CareFlite HEMS accident Texas
At some point....would not any querks in your autopilot such as being mentioned here be common knowledge to the folks actually flying the particular aircraft and maybe might just probably be discussed during training or shift turnovers?
I am one of those who see the "Go Around" button as being the fast track to establishing a climb attitude and constant heading.....so long as you remember to pull that stick on your left side up about your shoulder or so. Granted it helps to be at or above about 60 KIAS.
I am one of those who see the "Go Around" button as being the fast track to establishing a climb attitude and constant heading.....so long as you remember to pull that stick on your left side up about your shoulder or so. Granted it helps to be at or above about 60 KIAS.
Avoid imitations
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maybe might just probably be discussed during training or shift turnovers?
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CareFlite HEMS accident Texas
@ Jack Carson. WTF, go around may have a restriction below 120 kts???? It is designed to be used at lower speeds (as in approach speeds {cat a less than 90 kts!!})
It works in any a/c above Vmini, and in most a/c even lower than that!
IMHO - Perfect for inadvertent IMC...
It works in any a/c above Vmini, and in most a/c even lower than that!
IMHO - Perfect for inadvertent IMC...
C4,
The 109E we operated here in the US was a single pilot IFR machine. The limitations section of the autopilot supplement in the RFM identified the Vmin for go around engagement as 120KIAS. This limitation was identified for all autopilots with serial number below a specific number. Ours was one of those. Engagement below that number resulted in some rather significant pitch attitude excursions.
The 109E we operated here in the US was a single pilot IFR machine. The limitations section of the autopilot supplement in the RFM identified the Vmin for go around engagement as 120KIAS. This limitation was identified for all autopilots with serial number below a specific number. Ours was one of those. Engagement below that number resulted in some rather significant pitch attitude excursions.
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Engagement below that number resulted in some rather significant pitch attitude excursions.
I understand your feelings on this occurrence, but honestly it seems from the pictures that the A109E in subject was going anyway to have an hard-landing for unclarified reasons (no visibility?):
the AP engagement could have only have worsened the scenario under certain speed conditions, but definitely the accident responsibilities cannot be linked to the AP ...
"Just a pilot"
Autopilots,like any technology, have drawbacks
Not necessarily related to the Eastland CareFlite "Hard Landing", but as autopilots have been mentioned (edited, hopefully will work):
http://dms.ntsb.gov/aviation/Acciden...2012120000.pdf
The link is intended to lead to an NTSB factual report of a 109 night IFR fatal crash 7 OCT 2005. The investigators speculate on autopilot issues.
http://dms.ntsb.gov/aviation/Acciden...2012120000.pdf
The link is intended to lead to an NTSB factual report of a 109 night IFR fatal crash 7 OCT 2005. The investigators speculate on autopilot issues.
Last edited by Devil 49; 7th Oct 2012 at 15:38.
Purely an Autopilot Discussion Point
I agree that any limitations associated with the autopilot may not have had anything to do with this mishap. My input was purely in response discussions of the Agusta 109E’s autopilot limitations. A complete investigation should reveal the actual cause of the mishap.
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Recovered the factual report on 2005 accident:
NTSB Identification: NYC06MA005
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, October 07, 2005 in Smethport, PA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007
Aircraft: Augusta 109E, registration: N7YL
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The single-pilot helicopter was flying under instrument flight rules in night instrument meteorological conditions. The controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 340 degrees to intercept the localizer course for an instrument landing system approach. At that time, the helicopter was about 1.5 miles from the localizer centerline, headed 095 degrees, about 150 knots groundspeed. Consequently, the helicopter flew through and ended up well east of the 322-degree localizer course. During the resulting 135-degree turn to rejoin the final approach course, the pilot was issued an approach clearance, but told to "maintain 4,000." The helicopter's track approached the runway centerline, and then turned sharply away from, and to the right of the inbound course. The track showed an approximate heading of 100 degrees, when the radar target disappeared. During the 1 minute and 10 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgement of the 4,000-foot altitude assignment, the helicopter descended only 300 feet, slowed to approximately 65 knots groundspeed, and turned 140 degrees right of course. At the point where the helicopter re-intercepted the localizer, the autopilot was capable of capturing the localizer, but incapable of capturing the glideslope. If altitude hold remained engaged at that point of the flight, and the pilot reduced collective to initiate a descent, the autopilot would adjust pitch in an effort to maintain the selected altitude. Similar scenarios in helicopters and flight simulators have resulted in unusual attitudes and zero airspeed descents to the ground. The pilot had accrued 9,616 total hours of flight experience. He had 100 total hours of instrument flight experience; of which 10 hours was simulated instrument flight experience. Examination of the wreckage revealed no mechanical anomalies. Examination of voice communication tapes revealed that the controller used non-standard approach clearance procedures, did not comply with requirements for weather dissemination, and did not comply with the appropriate intercept angle of 45 degrees for helicopters as prescribed in Federal Aviation Administration orders.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control. Factors in the accident were, night instrument meteorological conditions, pilot workload, and improper air traffic control procedures by the approach controller.
Do we really want to continue on speculating on the autopilot?
NTSB Identification: NYC06MA005
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, October 07, 2005 in Smethport, PA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007
Aircraft: Augusta 109E, registration: N7YL
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The single-pilot helicopter was flying under instrument flight rules in night instrument meteorological conditions. The controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 340 degrees to intercept the localizer course for an instrument landing system approach. At that time, the helicopter was about 1.5 miles from the localizer centerline, headed 095 degrees, about 150 knots groundspeed. Consequently, the helicopter flew through and ended up well east of the 322-degree localizer course. During the resulting 135-degree turn to rejoin the final approach course, the pilot was issued an approach clearance, but told to "maintain 4,000." The helicopter's track approached the runway centerline, and then turned sharply away from, and to the right of the inbound course. The track showed an approximate heading of 100 degrees, when the radar target disappeared. During the 1 minute and 10 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgement of the 4,000-foot altitude assignment, the helicopter descended only 300 feet, slowed to approximately 65 knots groundspeed, and turned 140 degrees right of course. At the point where the helicopter re-intercepted the localizer, the autopilot was capable of capturing the localizer, but incapable of capturing the glideslope. If altitude hold remained engaged at that point of the flight, and the pilot reduced collective to initiate a descent, the autopilot would adjust pitch in an effort to maintain the selected altitude. Similar scenarios in helicopters and flight simulators have resulted in unusual attitudes and zero airspeed descents to the ground. The pilot had accrued 9,616 total hours of flight experience. He had 100 total hours of instrument flight experience; of which 10 hours was simulated instrument flight experience. Examination of the wreckage revealed no mechanical anomalies. Examination of voice communication tapes revealed that the controller used non-standard approach clearance procedures, did not comply with requirements for weather dissemination, and did not comply with the appropriate intercept angle of 45 degrees for helicopters as prescribed in Federal Aviation Administration orders.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control. Factors in the accident were, night instrument meteorological conditions, pilot workload, and improper air traffic control procedures by the approach controller.
Do we really want to continue on speculating on the autopilot?
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Do we really want to continue on speculating on the autopilot?
Let's just say that once the NTSB has done it's thing this may make some interesting reading.....or not.
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Attempting to capture the glidescope from above will almost always result in an unsatisfactory outcome, regardless of the autopilot make/model. They are all designed to capture from below. But I don't think the 2005 accident cited has much to do with the accident which is the subject of this thread. Letting the autopilot crash the aircraft is pilot error, either because of improper setup, engaging it too late, or both. I don't know if this is the case in this accident, only that rumor seems to indicate it. Rumor is all I have for now. It remains to be seen what the NTSB report will show.
Thread Starter
Concern Network is an optional venue that Operators can pass infomation out regarding transport issues. The following was released by CareFlite
Program: CareFlite 3110 S. Great Southwest Pkwy Grand Prairie, TX 75052 Type: Agusta 109 Tail #: N144CF
Weather: Marginal VMC
Team: Pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic. Injuries. No patient.
Description: The Granbury TX based aircraft was conducting a positioning flight for a patient pickup and encountered marginal VMC conditions enroute.
The pilot made initial contact with ATC to open an IFR flight plan. The aircraft encountered IMC conditions and the pilot transitioned to IFR flight, initiating a climb to above MSA.
While on extended downwind for the GPS 35 approach to Eastland Municipal Airport (ETN), Eastland TX, controlled flight was lost. The aircraft struck the ground tail first, 4.4 miles south of airport, sliding approxmiately 500ft before rolling over and coming to a stop.
Additional Info: The flight nurse was able to evacuate the aircraft. Two civilians who had seen the aircraft wreckage approached the scene and extricated the other two crew members and moved them all to a safe location.
FD arrived shortly thereafter, disabled the running engines, secured the scene and then transported the crew to Eastland hospital.
Source: David Carr, Director of Risk Management & Safety
Program: CareFlite 3110 S. Great Southwest Pkwy Grand Prairie, TX 75052 Type: Agusta 109 Tail #: N144CF
Weather: Marginal VMC
Team: Pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic. Injuries. No patient.
Description: The Granbury TX based aircraft was conducting a positioning flight for a patient pickup and encountered marginal VMC conditions enroute.
The pilot made initial contact with ATC to open an IFR flight plan. The aircraft encountered IMC conditions and the pilot transitioned to IFR flight, initiating a climb to above MSA.
While on extended downwind for the GPS 35 approach to Eastland Municipal Airport (ETN), Eastland TX, controlled flight was lost. The aircraft struck the ground tail first, 4.4 miles south of airport, sliding approxmiately 500ft before rolling over and coming to a stop.
Additional Info: The flight nurse was able to evacuate the aircraft. Two civilians who had seen the aircraft wreckage approached the scene and extricated the other two crew members and moved them all to a safe location.
FD arrived shortly thereafter, disabled the running engines, secured the scene and then transported the crew to Eastland hospital.
Source: David Carr, Director of Risk Management & Safety
