Almost died in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday..
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So there's nothing wrong with the system -all you can offer is palliatives and war stories.
No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.
After reading this thread, I would advise 'dumboffshorehand' to consider using the redress procedure of his company; if that doesn't work, think about other options that may involve a more heavy-handed approach.
From reading the posts of many of the GOM pilots, I would say that the system will not change until there is recognition that something is wrong. It is the acceptance of a poor safety culture - evidenced by the blind adherence to the current practices - that is at fault.
Let me ask a question; what would have happened if this had resulted in a CFIT accident? Don't bother responding, I already know.
No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.
After reading this thread, I would advise 'dumboffshorehand' to consider using the redress procedure of his company; if that doesn't work, think about other options that may involve a more heavy-handed approach.
From reading the posts of many of the GOM pilots, I would say that the system will not change until there is recognition that something is wrong. It is the acceptance of a poor safety culture - evidenced by the blind adherence to the current practices - that is at fault.
Let me ask a question; what would have happened if this had resulted in a CFIT accident? Don't bother responding, I already know.
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If these statistics are not enough to change the situation in the GOM, then I doubt that one scared passenger will have any contribution to aviation safety.
Crashes Common Among Helicopters Used in Oil and Gas Operations
A new study by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy finds that helicopters that service the drilling platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico crash on average more than six times per year resulting in an average of 5 deaths per year. From 1983 to 2009, 178 crashes resulted in 139 deaths, including 41 pilots and 3 co-pilots. Mechanical failure was the most common cause, leading to 68 crashes (38 percent of the total), followed by bad weather (16 percent of the total). While the challenges such as bad weather and long travel distances associated with helicopter flights in the Gulf related to oil and gas operations are recognized, this study is noteworthy for examining the circumstances of the crashes. The article is published in the September issue of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine.
Crashes Common Among Helicopters Used in Oil and Gas Operations
A new study by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy finds that helicopters that service the drilling platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico crash on average more than six times per year resulting in an average of 5 deaths per year. From 1983 to 2009, 178 crashes resulted in 139 deaths, including 41 pilots and 3 co-pilots. Mechanical failure was the most common cause, leading to 68 crashes (38 percent of the total), followed by bad weather (16 percent of the total). While the challenges such as bad weather and long travel distances associated with helicopter flights in the Gulf related to oil and gas operations are recognized, this study is noteworthy for examining the circumstances of the crashes. The article is published in the September issue of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine.
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Well, if a balanced discussion didn't follow I suspect it may be to do with the tone set by the OP. The assertion that the pilot was a "retard" for instance 
Just saying.
Just saying.
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Certainly that didn't help facilitate a rational discussion, but in we can get past that. If a medical crewmember came to me and told me that one of my pilots scared them on a flight I'd discount the use of the word "retard" and try to find out what really happened. I would not discount the person with the unfortunate choice of words.
Avoid imitations
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I would agree that the best place for a frightened passenger (such as the OP here) to vent his spleen is via his company's officicial channels. But it should be reported, as all such incidents should be. Then at least it can be properly investigated and hopefully safety lessons learned by those that need to learn them, if that is actually what is needed.... obviously some passengers have a lower "adrenaline threshold" than others.
Posting such stuff here in this fashion never achieves much at all (except riling up a few overly-defensive, VFR only qualified pilots of VFR only helicopters).
Posting such stuff here in this fashion never achieves much at all (except riling up a few overly-defensive, VFR only qualified pilots of VFR only helicopters).
Mars....a small objection!
Should read ...."How to address the real fear of a passenger who thinks he has looked disaster in the face."
We do not know if he did see a real disaster coming or merely imagined it was going to be a disaster.
As he is sat at his keyboard....it was not a disaster evidently.
As to the proximity to disaster the poor chap actually was....is anyone's guess.
Until it was investigated and the circumstances documented....it is just one man's opinion being voiced and that is certainly insufficient grounds to indict and convict a Pilot with any sense of fairness or impartiality.
how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.
We do not know if he did see a real disaster coming or merely imagined it was going to be a disaster.
As he is sat at his keyboard....it was not a disaster evidently.
As to the proximity to disaster the poor chap actually was....is anyone's guess.
Until it was investigated and the circumstances documented....it is just one man's opinion being voiced and that is certainly insufficient grounds to indict and convict a Pilot with any sense of fairness or impartiality.
Mars:
Hmm, "IFR conditions," eh Mars? So...what? What minimums would YOU set for VFR offshore flying in small, VFR helicopters? 1000 and 3? Not much will get done. GOM operators cut the ceiling in half for us and give us 500 and three, which is still pretty generous.
It's simple. If you cannot see three miles ahead you don't go there. And when you're chugging along at two miles a minute it's not too hard, really, to judge three miles. Because if you have to ask, "Is this three miles of viz?" it's probably not. If you press on anyway, is that the machine's fault?
Or Mars, would you prefer that the oil companies and the operators not even use small, VFR ships at all? Should *every* passenger-carrying helicopter in the GOM be twin-engine, two-pilot, and IFR-capable?
It's nice to throw stones without offering alternatives or suggestions.
I've seen days when it's nice and VFR both offshore and on, but a line of weather hangs right along the beach. What do you do...shut down operations until the weather lifts...like ohhhhh, tomorrow or the next day? Or again, maybe we should just get rid of the small, VFR ships altogether?
The oil companies and operators have decided that using single-engine, VFR helicopters in the warm waters and relatively benign weather of GOM is an acceptable risk. So do the pilots who fly in that environment, evidently. Perhaps you don't agree, and this would not happen in your perfect world. Sorry we don't all live there :-/
The key to reducing the admittedly few weather-related or CFIT accidents in the GOM is to educate pilots more thoroughly about the peculiar weather patterns in play down there, and get them to use better judgment (yeah, I know, good luck with that one!).
As a 2200-hour pilot I thought I knew a lot about weather. Until I went to work in the GOM. But I had to learn on my own. And I'll tell ya, I spent many, many hours sitting in a lawn chair up on the heliport of the platform I was based on for nine years, studying the weather.
It is what it is. Small helicopters are not going to disappear from commercial ops just because some people would prefer that we all fly expensive, sophisticated machines in every task.
Had the pilot in the OP's post exuded more confidence *and* slowed down and turned around before he got to the really bad stuff, this whole thread would likely not exist. The only foul here is that a passenger thought he was having a near-death experience.
So there's nothing wrong with the system -all you can offer is palliatives and war stories.
No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.
No, we are not really interested in how pilots can cope and deal with the weather in what are, probably, IFR conditions but how to address the real fear of a passenger who has looked disaster in the face.
It's simple. If you cannot see three miles ahead you don't go there. And when you're chugging along at two miles a minute it's not too hard, really, to judge three miles. Because if you have to ask, "Is this three miles of viz?" it's probably not. If you press on anyway, is that the machine's fault?
Or Mars, would you prefer that the oil companies and the operators not even use small, VFR ships at all? Should *every* passenger-carrying helicopter in the GOM be twin-engine, two-pilot, and IFR-capable?
It's nice to throw stones without offering alternatives or suggestions.
I've seen days when it's nice and VFR both offshore and on, but a line of weather hangs right along the beach. What do you do...shut down operations until the weather lifts...like ohhhhh, tomorrow or the next day? Or again, maybe we should just get rid of the small, VFR ships altogether?
The oil companies and operators have decided that using single-engine, VFR helicopters in the warm waters and relatively benign weather of GOM is an acceptable risk. So do the pilots who fly in that environment, evidently. Perhaps you don't agree, and this would not happen in your perfect world. Sorry we don't all live there :-/
The key to reducing the admittedly few weather-related or CFIT accidents in the GOM is to educate pilots more thoroughly about the peculiar weather patterns in play down there, and get them to use better judgment (yeah, I know, good luck with that one!).
As a 2200-hour pilot I thought I knew a lot about weather. Until I went to work in the GOM. But I had to learn on my own. And I'll tell ya, I spent many, many hours sitting in a lawn chair up on the heliport of the platform I was based on for nine years, studying the weather.
It is what it is. Small helicopters are not going to disappear from commercial ops just because some people would prefer that we all fly expensive, sophisticated machines in every task.
Had the pilot in the OP's post exuded more confidence *and* slowed down and turned around before he got to the really bad stuff, this whole thread would likely not exist. The only foul here is that a passenger thought he was having a near-death experience.
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I'm not interested in a dog-fight but rather an admission that there is a problem and how to address it. Perhaps our perceptions of the issue are different; mine results from the international standard that is contained in ICAO Annex 6 Part III, Section II Chapter 2.3.5.1:
I have no problems with the minima you quote - I might perhaps have distinguished between dispatch and in-flight criteria but it is a minor point. My reservations are with the principle that you can plan VFR at times when you have insufficiency knowledge of the en-route weather and, whether the flight can be completed in compliance with the Standard shown above (as evidence by the anecdotal report - and your own admission) - under circumstances where the onshore alternative of precautionary landing is not an option.
The point therefore is whether the criteria for dispatch can be met - or whether it is really an issue for operators in the GOM. It is a matter of Operational Control - i.e. management of safety.
As I have no problem with the minima you quote, clearly I have no problem in choosing to fly VFR when the circumstances permit it. (Well I do have one reservation and that is to do with mixing aircraft in an environment where VFR avoid criteria may be difficult.) I also have reservations about the carriage of VFR fuel if the criterion for dispatch does not meet a reasonable standard (what does the pilot do if encountering weather and being forced into a reversal of track when past the point of no return?). (VFR fuel does work when returning to base with an IFR-capable aircraft under circumstances where the base is clearly VFR.)
Why is it that when faced with opposition to the current system, some pilots immediately revert to the statement:
Yes, that would be a solution but not one that is being advocated. I would settle for either a VFR dispatch system (with appropriate operational control) meeting the stated standard, or the use of IFR capable aircraft with the associated protection that comes with ADS-B.
Oh yes, I would also like to see a change to a culture where denial (for any reason) is eliminated, and a move to an acceptable system that reduces the probability of such incidents/accidents.
2.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with VFR shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown or in the intended area of operations under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be such as to render compliance with these rules possible.
The point therefore is whether the criteria for dispatch can be met - or whether it is really an issue for operators in the GOM. It is a matter of Operational Control - i.e. management of safety.
As I have no problem with the minima you quote, clearly I have no problem in choosing to fly VFR when the circumstances permit it. (Well I do have one reservation and that is to do with mixing aircraft in an environment where VFR avoid criteria may be difficult.) I also have reservations about the carriage of VFR fuel if the criterion for dispatch does not meet a reasonable standard (what does the pilot do if encountering weather and being forced into a reversal of track when past the point of no return?). (VFR fuel does work when returning to base with an IFR-capable aircraft under circumstances where the base is clearly VFR.)
Why is it that when faced with opposition to the current system, some pilots immediately revert to the statement:
"Should *every* passenger-carrying helicopter in the GOM be twin-engine, two-pilot, and IFR-capable?
Oh yes, I would also like to see a change to a culture where denial (for any reason) is eliminated, and a move to an acceptable system that reduces the probability of such incidents/accidents.
Last edited by Mars; 27th Jan 2012 at 06:55. Reason: Grammar
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Thought I was going to die....
dumboffshorehand, I'm sorry you were scared. I know how it feels. I get scared on roller coasters. Sometimes I think the the car is going right off the tracks! I have quite few thousand hours in helicopters and I can't tell when I'm 30 feet off the water. Sometimes I'm 100' and it feels like 30. Sometimes I'm 30' and it looks like 100. Passengers and pilots have different comfort levels. Passengers almost never have the comfort level of a pilot. So when you are scared, the pilot is just starting to be concerned. Some folks on an airline flight are scared all the way to their destination. Relax. The pilot made the right decision and you were fine. It happens more than you know. You have to trust somebody some time, so just relax and it will be alright. You're in good hands.
Fly911: that's the problem matey - he isn't in good hands, the GOM has the worst track record EVER in offshore oil activities (See skwinty's post:#42).
Catch up - based on this report, he was probably just short of snuffing it and adding to a growing stats list.
Having read the report, the boys operating out there need to get their act together, it seems. Dodgy place to be statistically
Catch up - based on this report, he was probably just short of snuffing it and adding to a growing stats list.
Having read the report, the boys operating out there need to get their act together, it seems. Dodgy place to be statistically
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Mars - Believe it or not the oversight system you advocate has gotten better. Granted it's taken way too long, but unlike the old days where every pilot made his own decision, often under pressure from the customer, the big operators now have a system of 'levels' based on reported weather. Lower ones are cautions promulgagted at the base and broadcast on the radio. Higher level means operations on a case by case, management decision. The highest level is to shut it down. Its not uncommon to hear over the radio that such and such base is closed. No more "let's give it a try."
Another positive these days is the company will back you up if you decide not to go. That wasn't always the case.
A few years back, one of the Gulf majors sold off over 50 206's and some 35 contracts. Granted it was a business - money decision, but a collateral reason was management was tired of being pressured by the customer who were pushing the pilots.
A little background to keep in mind. The shelf in the Gulf of Mexico is slowly dying. All the big money is deep water. The thousands of structures on the shelf are, with a couple of exceptions, owned by small oil companies. Its not uncommon to see a new job on the board for a company no one ever heard of. They need little ships to land on toadstools and will use single engine VFR machines everytime.
Another positive these days is the company will back you up if you decide not to go. That wasn't always the case.
A few years back, one of the Gulf majors sold off over 50 206's and some 35 contracts. Granted it was a business - money decision, but a collateral reason was management was tired of being pressured by the customer who were pushing the pilots.
A little background to keep in mind. The shelf in the Gulf of Mexico is slowly dying. All the big money is deep water. The thousands of structures on the shelf are, with a couple of exceptions, owned by small oil companies. Its not uncommon to see a new job on the board for a company no one ever heard of. They need little ships to land on toadstools and will use single engine VFR machines everytime.
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How could you possibly imagine a structured reasonable debate could come from such a loaded post?
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Firstly, this is not intended to be an attack on js0987; his post just has more information than others that preceded it.
It is accepted that the standards in the GOM have improved; however, it is not clear from js0987' post whether an adequate system of dispatch (operational control) is yet in place to show compliance with the ICAO standard (it is not compulsory to be in compliance but, if not, a difference should be filed):
This reference in js0987' post is interesting:
I have no wish to be picky but the references in the text are to "a 'system of levels' promulgated at the base". My first question therefore would be; bearing in mind that the incident reported occurred on a flight from a platform, does this system provide adequate controls of the escalations (edited from the list in Jiml's post) at the remote site? - i.e.:
specifically, addressing the first escalation in the list; under conditions where a weather system is scheduled to cross the area of operations, are there planning facilities on the platform (or is a dispatch service available) to permit assurance that the flight can be conducted VFR and within limits?
Or; did the pilot succumb to one of the other escalations in the list - for which there were no controls?
Probably, a more direct question is merited; is there a system in place to monitor and control the escalations in this list?
Notwithstanding any answers that may be forthcoming to these questions, there is still the matter of the use of a VFR dispatch system under circumstances where it is not clear that VFR flights can be dispatched with a high probability that they will not meet adverse weather.
It would also be interesting to hear a view on my question about the use of VFR fuel under circumstances where (as seen in the initial report) a course reversal (after PNR) might place the pilot into other difficulties. We can of course speculate that the very system of fuel planning actually makes it more 'unlikely' that an abort call will be made - i.e. 'presonitis' is actually built into the system.
Yes, or you put in place systems that can deal with this and other weather related issues.
It is accepted that the standards in the GOM have improved; however, it is not clear from js0987' post whether an adequate system of dispatch (operational control) is yet in place to show compliance with the ICAO standard (it is not compulsory to be in compliance but, if not, a difference should be filed):
2.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with VFR shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown or in the intended area of operations under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be such as to render compliance with these rules possible.
the big operators now have a system of 'levels' based on reported weather. Lower ones are cautions promulgagted at the base and broadcast on the radio. Higher level means operations on a case by case, management decision. The highest level is to shut it down. Its not uncommon to hear over the radio that such and such base is closed.
The first control might be:
Dispatch only to approved weather limits
Dispatch only to approved weather limits
In that case 'threat escalations' could be:
Operating base does not provide an adequate planning system
There is pressure to launch below limits
Pilot self-approves flights below limits
Dispatch limits are not well understood
Dispatch limits are not enforced
There is pressure to launch below limits
Pilot self-approves flights below limits
Dispatch limits are not well understood
Dispatch limits are not enforced
Or; did the pilot succumb to one of the other escalations in the list - for which there were no controls?
Probably, a more direct question is merited; is there a system in place to monitor and control the escalations in this list?
Notwithstanding any answers that may be forthcoming to these questions, there is still the matter of the use of a VFR dispatch system under circumstances where it is not clear that VFR flights can be dispatched with a high probability that they will not meet adverse weather.
It would also be interesting to hear a view on my question about the use of VFR fuel under circumstances where (as seen in the initial report) a course reversal (after PNR) might place the pilot into other difficulties. We can of course speculate that the very system of fuel planning actually makes it more 'unlikely' that an abort call will be made - i.e. 'presonitis' is actually built into the system.
I've seen days when it's nice and VFR both offshore and on, but a line of weather hangs right along the beach. What do you do...shut down operations until the weather lifts...like ohhhhh, tomorrow or the next day?
management was tired of being pressured by the customer who were pushing the pilots.
If the management "stood up" to the Customers...supported their Pilots "NO Go!" decision....the customers would take their business elsewhere and there would be some other operator which would gladly accept the business...and leaving quite a few aircraft setting idle.
As those Customers are still in business and thus flying with some Operator....you reckon they are still pressuring the Pilots and Operator...and still getting flown?
Now as I do not believe in "coincidence"....you reckon all those "sold" 206's found themselves flying the same ol' Customers?
Perhaps we might ask some of the Pilots who fly for the outfit whose name starts with R and ends with C.
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SAS - Company management butting heads with customer management probably played a role in the customer allowing the contract to be cancelled an to go with another operator.
MARS - Gulf operators pay for specialized weather reporting available over the internet. Lets' say the weather is reported and forecast to be VFR to the southwest of the base and the weather is foggy and IFR to the east. The base manager would probably allow operations to the southwest while putting flights to the east on hold.
Offshore pilots have access to the same weather reporting system. Since they are their own dispatchers, they have to look at the weather and decide accordingly. It's not uncommon for the pilot to show the field foreman the weather and say "look what's coming - we'll wait." If the field foreman is still pressuring the pilot to fly, they are directed to call their respective base manager and let him deal with the foreman.
In summary, there are adequate planning materials and rules to follow, and as for your last four items - those are a ticket to getting fired.
Gulf weather is notoriously fickle. The strictest rules and the best technology can only go so far. For me - I always found a good rule to follow is always and I mean always have a place to run to.
MARS - Gulf operators pay for specialized weather reporting available over the internet. Lets' say the weather is reported and forecast to be VFR to the southwest of the base and the weather is foggy and IFR to the east. The base manager would probably allow operations to the southwest while putting flights to the east on hold.
Offshore pilots have access to the same weather reporting system. Since they are their own dispatchers, they have to look at the weather and decide accordingly. It's not uncommon for the pilot to show the field foreman the weather and say "look what's coming - we'll wait." If the field foreman is still pressuring the pilot to fly, they are directed to call their respective base manager and let him deal with the foreman.
In summary, there are adequate planning materials and rules to follow, and as for your last four items - those are a ticket to getting fired.
Gulf weather is notoriously fickle. The strictest rules and the best technology can only go so far. For me - I always found a good rule to follow is always and I mean always have a place to run to.
For the benefit of like-minded Rotorheads allow me to share my views in respect of the OP of this thread.
Anyone who starts a thread spouting what are (in my belief), unsubstantiated and spurious allegations and then fails to recognise the comments, advice and contribution of others (in most cases well-meaning professionals) is someone lacking in manners and ultimately sincerity.
Given Vaqueroaero's discovery of a similar tale on the American forum (posted within 24 hours of this thread) I would say that the chances of this being one and the same person are remarkably high. Assuming it is the same person I would go as far as to say (and I have seen this many times in this industry) that the OP quite likely harbours some form of resentment (perhaps fuelled by jealousy or some other lacking emotion) towards pilots. In opening this thread the driver in the story is a "retard" and on the American forum he "looked like a 14 year old". For me, such comments, combined with the OP's 'post and run' behaviour, substantially discredits him.
However, and notwithstanding the motivations and potential prejudices of the OP, I do recognise that there are bona fide issues surrounding GOM ops (and, as far as I know, always have been). If the NTSB say that US EMS accident rates are too high, would they not be an appropriate body to address GOM ops also - perhaps spurred-on by those within the industry with concerns?
Finally, do 206's (as in JetRangers) really still bomb around the Gulf? What sort of useful load could they offer with a reasonable fuel load and baggage .. three pax max? I do realise there are some smaller installations out there but is that how they perform crew changes in the Gulf .. three people at a time?
Anyone who starts a thread spouting what are (in my belief), unsubstantiated and spurious allegations and then fails to recognise the comments, advice and contribution of others (in most cases well-meaning professionals) is someone lacking in manners and ultimately sincerity.
Given Vaqueroaero's discovery of a similar tale on the American forum (posted within 24 hours of this thread) I would say that the chances of this being one and the same person are remarkably high. Assuming it is the same person I would go as far as to say (and I have seen this many times in this industry) that the OP quite likely harbours some form of resentment (perhaps fuelled by jealousy or some other lacking emotion) towards pilots. In opening this thread the driver in the story is a "retard" and on the American forum he "looked like a 14 year old". For me, such comments, combined with the OP's 'post and run' behaviour, substantially discredits him.
However, and notwithstanding the motivations and potential prejudices of the OP, I do recognise that there are bona fide issues surrounding GOM ops (and, as far as I know, always have been). If the NTSB say that US EMS accident rates are too high, would they not be an appropriate body to address GOM ops also - perhaps spurred-on by those within the industry with concerns?
Finally, do 206's (as in JetRangers) really still bomb around the Gulf? What sort of useful load could they offer with a reasonable fuel load and baggage .. three pax max? I do realise there are some smaller installations out there but is that how they perform crew changes in the Gulf .. three people at a time?
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savoia,
This has long ceased to be a thread exclusively about OPs post; as requested by the moderator, it is now dealing with concerns that are not dependent upon a single incident.
js0987,
It's not just Gulf weather - that applies to all offshore weather. Mostly, the weather reported by rigs is of reasonable quality; if there is a met. reporting station (AWOS or human) which is in the path of weather, the forecast improves; the forecasting of 'air mass' weather always has uncertainty unless it is based upon sufficient number of stations providing reports. (There are experimental systems fitted to fixed wing aircraft that collect and downlink met on routine flights - it has been established that this can improve forecasting by an order of magnitude.)
In some patches, a variation in the wind of 10º to 20º can result in widespread advection fog. Operators get to know the vagaries of the weather but no amount of forecasting or local knowledge provides a cast iron solution. The best solution is to remove en-route weather from the equation.
The number of incident/accidents could be reduced by a dispatch system which has real Operations Control; however, whichever way you cut it, the reduction of incidents/accidents will occur because the number of inappropriate flights will be reduced. Depending upon how well it is applied/managed, it will result in missed flights when the weather is marginal. If the marginal weather is extensive in area and time, eventually the rules will be bent and the bad practices will recur.
Launching of VFR flights offshore - where the regularity of the service is important - is anachronistic and inevitably lead to the type of incidents we are discussing. It is being done that way for historic reasons; if we were to start again, we would not do it that way.
The only way to beat en-route weather is not to be subject to its vagaries; the best thing about IFR system is that they are dependent mainly upon the forecast at either end of a flight - and the ends are subject to quality control (or should be).
This has long ceased to be a thread exclusively about OPs post; as requested by the moderator, it is now dealing with concerns that are not dependent upon a single incident.
js0987,
Gulf weather is notoriously fickle. The strictest rules and the best technology can only go so far. For me - I always found a good rule to follow is always and I mean always have a place to run to.
In some patches, a variation in the wind of 10º to 20º can result in widespread advection fog. Operators get to know the vagaries of the weather but no amount of forecasting or local knowledge provides a cast iron solution. The best solution is to remove en-route weather from the equation.
The number of incident/accidents could be reduced by a dispatch system which has real Operations Control; however, whichever way you cut it, the reduction of incidents/accidents will occur because the number of inappropriate flights will be reduced. Depending upon how well it is applied/managed, it will result in missed flights when the weather is marginal. If the marginal weather is extensive in area and time, eventually the rules will be bent and the bad practices will recur.
Launching of VFR flights offshore - where the regularity of the service is important - is anachronistic and inevitably lead to the type of incidents we are discussing. It is being done that way for historic reasons; if we were to start again, we would not do it that way.
The only way to beat en-route weather is not to be subject to its vagaries; the best thing about IFR system is that they are dependent mainly upon the forecast at either end of a flight - and the ends are subject to quality control (or should be).
This has long ceased to be a thread exclusively about OPs post; as requested by the moderator, it is now dealing with concerns that are not dependent upon a single incident.
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SAVOIE - Yes 206's still putter around the gulf. Ane two or three people are usually all they need to carry. Reading a meter or doing some light maintenance work usually just needs a few people. Keep in mind that a lot of the manned platforms that used to house 20 or more people are now manned by a handful. For crew changes, some companies use 76's to take out crews that are then dispersed or perhaps the platform only needs to change out five or six people and two trips will get it done.
MARS - Granted offshore weather is fickle everywhere, but that, combined with the unique nature of the Gulf, thousands and thousands of stuctures requiring little ships, means rules taylored to the local.
The majority of field ship flights are local in nature, working the platforms in the field. Some form of centralized control by dispatchers a hundred miles away and looking at a computer will have a hard time convincing a pilot on a platform, looking at sunshine and his intended landing platform a mile away that he knows best.
Perhaps the Hopkins report, while somewhat skewed, has a point when it noted that since 2007 things have gotten better - since the very system I have been describing has been implemented.
MARS - Granted offshore weather is fickle everywhere, but that, combined with the unique nature of the Gulf, thousands and thousands of stuctures requiring little ships, means rules taylored to the local.
The majority of field ship flights are local in nature, working the platforms in the field. Some form of centralized control by dispatchers a hundred miles away and looking at a computer will have a hard time convincing a pilot on a platform, looking at sunshine and his intended landing platform a mile away that he knows best.
Perhaps the Hopkins report, while somewhat skewed, has a point when it noted that since 2007 things have gotten better - since the very system I have been describing has been implemented.
Join Date: May 2010
Location: Amazon Jungle
Age: 38
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Almost died in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday..
Thanks for the wonderful experience!
Pilot did a great job, turning back.