a flight instructor certificate with helicopter rating, which was issued on June 20, 2018. He did not have an instrument rating. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on May 15, 2019, at which time he reported 2,805 hours of total flight experience.
At 1351, the weather conditions at a reporting station located in Central Park about 1 mile northeast of the accident site, at an elevation of 156 ft msl, included an overcast ceiling at 500 ft above ground level, visibility 1.25 statute miles in rain and mist, temperature 18° C, dew point 7° C, wind from 070° at 8 knots, altimeter setting 30.05 inches of mercury. According to 14 CFR Part 91.155, basic visual flight rules weather minimums for helicopters operating from the surface to 1,200 ft msl were 1/2-statute mile visibility, and remain clear of clouds.
The helicopter was retained for further examination.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information Aircraft Make: Agusta Registration: N200BK Model/Series: A109 E Aircraft Category: Helicopter Amateur Built: No Operator: N200bk Inc Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions Condition of Light: Day Observation Facility, Elevation: NYC, 156 ft msl Observation Time: 1351 EDT Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles Temperature/Dew Point: 18°C / 17°C Lowest Cloud Condition: Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 8 knots / , 70° Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 500 ft agl Visibility: 1.25 Miles Altimeter Setting: 30.05 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None Departure Point: New York, NY (6N5) Destination: Linden, NJ (LDJ)
Wreckage and Impact Information Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal Aircraft Damage: Destroyed Passenger Injuries: N/A Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A Aircraft Explosion: None Total Injuries: 1 Fatal Latitude, Longitude: 40.761667, -73.981944
Administrative Information Investigator In Charge (IIC): Douglass P Brazy Additional Participating Persons: David Gerlach; FAA/AVP-100; Washington, DC Christopher Lemieux; Leonardo Helicopters; Philidelphia, PA Merryn Spielman; Pratt & Whitney of Canada; Longueuil, QC Note: The NTSB traveled to the scene of this accident.
The big mystery still remains, he got out of the cloud at one point, and then climbed back up into it. The radio comms as reported would suggest this was not a medical incapacitation.
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Maybe he was trying to fly on instruments at that point. Whatever, he would have had no clear horizon outside, so not surprising he had no SA.