Automation versus "Mandraulics"
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Swamps
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I know where I feel safer
I have the benefit of flying a highly automated type (S92) and a steam driven type (AS332L), and feel able to compare the experience. They both require great dicipline to operate properly. The 92 needs more forward planning to decide what you wish to achieve and how best to make it happen, and, most importantly what is the back up plan if it does something unexpected.
The As332 requires the same forward plan but the execution method is a foregone conclusion.
Out of the two give me the S92 every time. The spare capacity it gives is invaluable provided the planning has been done.
We are in a new time where the skills required are changing,these must be accepted and trained for.
The big problem requiring the most work is the night offshore approach. This is an area which exposes us and our passengers to a level of risk which is greatly elevated from daytime operations, which in a risk averse bussiness is bizarre.
We have all had the situation where the wind and sea state have been too bad to operate during daylight, but, as it calms slightly after dark it is acceptable. Give me the risk in daylight anytime.
The night offshore approach when handled in the form of an ARA lends itself to the coupled approach and by inference the coupled aircraft lends itself to the ARA. Our fixed wing brothers don't do VFR.
This is for a good reason and if it were suggested that they carry out an approach with no guidance, no lead in lights, no VASI or PAPI to a series of lights that were correct when the pilot guessed that it looked rugby ball shaped, the CAA would have kittens and the pilots would refuse.
We have the automated aircraft lets get on with having the automate approaches to go with them.
The superior pilot is one who uses his superior judgement to avoid situations requiring his superior skill.
The As332 requires the same forward plan but the execution method is a foregone conclusion.
Out of the two give me the S92 every time. The spare capacity it gives is invaluable provided the planning has been done.
We are in a new time where the skills required are changing,these must be accepted and trained for.
The big problem requiring the most work is the night offshore approach. This is an area which exposes us and our passengers to a level of risk which is greatly elevated from daytime operations, which in a risk averse bussiness is bizarre.
We have all had the situation where the wind and sea state have been too bad to operate during daylight, but, as it calms slightly after dark it is acceptable. Give me the risk in daylight anytime.
The night offshore approach when handled in the form of an ARA lends itself to the coupled approach and by inference the coupled aircraft lends itself to the ARA. Our fixed wing brothers don't do VFR.
This is for a good reason and if it were suggested that they carry out an approach with no guidance, no lead in lights, no VASI or PAPI to a series of lights that were correct when the pilot guessed that it looked rugby ball shaped, the CAA would have kittens and the pilots would refuse.
We have the automated aircraft lets get on with having the automate approaches to go with them.
The superior pilot is one who uses his superior judgement to avoid situations requiring his superior skill.
Swamp Queen hit the nail on the head!
Offshore helicopter flying at night and landing on a rig, platform, or boat will always be much more difficult than landing to a well lit, instrumented, radar monitored, multi-thousand foot long patch of pavement equipped with lead-ins and real lighting stuck out all by itself with no clutter or obstacles about the place.
There are a lot of questions that need answering and some soul searching on industry attitudes, SOP's, and the like.
But....here we are....within the same company we have both the most advanced aircraft but at the same time still operates in the same locale what can only be described as antiques....aircraft without an autopilot of any description.
We sell the new high tech machines citing enhanced safety due to techology but cling to the antique machines of the 70's.
We cannot have it both ways.....either as an industry we embrace technology and up-grade the fleet as we can or we will never rise to the level of the airlines in safety and continue to have human factors losses of aircraft and people.
I can recall saying....."If I just had a Rad Alt!"
Then it was...."If I just had a Decca Tans!"
Then it was...."If I just had Attitude Hold!"
We got all that stuff plus FMS, 2-3-4 Axis Autopilots, Digital Displays, really good Radar, GPS/GNSS, EPIRBS that broadcast our location if we need it, HUMS, FDR's, CVR's, StormScope, Sat Phones, TCAS, EGPWS, but yet there has not been an industry wide, pilot population wide shift to fully incorporate the use of all that wizardly as a standard.
How many times when asked, have you heard the response from management..."Who's gonna pay for that?"
My answer is the pilots, crew, and passengers.....if we don't change with the times!
The latest Safety goal is to reduce accidents by either 80 or 90 percent over a ten year period. I give so much credence to such industry/FAA/CAA programs I cannot even tell you what the stated goal is.
Since we kicked off the latest program.....how much progress have we made in reducing accidents?
The night offshore approach when handled in the form of an ARA lends itself to the coupled approach and by inference the coupled aircraft lends itself to the ARA.
Our fixed wing brothers don't do VFR.
This is for a good reason and if it were suggested that they carry out an approach with no guidance, no lead in lights, no VASI or PAPI to a series of lights that were correct when the pilot guessed that it looked rugby ball shaped, the CAA would have kittens and the pilots would refuse.
Our fixed wing brothers don't do VFR.
This is for a good reason and if it were suggested that they carry out an approach with no guidance, no lead in lights, no VASI or PAPI to a series of lights that were correct when the pilot guessed that it looked rugby ball shaped, the CAA would have kittens and the pilots would refuse.
There are a lot of questions that need answering and some soul searching on industry attitudes, SOP's, and the like.
But....here we are....within the same company we have both the most advanced aircraft but at the same time still operates in the same locale what can only be described as antiques....aircraft without an autopilot of any description.
We sell the new high tech machines citing enhanced safety due to techology but cling to the antique machines of the 70's.
We cannot have it both ways.....either as an industry we embrace technology and up-grade the fleet as we can or we will never rise to the level of the airlines in safety and continue to have human factors losses of aircraft and people.
I can recall saying....."If I just had a Rad Alt!"
Then it was...."If I just had a Decca Tans!"
Then it was...."If I just had Attitude Hold!"
We got all that stuff plus FMS, 2-3-4 Axis Autopilots, Digital Displays, really good Radar, GPS/GNSS, EPIRBS that broadcast our location if we need it, HUMS, FDR's, CVR's, StormScope, Sat Phones, TCAS, EGPWS, but yet there has not been an industry wide, pilot population wide shift to fully incorporate the use of all that wizardly as a standard.
How many times when asked, have you heard the response from management..."Who's gonna pay for that?"
My answer is the pilots, crew, and passengers.....if we don't change with the times!
The latest Safety goal is to reduce accidents by either 80 or 90 percent over a ten year period. I give so much credence to such industry/FAA/CAA programs I cannot even tell you what the stated goal is.
Since we kicked off the latest program.....how much progress have we made in reducing accidents?
How much trust do you put into automation?
This applies to the Turkish crash in Amsterdam but should give food for thought as we consider approaching a rig at night in foul weather placing our trust in our trusty new world highly evolved friend "George" to drive the aircraft to near deckside.
Just how do we set up the systems for the maximum benefit with the least risk during failures?
Just how do we set up the systems for the maximum benefit with the least risk during failures?
Dutch investigators have revealed that a faulty altimeter shut down an
engine of the Turkish Airlines 737-800 that crashed last week in Amsterdam,
killing nine people. The Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning to Boeing
as a result of the first findings of the crash investigation. It was found
that the automatic throttle system, as a part of the automatic steering
system received incorrect information because of a malfunction in the left
radio altimeter. Professor Pieter van Vollenhoven, chief investigator,
reported that, while the jet was still at an altitude of 1,950 feet, the
radio altimeter reported an altitude of - 8 feet, which caused the
automatic throttle system to reduce power and configured the rest of the
systems as if the aircraft was only a few meters above the Polderbaan at
Amsterdam's Schiphol airport When the crew of the Turkish Airlines noticed
what was going on, it was already too late to intervene effectively.
Vollenhoven said the aircraft had twice before experienced problems with
its altimeter and urged operators to be vigilant with regard to the
instrument.
engine of the Turkish Airlines 737-800 that crashed last week in Amsterdam,
killing nine people. The Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning to Boeing
as a result of the first findings of the crash investigation. It was found
that the automatic throttle system, as a part of the automatic steering
system received incorrect information because of a malfunction in the left
radio altimeter. Professor Pieter van Vollenhoven, chief investigator,
reported that, while the jet was still at an altitude of 1,950 feet, the
radio altimeter reported an altitude of - 8 feet, which caused the
automatic throttle system to reduce power and configured the rest of the
systems as if the aircraft was only a few meters above the Polderbaan at
Amsterdam's Schiphol airport When the crew of the Turkish Airlines noticed
what was going on, it was already too late to intervene effectively.
Vollenhoven said the aircraft had twice before experienced problems with
its altimeter and urged operators to be vigilant with regard to the
instrument.
