Three killed in South Australia Helicopter crash
Why not? Last time I checked we still lived in a free country - of course Julia may have changed the rules since then. Interested to hear any case you might make why they should not have been.
Who can say, you know a crystal ball gazer?
I think I've said enough now anyway. Hopefully a few more people can answer my questions without simply thinking that I'm bashing the deceased. That was never my intention, and I hope other people like Oxi don't interpret it that way.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What I meant was should they have been there doing what they were doing (still to be determined) at that particular point in time (pitch black)?
Gary's ashes to be scattered from Wild Oats
Gary's ashes are being scattered from 'Wild Oats' starting today, during this week's Sydney to Hobart, Courier-Mail article
THEY have been rushing round all week preparing their boats and crews for the rigours of a tough Sydney to Hobart but sailors have stopped in their tracks to pay an emotional tribute to one of their own.
Skippers, navigators, crews and officials all undertook a minutes silence at the compulsory race briefing at the home of the race south, the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia, for helicopter pilot Gary Ticehurst ysterday.
Described as the "Guardian Angel'' of the Sydney to Hobart fleet, Ticehurst died this year in a horrifc crash involving ABC colleagues Paul Lockyer and John Bean in the outback.
The popular pilot, who knew the majority of sailors heading south this year, will have his ashes scattered during the race off the Sydney to Hobart favourite Wild Oats.
Ticehurst played a vital role in the deadly 1998 race, helping with the rescue of numerous sailors and was a well know sight flying over the fleet for two decade.
"He was so loved by everyone. It is quite overwhelming,'' said Ticehurst's wife Therese.
The high-tech supermaxis Wild Oats and Loyal remain on track to vie for the line honours in the 67th Rolex Sydney to Hobart which starts Boxing Day it is boats half their size who could steal their thunder in the chase for the coverted overall win.
Skippers, navigators, crews and officials all undertook a minutes silence at the compulsory race briefing at the home of the race south, the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia, for helicopter pilot Gary Ticehurst ysterday.
Described as the "Guardian Angel'' of the Sydney to Hobart fleet, Ticehurst died this year in a horrifc crash involving ABC colleagues Paul Lockyer and John Bean in the outback.
The popular pilot, who knew the majority of sailors heading south this year, will have his ashes scattered during the race off the Sydney to Hobart favourite Wild Oats.
Ticehurst played a vital role in the deadly 1998 race, helping with the rescue of numerous sailors and was a well know sight flying over the fleet for two decade.
"He was so loved by everyone. It is quite overwhelming,'' said Ticehurst's wife Therese.
The high-tech supermaxis Wild Oats and Loyal remain on track to vie for the line honours in the 67th Rolex Sydney to Hobart which starts Boxing Day it is boats half their size who could steal their thunder in the chase for the coverted overall win.
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: 'Stralia
Age: 58
Posts: 227
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As a veteran of of many Sydney to Hobart races, I can assure you all that Gary was a comfort to all whose horizon he darkened at any time of day. You felt safe when Gary flew over.
As a student pilot I can only hope that I can ever have one tenth of Gary's skill and experience.
Thoughts to Teresa and family.
As a student pilot I can only hope that I can ever have one tenth of Gary's skill and experience.
Thoughts to Teresa and family.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: On the move...
Age: 58
Posts: 358
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Update from the ATSB,
Update 26 November 2012
The Global Positioning System (GPS) data that was recovered from the accident site indicates that the helicopter took off normally, before being established on a heading of 035 °M at 1,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL). After maintaining 1,500 ft for 17 seconds, the helicopter commenced a gradual turn to the right and started to descend. The descending right turn continued for about 35 seconds until the last GPS plot at an altitude of about 728 ft, or about 725 ft above the elevation of the accident site. The location of the accident site was consistent with a continuation of the recorded flight path.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is examining various scenarios to explain the helicopter’s flight path, including spatial disorientation and pilot incapacitation. As part of these activities, the ATSB has arranged for simulations to be conducted of the flight by external agencies. Given the time required to conduct and analyse these simulations, the final report is now not expected to be released until the first quarter of 2013.
Although the reasons for the flight path have not yet been determined, the ATSB is concerned about the conduct of visual flight rules (VFR) flights in dark night conditions – that is, conditions with minimal celestial illumination, terrestrial lighting cues or visible horizon. The ATSB is reviewing the regulatory requirements and guidance for the conduct of night VFR flights, and the training and ongoing assessment of pilot skills to conduct such flights. The ATSB is also preparing an ‘Avoidable Accidents’ educational report focussing on night VFR accidents.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) data that was recovered from the accident site indicates that the helicopter took off normally, before being established on a heading of 035 °M at 1,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL). After maintaining 1,500 ft for 17 seconds, the helicopter commenced a gradual turn to the right and started to descend. The descending right turn continued for about 35 seconds until the last GPS plot at an altitude of about 728 ft, or about 725 ft above the elevation of the accident site. The location of the accident site was consistent with a continuation of the recorded flight path.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is examining various scenarios to explain the helicopter’s flight path, including spatial disorientation and pilot incapacitation. As part of these activities, the ATSB has arranged for simulations to be conducted of the flight by external agencies. Given the time required to conduct and analyse these simulations, the final report is now not expected to be released until the first quarter of 2013.
Although the reasons for the flight path have not yet been determined, the ATSB is concerned about the conduct of visual flight rules (VFR) flights in dark night conditions – that is, conditions with minimal celestial illumination, terrestrial lighting cues or visible horizon. The ATSB is reviewing the regulatory requirements and guidance for the conduct of night VFR flights, and the training and ongoing assessment of pilot skills to conduct such flights. The ATSB is also preparing an ‘Avoidable Accidents’ educational report focussing on night VFR accidents.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
Given that VFR implies the ability to orient the aircraft's attitude and height by means of visual references, it's really not possible to call any night flying VFR unless you're over a well lit area (like a city).
Shawn,
That's the quandary of NVFR in Australia.
Evidently it's called the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Who knew?
That's the quandary of NVFR in Australia.
Evidently it's called the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Who knew?
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That's the quandary of NVFR in Australia.
Evidently it's called the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Who knew?
Evidently it's called the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Who knew?
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/167...atalities.html
A Bell 407 which crashed in Queensland near Mackay in October 2003, killing 3.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the evening of 17 October 2003, an air ambulance Bell 407 helicopter, registered VH-HTD (HTD), being operated under the ‘Aerial Work’ category, was tasked with a patient transfer from Hamilton Island to Mackay, Queensland. The crew consisted of a pilot, a paramedic and a crewman. Approximately 35 minutes after the departure of the helicopter from Mackay, the personnel waiting for the helicopter on the island contacted the Ambulance Coordination Centre (ACC) to ask about its status. ACC personnel then made repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the helicopter before notifying Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR), who initiated a search for the helicopter. AusSAR dispatched a BK117 helicopter from Hamilton Island to investigate. The crew of the BK117 located floating wreckage, that was later confirmed to be from HTD, at a location approximately 3.2 nautical miles (NM) east of Cape Hillsborough, Queensland. There were no survivors.
Following 12 days of side scan array sonar searches, underwater diving and trawling, the main impact point and location of heavy items of wreckage were located. The wreckage was recovered and examined at a secure on-shore location.
Although the forecast weather conditions did not necessarily preclude flight under the night Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the circumstances of the accident were consistent with pilot disorientation and loss of control during flight in dark night conditions. The effect of cloud on any available celestial lighting, lack of a visible horizon and surface/ground-based lighting, and the pilot’s limited instrument flying experience, may have contributed to this accident. Although not able to determine with certainty what factors led to the helicopter departing controlled flight, the investigation determined that mechanical failure was unlikely.
The circumstances of the accident combined most of the risk factors known for many years to be associated with helicopter Emergency Medical Services (EMS) accidents, such as:
Pilot factors
the pilot was inexperienced with regards to long distance over water night operations out of sight of land and in the helicopter type
the pilot did not hold an instrument rating and had limited instrument flying experience
the pilot was new to the organisation and EMS operations.
Operating environment factors
the accident occurred on a dark night with no celestial or surface/ground-based lighting
the flight path was over water with no fixed surface lit features
forecast weather in the area of the helicopter flight path included the possibility of cloud at the altitude flown
Organisational factors
a number of different organisations were involved in providing the service
the operation was from a base remote from the operator’s main base
actual or perceived pressures may have existed to not reject missions due to weather or other reasons
an apparent lack of awareness of helicopter EMS safety issues and helicopter night VFR limitations
divided and diminished oversight for ensuring safety
no single organisation with expertise in aviation having overall oversight for operational safety
As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommending: a review of the night VFR requirements, an assessment of the benefits of additional flight equipment for helicopters operating under night VFR and a review of the operator classification and/or minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.
Following the accident, the Queensland Department of Emergency Services took initiatives to implement:
increased safety standards in the Generic Service Agreements to Community Helicopter Providers (CHP) to include increased pilot recency and training requirements, a pilot requirement for a Command Instrument Rating, crew resource management training, a Safety Management System and a Safety Officer
the recommendations of the reviews associated with the aeromedical system/network
the establishment of a centralised clinical coordination and tasking of aeromedical aircraft and helicopters for Southern Queensland1, including all CHP state-wide through a centre in Brisbane, with a parallel system planned for all Northern Queensland by July 2005
the establishment of a requirement for a safe arrival broadcast for flights of less than 30 minutes duration and the nomination of a SARTIME for all flights
the revision of the standard operating procedures for helicopter emergencies to attempt to establish communication with an aircraft when lost for a maximum 5 minute period, then immediately contacting AusSAR
the establishment of a requirement for CHP to provide updated contact/aircraft details on a bi-annual basis and amend the standard operating procedures containing this information accordingly
a requirement for CHP operations to ensure sufficient celestial lighting exists for night VFR flights to maintain reference to the horizon
FACTUAL INFORMATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the evening of 17 October 2003, an air ambulance Bell 407 helicopter, registered VH-HTD (HTD), being operated under the ‘Aerial Work’ category, was tasked with a patient transfer from Hamilton Island to Mackay, Queensland. The crew consisted of a pilot, a paramedic and a crewman. Approximately 35 minutes after the departure of the helicopter from Mackay, the personnel waiting for the helicopter on the island contacted the Ambulance Coordination Centre (ACC) to ask about its status. ACC personnel then made repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the helicopter before notifying Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR), who initiated a search for the helicopter. AusSAR dispatched a BK117 helicopter from Hamilton Island to investigate. The crew of the BK117 located floating wreckage, that was later confirmed to be from HTD, at a location approximately 3.2 nautical miles (NM) east of Cape Hillsborough, Queensland. There were no survivors.
Following 12 days of side scan array sonar searches, underwater diving and trawling, the main impact point and location of heavy items of wreckage were located. The wreckage was recovered and examined at a secure on-shore location.
Although the forecast weather conditions did not necessarily preclude flight under the night Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the circumstances of the accident were consistent with pilot disorientation and loss of control during flight in dark night conditions. The effect of cloud on any available celestial lighting, lack of a visible horizon and surface/ground-based lighting, and the pilot’s limited instrument flying experience, may have contributed to this accident. Although not able to determine with certainty what factors led to the helicopter departing controlled flight, the investigation determined that mechanical failure was unlikely.
The circumstances of the accident combined most of the risk factors known for many years to be associated with helicopter Emergency Medical Services (EMS) accidents, such as:
Pilot factors
the pilot was inexperienced with regards to long distance over water night operations out of sight of land and in the helicopter type
the pilot did not hold an instrument rating and had limited instrument flying experience
the pilot was new to the organisation and EMS operations.
Operating environment factors
the accident occurred on a dark night with no celestial or surface/ground-based lighting
the flight path was over water with no fixed surface lit features
forecast weather in the area of the helicopter flight path included the possibility of cloud at the altitude flown
Organisational factors
a number of different organisations were involved in providing the service
the operation was from a base remote from the operator’s main base
actual or perceived pressures may have existed to not reject missions due to weather or other reasons
an apparent lack of awareness of helicopter EMS safety issues and helicopter night VFR limitations
divided and diminished oversight for ensuring safety
no single organisation with expertise in aviation having overall oversight for operational safety
As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommending: a review of the night VFR requirements, an assessment of the benefits of additional flight equipment for helicopters operating under night VFR and a review of the operator classification and/or minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.
Following the accident, the Queensland Department of Emergency Services took initiatives to implement:
increased safety standards in the Generic Service Agreements to Community Helicopter Providers (CHP) to include increased pilot recency and training requirements, a pilot requirement for a Command Instrument Rating, crew resource management training, a Safety Management System and a Safety Officer
the recommendations of the reviews associated with the aeromedical system/network
the establishment of a centralised clinical coordination and tasking of aeromedical aircraft and helicopters for Southern Queensland1, including all CHP state-wide through a centre in Brisbane, with a parallel system planned for all Northern Queensland by July 2005
the establishment of a requirement for a safe arrival broadcast for flights of less than 30 minutes duration and the nomination of a SARTIME for all flights
the revision of the standard operating procedures for helicopter emergencies to attempt to establish communication with an aircraft when lost for a maximum 5 minute period, then immediately contacting AusSAR
the establishment of a requirement for CHP to provide updated contact/aircraft details on a bi-annual basis and amend the standard operating procedures containing this information accordingly
a requirement for CHP operations to ensure sufficient celestial lighting exists for night VFR flights to maintain reference to the horizon
no single organisation with expertise in aviation having overall oversight for operational safety
The official report has been pulled from the ATSB web site.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 27th Nov 2012 at 23:10.
Given that VFR implies the ability to orient the aircraft's attitude and height by means of visual references, it's really not possible to call any night flying VFR unless you're over a well lit area (like a city).
The implication is that you can fly on a no moon night with no discernable horizon, and therefore not even know you're about to go into cloud if it's dark enough!
The potential for stuff-ups is high to say the least. There aren't any mandatory instrument flying recency requirements for NVFR.
I trained in the military before goggles were commonly available, and consequently was used to dark night departures, transits and approaches to fairly basic light sources, so I know it can be done safely with the right planning and training. However, we had a strong IFR background too, which I always considered to be the ace up my sleeve if everything went pear shaped, something that many of our civilian counterparts don't have.
I'm not commenting on any of these accidents in particular, just pointing out that after relatively little training, you can legally go and do some extremely demanding flying at night in this country. By all means, have the capability, but we need to back it up with appropriately rigorous training, and I'd personally like to see all night pilots instrument rated.
Hey AOTW,
Not sure whether you already knew it but one of those people you used to do the night VFR military stuff with is now GM of Aviation Accident Investigation at the ATSB. Knowing the person involved I'd expect well informed and sensible recommendations to come out of the investigation.
Not sure whether you already knew it but one of those people you used to do the night VFR military stuff with is now GM of Aviation Accident Investigation at the ATSB. Knowing the person involved I'd expect well informed and sensible recommendations to come out of the investigation.
Hey M6, good to hear from you. Hope you're doing well!
I did know that he's there, hopefully what he recommends will be acted on.
I've always felt there should be more emphasis on IF skills in the civvy syllabus even for non-instrument or night rated pilots. Obviously money's a factor and the aircraft you're in might not be appropriately equipped, but it's time well spent I reckon.
I did know that he's there, hopefully what he recommends will be acted on.
I've always felt there should be more emphasis on IF skills in the civvy syllabus even for non-instrument or night rated pilots. Obviously money's a factor and the aircraft you're in might not be appropriately equipped, but it's time well spent I reckon.
Confirms the old adage about there being nothing new in aviation.
Sound familiar? http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...7%20G-CFLT.pdf
Sound familiar? http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...7%20G-CFLT.pdf
Apologise for the thread drift but wasn't it Lake Eyre where Donald Campbell broke the land speed record? If so was the crash site anywhere near where he set up his camp or stored Bluebird between runs?
Just visited his grave at Coniston & started reading Tonia's book about her life in the fast lane.
Just visited his grave at Coniston & started reading Tonia's book about her life in the fast lane.
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,957
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ATSB have a long way to go to restore suitable cred me thinks, although the preliminary report write up of the recent crash in the Kimberley was a good start.
I'll not comment on this accident at all other than to not discount anything and remark that we once very - very nearly bought the farm operating in search mode in a baron, dark night, full stratus cloud cover and a couple of hundred below minimas to keep under under the fog to maintain ground motor car light visibility The only other light was a small fire lit by the downed pilot and we were using the aircraft lights to direct the motor car through extremely dense middle story vegetation in a racetrack fashion, yep boring after a while, read - complacency. A very simple thing happened. The Flight director locked up on the heading bug on a routine turn and oh boy, was it close before the pilot was onto it and then recovered. I can just imagine the comments of negativity that may have ensued.
This excerpt is a good statement as well.
For my money the visible horizon is the most critical. It is strangely illogical that engagement in NVMC requires further instrumentation than that which is required for the same activity during daylight.It may not at all be a good idea to discuss on an open forum, what may have been taught to others or the techniques engaged to ensure safety of flight at night, with bugger all instruments, if you get the drift, but all of those considerations shrink violently into the deepest, darkest most terrifying corners of the mind when one contemplates attempting the same activity over a mirror still, massive lake on a starry night.
Under such circumstances and a myriad of other scenarios, just a small amount of bushfire smoke for example, AOTW's suggestion of being fulls IR capable is the only way that such flight should be contemplated after legal last light. If the light available at destination is suitable for transitioning to NVMC, so be it.
There is an example from a few years ago of a mustering pilot in western Queensland, who according to his log book engaged in dark night flights and at altitude. (I.E. well away from where he might establish and lock onto a horizon)
On his last flight he reported by radio that he had the lights of homestead outstation X in sight. After his crash and body was discovered it was also found that there was no one at homestead X and no lights on. That is, he confused an assumption of lights with the stars and had by that stage gone inverted. A terrifying ride down for him from around a couple of thousand feet for sure
. I am with all those who say full IR or not at all. At least during daylight hours one can see enough to establish your visual range.
I'll not comment on this accident at all other than to not discount anything and remark that we once very - very nearly bought the farm operating in search mode in a baron, dark night, full stratus cloud cover and a couple of hundred below minimas to keep under under the fog to maintain ground motor car light visibility The only other light was a small fire lit by the downed pilot and we were using the aircraft lights to direct the motor car through extremely dense middle story vegetation in a racetrack fashion, yep boring after a while, read - complacency. A very simple thing happened. The Flight director locked up on the heading bug on a routine turn and oh boy, was it close before the pilot was onto it and then recovered. I can just imagine the comments of negativity that may have ensued.
This excerpt is a good statement as well.
Although the reasons for the flight path have not yet been determined, the ATSB is concerned about the conduct of visual flight rules (VFR) flights in dark night conditions – that is, conditions with minimal celestial illumination, terrestrial lighting cues or visible horizon.
Under such circumstances and a myriad of other scenarios, just a small amount of bushfire smoke for example, AOTW's suggestion of being fulls IR capable is the only way that such flight should be contemplated after legal last light. If the light available at destination is suitable for transitioning to NVMC, so be it.
There is an example from a few years ago of a mustering pilot in western Queensland, who according to his log book engaged in dark night flights and at altitude. (I.E. well away from where he might establish and lock onto a horizon)
On his last flight he reported by radio that he had the lights of homestead outstation X in sight. After his crash and body was discovered it was also found that there was no one at homestead X and no lights on. That is, he confused an assumption of lights with the stars and had by that stage gone inverted. A terrifying ride down for him from around a couple of thousand feet for sure
. I am with all those who say full IR or not at all. At least during daylight hours one can see enough to establish your visual range.
It is strangely illogical that engagement in NVMC requires further instrumentation than that which is required for the same activity during daylight.
Another "unique" Australian idea. The bit that is missing amongst others is "adequate celestial and/or terrestrial lighting"
That is, he confused an assumption of lights with the stars and had by that stage gone inverted.
For me, that's one of the key points with the IF training - if you're under the grip of a visual illusion at night, or anywhere for that matter, if you've developed that ingrained response to get on the AI (or whatever you've got available) and get your scan going, plus you've done unusual attitude recovery training, you've got a good chance, not least because you'll probably pick errors up before they have a chance to develop into bad situations.
The fundamental thing in the NVFR training we did was that it was an IF/visual combo - all attitudes set and maintained on the AI, good instrument scan for altitudes and headings, plus a diligent lookout for traffic and your ground lights for approaches or whatever you were doing.
The natural habit pattern to set up a turn, for example, might be to look out in the direction you want to go and make control inputs while you're still looking that way, so at first it might seem unnatural to have to drag your eyes inside to the AI to make a specific attitude change. It's a whole different scan to either day VFR or full IF, and probably harder work I reckon.
Join Date: May 2010
Location: More than 300km from SY, Australia
Posts: 817
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
atsb - Reports
Report released today, with some serious implications for NVFR and IFR and Charter OPS
ABC Chopper Report | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
ABC Chopper Report | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
Join Date: May 2010
Location: More than 300km from SY, Australia
Posts: 817
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Accidents - ATSB data
The following SR was attached. This has serious implications for NVFR operations [Further comments]:
and the atsb response:
ATSB comment/action in response:
The ATSB welcomes the intent of the action proposed by CASA in response to this safety issue. In particular, the ATSB agrees that expanding what is meant by the term ‘visibility’ at night to include the requirement for a visual horizon will help ensure that pilots operating under the night VFR will have sufficient visual cues. However, given the importance of the safety issue, the ATSB is concerned about the indefinite nature of the proposed evaluation and other exploratory activities.
As a result, the ATSB has issued the following safety recommendation.
ATSB safety recommendation to: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action number: AO-2011-102-SR-59
Action status: Safety action pending
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority prioritise its efforts to address the safety risk associated with aerial work and private flights as permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without sufficient requirements for proficiency checks and recent experience to enable flight solely by reference to the flight instruments.
AND further:
Requirements for visual flight rule flights in dark night conditions Number: AO-2011-102-SI-02
Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority Operation affected:
Aviation – All general aviation operations
Who it affects:
All aircraft operating under the night visual flight rules (VFR)
Safety issue description:
Aerial work and private flights were permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without sufficient requirements for proficiency checks and recent experience to enable flight solely by reference to the flight instruments.
ATSB – AO-2011-102
Response to safety issue by: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 18 October 2013, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) stated that as part of the new pilot licencing rules (in development prior to August 2011), Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 61.970 will require pilots to demonstrate competency during biennial night visual flight rules assessments, which become effective in December 2013. As noted in Minimum requirements for night operations, this will certainly help maintain some pilots’ ability to a higher level than previously, but it will not ensure that the pilots are able to maintain their skills at an instrument rating standard.
CASA also advised of the following actions:
CASA will implement a regulatory change project to study the feasibility of rule changes that provide enhanced guidance on NVFR [night VFR] flight planning and other considerations, addressing all categories of operation.
CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with.
CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”. CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
CASA will provide additional guidance material and advisory notes in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.13-2:
o distinguishing the difference between NVFR / IFR and instrument conditions;
o including Certification standards for instrument and non-instrument rotorcraft; and
o emphasising the authority given by a NVFR rating.
The proposed changes project will be subject to CASA’s normal consultation requirements.
Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority Operation affected:
Aviation – All general aviation operations
Who it affects:
All aircraft operating under the night visual flight rules (VFR)
Safety issue description:
Aerial work and private flights were permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without sufficient requirements for proficiency checks and recent experience to enable flight solely by reference to the flight instruments.
ATSB – AO-2011-102
Response to safety issue by: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 18 October 2013, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) stated that as part of the new pilot licencing rules (in development prior to August 2011), Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 61.970 will require pilots to demonstrate competency during biennial night visual flight rules assessments, which become effective in December 2013. As noted in Minimum requirements for night operations, this will certainly help maintain some pilots’ ability to a higher level than previously, but it will not ensure that the pilots are able to maintain their skills at an instrument rating standard.
CASA also advised of the following actions:
CASA will implement a regulatory change project to study the feasibility of rule changes that provide enhanced guidance on NVFR [night VFR] flight planning and other considerations, addressing all categories of operation.
CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with.
CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”. CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
CASA will provide additional guidance material and advisory notes in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.13-2:
o distinguishing the difference between NVFR / IFR and instrument conditions;
o including Certification standards for instrument and non-instrument rotorcraft; and
o emphasising the authority given by a NVFR rating.
The proposed changes project will be subject to CASA’s normal consultation requirements.
and the atsb response:
ATSB comment/action in response:
The ATSB welcomes the intent of the action proposed by CASA in response to this safety issue. In particular, the ATSB agrees that expanding what is meant by the term ‘visibility’ at night to include the requirement for a visual horizon will help ensure that pilots operating under the night VFR will have sufficient visual cues. However, given the importance of the safety issue, the ATSB is concerned about the indefinite nature of the proposed evaluation and other exploratory activities.
As a result, the ATSB has issued the following safety recommendation.
ATSB safety recommendation to: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action number: AO-2011-102-SR-59
Action status: Safety action pending
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority prioritise its efforts to address the safety risk associated with aerial work and private flights as permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without sufficient requirements for proficiency checks and recent experience to enable flight solely by reference to the flight instruments.
Requirements for autopilots in dark night conditions Number: AO-2011-102-SI-03
Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Operation affected: Aviation – All general aviation helicopter operations
Who it affects: All helicopters operating under the night VFR
Safety issue description:
Helicopter flights were permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without the same requirements for autopilots and similar systems that are in place for conducting flights under the instrument flight rules.
Response to safety issue by: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 18 October 2013, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) advised that it would work towards promulgating Part 133 (Australian air transport operations – rotorcraft) of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, which will include the following regulation:
(1) This regulation applies if:
(a) the flight is a VFR flight at night; and
(b) a passenger is carried in the flight; and
(c) the rotorcraft is not carrying a 2-pilot crew each of whom is authorised under [Part 61] to conduct an IFR flight in a rotorcraft.
(2) The operator and the pilot in command each commit an offence if, when the rotorcraft begins the flight, the rotorcraft is not fitted with an autopilot.
In addition, as previously stated, CASA advised of further action proposed to address safety issue AO-2011-102-SI-02.
This included:
CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with. CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”.
CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
Subsequently, CASA advised on 30 October 2013 that Part 133 is planned to be made (or become law) in the last quarter of calendar year 2013 or first quarter of 2014 and come into effect from the first quarter of 2015. This will align with the normal Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control cycle for the notification of aeronautical information changes. The period between the Part being made and having effect will allow for implementation planning and education programs.
ATSB comment/action in response:
The ATSB notes that the introduction of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 133.571 will require all air transport flights in helicopters with passengers at night to be in helicopters equipped with an autopilot or with a two-pilot crew. This extends the range of operations required to have such risk controls. Although it does not directly address the situation for other helicopter operations, effective risk controls for such operations will be potentially addressed in any safety action taken by CASA to address the safety recommendation AO-2011-102-SR-59.
The ATSB will monitor the progress of that safety action.
Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Operation affected: Aviation – All general aviation helicopter operations
Who it affects: All helicopters operating under the night VFR
Safety issue description:
Helicopter flights were permitted under the visual flight rules in dark night conditions, which are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without the same requirements for autopilots and similar systems that are in place for conducting flights under the instrument flight rules.
Response to safety issue by: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 18 October 2013, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) advised that it would work towards promulgating Part 133 (Australian air transport operations – rotorcraft) of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, which will include the following regulation:
(1) This regulation applies if:
(a) the flight is a VFR flight at night; and
(b) a passenger is carried in the flight; and
(c) the rotorcraft is not carrying a 2-pilot crew each of whom is authorised under [Part 61] to conduct an IFR flight in a rotorcraft.
(2) The operator and the pilot in command each commit an offence if, when the rotorcraft begins the flight, the rotorcraft is not fitted with an autopilot.
In addition, as previously stated, CASA advised of further action proposed to address safety issue AO-2011-102-SI-02.
This included:
CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with. CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”.
CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
Subsequently, CASA advised on 30 October 2013 that Part 133 is planned to be made (or become law) in the last quarter of calendar year 2013 or first quarter of 2014 and come into effect from the first quarter of 2015. This will align with the normal Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control cycle for the notification of aeronautical information changes. The period between the Part being made and having effect will allow for implementation planning and education programs.
ATSB comment/action in response:
The ATSB notes that the introduction of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 133.571 will require all air transport flights in helicopters with passengers at night to be in helicopters equipped with an autopilot or with a two-pilot crew. This extends the range of operations required to have such risk controls. Although it does not directly address the situation for other helicopter operations, effective risk controls for such operations will be potentially addressed in any safety action taken by CASA to address the safety recommendation AO-2011-102-SR-59.
The ATSB will monitor the progress of that safety action.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Perth - Western Australia
Age: 75
Posts: 1,805
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts