USMC CH-53 Mid-Air Off Hawaii Declared Pilot Error
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USMC CH-53 Mid-Air Off Hawaii Declared Pilot Error
Article about the Mid-Air that killed Twelve and video of wreckage on the sea bottom.
Cause of helicopter collision that killed 12 Marines off Hawaii revealed - CBS News
Cause of helicopter collision that killed 12 Marines off Hawaii revealed - CBS News
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Those guys went to work that day with the best intentions. They've been thoroughly let down and people should be ashamed this occurred. Their deaths were entirely preventable. It's not rocket science - poor serviceability, low flying rates, inadequate training, lack of focus and poor command will kill people. Only fools believe otherwise. Unfortunately it's the guys and girls at the pointy end, doing their best, that pay the piper. The report only proves what people knew already. My most sincere condolences to their families and friends.
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It's a sad fact that it's always easier to decree "pilot error" than "management error". Management are seldom in the aircraft crash.
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Not wishing to condone 'management error' in this tragedy. I can't see how in a mid air collision with no mechanical faults and I assume no crew not trained properly, else they would have said, how it couldn't be anything but a tragic accident. I lost 4 colleagues when 2 Seakings collided at the start of Gulf War II, the conclusion had reasons why the risk increased but again a tragedy. Formation flying at night over water is inherently risky.
Frying Pan
As I understood the article there is very definitely the suggestion that the crew were not sufficiently current for the operation they were undertaking.
I would suggest that that comes clearly under the heading of "Not Trained Properly", if we consider that currency should be part of any adequate ongoing training programme, and therefore clearly a management failing is it not?
OH
As I understood the article there is very definitely the suggestion that the crew were not sufficiently current for the operation they were undertaking.
I would suggest that that comes clearly under the heading of "Not Trained Properly", if we consider that currency should be part of any adequate ongoing training programme, and therefore clearly a management failing is it not?
OH
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This one was personal....one of the young Crewmen was a Friend's Son.
The US Military is suffering from Budget Cuts due to Congress and the President being unable to properly assess priorities on spending thus the implementation of Sequestration where none of them take the blame for the bad things that happen due to automatic across the board Budget Cuts.
Military flying can be very hazardous due to the very nature of what is being done.
To send Crews out that are not properly trained and experienced during Training is inexcusable at the Command Level.
In War Time...then perhaps that situation becomes tolerable even if not desirable.
We need to hold our Civilian and Military Leadership responsible for their actions and their In-Action.
Yes....it can be called "Pilot Error" but someone gave them the Gun, Loaded the Bullets into it, Pointed it at their Head, Cocked it....leaving only the pulling of the trigger to the victims.
Twelve Good Marines died that Night that should still be with us had the System not failed them.
The US Military is suffering from Budget Cuts due to Congress and the President being unable to properly assess priorities on spending thus the implementation of Sequestration where none of them take the blame for the bad things that happen due to automatic across the board Budget Cuts.
Military flying can be very hazardous due to the very nature of what is being done.
To send Crews out that are not properly trained and experienced during Training is inexcusable at the Command Level.
In War Time...then perhaps that situation becomes tolerable even if not desirable.
We need to hold our Civilian and Military Leadership responsible for their actions and their In-Action.
Yes....it can be called "Pilot Error" but someone gave them the Gun, Loaded the Bullets into it, Pointed it at their Head, Cocked it....leaving only the pulling of the trigger to the victims.
Twelve Good Marines died that Night that should still be with us had the System not failed them.
Not wishing to condone 'management error' in this tragedy. I can't see how in a mid air collision with no mechanical faults and I assume no crew not trained properly, else they would have said, how it couldn't be anything but a tragic accident. I lost 4 colleagues when 2 Seakings collided at the start of Gulf War II, the conclusion had reasons why the risk increased but again a tragedy. Formation flying at night over water is inherently risky.
Training dollars are not infrequently cut as they are more easily reached funds, unlike MilCon or APN 1 acquisition dollars. Training, however expensive, is how you keep your force proficient and professional in their craft. The monthly pilot flying rate, which was about 30 hours when I was an Ensign back in the 80's, has been drastically reduced.
This is the kind of executive level decision made up the chain of command, and in Congress, and when budgets are established and prioritized. And then, operating and maintenance funds (O&M) are raided half way through the fiscal year leaving the squadron commander and his opso holding the bag. (No, I'm not bitter ... ) The squadron is once again told to "do more with less."
This is an old and tiresome story. The politicians want to declare "we have the best trained military in the world" but they'll cut training funds in the blink of an eye. Further comments censored.
RIP and Semper Fi: sadly not the first nor the last "routine training mission" that ends with us losing comrades in arms.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 27th Oct 2016 at 16:57.
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I apologise for treading on toes. Tradegies that involve insufficiently trained aircrew is inexcusable. From memory more allies died in Operation Desert Shield than Operation Desert Storm. That says too much. Why were these guys flying so close at night without the skills...so unnecessary. All those levels of command and pre flight briefings in peacetime and still they did it. Let's hope lessons are learned.
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FP,
We are agreeing with you. Yet most of us are inclined to think under the Contributing Factors section of the Accident Report should be a very clear assertion that there were Command Failures right up to the Oval Office.
We are agreeing with you. Yet most of us are inclined to think under the Contributing Factors section of the Accident Report should be a very clear assertion that there were Command Failures right up to the Oval Office.
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Problem comes with senior officers, often at station, or even squadron level, not having big enough balls to stand up and risk their own careers by saying "NO!"
I saw it a number of times during my time in the armed forces.
One particular night will always stick in my mind. We had been called back into work on a Friday night, after a long week, for a "MINEVAL" (station generated exercise, latter Cold War days). We had a new Station Commander who was obviously rapidly on his way to the top (and he did), having come from a fixed wing, recently made obsolete type and was in the process of making his mark on the SH force. Our squadron commander was of the same ilk, albeit further down the chain of command.
It was obvious to me that the weather was well below limits for visual night flying (low cloud, rain, poor visibility, gusty winds). Regardless, we were soon called to a mass pre-flight briefing where it immediately became obvious that our aircraft were expected to deploy very shortly afterwards. The brief was to deploy in radio silence as a night stream to an unlit and unrecc'ed landing site at an army camp somewhere south of our secret helicopter base not far from London.
However, we were not trained or equipped to land at unlit landing sites (our aircraft were deficient in NVG searchlights or floodlighting. Our SOPs of the time required night landing sites to be pre-recc'ed or be manned by a ground party and conventional ground lighting laid out in advance.
During the briefing, nothing was mentioned about night stream procedures, except that a two minute time gap would be maintained. No mention of approach or circuit direction was made.
As this briefing went on, the hackles on the back of my neck began to rise and alarm bells began to ring in my soul. It seemed to me that basic common sense had departed when the MINEVAL siren went off.
As an OCU QHI, albeit relatively inexperienced compared to some of the old lags present, I couldn't believe that no-one more senior than I hadn't already spoken up about the obvious deficiencies of the plan. I looked around. Everyone seemed uneasy but reluctant to question the "Boss".
I finally asked the question "What is going to happen to the aircraft separation if someone has to go around from their approach to the landing site or goes IMC in transit?"
I received a blank look from the briefing officer. The briefing was concluded. I told my flight commander and crewman that we weren't going to fly under that plan. I wasn't popular among the hierarchy for some time but none of us flew to that landing site.
I saw it a number of times during my time in the armed forces.
One particular night will always stick in my mind. We had been called back into work on a Friday night, after a long week, for a "MINEVAL" (station generated exercise, latter Cold War days). We had a new Station Commander who was obviously rapidly on his way to the top (and he did), having come from a fixed wing, recently made obsolete type and was in the process of making his mark on the SH force. Our squadron commander was of the same ilk, albeit further down the chain of command.
It was obvious to me that the weather was well below limits for visual night flying (low cloud, rain, poor visibility, gusty winds). Regardless, we were soon called to a mass pre-flight briefing where it immediately became obvious that our aircraft were expected to deploy very shortly afterwards. The brief was to deploy in radio silence as a night stream to an unlit and unrecc'ed landing site at an army camp somewhere south of our secret helicopter base not far from London.
However, we were not trained or equipped to land at unlit landing sites (our aircraft were deficient in NVG searchlights or floodlighting. Our SOPs of the time required night landing sites to be pre-recc'ed or be manned by a ground party and conventional ground lighting laid out in advance.
During the briefing, nothing was mentioned about night stream procedures, except that a two minute time gap would be maintained. No mention of approach or circuit direction was made.
As this briefing went on, the hackles on the back of my neck began to rise and alarm bells began to ring in my soul. It seemed to me that basic common sense had departed when the MINEVAL siren went off.
As an OCU QHI, albeit relatively inexperienced compared to some of the old lags present, I couldn't believe that no-one more senior than I hadn't already spoken up about the obvious deficiencies of the plan. I looked around. Everyone seemed uneasy but reluctant to question the "Boss".
I finally asked the question "What is going to happen to the aircraft separation if someone has to go around from their approach to the landing site or goes IMC in transit?"
I received a blank look from the briefing officer. The briefing was concluded. I told my flight commander and crewman that we weren't going to fly under that plan. I wasn't popular among the hierarchy for some time but none of us flew to that landing site.
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"NO!" is the most difficult word in the Pilot's Vocabulary....especially if directed towards a Senior of some sort.
That inability to articulate such a simple word....only two letters in it...one syllable.....and Pilot's will rather kill themselves than utter that word!
That inability to articulate such a simple word....only two letters in it...one syllable.....and Pilot's will rather kill themselves than utter that word!
I once did that and, in part due to the style of my saying "no," was grounded by my CO for three months and directed to take anger management training. (I kid you not). What's funny is that in the long run his directive had some embedded wisdom. That wasn't bad training as it helped me later in life in a variety of situations. The CO and I served in another squadron later and had a solid relationship.
Not sure that faster 53Ks will fix it, or jumping on Obama, but a familiar story.
The senior ranks not taking responsibility for their decisions is not new. A young man I met when he was a high school student went on to join the RAAF, dux of his wings course, went straight to F-111, and dux of that as well. Being a computer whip the squadron had him doing IT work with little flying, though he was champing at the bit and on the back of his seniors for same. Came the day, night actually, he was put down to fly a night low level simulated attack mission, not only fly, but to brief the others, and lead the mission, despite not having flown at night for some six months, and the nav was not his usual crew member, since he was down medically. A young buck (squadrons youngest and most inexperienced) not wanting to be seen lacking and desperate for stick time. What could go wrong? Weather was crap, and the poor guy lost it during the attack and CFIT. It took his Mother to investigate and find what went on, and detailed it in a book "The Thirteenth Night". The only RAAF fatal accident not to have had an official investigation. Why is that you might well ask. Senior officers with red faces? Where was the supervisory oversight of this young man, and in particular, the authorising officer of the fatal flight? The reason those people are in place is to pace the development of the up and comers, not to let them get in over their heads.
RIP Jeremy McNess - one of our nations most dedicated and brightest.
RIP Jeremy McNess - one of our nations most dedicated and brightest.
It will be interesting to see if the families of the deceased mount a campaign to challenge that 'pilot error' declaration in the same way as the Mull Chinook crew's families did. It seems they could have a very good case.
47-B: it is only comparatively recently that the Hawaii squadrons got 53E's. Kanehoe Bay was the last operating 53D squadron for some years. I'll need to ask around to be sure, but I don't think the full motion 53E sims are present. I'll get back to you.
Thread Starter
More information re the Crash and possible linkage to temporary restrictions on the Unit flying while the POTUS was on Vacation near the Unit.
Report: Marines Link Obama Vacation to Deadly Helo Crash | Military.com
Report: Marines Link Obama Vacation to Deadly Helo Crash | Military.com