Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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BC
An excellent point.
I should have thought of it. All of us who do / did emergency service work rely greatly on knowledge of the patch. It is unlikely that any pilot living in the Glasgow area and operating out of the SECC site would be unaware of the Clutha.
If I had found myself committed to an autorotative landing over Glasgow city centre, and I had any control available, I would have gone for the river. At least you know what you are going to hit and you know that you are unlikely to kill anyone else.
This suggests to me that DT had few or no options.
An excellent point.
I should have thought of it. All of us who do / did emergency service work rely greatly on knowledge of the patch. It is unlikely that any pilot living in the Glasgow area and operating out of the SECC site would be unaware of the Clutha.
If I had found myself committed to an autorotative landing over Glasgow city centre, and I had any control available, I would have gone for the river. At least you know what you are going to hit and you know that you are unlikely to kill anyone else.
This suggests to me that DT had few or no options.
P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm; }A:link { } Hey all,
please don´t take it personal, if I try to look after other, than mechanical possibility for this accident. Nothing against the crew – RIP – but even the best have a limit – and that night, it might have been exceeded. I don´t say, it was so – but it might have been or contributed....
I lately spent a lot of time in different simulators while completing my MCC, made there mistakes, saw very experienced pilots make mistakes and had the chance to see from behind, how long timers got under stress and missed vital informations. We also covered a lot of accidents and incidents – also EC135 related – which showed, that even with two flight-crew in the cockpit, mistakes occurred which ended up in costly repairs and could have led to an accident.
Luckily we we operate with two pilots at night – but you have still work together, to get home safely again.
„Floatsarmed“ brought up a very interesting point in his post about nightflying down under (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/528...ml#post8185576)
So a question – how far were the police-crew integrated in the flight. Were they able to assist the pilot, i.e. with checklists, did they have an basic understanding of the aircraft including warning lights and cautions? Could they switch radio-channels (not tactical radios)?
Or was the pilot just on his own – responsible for flying, navigation, communication with air traffic? Everything at night with a tactical background for the helicopter – not just straight an level flight?
And even with two up front, a perfect servicable aircraft can crash at night :-(
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/451...th-2011-a.html
report (in german) http://www.bfu-web.de/DE/Publikation...ublicationFile
What I´m talking about is situational awareness – when the going gets rough or you have a malfunction or a false operation (by mistake, i.e. switching of the autopilot and SAS OFF by pressing the wrong button – and assuming it´s an aircraft fault – wondering what the hell is going on – trying to identify the „fault“ on the clocks – while all you have to do, is press the right button....or turn the throttle on the collective by mistake and get an MANUAL – indication – you´re sure will be busy sorting the problem out)
I personal have over 800 hrs with NVG – and there were great nights and nights, where I had to fight to keep the bird at the right position and nights, where the operator had to work more with his joystick cause hover OGE just was n´t possible (for me that night).
There are times, where we have to remember aviate – navigate – communicate – that is first fly the aircraft and only start to address problems, when you´re flying safe (even with autorotations – get a stable one, if you have the height and then sort things out – chasing speed and Nr will spoil the whole procedure)
And these three vital things – they are ahead of any task you have to carry out.
Let the robber get away – you might catch him the next time – but you never will, if you crash!
I´m sure this pilot was busy trying to aviate – so no wonder there was no mayday-call – the question is, what happened before? I know we have to wait a long time, before we get informations about the remains – until then, every-time you recognize, that you are busy within the cockpit – don´t forget to aviate – for many many happy landings!
please don´t take it personal, if I try to look after other, than mechanical possibility for this accident. Nothing against the crew – RIP – but even the best have a limit – and that night, it might have been exceeded. I don´t say, it was so – but it might have been or contributed....
I lately spent a lot of time in different simulators while completing my MCC, made there mistakes, saw very experienced pilots make mistakes and had the chance to see from behind, how long timers got under stress and missed vital informations. We also covered a lot of accidents and incidents – also EC135 related – which showed, that even with two flight-crew in the cockpit, mistakes occurred which ended up in costly repairs and could have led to an accident.
Luckily we we operate with two pilots at night – but you have still work together, to get home safely again.
„Floatsarmed“ brought up a very interesting point in his post about nightflying down under (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/528...ml#post8185576)
So a question – how far were the police-crew integrated in the flight. Were they able to assist the pilot, i.e. with checklists, did they have an basic understanding of the aircraft including warning lights and cautions? Could they switch radio-channels (not tactical radios)?
Or was the pilot just on his own – responsible for flying, navigation, communication with air traffic? Everything at night with a tactical background for the helicopter – not just straight an level flight?
And even with two up front, a perfect servicable aircraft can crash at night :-(
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/451...th-2011-a.html
report (in german) http://www.bfu-web.de/DE/Publikation...ublicationFile
What I´m talking about is situational awareness – when the going gets rough or you have a malfunction or a false operation (by mistake, i.e. switching of the autopilot and SAS OFF by pressing the wrong button – and assuming it´s an aircraft fault – wondering what the hell is going on – trying to identify the „fault“ on the clocks – while all you have to do, is press the right button....or turn the throttle on the collective by mistake and get an MANUAL – indication – you´re sure will be busy sorting the problem out)
I personal have over 800 hrs with NVG – and there were great nights and nights, where I had to fight to keep the bird at the right position and nights, where the operator had to work more with his joystick cause hover OGE just was n´t possible (for me that night).
There are times, where we have to remember aviate – navigate – communicate – that is first fly the aircraft and only start to address problems, when you´re flying safe (even with autorotations – get a stable one, if you have the height and then sort things out – chasing speed and Nr will spoil the whole procedure)
And these three vital things – they are ahead of any task you have to carry out.
Let the robber get away – you might catch him the next time – but you never will, if you crash!
I´m sure this pilot was busy trying to aviate – so no wonder there was no mayday-call – the question is, what happened before? I know we have to wait a long time, before we get informations about the remains – until then, every-time you recognize, that you are busy within the cockpit – don´t forget to aviate – for many many happy landings!
Avoid imitations
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Wouldn't he have time to switch on the night sun if doing a auto to unknown area
Md
Wouldn't he have time to switch on the night sun if doing a auto to unknown area
Md
However, from experience of Nightsun on other types I have flown, it may well not be available in an unpowered descent because it has a very high electrical load, i.e. it needs at least one generator to be on line, possibly both, depending on how the aircraft is wired.
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Is it time Police flying became a twin pilot operation?????
The other issue is weight. If you put a second pilot, a set of controls and flight instruments into a typical police fit light twin
I'm sure he would love that and no weight penalty.
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2 stage collapse
Firstly, I'm a long time lurker - no flight experience, not even on a computer keyboard, so wouldn't presume to posit an opinion on what caused this accident. However I often read witness statements as part of my job, and have to work out how they support and refute each other...
Which brings me to the point about the witness accounts of the band joking about bringing the roof down before the ceiling totally collapsed. Some posters are suggesting this means that the helicopter hit the roof twice, or landed hard and then the roof collapsed under the load. The sketch map of the building suggests that the area of the impact was relatively screened from the area around the stage - it seems to me that these witness accounts are equally compatible with the helicopter impacting once, hard, penetrating the building, followed by a wider collapse as the weight of the wreckage starts to settle. The initial damage might not have been immediately obvious from around the corner, although the noise clearly was. It'd be interesting to know where some of the quoted witnesses were in the bar to see if that held up, but it seems more plausible as a scenario than some of the suggestions.
This idea might be shot to pieces, but equally might save some people from trying to square a circle that eventually turns out to have four right angles in it.
I'll go back to lurking now, and keep hoping to learn new things.
Which brings me to the point about the witness accounts of the band joking about bringing the roof down before the ceiling totally collapsed. Some posters are suggesting this means that the helicopter hit the roof twice, or landed hard and then the roof collapsed under the load. The sketch map of the building suggests that the area of the impact was relatively screened from the area around the stage - it seems to me that these witness accounts are equally compatible with the helicopter impacting once, hard, penetrating the building, followed by a wider collapse as the weight of the wreckage starts to settle. The initial damage might not have been immediately obvious from around the corner, although the noise clearly was. It'd be interesting to know where some of the quoted witnesses were in the bar to see if that held up, but it seems more plausible as a scenario than some of the suggestions.
This idea might be shot to pieces, but equally might save some people from trying to square a circle that eventually turns out to have four right angles in it.
I'll go back to lurking now, and keep hoping to learn new things.
"Just a pilot"
Speculative scenario
Reported East bound;
Emergency (pick one) pull engines off line;
Entering turning auto (probably to the right) ah! the parking lot;
Stretch the turning glide, suck the NR down a bit and load the rotor;
Lost more altitude than anticipated (how many autos do you really do in a twin?), can't clear the 3-4 story block of buildings N of the eventual crash site;
Decel and attempt a steep but survivable landing on the Clutha roof rather head on into the structures short of the parking lot;
Street lights left with 3-4 story buildings, and in front, right side, poor altitude reference, aircraft looks lower than actual;
Pull collective early and fall 30-40 feet...
Emergency (pick one) pull engines off line;
Entering turning auto (probably to the right) ah! the parking lot;
Stretch the turning glide, suck the NR down a bit and load the rotor;
Lost more altitude than anticipated (how many autos do you really do in a twin?), can't clear the 3-4 story block of buildings N of the eventual crash site;
Decel and attempt a steep but survivable landing on the Clutha roof rather head on into the structures short of the parking lot;
Street lights left with 3-4 story buildings, and in front, right side, poor altitude reference, aircraft looks lower than actual;
Pull collective early and fall 30-40 feet...
Last edited by Devil 49; 3rd Dec 2013 at 22:03. Reason: complete narrtive
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what about training the front seat observer to PPLH standard?
Have one pilot, or two. But not one and a quarter? It's not just about taking control during an incapacitation. Police flying is amongst the most challenging I have ever done, and the cockpit authority gradient needs to be fairly level, or just don't bother.
I have a funny feeling this tragedy will mark a step change in Police operations, perhaps along the lines I have just suggested?
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Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
Just an observation but an object weighing 2500kg falling from say 213m(700') in freefall I.e dropping like a stone, would arrive at ground level in a little under 7 seconds. Not 30s. The terminal velocity would be determined by the cross section presented to direction of travel but without any additional resistance ( I.e. Turning rotor blades) the velocity at impact is likely to be in the region of 140-150mph say 64-65m/s.
As the helicopter had been tasked on an observational sortie it would most likely had an almost full fuel load but well below MTOW. If it was any lower than 700' or if a mechanical failure caused a preliminary descent before a freefall situation occurred, then the crew may have had only seconds to respond 5-6 seconds max. This might explain lack of may-day. There appears to have been little or no forward momentum but without knowing the initial direction of travel it is difficult to assess/verify this. The although the impact area appears small and consistent with an almost vertical drop the damage to a/c suggests an angled approach , nose down at speed. Sadly, not survivable. The cause was sudden with little or no control authority remaining? I am surprised that fleet grounding of similar variants / operational hours hasn't been considered. There is much to suggest mechanical failure and little to suggest anything else!
As the helicopter had been tasked on an observational sortie it would most likely had an almost full fuel load but well below MTOW. If it was any lower than 700' or if a mechanical failure caused a preliminary descent before a freefall situation occurred, then the crew may have had only seconds to respond 5-6 seconds max. This might explain lack of may-day. There appears to have been little or no forward momentum but without knowing the initial direction of travel it is difficult to assess/verify this. The although the impact area appears small and consistent with an almost vertical drop the damage to a/c suggests an angled approach , nose down at speed. Sadly, not survivable. The cause was sudden with little or no control authority remaining? I am surprised that fleet grounding of similar variants / operational hours hasn't been considered. There is much to suggest mechanical failure and little to suggest anything else!
In reference to the descend rates mentioned earlier (2000ft/min), this picture Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid is from an EC130 accident investigation report, which mentions a descend rate in excess of 846ft/min & 20+G at impact, down from the max 4500ft/min. reached during the descend. The damage to the windscreen, instrument panel, the whole front cockpit area was due to the crash and not post crash rescue. Engine, gearbox, rotor assembly were largely separated from the hull. Blades fractured.
Worth noting that the tail boom and fenestron were reported to be fairly undamaged, except for a fracture at the root of the tail boom!!
Given the fact that the EC135 was lifted out by the rotor assembly, less structural damage (even after going through the ceiling) can be assumed. So a descend rate on impact below 800ft/min, will be a better estimate. Of course, 15G or even 10G at impact are devastating.
Worth noting that the tail boom and fenestron were reported to be fairly undamaged, except for a fracture at the root of the tail boom!!
Given the fact that the EC135 was lifted out by the rotor assembly, less structural damage (even after going through the ceiling) can be assumed. So a descend rate on impact below 800ft/min, will be a better estimate. Of course, 15G or even 10G at impact are devastating.
Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Dec 2013 at 22:26. Reason: removing the word 'freefall', which it wasn't
MD600.....it takes a bit to fire up the NightSun....but not a lot of time to swing the IR Filter away if the Night Sun is already Operational.
Had NVG's been in use....it would be somewhat normal to have the Night Sun in operation but with the IR Lens in place so that only IR Illum is produced.
I am sure the Police have a SOP for use of the Night Sun....and I would bet they do not fire it up unless they are spotting with visible light as a result of a Tasking.
Some of the Police Pilots might respond to that.
If I was having to contend with a sudden demanding flight emergency....the last thing I would be doing is fiddling with the Night Sun. If the Observer had the time....presence of mind....and was not occupied with other business....perhaps the Observer could have gotten the Night Sun into operation.
Had NVG's been in use....it would be somewhat normal to have the Night Sun in operation but with the IR Lens in place so that only IR Illum is produced.
I am sure the Police have a SOP for use of the Night Sun....and I would bet they do not fire it up unless they are spotting with visible light as a result of a Tasking.
Some of the Police Pilots might respond to that.
If I was having to contend with a sudden demanding flight emergency....the last thing I would be doing is fiddling with the Night Sun. If the Observer had the time....presence of mind....and was not occupied with other business....perhaps the Observer could have gotten the Night Sun into operation.
One thing no one of this opinion appears to have considered is that he knew the area well from having spent over 4 years working at the Glasgow unit based a couple of miles from the crash site. I am sure he spent may an hour hovering over the city centre, in which case he would have known not only the layout of the city intimately, but many of its prominent buildings well also.
I think you are being slightly unrealistic in expecting a single pilot to be able to remember the exact location of a small non-descript building, among many other larger buildings and obstructions, while dealing with (probably) a major emergency, at night! Yes of the course the pilot (RIP) was familiar with that part of the city, but what tends to stick in our minds from local area knowledge is the features which are either a hazard to us as we go about our business, or useful landmarks (in many cases, one feature can be both at once). The Clutha was neither of these.
In fact, your mention of 'prominent buildings' kind of makes my point for me!
In reference to the descend rates mentioned earlier (2000ft/min), this picture Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid is from an EC130 accident investigation report, which mentions a descend rate in excess of 846ft/min & 20+G at impact, down from the max 4500ft/min. reached during the descend/freefall.
Vertical Speed at impact was 1800fpm.
And it hit solid ground. Not a Roof which gave way.
Still it is less flatened (cabin has still almost full height) than what we see in this instance.
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I find the autorotation to an apparent carpark theory hard to swallow.
Look at Google Earth - that just isn't the sort of area you'd ever autorotate into. A road junction surrounded by buildings and more particularly lighting poles and you know its going to be infested with wires. An auto into that is acceptance of a big crash and unless the situation was utterly hopeless I just don't think you'd try it. They had floats, they were next to/over the river where at least you know wires and poles aren't going to kill you before you've landed.
imo they fell where they did as I can't believe anyone with any control would choose to land there. I think the bar was simply where the accident took them.
Gearbox failure? Two reasons why not. 1) The CAA would have grounded the type if they suspected a catastrophic failure of that kind. 2) You wouldn't try to lift a helo that has had a catastrophic 'box failure using strops around the head.
Tail rotor fail? We think they were in transit to base do we not - so at cruise speed or somewhere close, not in a hover so should have flown right through that suggestion.
The AAIB must have a pretty good idea that it isn't any obvious catastrophic failure or we'd see the type grounded.
What that leaves heaven knows but the witness report of it tumbling sounds credible given the way it landed. One could surmise at lasers or even a birdstrike incapacitation (watch that one, the Clyde attracts gulls at night in swarms) but I rather doubt we'll outguess the AAIB on this one.
Look at Google Earth - that just isn't the sort of area you'd ever autorotate into. A road junction surrounded by buildings and more particularly lighting poles and you know its going to be infested with wires. An auto into that is acceptance of a big crash and unless the situation was utterly hopeless I just don't think you'd try it. They had floats, they were next to/over the river where at least you know wires and poles aren't going to kill you before you've landed.
imo they fell where they did as I can't believe anyone with any control would choose to land there. I think the bar was simply where the accident took them.
Gearbox failure? Two reasons why not. 1) The CAA would have grounded the type if they suspected a catastrophic failure of that kind. 2) You wouldn't try to lift a helo that has had a catastrophic 'box failure using strops around the head.
Tail rotor fail? We think they were in transit to base do we not - so at cruise speed or somewhere close, not in a hover so should have flown right through that suggestion.
The AAIB must have a pretty good idea that it isn't any obvious catastrophic failure or we'd see the type grounded.
What that leaves heaven knows but the witness report of it tumbling sounds credible given the way it landed. One could surmise at lasers or even a birdstrike incapacitation (watch that one, the Clyde attracts gulls at night in swarms) but I rather doubt we'll outguess the AAIB on this one.
MD600 Driver,
Re: Nitesun. As Shy correctly pointed out, the Nitesun power comes from the mission bus which is only available with both generators on line. One of the first signs that an engine has quit will be all the police role equipment failing. Also, with only battery power available, it is only the fixed lamp on the nose which is available unless, with sufficient time and height, the Shed Bus Switch in the roof panel can be made which will allow the steerable landing lamp under the fuselage to be used.
Another thought that occured to me was that, in relation to a witness describing the aircraft falling end over end - once the aircraft was inverted, the weight of the main gearbox and engines would have kept it that way wouldn't it??
Re: Nitesun. As Shy correctly pointed out, the Nitesun power comes from the mission bus which is only available with both generators on line. One of the first signs that an engine has quit will be all the police role equipment failing. Also, with only battery power available, it is only the fixed lamp on the nose which is available unless, with sufficient time and height, the Shed Bus Switch in the roof panel can be made which will allow the steerable landing lamp under the fuselage to be used.
Another thought that occured to me was that, in relation to a witness describing the aircraft falling end over end - once the aircraft was inverted, the weight of the main gearbox and engines would have kept it that way wouldn't it??
Vertical Speed at impact was 1800fpm.
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l would respectfully suggest that a sink rate of 4 m/s doesn`t really cover
what happened to the poor sods.
64ft/per second/ per second would be nearer the mark. From 400ft,
let me think, . . l`d rather not.
lf they didn`t run out of fuel then l believe some drug dealer ..........
But l have lived there, drunk gassy beer in the pub, and watched one of the
locals have a long and drawn out violent argument with a table.
what happened to the poor sods.
64ft/per second/ per second would be nearer the mark. From 400ft,
let me think, . . l`d rather not.
lf they didn`t run out of fuel then l believe some drug dealer ..........
But l have lived there, drunk gassy beer in the pub, and watched one of the
locals have a long and drawn out violent argument with a table.
The mention of a Bird Strike....reminds me of the S-76 that was outbound to a Rig in Louisiana and hit a big Red Tailed Hawk right at the top of the Windscreen....which shoved the Throttle Quadrant Structure back a bit and removed the engines from "Flight". All aboard died in that one....and the Investigators took quite a bit of time to figure out what happened.
That the wreckage was pressure washed before the Investigators took their look at the thing did not speed things up at all.
Am I right to assume the Engine Controls are on the Overhead Console right at the windscreen on the 135?
That the wreckage was pressure washed before the Investigators took their look at the thing did not speed things up at all.
Am I right to assume the Engine Controls are on the Overhead Console right at the windscreen on the 135?
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Pilot Incapacitation
Hello
The Eurocopter Safety Information:
http://www.eurocopter.com/site/docs_...0-Rev-1-EN.pdf
Only mention about fleet grounding previous to accident, no comments about mechanical failures....so Pilot Incapacitation is a possibility.
The Eurocopter Safety Information:
http://www.eurocopter.com/site/docs_...0-Rev-1-EN.pdf
Only mention about fleet grounding previous to accident, no comments about mechanical failures....so Pilot Incapacitation is a possibility.
SASless,
"Am I right to assume the Engine Controls are on the Overhead Console right at the windscreen on the 135?"
No -the engine main switches are slightly low and left of centre on the main panel. Manual throttles, should the FADECs decide not to play, are collective mounted. In John's photo below you can see the 2 red catches that must be moved before rolling the throttle from low idle to off in order to shut the engines down fully. The engine main switches are the yellow ones.
John Eacott - cracking picture and well timed. Thanks.
"Am I right to assume the Engine Controls are on the Overhead Console right at the windscreen on the 135?"
No -the engine main switches are slightly low and left of centre on the main panel. Manual throttles, should the FADECs decide not to play, are collective mounted. In John's photo below you can see the 2 red catches that must be moved before rolling the throttle from low idle to off in order to shut the engines down fully. The engine main switches are the yellow ones.
John Eacott - cracking picture and well timed. Thanks.
Last edited by Fortyodd2; 4th Dec 2013 at 01:38.