Another Night-HEMS accident in US
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Wow... great to hear there were no fatalities
The pics of the wreckage recovery show the complete tail boom ripped off and the tail gearbox not attached to... I would say from impact but heres a link showing pics anyhows
http://www.alecbuck.com/
Fly safe...
The pics of the wreckage recovery show the complete tail boom ripped off and the tail gearbox not attached to... I would say from impact but heres a link showing pics anyhows
http://www.alecbuck.com/
Fly safe...
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Mmmmm ...
Damage very typical for Bo105/Bk117/Ec145 ...... like a Hu500 very crash worthy airframe.
So sad it had to happen .... but happy everyone walked/swam away from it !
Damage very typical for Bo105/Bk117/Ec145 ...... like a Hu500 very crash worthy airframe.
So sad it had to happen .... but happy everyone walked/swam away from it !
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NTSB Identification: ERA09LA464
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 17, 2009 in North Captiva Island, FL
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC-145, registration: N911LZ
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On August 17, 2009, at 0031 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter EC-145, N911LZ, operated by the Lee County Division of Public Safety, as MedStar 1, was substantially damaged when it impacted water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. The positioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
According to the pilot, she received a call around midnight for a patient pickup on North Captiva Island. After departure from FMY, she flew west over the water, with the autopilot engaged (set on altitude hold), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The helicopter remained at 1,000 feet to assure obstruction clearance (towers on Pine Island). After passing over the towers, the pilot descended to 800 feet, using autopilot. At the same time, she was attempting to contact the Captiva Fire Department (FD) on the radio. The pilot reported she tried to call the FD 4 or 5 times with no response, and then contacted Lee County Dispatch to confirm which frequency the FD was using.
When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. She continued toward the airfield and made a final transmission to the FD that she was "one minute out."
The pilot commented to the medical crew that she could see the FD moving fire trucks to the center of the landing zone (a grass airstrip). She stated she wasn't concerned that she could not reach the FD since she was landing on an airfield, and was familiar with the obstructions in the landing zone.
The plot could not remember the exact sequence of the final 500-foot descent; however, at some point she remembered the medical crew commenting they "couldn't see anything." She responded, that the flight to Captiva is usually very dark over the water and there's "never anything to see." She remembered turning on the search light and shortly after, impacting the water. She also stated she thought she "pulled power and cyclic" when she saw the water; but didn't have time to warn the crew. After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over and was submerged within seconds.
The pilot and two paramedics were able to egress from the helicopter and swim to the surface of the water. They climbed onto the underside of the helicopter and waited for a FD boat to pick them up.
The pilot had flown to North Captiva Island numerous times prior to the accident flight. She reported that the "sight picture was the same as previous flights;" however, the pilot did remember that during the accident just prior to impact, she saw an amber altitude alert on the primary flight display (signifying the autopilot was disengaged). The pilot did not remember ever disconnecting the autopilot during the flight, and knew she was "at the controls at impact." The pilot additionally reported no mechanical problems with the helicopter.
Both paramedics reported the flight was routine (with the exception of being unable to contact the FD), until they were within a few minutes of landing at North Captiva Island. At that time, they commented that they "couldn't see anything" outside of the helicopter. They observed what appeared to be rain outside the helicopter; however, since they knew it was not raining at the time, they thought this was the rotorwash from the water below. The helicopter then immediately impacted the water, flipped over, and the cabin filled with water within 5 seconds.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter after the accident. According to the inspector, flight control continuity was established and no anomalies were noted with the helicopter's engines.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. She also held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 24, 2009. At that time, the pilot reported 5,800 hours of total flight experience.
The weather reported at FMY, at 0053, included winds from 060 degrees at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 25 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.07 inches mercury.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 17, 2009 in North Captiva Island, FL
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC-145, registration: N911LZ
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On August 17, 2009, at 0031 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter EC-145, N911LZ, operated by the Lee County Division of Public Safety, as MedStar 1, was substantially damaged when it impacted water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The pilot and two medical crewmembers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. The positioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
According to the pilot, she received a call around midnight for a patient pickup on North Captiva Island. After departure from FMY, she flew west over the water, with the autopilot engaged (set on altitude hold), at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The helicopter remained at 1,000 feet to assure obstruction clearance (towers on Pine Island). After passing over the towers, the pilot descended to 800 feet, using autopilot. At the same time, she was attempting to contact the Captiva Fire Department (FD) on the radio. The pilot reported she tried to call the FD 4 or 5 times with no response, and then contacted Lee County Dispatch to confirm which frequency the FD was using.
When the helicopter was approximately 3 minutes from landing, the pilot selected 500 feet using the autopilot and the helicopter initiated a descent to that altitude. She continued toward the airfield and made a final transmission to the FD that she was "one minute out."
The pilot commented to the medical crew that she could see the FD moving fire trucks to the center of the landing zone (a grass airstrip). She stated she wasn't concerned that she could not reach the FD since she was landing on an airfield, and was familiar with the obstructions in the landing zone.
The plot could not remember the exact sequence of the final 500-foot descent; however, at some point she remembered the medical crew commenting they "couldn't see anything." She responded, that the flight to Captiva is usually very dark over the water and there's "never anything to see." She remembered turning on the search light and shortly after, impacting the water. She also stated she thought she "pulled power and cyclic" when she saw the water; but didn't have time to warn the crew. After the helicopter impacted the water, it flipped over and was submerged within seconds.
The pilot and two paramedics were able to egress from the helicopter and swim to the surface of the water. They climbed onto the underside of the helicopter and waited for a FD boat to pick them up.
The pilot had flown to North Captiva Island numerous times prior to the accident flight. She reported that the "sight picture was the same as previous flights;" however, the pilot did remember that during the accident just prior to impact, she saw an amber altitude alert on the primary flight display (signifying the autopilot was disengaged). The pilot did not remember ever disconnecting the autopilot during the flight, and knew she was "at the controls at impact." The pilot additionally reported no mechanical problems with the helicopter.
Both paramedics reported the flight was routine (with the exception of being unable to contact the FD), until they were within a few minutes of landing at North Captiva Island. At that time, they commented that they "couldn't see anything" outside of the helicopter. They observed what appeared to be rain outside the helicopter; however, since they knew it was not raining at the time, they thought this was the rotorwash from the water below. The helicopter then immediately impacted the water, flipped over, and the cabin filled with water within 5 seconds.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter after the accident. According to the inspector, flight control continuity was established and no anomalies were noted with the helicopter's engines.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. She also held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 24, 2009. At that time, the pilot reported 5,800 hours of total flight experience.
The weather reported at FMY, at 0053, included winds from 060 degrees at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 25 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.07 inches mercury.
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Are the paramedics part of the flight crew in these single pilot operations and if so why are they not assisting with navigation and situational awareness? Sounds as if they were sitting in the back with no patient to distract them yet having no input whatsoever.
The following link has a very good news report on the event, a spot map showing the crash site off the island.....and a nice video. In the article you can see a google earth link (text in purple print) that shows the dirt strip that runs across the island "between" houses on either side of it. The landing strip cuts a developed area in two and is dark on each end.
Crews still working to recover downed helicopter - NBC-2.com WBBH News for Fort Myers, Cape Coral & Naples, Florida
DoubleBogey can have fun with this situation I would think.....it would play right into his concept of a formalized approach procedure rather than peering out the windows.
I do have to wonder if the Pilot was using the GPS distance readout to determine distance from mid-field....along with her MK I's? Also...wonder what the RadAlt bug was set to? Did they have the Night Sun fired up and pointing down? I don't reckon the crew had NVG's either!
Crews still working to recover downed helicopter - NBC-2.com WBBH News for Fort Myers, Cape Coral & Naples, Florida
DoubleBogey can have fun with this situation I would think.....it would play right into his concept of a formalized approach procedure rather than peering out the windows.
I do have to wonder if the Pilot was using the GPS distance readout to determine distance from mid-field....along with her MK I's? Also...wonder what the RadAlt bug was set to? Did they have the Night Sun fired up and pointing down? I don't reckon the crew had NVG's either!
I too wonder if they had used any of those helpers. Seems like it was a known, airfield approach and she was a human who may have relaxed at just the wrong time with task familiarity. We have all been there.
Glad she and her crew are still with us that we might all learn how to avoid the trap that got them.
I will go out on a limb here: they were not wearing NVG. If they were, I would expect extreme hysteria about the dangers of NVG.
Nevermind the extreme dangers of not seeing the ground!
Glad she and her crew are still with us that we might all learn how to avoid the trap that got them.
I will go out on a limb here: they were not wearing NVG. If they were, I would expect extreme hysteria about the dangers of NVG.
Nevermind the extreme dangers of not seeing the ground!
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From the NTSB's preliminary report, it would seem she set the auto pilot to descend to 500 feeet and flew into the water.She was using the auto pilot alt. hold for her cruise at 1000' feet agl(or amsl).
Will try and find the link and post it here.
Alt3.
Will try and find the link and post it here.
Alt3.
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Are the paramedics part of the flight crew in these single pilot operations
In many cases, the paramedics are hospital employees, whilst the aircraft and pilot are leased by the hospital under "for hire" operations. So the pilot is flight crew, but not the med crew...
"Just a pilot"
For-profit or otherwise; Single or twin: IFR/VFR; autopilot or handflown; until we, in the industry, deal with the real issue, night EMS accident rates will continue out of proportion. Pilot error is problem in all accidents, and a pilot handicapped by a poorly considered transition to a night shift is going to make more errors.
A021, risk matrices, all the rest of the easy answers are not going to make a pilot any smarter. We don't need to reinvent the wheel- sleep deficiency issues, circadian and sleep disruption, a/k/a jet lag, general fatigue, are known issues with some fairly well established resolutions. They may require unsettling, inconvenient and disruptive changes to 'the way we've always done it', but tradition is killing us: For-profit or otherwise; Single or twin: IFR/VFR; Autopilot or handflown.
A021, risk matrices, all the rest of the easy answers are not going to make a pilot any smarter. We don't need to reinvent the wheel- sleep deficiency issues, circadian and sleep disruption, a/k/a jet lag, general fatigue, are known issues with some fairly well established resolutions. They may require unsettling, inconvenient and disruptive changes to 'the way we've always done it', but tradition is killing us: For-profit or otherwise; Single or twin: IFR/VFR; Autopilot or handflown.
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HEMS and NVGs...
Mars, thanks for posting the NTSB prelim. Helmet-fire, you're right on the money: why isn't the HEMS community leaning towards the use of NVGs? With over 500 hours of NVG time in some very demanding enviornments, I can honestly say that I don't like flying unaided. For some commercial ops, it's a non-issue. For HEMS, PD, and other ops that are conducted to field sites at night in low visibility, it seems like an unwise safety decision.
And there will be nay-sayers touting the limited field of view when using NVGs, etc, but the proof exists in the numbers. I'd be curious what the statistics are for accidents per 100,000 hours for operators using NVGs and those without. -even operators in similar mission modes (border patrol, PD, etc).
Not to mention, three sets of NVGs, initial and yearly training won't add up to more than the cost of that EC.
And there will be nay-sayers touting the limited field of view when using NVGs, etc, but the proof exists in the numbers. I'd be curious what the statistics are for accidents per 100,000 hours for operators using NVGs and those without. -even operators in similar mission modes (border patrol, PD, etc).
Not to mention, three sets of NVGs, initial and yearly training won't add up to more than the cost of that EC.
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Most operators seem to be working towards using NVGs, but the FAA is a severe holdup. Their extremely slow approval rate is the problem. My company has the goggles on the shelf, but the FAA will only approve bases at about the rate of one a week, and that's only because the company is pushing them. It will take well into next year to get the NVG approval for all the bases, even though the equipment is on hand, and the installation is as standard as it can get. The FAA fought all NVG use by civilian programs for years, and only started allowing them very recently. NVG use will become pretty much universal, I think, but it will take time.
I also think SASless is well behind the times. FAA inspectors visit one of our bases pretty much every day. Enforcement has been a priority for some time, and the only holdup on that has been the lack of personnel, left over from the previous administration which didn't want to enforce any regulations on any company at any time. It's getting better, but slowly.
I also think SASless is well behind the times. FAA inspectors visit one of our bases pretty much every day. Enforcement has been a priority for some time, and the only holdup on that has been the lack of personnel, left over from the previous administration which didn't want to enforce any regulations on any company at any time. It's getting better, but slowly.
Gom,
They checking weather reports, flight plans, and routing on night flights to see if ya'll are seeing enough lights where you fly? They done any night flights with you to see for themselves you are complying with the rule?
It is not how often they show up but what they do when they are there.
I am not suggesting they become the Gestapo by any means but look into areas of concern that are known factors in these accidents we seem to be having due to the same old causes year after year.
Checking paperwork and duty hours logs and looking in the maintenance log or doing an audit on training documentation is not going to make that big a change in the safety performance. Monitoring the flight activity and all the operational issues will.
They checking weather reports, flight plans, and routing on night flights to see if ya'll are seeing enough lights where you fly? They done any night flights with you to see for themselves you are complying with the rule?
It is not how often they show up but what they do when they are there.
I am not suggesting they become the Gestapo by any means but look into areas of concern that are known factors in these accidents we seem to be having due to the same old causes year after year.
Checking paperwork and duty hours logs and looking in the maintenance log or doing an audit on training documentation is not going to make that big a change in the safety performance. Monitoring the flight activity and all the operational issues will.