Tackling Engine Fire After Take Off in Multi Engine Heli
I do love it when experienced pilots put forward theories that are fine in their own little worlds but don't translate well across to another operations.
Let us think about how offshore operations are conducted. They are mostly to helidecks which are in the region of 200ft amsl. So Crabs cruising at 200ft is not a scenario that fits in with what happens offshore.
On takeoff the idea is to minimise the chance of a tailstrike should one engine fail therefore there is a SOP for each aircraft type which basically is a dynamic t/o which gives a ballistic profile should an engine stop - this clears the tail from the edge of the helideck. This profle entails high power settings which as the a/c accelerates give it a good rate of climb. The time taken for the a/c to reach 500ft is therefore very short so the SOP to reach 500ft is a good one.
Remember the SOP has to cover all weather scenarios from CAVOK to a dark and stormy night. So the non NS pilots ideas of descending to 50 - 100ft (TC) is dangerous. You are asking the HP to make a fairly major attitude/power change to start a descent towards the sea with the chance he misses his 50ft level off either through distraction - in Crab's words
or intertia because the a/c is going down too fast.
The a/c have autopilots with more and more sophistication but none has auto letdown as does the Seaking. The SOPs also have to cater for a wide variance in crew experience so that any Captain can fly with any copilot. NS operations are not like cosy SAR flights where you know the weaknesses of the 4 copilots you always fly with. On NS operations you may not have flown with a particular copilot for months but you need to know how he will react to any emergency.
We all know that having a burning airframe is potentially very dangerous but there is no point in putting a serviceable a/c in the water, endangering 19 pax who haven't a clue what is going on outside the warm cabin. They are not on intercom like a military crew who will be aware of the emergency from the very start so we also need time to brief them - remember some of the pax on the recent ETAP ditching thought they had landed normally until water started to come into the cabin.
So the climb to 500ft isn't as "dangerous" as Crab and TC try to make out
HF
Let us think about how offshore operations are conducted. They are mostly to helidecks which are in the region of 200ft amsl. So Crabs cruising at 200ft is not a scenario that fits in with what happens offshore.
On takeoff the idea is to minimise the chance of a tailstrike should one engine fail therefore there is a SOP for each aircraft type which basically is a dynamic t/o which gives a ballistic profile should an engine stop - this clears the tail from the edge of the helideck. This profle entails high power settings which as the a/c accelerates give it a good rate of climb. The time taken for the a/c to reach 500ft is therefore very short so the SOP to reach 500ft is a good one.
Remember the SOP has to cover all weather scenarios from CAVOK to a dark and stormy night. So the non NS pilots ideas of descending to 50 - 100ft (TC) is dangerous. You are asking the HP to make a fairly major attitude/power change to start a descent towards the sea with the chance he misses his 50ft level off either through distraction - in Crab's words
(engine still burning)
The a/c have autopilots with more and more sophistication but none has auto letdown as does the Seaking. The SOPs also have to cater for a wide variance in crew experience so that any Captain can fly with any copilot. NS operations are not like cosy SAR flights where you know the weaknesses of the 4 copilots you always fly with. On NS operations you may not have flown with a particular copilot for months but you need to know how he will react to any emergency.
We all know that having a burning airframe is potentially very dangerous but there is no point in putting a serviceable a/c in the water, endangering 19 pax who haven't a clue what is going on outside the warm cabin. They are not on intercom like a military crew who will be aware of the emergency from the very start so we also need time to brief them - remember some of the pax on the recent ETAP ditching thought they had landed normally until water started to come into the cabin.
So the climb to 500ft isn't as "dangerous" as Crab and TC try to make out
HF
76Fan, I take it that's your age then? Because that's how old you'd have to be to have taught me anything
Bravo and Fareast: C'mon guys, SOP's are an amalgamation of chief pilots thoughts and ideas gleaned from the rest of you coal face workers over years of experience. I have flown a fleet wide AOC for 14yrs and all our SOP's are through communal agreements throughout that fleet. What's more important is that they are revised and reviewed very frequently. For you to say they are SOP's therefore we must obey....is pathetic and shows how immature the industry is in this particular regard.
Secondly, I bet even your SOP's have clause that allows the Captain to extricate himself from said rules in the exigencies of safety. And flying all the way UP and then all the way back DOWN just because you think that the difference between bernoullis at 500' or 100/200' will give you "breathing space" is a fallacy. Does the helo in autopilot care or even know it's at 500' or lower? Of course not, so why climb? Granted, 50' is suicidal, but 100 or 200' dependent on ambient conditions most certainly should NOT be excluded.
[Perhaps the colder temp at 500' will put the fire out
].
IF you gentlemen are old or bold or even both and have been in your industry for many years, shame on you that you have adhered unblinkered to 45yrs worth of SOP's without a second thought or challenge.
Am I really hearing that a wisened old bus driver will diengage brain and climb to 500' because it says so in a BOOK? Get a life guys.
Hummingfrog - A much more enlightening insight to your ops - thank you. I admit to being a little too hasty w.r.t. climbing from low to medium level (based on the OP's comments) now that I understand you are already close to said height from the start. That said, I stand by my comments about:
IF one is low level to start with, don't leave that level, simply to fight a fire.
[Let's not get into a pi**ing contest over offshore rig driving and real flying now.........]
Flexibility - sorts the men out from the statistics
Bravo and Fareast: C'mon guys, SOP's are an amalgamation of chief pilots thoughts and ideas gleaned from the rest of you coal face workers over years of experience. I have flown a fleet wide AOC for 14yrs and all our SOP's are through communal agreements throughout that fleet. What's more important is that they are revised and reviewed very frequently. For you to say they are SOP's therefore we must obey....is pathetic and shows how immature the industry is in this particular regard.
Secondly, I bet even your SOP's have clause that allows the Captain to extricate himself from said rules in the exigencies of safety. And flying all the way UP and then all the way back DOWN just because you think that the difference between bernoullis at 500' or 100/200' will give you "breathing space" is a fallacy. Does the helo in autopilot care or even know it's at 500' or lower? Of course not, so why climb? Granted, 50' is suicidal, but 100 or 200' dependent on ambient conditions most certainly should NOT be excluded.
[Perhaps the colder temp at 500' will put the fire out
].IF you gentlemen are old or bold or even both and have been in your industry for many years, shame on you that you have adhered unblinkered to 45yrs worth of SOP's without a second thought or challenge.
Am I really hearing that a wisened old bus driver will diengage brain and climb to 500' because it says so in a BOOK? Get a life guys.
Hummingfrog - A much more enlightening insight to your ops - thank you. I admit to being a little too hasty w.r.t. climbing from low to medium level (based on the OP's comments) now that I understand you are already close to said height from the start. That said, I stand by my comments about:
IF one is low level to start with, don't leave that level, simply to fight a fire.
[Let's not get into a pi**ing contest over offshore rig driving and real flying now.........]
Flexibility - sorts the men out from the statistics
I have flown a fleet wide AOC for 14yrs
In the late 90s I was flying in China teaching Chinese pilots to operate to Western standards. Chinese aviation during that time was appalling. We had British CAA personnel who refused to fly in Chinese airliners. The stories going around were unbelievable; if an airliner crashed and there were no Westerners on board they just bulldozed over the hole, if an ATC bloke caused an accident they took him round the back and shot him. We Brits, Ozzys, Kiwis and Yanks in both the rotary and the fixed wing civil aviation world slowly brought them around to our way of thinking using our proven SOPs. Chinese aviation is now as safe as any aviation system in the world.
I do not know how much of the S61 is made of magnesium but a lot of the mystique in miltary circles is based on the speed at which Whirlwinds and Wessexs would evaporate if they caught fire. I can remember having to put a parachute on in order to do an air test involving climbing above 3,000 ft. because if it caught fire it would burn out before you could autorotate to the ground.
North Sea helicopters are not made like that any more. They are made out of alloy and steel and the designers look at it and think that if that bit catches fire what do you need to stop it going to that bit, and so on. Logic says that an engine will not run with an uncontrollable fire because the fire is burning the fuel that the engine is supposed to be using. Shut off the fuel, the fire stops. The days of helicopters catching fire and burning out in the air have gone. It is now an orderly progression through the checklist which will, and has been proved, controls the problem.
shame on you that you have adhered unblinkered to 45yrs worth of SOP's without a second thought or challenge.
Tightgit
mad-jock - each engine is in its own firewalled enclosure - apart from the cowlings of course, but I guess they are dispensible! However it you look at the nature of the firewalls, they never look that substantial to me, and just behind them is the main gearbox / flight control jacks and all hydraulic systems. Just underneath them is the passenger cabin.
I did however derive a lot of confidence from the fact that the engine firewalls meant that the engine bays and engines were 'relatively intact'. If you saw the condition of the crew compartment post fire, close up as I did. You may have more confidence that an engine fire would be contained behind the firewall!! Isn't the theory, fly the aircraft then deal with the emergency? Remaining low level strikes me a bit as prioritising the emergency over flying the aircraft!!Last edited by handysnaks; 20th Dec 2012 at 21:29.
SOPs
What's more important is that they are revised and reviewed very frequently.
For you to say they are SOP's therefore we must obey....is pathetic
Perhaps you could let us know which operator you have been flying for, so we can have a good laugh!
Last edited by HeliComparator; 20th Dec 2012 at 22:01.
Never mind TC - it has been good sport just before Christmas and, as always on PPrune, educational
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Sounds like they same issues the fixed wing pilots went through 15-20 years ago regarding SOP's.
In the west is pretty much a done deal now with most if not all now sold on the fact that SOP's are the way forward and to stick to them. Some of the SOP's it has even been admitted that they are not the best. But....
When you take into account the average pilot skills, fatigue, poor wx conditions etc etc it has been shown that the SOP has a more successful out come than the best technical solution.
I find this sort of thing very interesting but its hard to discuss it clinically because emotions get high and people focus on individual events and types and that deflects away from the core subject. There is also a huge difference between multicrew and single crew. Single crew experenced pilots have a different way of dealing with things which is quiet hard to break them away from. Hence some airlines preference for straight out of school pilots which they can mold with relative ease.
And yes it does take some sitting on your hands when a bus tie is clacking away waiting for your FO to get the QRH out to eventually work out that one of the generators is rubber ducked. But there is minimal chance of turning the wrong one off. The flight profile won't have changed and apart from a bit of clacking the punters in the back won't have a clue that anything has happened. Yes it could have been sorted on the first couple of clacks but such is life. That example wasn't meant to be condersending it was just the first one I thought off because it happened last week when I was line training an FO. All very exciting for the FO and he did very well. My main though was I wonder how much charge is in my kindle thats us grounded.
In the west is pretty much a done deal now with most if not all now sold on the fact that SOP's are the way forward and to stick to them. Some of the SOP's it has even been admitted that they are not the best. But....
When you take into account the average pilot skills, fatigue, poor wx conditions etc etc it has been shown that the SOP has a more successful out come than the best technical solution.
I find this sort of thing very interesting but its hard to discuss it clinically because emotions get high and people focus on individual events and types and that deflects away from the core subject. There is also a huge difference between multicrew and single crew. Single crew experenced pilots have a different way of dealing with things which is quiet hard to break them away from. Hence some airlines preference for straight out of school pilots which they can mold with relative ease.
And yes it does take some sitting on your hands when a bus tie is clacking away waiting for your FO to get the QRH out to eventually work out that one of the generators is rubber ducked. But there is minimal chance of turning the wrong one off. The flight profile won't have changed and apart from a bit of clacking the punters in the back won't have a clue that anything has happened. Yes it could have been sorted on the first couple of clacks but such is life. That example wasn't meant to be condersending it was just the first one I thought off because it happened last week when I was line training an FO. All very exciting for the FO and he did very well. My main though was I wonder how much charge is in my kindle thats us grounded.
Last edited by mad_jock; 21st Dec 2012 at 11:32. Reason: Ta seen what the problem was thanks HC
mad-jock, yes I agree with all that although
was possibly a typo?
I wouldn't like you to think that the vast majority of N Sea Oil and Gas pilots share some of the views expressed by the old and bold (and in some cases, retired many years ago) dinosaurs. Whilst we may be slightly behind fixed-wing philosophy in a few areas, we are not that far behind and certainly SOPs and following the Emerg Checklist is the order of the day for all the 3 main operators, for the reasons you have mentioned.
That example was meant to be condersending
I wouldn't like you to think that the vast majority of N Sea Oil and Gas pilots share some of the views expressed by the old and bold (and in some cases, retired many years ago) dinosaurs. Whilst we may be slightly behind fixed-wing philosophy in a few areas, we are not that far behind and certainly SOPs and following the Emerg Checklist is the order of the day for all the 3 main operators, for the reasons you have mentioned.
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Well it was meant to be "condescending"
And it was the trivial nature of the example that I didn't want you to feel I was preaching how to suck eggs with.
I had no doudt to be honest that would be the case in ABZ.
And it was the trivial nature of the example that I didn't want you to feel I was preaching how to suck eggs with.
I had no doudt to be honest that would be the case in ABZ.
The days of helicopters catching fire and burning out in the air have gone. It is now an orderly progression through the checklist which will, and has been proved, controls the problem.
And the S-92 in Newfoundland highlighted that checklists are not the answer to all problems either.Whilst I accept that percentage-wise, the SOP and checklist mantra will work - why automatically accept that it will always be so - if you remove the pilot's ability to recognise and react to an unusual emergency, you might as well have a robot on board. I think I would still rather risk scaring the pax than running out of ideas and time just because the SOP says so.
And the S-92 in Newfoundland highlighted that checklists are not the answer to all problems either.
That opens up the discussion of why he failed to follow the checklist - ISTR it was to do with confusion over lack of oil temp increase (no oil left to give the sensor input) added to the belief he had a 30-min run dry. That doesn't prove that checklists are infallible (nor pilots, sadly).
That doesn't prove that checklists are infallible
So let me get this straight - in every situation, regardless of the problem or scenario, following the checklist and SOP is the only option?
Helicomparator: don't be so simplistic/pedantic. You know what i mean when something is revised. Is it necessarily changed everytime it is revisited - of course not.
Have I said SOP's should not be followed - of course not. I did stress that in the exigencies of the service one is expected to be flexible, that is why some people are Captains and others make the coffee.
Here (in this thread) we have persons explaining that SOP's haven't changed for 45 yrs and then others explaining that modern helicopters have changed beyond recognition. If the latter is correct (and of course it is) then SOP's are at the very least out of step - QED. Eat your shorts
As we speak, SOP's are being changed for gearbox mals over inhospitable terrain. Don't tell me they will remain in their new format until 2057+
Hummingfrog: TC. 1, HC. 0.
Crab - I love it, especially with the rig drivers, most (certainly not all) who dream of breaking away from SOP's just for 5 minutes. And when no -one is looking, to actually fly the helicopter for real.
Happy Christmas to you all, fly safely (unless it says otherwise in your SOP [Santa Operating Procedure].
Have I said SOP's should not be followed - of course not. I did stress that in the exigencies of the service one is expected to be flexible, that is why some people are Captains and others make the coffee.
Here (in this thread) we have persons explaining that SOP's haven't changed for 45 yrs and then others explaining that modern helicopters have changed beyond recognition. If the latter is correct (and of course it is) then SOP's are at the very least out of step - QED. Eat your shorts
As we speak, SOP's are being changed for gearbox mals over inhospitable terrain. Don't tell me they will remain in their new format until 2057+
Hummingfrog: TC. 1, HC. 0.
Crab - I love it, especially with the rig drivers, most (certainly not all) who dream of breaking away from SOP's just for 5 minutes. And when no -one is looking, to actually fly the helicopter for real.
Happy Christmas to you all, fly safely (unless it says otherwise in your SOP [Santa Operating Procedure].
Crab
It is never the only option but it is the basis for what ever the Captain does. It is a framework that has been distilled over many thousands of hours of NS flying by hundreds of experienced NS pilots and believe it or not Crab it works!
There will always be "out of the box" scenarios that require experience to satisfactorily solve. You would, however be hard pressed to point to an offshore emergency that has ended badly due to someone slavishly following the SOPs/Checklist whilst HC has already shown you one which did when the checklist wasn't followed and erroneous technical information was used to justify that decision
I would, also, hazard a guess that every NS pilot has had a false fire warning but very few have had a real one. So SOPs help prevent a non-event becoming an event.
I am sure the RAF still has SOPs written in the Flying Order book and GASOs or what ever they are called nowadays. RAF checklists are also far more extensive than civilian ones - perhaps to prevent RAF pilots making an emergency situation worse by doing their own thing
HF
It is never the only option but it is the basis for what ever the Captain does. It is a framework that has been distilled over many thousands of hours of NS flying by hundreds of experienced NS pilots and believe it or not Crab it works!
There will always be "out of the box" scenarios that require experience to satisfactorily solve. You would, however be hard pressed to point to an offshore emergency that has ended badly due to someone slavishly following the SOPs/Checklist whilst HC has already shown you one which did when the checklist wasn't followed and erroneous technical information was used to justify that decision
I would, also, hazard a guess that every NS pilot has had a false fire warning but very few have had a real one. So SOPs help prevent a non-event becoming an event.
I am sure the RAF still has SOPs written in the Flying Order book and GASOs or what ever they are called nowadays. RAF checklists are also far more extensive than civilian ones - perhaps to prevent RAF pilots making an emergency situation worse by doing their own thing
HF
TC
You don't work for the Scottish Executive do you as they are quite happy to trot out rubbish as fact. Though they normally use 1 in 4 rather than most.
That sentence hardly deserves a reply but I will bite. Responsible NS pilots don't dream of breaking away from SOPs - all we do is get the offshore workers to and from the rigs, in all weathers, as safely as we can. Then go home and look at our bank balance
If you are the sort of pilot who likes to do more than that then there are ways and means. I for instance take ATC Cadets on aerobatic flights (fixed wing) at the weekend, others glide.
I also don't think that HC has ever said that SOPs are cast in stone - of course they get revised as more information is discovered about our operations. However, most are pretty robust as they have been distilled from experience. When technical issues, aside from flight profile issues, come to light - as per the 225 gear shaft then Checklists/SOPs are modified fairly quickly.
HF
You don't work for the Scottish Executive do you as they are quite happy to trot out rubbish as fact. Though they normally use 1 in 4 rather than most.
Crab - I love it, especially with the rig drivers, most (certainly not all) who dream of breaking away from SOP's just for 5 minutes. And when no -one is looking, to actually fly the helicopter for real.
If you are the sort of pilot who likes to do more than that then there are ways and means. I for instance take ATC Cadets on aerobatic flights (fixed wing
) at the weekend, others glide. I also don't think that HC has ever said that SOPs are cast in stone - of course they get revised as more information is discovered about our operations. However, most are pretty robust as they have been distilled from experience. When technical issues, aside from flight profile issues, come to light - as per the 225 gear shaft then Checklists/SOPs are modified fairly quickly.
HF
crab, yes, where the scenario fits the checklist drill, it must be followed. But I agree that once in a blue moon there may be a scenario not previously thought of, not in the RFM and not in the EOPs and then yes, you are allowed to make it up as you go along.
This has happened a few times on our fleet due to the technical complexity of the 225 and the limited number of failure considered in the FMEA and hence in the RFM. In some cases it was handled very well, but in other cases very badly, which just goes to show that the more comprehensive the EOPs and SOPs are, the better.
You have to bear in mind that you military chappies were born with Raybans already attached, a square jaw and steely blue eyes with no sense of fear and cold live-or-die logic circuits for a brain. However us civilian chappies are less blessed, we fly along thinking about the necessary trip to Sainsburys to pick up toilet roll and milk on the way back home after the trip, rather than who we are going to shoot down next.
Horses for courses, we need SOPs, you don't need SOPs to shoot to kill, just an itchy trigger finger.....
This has happened a few times on our fleet due to the technical complexity of the 225 and the limited number of failure considered in the FMEA and hence in the RFM. In some cases it was handled very well, but in other cases very badly, which just goes to show that the more comprehensive the EOPs and SOPs are, the better.
You have to bear in mind that you military chappies were born with Raybans already attached, a square jaw and steely blue eyes with no sense of fear and cold live-or-die logic circuits for a brain. However us civilian chappies are less blessed, we fly along thinking about the necessary trip to Sainsburys to pick up toilet roll and milk on the way back home after the trip, rather than who we are going to shoot down next.
Horses for courses, we need SOPs, you don't need SOPs to shoot to kill, just an itchy trigger finger.....
HF - you seem you want to have your cake and eat it - either SOPs are the only options or
- I would suggest that an engine fire that doesn't conveniently go out when you hit the fire button might come into that category.
Yes we have SOPs and FRCs but they are 'handrails, not handcuffs' to quote one senior examiner - Standard operating procedures are for Standard scenarios and if something unusual occurs (ie a fire not going out), being (potentially) IMC at 500' really isn't going to help either the pilot or the pax, regardless of what the SOP says.
Neither TC or myself are suggesting an 'off-piste' approach to normal ops, only to retain the flexibility and captaincy which, apparently, we have been trained for when something unusual happens.
my FRCs are a small A5 document half an inch thick that fit in my flying suit leg pocket - if the 139 checklist is anything to go by, it is massive and very complex by comparison - as I understand it, you are required to have all the aircraft documents on board so you can refer to them in flight if necessary (again judging by the 139 that is a serious amount of paperwork to plough through in the air)
hence my initial post on this subject which was 'check for positive signs of fire' not 'climb to 500' and consult the checklist'.
There will always be "out of the box" scenarios that require experience to satisfactorily solve.
Yes we have SOPs and FRCs but they are 'handrails, not handcuffs' to quote one senior examiner - Standard operating procedures are for Standard scenarios and if something unusual occurs (ie a fire not going out), being (potentially) IMC at 500' really isn't going to help either the pilot or the pax, regardless of what the SOP says.
Neither TC or myself are suggesting an 'off-piste' approach to normal ops, only to retain the flexibility and captaincy which, apparently, we have been trained for when something unusual happens.
RAF checklists are also far more extensive than civilian ones
I would, also, hazard a guess that every NS pilot has had a false fire warning but very few have had a real one. So SOPs help prevent a non-event becoming an event