Wollongong fatal crash March 2013

[CYHeli]

If the aircraft spills fuel and burns as a result of an impact, is that fire not part of the impact? Therefore does the propensity of the aircraft to burn, directly impact on the certification requirements as to survivability of the occupants in the event of an accident?

Accidents happen, that's why we train. Accidents happen at sea, that's why we have HUET courses. They shouldn't, nobody plans to have an accident, but they do occur. The skids are designed to spread to take an impact, It improves survivability. Seat belts are mandatory.

Bladders are designed to reduce fuel spill, since it is a known issue, is enough being done to protect life?

[Gemini Twin]

No CYHeli enough isn't being done to protect life. These helicopters are cheap and allow many people to gain a "license" without the skills that were taught years ago. They come apart in the air or crash due to "pilots" simple running out of ideas and are just along for the ride for the last few seconds. You get what you pay for and lots of buyers didn't want to pay for the fire proof systems. Do blame the certification regs. These helicopters are the Ladas of the helicopter industry.

[heliduck]

I think CYHeli & GT have a point, once there is a known problem I don't understand why there is such a long delay in rectifying said known problem. No doubt highly paid lawyers work all those details out, so what could possibly go wrong

On a different point GT, if I read your statement correctly you are attributing a lack of pilot skill on the helicopters being too cheap to train in? Using this logic, if flying schools charge more for training in an R44 then less people will learn, therefore less people crash? Sounds ridiculous to me so I'm sure I've interpreted your comment incorrectly. The standard a pilot needs to achieve before being let loose on the world is set by the examiners, not by the cost of running the helicopter.

Just a thought to add to the previous comments - Myself & thousands of others have conducted mustering, Ag, photography, longlining, shooting & lots of other so-called "high risk" activities in Robinson helicopters & have come out the other end unscathed. I agree that if I did happen to come to grief in one I would prefer it didn't burn, but blaming a collision with an immovable object by an otherwise perfectly functioning helicopter(assumption on my part) & the financial situation of the trainee is drawing a very long bow.

[Ian Corrigible]

Originally Posted by Dick Smith

So surely by now someone must be able to tell us if a bladder was installed?

Originally Posted by ARRJ

I am advised that HWQ was not fitted with the new fuel bags

Helicopter that crashed at Bulli Tops fitted with a faulty fuel tank

The article notes that CASA is only aware of 25% of the Aus R44 fleet having been installed with bladder tanks.

I/C

[mickjoebill]

We simply do not know if the impact would have been survivable in the absence of fire.

Disturbing first responder account that suggests all occupants probably survived a collision with trees, followed by a bounce with rotors turning and then rollover from a height of a few feet.

Bulli Tops tragedy: men traumatised by helicopter rescue attempt | Illawarra Mercury

A man (according to another eyewitness) wearing a helmet tried to exit from (presumably) the passenger side front door, but said he was stuck.

Conflicting reports that they put the fire out, but it was too hot to extract anyone. The Volunteer fire brigade probably took 10-12 minutes to arrive from time of incident and the craft was not totally consumed as one would expect.



Mickjoebill

[cattletruck]

Dear me, I find that account in the link absolutely gutting.

I can only wonder what the pax brief involved before the flight. The "Flimsycopter" that VF refers should not require too much effort to egress.

[212man]

Very sad news and I hope those who attempted to assist will not suffer as a result what they witnessed.

it has echoes of my (then) best friend's death in 1988. He span his Bulldog into Southport beach and survived the impact. The first responder was an off duty fireman but he was confused by the two harness releases (seat and parachute) so ran to his car a few yards away to get a knife to cut the straps. When he got back the aircraft caught fire and he had to watch Mark burn alive.
ASN Aircraft accident 02-MAR-1988 Scottish Aviation Bulldog T1 XX712

[OvertHawk]

I have the utmost respect for those who risked their lives to help those people involved in this horrible accident. I hope that they can, in time, recover from the terrible things they will have seen that day.

OH

[RVDT]

CSIRO mourns four retired scientists killed in chopper crash

The Australian

[ChippyChop]

This is a very tricky confined area landing site. The cliffs have a big influence on the conditions for landing. I would not describe this as a suitable site for inexperienced PPL pilots with a full load of pax. My condolences to all involved especially the staff who tried in vain to help the victims.

[John Eacott]

ATSB preliminary report here:

What happened
At about 1207 local time on 21 March 2013, a Robinson Helicopter Company R44 helicopter (R44), registered VH-HWQ, was manoeuvring at a grassed area at Bulli Tops, New South Wales. Shortly after landing, the helicopter lifted off and turned to the right. The main rotor struck branches of a nearby tree, and the helicopter descended and then rolled over onto its right side. A fire started on the grass under the rotor mast and the cabin. The pilot and the three passengers were fatally injured.

What the ATSB found
The circumstances of this accident are consistent with two recent R44 accidents in Australia involving low-energy impacts that resulted in the all-aluminium fuel tanks being breached and a fuel-fed fire. R44 accidents result in a significantly higher proportion of post-impact fires than for other similar helicopter types. The accident helicopter was equipped with an all-aluminium tank.
On 20 December 2010 the Robinson Helicopter Company issued Service Bulletin SB-78 providing for the replacement of all-aluminium tanks in R44 helicopters with bladder-type tanks that substantially reduce the likelihood of post-crash fires. On 28 September 2012 the Robinson Helicopter Company revised and reissued the service bulletin as SB-78B. This revision brought forward the compliance date for the service bulletin to 30 April 2013. The ATSB has assessed that about 100 Australian R44 helicopters will not have met the service bulletin by the due date.

What's been done as a result
In response to this accident, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has confirmed its understanding that the great majority of Australian R44 helicopter owners are legally required to comply with Service Bulletin SB-78B. CASA has also undertaken to contact owners who may not be required to comply and then consider further action depending on the response to that contact.
The ATSB remains concerned at the significant risk that many R44 helicopters will not comply with the service bulletin and has recommended that CASA take further action to ensure compliance.

Safety message
The fitment of bladder-type fuel tanks to R44 helicopters is a very important safety enhancement that could save lives and is very strongly encouraged. In addition, regulators and investigation agencies in other countries should take note of this report and consider what steps they can take to increase compliance with the manufacturer’s safety bulletin.

[pohm1]

CASA Directive

R44 helicopter fuel tanks must be upgraded
Robinson R44 helicopters that have not been fitted with upgraded fuel tanks face being grounded from 30 April 2013.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has issued a direction to all affected R44 helicopter operators about the installation of flexible fuel tanks to reduce the risk of post-accident fires.

CASA has made it clear that R44 helicopter operators following the Robinson maintenance program are required to install the new fuel tanks.

Any operators not covered by the Robinson maintenance program will be directed by CASA to fit the tanks if the upgrade has not already been completed.

In a service bulletin issued in September 2012 Robinson set 30 April 2013 as the deadline for the fitting of the flexible fuel tanks.

All R44 helicopter operators have been given ample notice of this requirement, with the first fuel tank service bulletin issued by Robinson in December 2010.

CASA issued an airworthiness bulletin in June 2012 strongly recommending the fuel tanks be fitted at the earliest opportunity.

CASA then wrote to R44 operators in February 2013 to emphasise the deadline set by Robinson.

On 28 March 2013 CASA again wrote to all R44 operators to highlight the importance of replacing the fuel tanks and to direct them to give information to CASA about the status of their maintenance program.

In addition, CASA this week issued another airworthiness bulletin to formally remind R44 operators and maintainers of the need to have new fuel tanks fitted.

The latest actions by CASA follow a preliminary investigation report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into a fatal R44 helicopter accident at Bulli Tops in NSW on 21 March 2013.

Safety is CASA’s overriding priority.



Media contact:
Peter Gibson
Mobile: [phone]
Email: [email protected]
Ref: MR0813

[Up-into-the-air]

casa and the atsb

It is always sad when someone makes a mistake such as this with fatal consequences

Safety is CASA’s overriding priority.

But, where is the discussion about:

Training;
Loss tail rotor effectiveness;
Effect of orographic uplift;
Other factors.

Yes, the final effect of split aluminium tanks is fatal - but the reason for the pilot being in that situation, where [according to atsb] he has lost cotrol to strike the trees is the real issue.

Read the Robbo safety bulletins, particularly at

R22/R44 Ops Info | Assistance to the Aviation Industry

and look at:

Safety Notice SN-34 Issued: Mar 99 Rev: Apr 2009
AERIAL SURVEY AND PHOTO FLIGHTS - VERY HIGH RISK

[Flying Binghi]

Its only a preliminary report Up-into-the-air.

"...R44 helicopter (R44), registered VH-HWQ, was manoeuvring at a grassed area at Bulli Tops, New South Wales. Shortly after landing, the helicopter lifted off and turned to the right. The main rotor struck branches of a nearby tree..."

No mention of loss of control as such. Perhaps there will be more on it in the final report.





Edit - and before the forum wacko's start up - Yes, i have owned an R44.





.

[Ascend Charlie]

But, where is the discussion about:

Training;
Loss tail rotor effectiveness;

You won't get LTE in a Robinson, Frank was a genius at tail rotor design.

In fact, you won't get LTE anywhere except in an old B206 with a small tail rotor.

This R44 accident sounds like a simple pilot error in bumping into a tree. And yes, I have landed at Panorama myself under all sorts of weather conditions, but have never come at it from below the escarpment.

[Flying Binghi]

...Frank was a genius at tail rotor design...

If i recall correctly, i think he cut his teeth on the Hughes 300 tail rotor.

[as350nut]

Pohm1 CASA directive

Interesting to read the CASA spin, if the fuel bladder is the fix to a problem, then if safety was the real factor it should have been mandatory, and done as per availability of kits and done a lot sooner than has been allowed. If its not necessarily the fix why do it at all. I think CASA has been to slow to act, and I don't understand why. Writing letters to owners and asking if they have got round to doing anything yet is just a sign of how ineffectual they have been on this one. Personally I don't think any R44 should be carrying passengers now if the tanks aren't done. If the pilot wants to risk his own neck well so be it. I imagine if that idea is taken up there will be a lot of 44's sitting. Don't think I am a R44 basher I have owned 5 of them and 7 R22's. The interesting thing will be the next accident where the tank is ruptured and the fuel bladder is intact and no fire, that will be the proof needed.

[Up-into-the-air]

LTE and Robinson's

I have had a quick trawl on LTE and the following is interesting:

Helicopter Safety | Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness [LTE]

What is LTE? LTE is an uncommanded, rapid yaw towards the advancing blade which does not subside of its own accord. It can result in the loss of the aircraft if left unchecked.

Which helicopters are susceptible to LTE?
All helicopters with a single main rotor and tail rotor are susceptible to LTE. Those helicopters equipped with a Fenestron are affected by a similar phenomenon traditionally known as 'Fenestron Stall'. The Bell Jetranger is statistically the most likely to encounter LTE and it is this type which caused the FAA to look more closely at the problem back in the 1980s.

Is LTE caused by a mechanical defect?
No. LTE is caused by an aerodynamic interaction between the main rotor and tail rotor. Some helicopter types (Jetranger) are more likely to encounter LTE due to the insufficient thrust produced by having a tail rotor which meets certification standards, but which is not always able to produce the thrust demanded by the pilot.

AND [:]Rotor & Wing Magazine :: Safety Watch: Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness

Thursday, February 1, 2007
Safety Watch: Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness

Tim McAdams

ACCORDING TO THE NTSB, ON July 11, 2000, the pilot of a Robinson Helicopter R22B said he was flying northeast about 10-20 mph at about 230 ft agl when the helicopter began to rotate to the right and seemed as if it was inverted.
He applied full left pedal and lowered the collective. After about three rotations, he heard a horn, which he believed was a low rotor-rpm warning. Initial inputs did not correct the loss of control.
As the helicopter descended toward trees, he applied full left cyclic, followed by full forward cyclic, then full right cyclic. The helicopter seemed slightly more controllable and was no longer inverted. However, it was still corkscrewing to the right. It impacted a swampy area and the fuselage, tail boom, and tail rotor were damaged. The pilot sustained serious injury. The passenger was not injured.
Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Reported winds at an airport about 7 mi from the accident site were from 300 deg at 15 kt, gusting to 21.
The NTSB determined the probable cause as the pilot-in-command’s improper in-flight decision to maneuver at a low airspeed with a left quartering tailwind, which resulted in a loss of tail-rotor effectiveness.
Just over a year later, the pilot of a Bell Helicopter 206B JetRanger and his passenger were not so lucky. They were fatally injured when their helicopter collided with Alpha taxiway abeam Runway 15 Right at Baltimore-Washington International Airport.
The helicopter approached a construction site on the airport in an out-of-ground-effect (OGE) hover taxi, with a quartering left tailwind. The helicopter turned right, and slowed to a stationary hover at about 250 ft with a direct tailwind. Once in a hover, it made a right, rapid, 180-deg pedal turn around the mast, stopped momentarily, then initiated another, rapid pedal turn to the right. The helicopter turned at a faster rate than the initial turn and continued into a spinning, vertical descent to the ground. The FAA’s examination of the helicopter found no mechanical anomalies.
Again, the NTSB determined the probable cause was the pilot’s improper decision to maneuver in an environment conducive to a loss of tail-rotor effectiveness and his inadequate recovery from the resulting unanticipated right yaw.
According to FAA Advisory Circular AC90-95, any maneuver which requires the pilot to operate in a high-power, low-airspeed environment with a left crosswind or tailwind creates an environment where unanticipated right yaw may occur. It also advises of greater susceptibility for loss of tail-rotor effectiveness in right turns and states the phenomena may occur in varying degrees in all single main-rotor helicopters at airspeeds less than 30 kt.
Bell’s Operations Safety Notice OSN 206-83-10, regarding loss of tail-rotor effectiveness in the 206B and similar airframes, describes the phenomenon as an unanticipated right yaw. It contains the following warnings when maneuvering between a hover and 30 mph:
"Be aware that a tail wind will reduce relative wind speed if a downwind translation occurs. If loss of translational lift occurs, it can result in a high power demand and an additional anti-torque requirement. Be alert during hover (especially OGE) and high-power-demand situations. Be alert during hover in winds of about 8-12 kt (especially OGE), since there are no strong indications to the pilot [of] the possibility of a reduction of translational lift... Be aware that if a considerable amount of left pedal is being maintained, that a sufficient amount of left pedal may not be available to counteract an unanticipated right yaw."
Included in this notice is a chart that depicts relative-wind directions referencing the fuselage where an unanticipated right yaw can occur. More information is also available in Bell’s Rotorbreeze magazine.
One reason these pilots may have placed themselves and their passengers in jeopardy despite the abundance of warnings and information regarding loss of tail-rotor effectiveness is inexperience. The pilot of the R22B held a private pilot’s license and did not provide any further information to the NTSB or FAA. The Bell 206B pilot was commercially rated, but had less than 500 hr of helicopter flight experience, and 87.2 hr of experience in that model.
Both of these flights were performing aerial photography, the nature of which requires maneuvering at low altitudes and slow speeds. Add to that the distraction of trying to work with a photographer to line up the desired shot and the mission becomes very demanding. Any pilot flying a photographer needs to insure that he understands the aerodynamics and limitations of maneuvering at slow speeds.
Flight instructors should take note because students often misunderstand loss of tail-rotor effectiveness. More emphasis should be placed on this subject and instructors must ensure students fully understand the dangers of loss of tail-rotor effectiveness. Failure to do so can be deadly.
Tim McAdams has more than 9,000 total flight hours, with 7,000 in helicopters. A helicopter CFI and a fixed- and rotor-wing ATP, he flies a single-pilot IFR Agusta 109E for CareFlite in Dallas. You can reach him at [email protected].

And from Australia [http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3450408/ao2011055.pdf]

ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT
Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2011-055
Final
Loss of control, VH-ETT
4 km south-east of Kilmore, Victoria
30 April 2011
Abstract
On 30 April 2011, the owner-pilot of a Robinson Helicopter Co. R44 helicopter, registered VH-ETT, was conducting a local flight from a private property located near Kilmore Gap, Victoria. During low-level maneuvering at low speed around a dam, the pilot lost directional control and landed heavily in the water. The helicopter was seriously damaged; the pilot and passenger sustained minor injuries.
The investigation found that the helicopter was probably serviceable and that the loss of directional control was likely to be a result of a loss of tail rotor effectiveness.
The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) activated on impact and prompted an effective search and rescue (SAR) response through a broadcast on the 121.5 MHz frequency. However, the 406 MHz transmission that was monitored by the SAR agency did not trigger an alert or provide identification information. As a result, there was no assurance of an immediate and effective response from the SAR agency.
The investigation found that the ELT could be programmed with identification information either directly or (if fitted) by input from a component (dongle) in the ELT wiring connector. In this occurrence, the ELT had been inadvertently reprogrammed with incorrect information from the dongle.
A minor safety issue was identified in that there were only subtle cues to distinguish programmable dongles from the standard-type wiring connector. There was also variability in the conduct of post-installation ELT testing.
In response, on 6 June 2011, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) published Airworthiness Bulletin 25-018 to alert maintenance organisations to the risk of programming dongles transferring potentially invalid details to the memory of ELTs. CASA advised that an article in Flight Safety Australia would also highlight the issue.
The helicopter manufacturer advised that they were introducing measures to increase awareness of programming dongles in their new helicopters.

[Ascend Charlie]

Do a search on Helicopter Urban Myths, you will see how the mantra has been accepted by even the FAA.

From Nick Lappos, ex-Chief Sikorsky Test Pilot, also worked for Bell and Gulfstream:
"Ascend Charlie has is dead on. Most helo pilot can't experience LTE becausae most helos cant get LTE.

The term LTE makes me wince. The concept of the tail rotor somehow losing effectiveness is a convenient one for folks to use, because it allows the people who make small tail rotors to blame a mysterious force of nature instead of fixing their problem.

There are two possibilities for an LTE event to be triggered. They are both the result of you having entered a region where the tail thrust is not enough to counter the main torque because the main torque rose by itself.

They are neither because the tail rotor suddenly experienced massive reduced thrust.

LTE is almost always because the tail rotor has too little thrust BY DESIGN to account for small normal reductions in its thrust. Typical thrust variations of 5% are easily handled by tail rotors with that much margin above the thrust needed to do their jobs. When a tail rotor has no margin, by design, these 5% variations are too much, and the main rotor torque dominates, causeing loss of yaw control.

The two cases cited by hilico show how the term has now been so badly abused as to have entered the lexicon for any pedal stop event. An overloaded helo that runs out of yaw control does so as its tail rotor is producing thrust well in excess of its design capability. The tail rotr is not the cause.

LTE is a term invented by the team from one manufacturer who has to quickly train a bunch of pilots to compensate for a marginal yaw control. the worldwide data base shows that about 95% of legitimate LTE events is experienced by one type of helo (the 206).

Look at the hover curves of several helos to note that the hover weight is not determined by the power, it is determined by the tail rotor design thrust. These are prime candidates for "LTE" because the have "Tailo Rotors Too Small".

Please, to be precise and to teach proper procedure for recovery, do not call overpitching and loss of yaw control LTE, call it overpitching."

[Up-into-the-air]

LTE and Robinson's

Don't have a problem with any of what you say especially:

Please, to be precise and to teach proper procedure for recovery, do not call overpitching and loss of yaw control LTE, call it overpitching."

What concerns me is: "Are allowing the regulator and investigator to just blame the "tanks" for the fatality."

We must question how the R44 got into this predicament. Was the 44 in the wrong part of the power curve and the rest is just the unfortunate result.