Originally Posted by
Frying Pan
Not wishing to condone 'management error' in this tragedy. I can't see how in a mid air collision with no mechanical faults and I assume no crew not trained properly, else they would have said, how it couldn't be anything but a tragic accident. I lost 4 colleagues when 2 Seakings collided at the start of Gulf War II, the conclusion had reasons why the risk increased but again a tragedy. Formation flying at night over water is inherently risky.
Frying Pan, I suggest that you read the article, which mentions the matter of not being current (proficiency is another matter) on some of their training minimums. Night minimums, with and without aids, is governed by OPNAVINST 3710 and other training and standardization regulations. The larger problem that is even if you manage to get your minimums to stay current,
proficiency usually takes a bit more flying. Night formation has some hazards that day formation flying does not.
Training dollars are not infrequently cut as they are more easily reached funds, unlike MilCon or APN 1 acquisition dollars. Training, however expensive, is how you keep your force proficient and professional in their craft. The monthly pilot flying rate, which was about 30 hours when I was an Ensign back in the 80's, has been drastically reduced.
This is the kind of executive level decision made up the chain of command, and in Congress, and when budgets are established and prioritized. And then, operating and maintenance funds (O&M) are raided half way through the fiscal year leaving the squadron commander and his opso holding the bag. (No, I'm not bitter ... ) The squadron is once again told to "do more with less."
This is an old and tiresome story. The politicians want to declare "we have the best trained military in the world" but they'll cut training funds in the blink of an eye. Further comments censored.
RIP and Semper Fi: sadly not the first nor the last "routine training mission" that ends with us losing comrades in arms.