SAR S-92 Missing Ireland
From the article
Very good question.................
Fianna Fáil’s Dara Calleary, a Mayo TD, said: “I wonder why, as an island nation, we are contracting out our search-and-rescue, service?”
“Minister we cannot allow our search and rescue to become an issue of profit.”
“Minister we cannot allow our search and rescue to become an issue of profit.”
Yes, trying to move it from the public balance sheet to a private one in order to move the risk away from Govt. It then allows blame and liability to be shifted away from the state if something goes wrong. Seems familiar in this case perhaps?
Its not so much about shifting liability risk its about shifting financial risk. A privatised service will always work out cheaper. Not necessarily the best. That depends on oversight of the operator.
Not necessarily the best. That depends on oversight of the operator.
If everything is owned and regulated by the state, any issues should be quick to address since Govt departments tend not to sue each other.
Introduce a contractor on the other hand and things start to get messy when something bad happens and the reason(s) for it need to be established.
How can you say that the oversight of the operator was found wanting in this case, and then imply that the operation should be owned and regulated by the very people who failed to handle even the oversight?
You also have a rosy picture of governments: “any issues should be quick to address“?? “quick to address” is simply not in any government’s skill set. Read yesterday’s Times article by the lady brought in from industry to buy covid vaccines so quickly and successfully. Selected excerpts include:
“across government there is a devastating lack of skills and experience in science, industry and manufacturing”
“there are very few people with science or operating backgrounds at all levels of government. This would not matter if we had senior civil servants with scientific and technical understanding, but we don’t”
“The machinery of government is dominated by process rather than outcome causing delay and inertia”
I’ve seen this from all sides and can only applaud her. Government is amateurs avoiding bad news, Industry is people moving quickly to fulfil often weak contracts (in order to win the next one) under often weak oversight.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/k...hink-xqmhztc6p
You also have a rosy picture of governments: “any issues should be quick to address“?? “quick to address” is simply not in any government’s skill set. Read yesterday’s Times article by the lady brought in from industry to buy covid vaccines so quickly and successfully. Selected excerpts include:
“across government there is a devastating lack of skills and experience in science, industry and manufacturing”
“there are very few people with science or operating backgrounds at all levels of government. This would not matter if we had senior civil servants with scientific and technical understanding, but we don’t”
“The machinery of government is dominated by process rather than outcome causing delay and inertia”
I’ve seen this from all sides and can only applaud her. Government is amateurs avoiding bad news, Industry is people moving quickly to fulfil often weak contracts (in order to win the next one) under often weak oversight.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/k...hink-xqmhztc6p
How can you say that the oversight of the operator was found wanting in this case, and then imply that the operation should be owned and regulated by the very people who failed to handle even the oversight?
Industry didn't exactly cover itself in glory - how many years have CHC failed to introduce NVG when they all knew it was the industry standard.
As for the failings of Govt and the lack of expertise in the civil service - can you guess who has been systematically removing those skills and expertise from them? Oh yes, the Govt who doesn't like to be told No when they try something dodgy or egregious.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
Industry didn't exactly cover itself in glory - how many years have CHC failed to introduce NVG when they all knew it was the industry standard.
Does the contract that CHC signed specify NVG would be used /implemented on the contract?
At the point where the need for NVG is recognised - presuming the contract was written without it (unforgiveable in modern SAR) - the contractor says 'It's not in the contract - we need more money to provide that additional service level'.
The Govt has allocated a budget for SAR and it has spent it - not wisely it would seem - and can't lose face handing out extra cash to a contractor as that might set a precedent and/or make them look incompetent or foolish.
Round and round it goes until a fatal accident where both sides can now blame the other.
You only get as much safety as you are prepared to pay for........
Well you must be much cleverer than me Manchester because I can find no mention of the contract regarding aircraft spec and night capability - the only mention I can find of NVG is here
Indicating that a contract amendment was made (so not stipulated in the original) and enough money was found by DTTAS (Dept of Transport) yet it never went operational and it seems therefore that the crews were never trained.
Now there may be many reasons for that (not contained in the report) but the UKSAR S-92s were procured and utilised with NVIS so that rules out a technical issue. Possibilities are reluctance among crews to use NVG (most not ex-mil with any experience of them) or possibly DTTAS balking at the costs of modifying the aircraft, procuring NVG and then the large training bill associated with doing night SAR properly.
An interesting line earlier in the report refers to commercial pressure to get the transition from S61 to S92 completed and the loss of 2 weeks (it calls it ITAR) training. NVG/NVIS come firmly under the ITAR banner so should the service on S-92 actually have started with NVG embodied and crews trained?
Between June and August 2015 work was carried out on EI-ICR to incorporate Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS)-compatible components into the aircraft. This work was carried out under an amendment (No. 13) to the contract between DTTAS and the Operator. Components were installed as part of a planned adoption of NVGs (Night Vision Goggles) by air crew. The work had the effect of changing the lighting environment within the cockpit to optimise it for use with NVGs, in particular by altering the intensity and tone of cockpit lighting and its colour spectrum. At the time of the accident the use of NVGs by crews had not commenced.
Now there may be many reasons for that (not contained in the report) but the UKSAR S-92s were procured and utilised with NVIS so that rules out a technical issue. Possibilities are reluctance among crews to use NVG (most not ex-mil with any experience of them) or possibly DTTAS balking at the costs of modifying the aircraft, procuring NVG and then the large training bill associated with doing night SAR properly.
An interesting line earlier in the report refers to commercial pressure to get the transition from S61 to S92 completed and the loss of 2 weeks (it calls it ITAR) training. NVG/NVIS come firmly under the ITAR banner so should the service on S-92 actually have started with NVG embodied and crews trained?
As the THE NIMROD REVIEW conducted by Haddon-Cave found, contracting-out of services in safety-critical areas presents particular challenges, which must be recognised and addressed through appropriate structures and arrangements. The Investigation believes that whilst contracting out of aviation support services (including auditing) is a matter for the Department of Transport, it is imperative that the Department has sufficient in-house expertise to allow it to remain an ‘intelligent-customer’. The Minister outlined several measures that have been taken since the accident (Section 1.17.8.2 and Appendix U), including the planned appointment of a full time Aviation Manager.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
... ... the large training bill associated with doing night SAR properly. ... ...
With that factor comes the inevitable question of whether the correct resources are actually available. This may be the part where Ireland has not covered itself in glory.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
An interesting line earlier in the report refers to commercial pressure to get the transition from S61 to S92 completed and the loss of 2 weeks (it calls it ITAR) training. NVG/NVIS come firmly under the ITAR banner so should the service on S-92 actually have started with NVG embodied and crews trained?
The FLIR is ITAR controlled and would have probably required some training in its use.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
Good point - that explains the mention of a lack of training from the manufacturers for the rearcrew later in the report
Agreed, The problem with FLIR is that it doesn't see through cloud and rain well and it is difficult to make a weather assessment using FLIR. So if the weather was worse than expected it would have been a late spot (as it appears to have been) of the rock in conditions of poor thermal contrast.
I don't know how much weight their SOPs gave to direction from the cabin on letdowns but I know most pilots I have flown with would have taken immediate hands-on action to the 'Come right' request.
I don't know how much weight their SOPs gave to direction from the cabin on letdowns but I know most pilots I have flown with would have taken immediate hands-on action to the 'Come right' request.
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Little weight to LLIF and direction from rear crew in CHCI, and they never did any in their military careers. Not even trained to navigate. Certainly U.K. levels of crew driven letdowns and transits were not practised and not SOP.