AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Too much Ye Old Pilot. Do come back on frequency.
The pilots were almost certainly not authorised to speak about the accident and will have had to reconstruct what went wrong both for themselves and the AAIB.
That comments reflect a colleagial empathy is absolutely understandable. That shouldn't be confused with making excuses or giving a higher priority to the pilots' needs than of those who lost their lives. It is a tragedy for many people in many ways.
If you really think blame is what is needed here then you are part of the problem, not the solution.
TT
The pilots were almost certainly not authorised to speak about the accident and will have had to reconstruct what went wrong both for themselves and the AAIB.
That comments reflect a colleagial empathy is absolutely understandable. That shouldn't be confused with making excuses or giving a higher priority to the pilots' needs than of those who lost their lives. It is a tragedy for many people in many ways.
If you really think blame is what is needed here then you are part of the problem, not the solution.
TT
Ye Olde Pilot.
There aren't sufficient printable words in the language to describe how despicable you seem and the contempt with which most of us regard you. You insist on making your reprehensible analyses repeatedly, with no attempt to see the wider situatuon.
In Dickensian times you would have been best suited as a hanging judge, of the kind who ordered transportation to the colonies for minor crimes, using the flimsiest of evidence.
I very much doubt that you've ever been part of a multi-engined North Sea helicopter crew, or if you have then you're likely one of those for whom CRM was invented to root out your pernicious brand of unpleasantness.
How glad we are to have seen the back of your ilk on the North Sea!
There aren't sufficient printable words in the language to describe how despicable you seem and the contempt with which most of us regard you. You insist on making your reprehensible analyses repeatedly, with no attempt to see the wider situatuon.
In Dickensian times you would have been best suited as a hanging judge, of the kind who ordered transportation to the colonies for minor crimes, using the flimsiest of evidence.
I very much doubt that you've ever been part of a multi-engined North Sea helicopter crew, or if you have then you're likely one of those for whom CRM was invented to root out your pernicious brand of unpleasantness.
How glad we are to have seen the back of your ilk on the North Sea!
It is far too simplistic for anyone to say – “The solution is…….”. In reality, as humans make autopilot systems more reliable, then the human monitoring of those systems will become more frail.
If your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once every flight, then you monitor it as if your life depends on it; however, if your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once in a lifetime, then you monitor it as if you depend on it!
I don’t for a second suggest that advanced autopilots are not the way of the future but I do suggest that we still ask the wrong questions and we still don’t have the right answers.
TeeS
If your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once every flight, then you monitor it as if your life depends on it; however, if your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once in a lifetime, then you monitor it as if you depend on it!
I don’t for a second suggest that advanced autopilots are not the way of the future but I do suggest that we still ask the wrong questions and we still don’t have the right answers.
TeeS
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On 5 November 2006 an AS332L2 operating offshore Malaysia crashed into the sea during an ARA, with one fatality (the captain). At the time there was information to suggest that the crew were not aware that some AP modes had disengaged due to the reducing airspeed.
What a terrible shame it is that the full findings of the accident report were not made public. If the Malaysian DCA published accident reports in the interest of aviation safety, as the AAIB do, lives could quite possibly have been saved.
What a terrible shame it is that the full findings of the accident report were not made public. If the Malaysian DCA published accident reports in the interest of aviation safety, as the AAIB do, lives could quite possibly have been saved.
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Gypsie Magpie - not getting any better I'm afraid. I remain staggered that you think there are ATPLs/CPLs out there that really do not know that if you reduce the collective sufficiently when coupled on ALT or VS on a 3 axis AFCS that the set ALT or VS may not be maintained. Seriously scary. And obviously that did include you. If that's the case then pilots either need better training to cover this right now - or perhaps just be brighter. As I said before, this is basic physics, and there will be umpteen other flight scenarios that require a fundamental understanding of what keeps the things in the air, and the right way up. And yes, I have tried it.
The fact is 3 axis AFCSs are considered safe systems by the the regulators for coupled IMC approaches with one pilot, let alone two, and I can't see that changing for a long time, so any vulnerability must be addressed by pilot training and competency.
Ye Olde Pilot may have put it harshly, but I think our industry would look better from the outside if there was a greater willingness from some to accept basic responsibility when mistakes are made - in this case surely by the pilots. It's understandable that in the close knit pilot community people feel defensive of their colleagues - but are those seeking to attribute responsibility to corporate approach/training/aircraft systems going to be as ready to do so when a relative of theirs gets killed by a coach driver on the public roads that loses concentration? I suspect not.
YOP I think however you're wrong to slam the pilots for not talking so far. I bet in some ways they'd love to, to help them share their angst and try and move on. But the legal implications just mean they can't. The situation is obviously very serious for them. When the time is right I suspect they will provide very candid views.
I am quite sure that following this accident a lot of us doing IMC approaches are focussed that bit more on proper scans and parameter monitoring, and that flying will be the safer for it. As has been said before, Pprune does a great job publicising incidents and sparking debate about causes, and definitely benefits flight safety. And He1aviator - quite right, disclosure of mistakes by others is the best learning tool.
The fact is 3 axis AFCSs are considered safe systems by the the regulators for coupled IMC approaches with one pilot, let alone two, and I can't see that changing for a long time, so any vulnerability must be addressed by pilot training and competency.
Ye Olde Pilot may have put it harshly, but I think our industry would look better from the outside if there was a greater willingness from some to accept basic responsibility when mistakes are made - in this case surely by the pilots. It's understandable that in the close knit pilot community people feel defensive of their colleagues - but are those seeking to attribute responsibility to corporate approach/training/aircraft systems going to be as ready to do so when a relative of theirs gets killed by a coach driver on the public roads that loses concentration? I suspect not.
YOP I think however you're wrong to slam the pilots for not talking so far. I bet in some ways they'd love to, to help them share their angst and try and move on. But the legal implications just mean they can't. The situation is obviously very serious for them. When the time is right I suspect they will provide very candid views.
I am quite sure that following this accident a lot of us doing IMC approaches are focussed that bit more on proper scans and parameter monitoring, and that flying will be the safer for it. As has been said before, Pprune does a great job publicising incidents and sparking debate about causes, and definitely benefits flight safety. And He1aviator - quite right, disclosure of mistakes by others is the best learning tool.
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Being a shipping man and now being reliably informed that Autopilot is not Autopilot other than a meaningless word...
Again correct me if I'm wrong but as ye old pilot says the buck stops.
'It is actually very easy to get out of vortex ring… at least in the incipient stage when the juddering and yawing starts'
If the above is not a meaningless statement then why did this pair not follow what would appear to be very basic steps to recover.
You would expect a Fireman to know the fire triangle...
Or is that unfair as that is the opinion that will be cast by many non pilots
Again correct me if I'm wrong but as ye old pilot says the buck stops.
'It is actually very easy to get out of vortex ring… at least in the incipient stage when the juddering and yawing starts'
If the above is not a meaningless statement then why did this pair not follow what would appear to be very basic steps to recover.
You would expect a Fireman to know the fire triangle...
Or is that unfair as that is the opinion that will be cast by many non pilots
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If the above is not a meaningless statement then why did this pair not follow what would appear to be very basic steps to recover
That's because it's "far away".
Or what we in aviation call "high up".
See how they started the exercise at 2500'.
See how the little Robinson lost 500', even though this was expected and pre-planned.
Now go and read the report again and tell us all how the crew of the 9 ton helicopter would recover from the unexpected onset of VRS (if that's what it was) from under 300'.
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For my money, VRS was not causal here, it was part of the 'ultimate effect'.
Nose-up cyclic progressively robbed the aircraft of airspeed and, at c 300', VRS developed and the aircraft entered what was, at that height, an unrecoverable uncontrolled descent.
VRS and the (probably associated) sudden yaw/hdg changes are an interesting discussion point, no more
Or at least that's my tuppence worth
Nose-up cyclic progressively robbed the aircraft of airspeed and, at c 300', VRS developed and the aircraft entered what was, at that height, an unrecoverable uncontrolled descent.
VRS and the (probably associated) sudden yaw/hdg changes are an interesting discussion point, no more
Or at least that's my tuppence worth
HC, the term "overreliance on automation" is not to be countered with "you are a cavemen for so asserting" if one wishes to prevent accidents in the future.
For GypsieMagpie:
It's dangerous when you are swapping axes (collective = speed) and an engaged mode will fly you into danger.
What is also true is that when one knows one's aircraft and one's systems, what may have been counterintuitive can become understood and applied to a given mission. People who have flown multiple models of aircraft have to do that all the time, as do people who fly more than one type for a fleet that has multiple types. If you are used to flying a given machine, you may find the next machine "counterintuitive" until one is used to it ... or trained to it. A test pilot friend of mine experienced that when flying a few Aerospatiale (and Mi) helicopters after some years as a U.S. Helicopter pilot.
(See the old vertigo demonstrations under the bag, for one).
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 24th Oct 2013 at 14:41.
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heliaviator makes a good point referencing the lack of a report on the Malaysian accident, more recently Bristow had a Puma go into the water in an apparent CFIT in Nigeria, and not an ounce of information forth coming. Perhaps lessons available and not being learnt through lack of willingness to confront and advertise shortcomings.
Autopilot modes certainly can cause trouble, Asiana has been mentioned, there was also a DC-10 climbing in VS and stalled when performance available was unable to meet the demand. Bits were shaken off the air frame due stall buffet.
Autopilot modes certainly can cause trouble, Asiana has been mentioned, there was also a DC-10 climbing in VS and stalled when performance available was unable to meet the demand. Bits were shaken off the air frame due stall buffet.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 21st Oct 2013 at 23:57.
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Been following this thread with interest as I work offshore and have done for over a decade. I read the recent report of the incident, not a pilot but have a background in military air traffic and flight ops, and there was no mention of warnings being given to the crew that their speed was decreasing. It mentions height warnings but nothing about speed which was a critical factor in this incident. Just curious about that.
As there has been some comments about blame recently perhaps a bit of feedback from a passengers may be useful. There has been a lot of discussion offshore obviously about this accident and the previous events. But the vast majority of people I have spoken with, and the conversations I have been party to, show that you guys have the confidence of the workforce offshore. We are not stupid and by the very nature of the work we do know that there is a) risk and b) people can and do make mistakes. It happens. We dont have all the facts as yet but all indications are that there was a human error at work here. But from this thread it is clear that the crews are looking at every possibility and trying to learn from what happened. Cant see what else can be done. People are naturally defensive and I understand that, nothing more natural than standing up for your colleagues, but to me its more important that every avenue is investigated and I am happy that is being done. I have always taken the view that if the pilot is happy to sign for it I am happy to sit in the back. Still am.
The bottom line is that the only people strapping into these aircraft are the crews and passengers, yet we seem to have almost zero interaction with each other. We just get in, sit behind you for a bit, and get off at at the other end. I want to see the CAA led investigation and the individual inquiries the helicopter companies being pilot led. Will they be ??, just how much input will you guys have ??, As a passenger I cringe when I hear the suited man from the HSSG going on in fluent managment speak about "opening up a dialogue" with us and I dont really put much store in PR blurb from the operators and Eurocopter. When the EC225 returned with the gearbox fix the first place I looked was here. I wanted to know what the people driving the thing had to say. The industry is missing a trick here, some guys I have talked to about the helicopter situation have openly commented that the very people whose views they want to hear, the pilots, seem to be the only ones we are not hearing from directly. Now that isnt a crticism as you are employees like us and your bosses want to manage the message that goes out. But I cannot help but feel that a meeing with current pilots would go a long way to put to rest the concerns that a small number working offshore still have. The offshore industry as a whole seems to have lost the human touch in many respects and I feel the current situation would benefit from it.
As there has been some comments about blame recently perhaps a bit of feedback from a passengers may be useful. There has been a lot of discussion offshore obviously about this accident and the previous events. But the vast majority of people I have spoken with, and the conversations I have been party to, show that you guys have the confidence of the workforce offshore. We are not stupid and by the very nature of the work we do know that there is a) risk and b) people can and do make mistakes. It happens. We dont have all the facts as yet but all indications are that there was a human error at work here. But from this thread it is clear that the crews are looking at every possibility and trying to learn from what happened. Cant see what else can be done. People are naturally defensive and I understand that, nothing more natural than standing up for your colleagues, but to me its more important that every avenue is investigated and I am happy that is being done. I have always taken the view that if the pilot is happy to sign for it I am happy to sit in the back. Still am.
The bottom line is that the only people strapping into these aircraft are the crews and passengers, yet we seem to have almost zero interaction with each other. We just get in, sit behind you for a bit, and get off at at the other end. I want to see the CAA led investigation and the individual inquiries the helicopter companies being pilot led. Will they be ??, just how much input will you guys have ??, As a passenger I cringe when I hear the suited man from the HSSG going on in fluent managment speak about "opening up a dialogue" with us and I dont really put much store in PR blurb from the operators and Eurocopter. When the EC225 returned with the gearbox fix the first place I looked was here. I wanted to know what the people driving the thing had to say. The industry is missing a trick here, some guys I have talked to about the helicopter situation have openly commented that the very people whose views they want to hear, the pilots, seem to be the only ones we are not hearing from directly. Now that isnt a crticism as you are employees like us and your bosses want to manage the message that goes out. But I cannot help but feel that a meeing with current pilots would go a long way to put to rest the concerns that a small number working offshore still have. The offshore industry as a whole seems to have lost the human touch in many respects and I feel the current situation would benefit from it.
Last edited by Offshore Addict; 22nd Oct 2013 at 06:03.
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I agree addict but what really doesnt help the dialogue is when you get marxists nut jobs opening up facebook pages or pretending to speak on behalf of the workforce through "Union" nutjobs asking for the world of helicopters and pilots to be grounded after an incident!
I have always had a fantastic dialogue with pilots and many time they have handed me a headset and we have joked and chatted on the flight when they werent at their busiest.
What we need is respect for these guys. They land on our decks without asking each and everyone of us if we have done our job and made it safe for them to do so! Some of those retards posting on facebook and such places would do well to remember that.
I have always had a fantastic dialogue with pilots and many time they have handed me a headset and we have joked and chatted on the flight when they werent at their busiest.
What we need is respect for these guys. They land on our decks without asking each and everyone of us if we have done our job and made it safe for them to do so! Some of those retards posting on facebook and such places would do well to remember that.
So more like Bond ABZ?
So more like Bond ABZ?
Perhaps some suitably qualified pilots could go offshore for a few days for small group meetings or one-to-one discussions.
Last edited by P3 Bellows; 22nd Oct 2013 at 10:23.
So more like Bond ABZ?
The process works well until the pilot is confronted by a passenger(s) with less common sense and social skills than those demonstrated by Offshore Addict above (I'm choosing my words very carefully here!). End result is a pilot who is now potentially shook up or angry having been confronted by his passengers, then having to climb into a cockpit and focus on his real task of completing the flight safely. He will not be in the right frame of mind no matter how calm he appears.
The above is not supposition on my part
Interesting idea Offshore Addict. Some warning that speed has reduced below Vy, somehow only activated when IFR (imagine slinging with a warning like that?)?
Not sure how they'd implement it, but as an instructor for years for offshore guys, I know that being unaware of slowing below Vy has put many in a world of hurt. I don't know how many times I've said "watch your speed" and how much stress we'd put on being aware of dropping below Vy. "Fly the aircraft" is the most common debrief item. It's a very common mistake that generates interesting recoveries in the sim.
Not sure how they'd implement it, but as an instructor for years for offshore guys, I know that being unaware of slowing below Vy has put many in a world of hurt. I don't know how many times I've said "watch your speed" and how much stress we'd put on being aware of dropping below Vy. "Fly the aircraft" is the most common debrief item. It's a very common mistake that generates interesting recoveries in the sim.
Last edited by Bladestrike; 22nd Oct 2013 at 10:39.
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Bladestrike:
You refer to the warning of airspeed dropping below Vy and suppose there's a way to do it when IFR. Completely agree with the idea, always have.
An immediate fix would be when 3-axis (alt, and hdg/app engaged) that annunciators show IAS below Vy and 40kts.
This is where the 225 would have had an effect on this incident (not a 225 buff, an L2 driver myself). With the V/S and APP engaged the autopilot would have engaged the IAS below 40kts? (Anyone please correct me if I am wrong). Thus -arguably- preventing VRS.
You refer to the warning of airspeed dropping below Vy and suppose there's a way to do it when IFR. Completely agree with the idea, always have.
An immediate fix would be when 3-axis (alt, and hdg/app engaged) that annunciators show IAS below Vy and 40kts.
This is where the 225 would have had an effect on this incident (not a 225 buff, an L2 driver myself). With the V/S and APP engaged the autopilot would have engaged the IAS below 40kts? (Anyone please correct me if I am wrong). Thus -arguably- preventing VRS.
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What, if any, new policy or advice has CHC introduced for flight crews following this accident, regarding use of upper modes on aircraft with 3 axis AFCSs during IMC non-precision approaches?
Or other operators, come to that?
Or other operators, come to that?
Iamthetroll - its 65 kts not 40. 40 is getting pretty slow! Had his been a 225 the heli would not have slowed below 65 kts had the pilots done nothing. But then, since the 225 is flown 4 axis pretty much all the time (in BHL anyway) it seems highly unlikely that a 3 axis approach would have been contemplated in the first place.
Rotorspeed - wrong question? Should read ...4-axis...if you want to relate it to this accident and the L2.
Rotorspeed - wrong question? Should read ...4-axis...if you want to relate it to this accident and the L2.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 23rd Oct 2013 at 07:48.
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Sorry HC - getting confused, though admittedly rushing! I thought the accident acft here only had a 3 axis hence speed decay with low collective on VS couple. Are you saying it was 4 axis? If so was it only being used in 3 axis mode here? Perhaps I better try to find time to go through reports again!