AW139 down in Italy
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AW139 down in Italy
Today another AW 139 was destroyed during a HEMS mission in the italien alps near Madonna di Campiglio. The crew was luckier than the last one. Two of them received injuries.
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skadi
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skadi
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from https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=193984
An AgustaWestland AW139 rolled over in snow during a mission to rescue two hikers from a mountain, Nambino mount near Pinzolo, at 2650 mts.
The doctor was injured. Mechanic was severely injured. Other occupants were slightly injured.
The bad weather conditions during the mission can be a factor of the crash.
An AgustaWestland AW139 rolled over in snow during a mission to rescue two hikers from a mountain, Nambino mount near Pinzolo, at 2650 mts.
The doctor was injured. Mechanic was severely injured. Other occupants were slightly injured.
The bad weather conditions during the mission can be a factor of the crash.
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Just wondering how common are somatogravic illusions?
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=164691 (another AW139 crash)
Somatogravic Illusion - AviationKnowledge
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=164691 (another AW139 crash)
Somatogravic Illusion - AviationKnowledge
Just wondering how common are somatogravic illusions?
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Somatogravic Illusions are not really connected to helicopter accidents-although they might appear, their numbers are neglectable, like 212man stated, they are more likely to occur at higher speeds.
I can´t stop to get back to my initial thoughts when reading about those accidents....lack of training and/or poor airmanship...
I am saying this without having any information on this crash-but again my experience in 25 years flying helicopter (and as an examiner) shows that there is a huge difference in quality and training within EASA countries....
E.g. Germany is VERY strict in their policies, and they hardly allow any deviation, resulting in pilots with thousands of hours experience on one type having to do a complete type rating course again only because their rating has expired a few days too long...while in other countries (not saying which), a "deviation letter" is created, and a waiver is produced, so the same pilot can now get away with only a checkflight...
(I saw exactly this-a pilot trying to renew his rating in Germany which he rejected as being too expensive....then a few weeks later, doing a checkride in a south eastern country, and got the rating back....not saying this pilot was not qualified; just saying that there are huge differences).
Flying is expensive-and flying helicopters is even more expensive; unfortunately the CAAs in Europe are Commited Against Aviation-they do their best to make flying as hard as possible, where they should try to make it as cheap and easy as possible, so pilots can receive the necessary training...
Just my2ct
I can´t stop to get back to my initial thoughts when reading about those accidents....lack of training and/or poor airmanship...
I am saying this without having any information on this crash-but again my experience in 25 years flying helicopter (and as an examiner) shows that there is a huge difference in quality and training within EASA countries....
E.g. Germany is VERY strict in their policies, and they hardly allow any deviation, resulting in pilots with thousands of hours experience on one type having to do a complete type rating course again only because their rating has expired a few days too long...while in other countries (not saying which), a "deviation letter" is created, and a waiver is produced, so the same pilot can now get away with only a checkflight...
(I saw exactly this-a pilot trying to renew his rating in Germany which he rejected as being too expensive....then a few weeks later, doing a checkride in a south eastern country, and got the rating back....not saying this pilot was not qualified; just saying that there are huge differences).
Flying is expensive-and flying helicopters is even more expensive; unfortunately the CAAs in Europe are Commited Against Aviation-they do their best to make flying as hard as possible, where they should try to make it as cheap and easy as possible, so pilots can receive the necessary training...
Just my2ct
My 2 cents is that helicopters, far more than their fixed-wing brethren do sometimes shed important bits of engineering needed for continued flight. However, the meatsack is often related if not the principle manifestation when things go pear-shaped.
I can´t stop to get back to my initial thoughts when reading about those accidents....lack of training and/or poor airmanship...
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True...but that brings us back to the original question:
Why have they been there at all?
Especially in HEMS (and even more with inexperienced, young crews) we often see pilots flying missions in critical weather conditions.....
While i understand how easy it is to get carried away while having a "Lets do it" attitude, this is exactly what kills people.....
I believe in strict launch criteria and a risk assessment checklist..
Call comes in->Crew ready and qualified for the mission?->Aircraft ready and good to go/equipped for this mission?->Weather above Minima?->Alternate or Diversion plan in place?->Final decision Go/NoGo.
Accidents will always happen, and can never be avoided 100%.....but it appears that too many accidents only happen because someone does not fully understand the concept of "risk mitigation" or "risk management"...
Why have they been there at all?
Especially in HEMS (and even more with inexperienced, young crews) we often see pilots flying missions in critical weather conditions.....
While i understand how easy it is to get carried away while having a "Lets do it" attitude, this is exactly what kills people.....
I believe in strict launch criteria and a risk assessment checklist..
Call comes in->Crew ready and qualified for the mission?->Aircraft ready and good to go/equipped for this mission?->Weather above Minima?->Alternate or Diversion plan in place?->Final decision Go/NoGo.
Accidents will always happen, and can never be avoided 100%.....but it appears that too many accidents only happen because someone does not fully understand the concept of "risk mitigation" or "risk management"...
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
It's nice for us to be able to sit with a brew to hand talking about things 'after the event', however when someone needs you, really needs you, those times that those of us here such as crab know all too well about; that continual assessment and soul searching decision making process, becomes so much more than a mere opinion between sips.
As seen on a recent CRM refresher;
The job of course is to save & preserve life and all decisions will be taking that into account; of course that 'life' not only includes that of the victim on the mountain, it also includes the life of your crew, what'll it be today?
Tough call; one that thankfully most of us don't have to make on a daily basis; to those that do, thank you
As seen on a recent CRM refresher;
The job of course is to save & preserve life and all decisions will be taking that into account; of course that 'life' not only includes that of the victim on the mountain, it also includes the life of your crew, what'll it be today?
Tough call; one that thankfully most of us don't have to make on a daily basis; to those that do, thank you
Harks back to the days where the aircrew shouldn't ever be aware of the condition of the patient.
This procedure is prevalent in a few operations I am aware of.
The condition of the patient should never influence the crews decision making process.
It is surely the only reason for HEMS cock ups?
WRT to the 139 accident - I was based in Trento for a time and unless things have changed this operation can only be described as exceptional.
The general consensus in the area is that they are taxed with rescuing "idiots" that shouldn't have been there in the first place proving you cannot legislate for stupidity.
This procedure is prevalent in a few operations I am aware of.
The condition of the patient should never influence the crews decision making process.
It is surely the only reason for HEMS cock ups?
Pilots and operator management personnel should not make flight decisions based on the condition of the patient, but rather upon the safety of the flight.
The general consensus in the area is that they are taxed with rescuing "idiots" that shouldn't have been there in the first place proving you cannot legislate for stupidity.
RVDT,
You make some good observations, but I'm not sure I entirely agree with all of them. For instance - should the crew be aware of the casualties condition or make decisions based on their injuries?
Certainly once they're on board; countless times we have had to make the decision to go either high/low based on condition, or fast or slow based on the effect of vibration on a casualty.
The general public do regularly do daft things - I think we all agree on that; but they are also taxed with paying for the service.
You make some good observations, but I'm not sure I entirely agree with all of them. For instance - should the crew be aware of the casualties condition or make decisions based on their injuries?
Certainly once they're on board; countless times we have had to make the decision to go either high/low based on condition, or fast or slow based on the effect of vibration on a casualty.
The general consensus in the area is that they are taxed with rescuing "idiots" that shouldn't have been there in the first place proving you cannot legislate for stupidity.
Yes, of course the crew should know the condition of the casualty - as a SAR crew you are making a constantly updated risk assessment and there will always be some risk attached to any SAR mission.
How much risk you and your crew are prepared to take will depend in some circumstances on the condition of the casualty - do you let the casualty bleed out on the hill or do you accept the additional risk of hover taxiing in poor vis?
Some of your acceptance of risk will depend on your 'plan B' - in the case of the SAR video, they had an IF abort option if they did lose all visual references - the sort of thing the crews are trained for and are very well within their capabilities.
What is the point of having a super-modern helicopter with all the bells and whistles if you are not going to use it to its full capability because the weather is a bit bad?
Anyone who thinks you can make SAR super-safe with PC1 profiles all round and no-go weather limits is kidding themselves and better hope they are never the ones in trouble.
It is too easy to criticise the actions of the Italian HEMS crew from the comfort of ones armchair - anyone who has spent any time in the mountains knows that the weather can change very quickly and anyone can get caught out no matter how many safety protocols you have in place. The only safe way to operate is to not go flying in the first place but that doesn't help those in need.
How much risk you and your crew are prepared to take will depend in some circumstances on the condition of the casualty - do you let the casualty bleed out on the hill or do you accept the additional risk of hover taxiing in poor vis?
Some of your acceptance of risk will depend on your 'plan B' - in the case of the SAR video, they had an IF abort option if they did lose all visual references - the sort of thing the crews are trained for and are very well within their capabilities.
What is the point of having a super-modern helicopter with all the bells and whistles if you are not going to use it to its full capability because the weather is a bit bad?
Anyone who thinks you can make SAR super-safe with PC1 profiles all round and no-go weather limits is kidding themselves and better hope they are never the ones in trouble.
It is too easy to criticise the actions of the Italian HEMS crew from the comfort of ones armchair - anyone who has spent any time in the mountains knows that the weather can change very quickly and anyone can get caught out no matter how many safety protocols you have in place. The only safe way to operate is to not go flying in the first place but that doesn't help those in need.
Not when you are rescuing people from the sides of mountains - they may not be winching but the risks are still the same. The main difference would seem to be that there would be another way off the mountain for the casualty with the HEMS setup ie by skidoo or similar.
The point is that you can have go/no-go weather limits which allow you to launch quite legally but are subject to rapid change in the mountains - very possibly while you are on the ground loading the casualty. Your options are limited if the LS isn't suitable for shutdown so trying to get out and rolling the aircraft over is very unfortunate but not something you can just blame on poor training or currency.
The point is that you can have go/no-go weather limits which allow you to launch quite legally but are subject to rapid change in the mountains - very possibly while you are on the ground loading the casualty. Your options are limited if the LS isn't suitable for shutdown so trying to get out and rolling the aircraft over is very unfortunate but not something you can just blame on poor training or currency.
RVDT: "HEMS Crab old chap. NOT SAR.
Chalk and cheese."
Not so much ....
Many operations conduct SAR/HEMS and there is often very little to distinguish the classification of the actual mission. For instance, landing at a remote & dusty location on NVIS to transport a critical patient. SAR or HEMS in practical terms? Certainly a very different thing than Hosp' pad to Hosp' pad .... Anyway, semantics aside, I agree with Crab, that having some information on the patient's condition enables a "mature operator" to make a better, well informed risk v gain assessment. (by "mature operator", I mean an entire organisation that has the checks & balances in place to promote safe decision making)
Chalk and cheese."
Not so much ....
Many operations conduct SAR/HEMS and there is often very little to distinguish the classification of the actual mission. For instance, landing at a remote & dusty location on NVIS to transport a critical patient. SAR or HEMS in practical terms? Certainly a very different thing than Hosp' pad to Hosp' pad .... Anyway, semantics aside, I agree with Crab, that having some information on the patient's condition enables a "mature operator" to make a better, well informed risk v gain assessment. (by "mature operator", I mean an entire organisation that has the checks & balances in place to promote safe decision making)
