NTSB says EMS accident rate is too high
Changing the funding model is not going to happen. In fact....one could almost suggest the reverse be true....that being the UK should go the private enterprise method except there is no private enterprise in the healthcare field in the UK that compares to our system.
We have to agree the two approaches to business/funding/ownership of EMS operatins are and shall remain quit different between the UK and USA.
Bottomline...someone has to pay for the service...either the user, the provider, or someone who does so as a third party be it a charity, government, or insurance company.
Helicopters run on money....not jet fuel as most folks assume.
We have to agree the two approaches to business/funding/ownership of EMS operatins are and shall remain quit different between the UK and USA.
Bottomline...someone has to pay for the service...either the user, the provider, or someone who does so as a third party be it a charity, government, or insurance company.
Helicopters run on money....not jet fuel as most folks assume.
Jack - in your Maryland example, does the state directly own and employ the helicopters and crews or does a sub-contractor (who would have to bid for the contract) provide? If it is the latter then it is no different to the other states in that the cheapest bidder will get the contract and have to minimise costs to make a profit.
and allowing them to operate VFR in poor weather conditions is the one thing that won't prevent poor decisions - it is exactly the cause of the crashes at the moment.
Poor decision-making in poorly (compared to the more expensive alternatives) equipped aircraft is the reason why so many of these well-meaning crews end up as statistics.
If you make a poor decision in a VFR only helo, you have nowhere to go - if you make the same poor decision but have a real IFR option, then plan B saves the day.
I will say again, change the funding model and regulate for SPIFR aircraft and appropriately trained and competent pilots and the problem will likely go away almost overnight.
Changing the funding model will do little to effect the results if we don’t have a system ultimately driven by prudent PIC decisions
Poor decision-making in poorly (compared to the more expensive alternatives) equipped aircraft is the reason why so many of these well-meaning crews end up as statistics.
If you make a poor decision in a VFR only helo, you have nowhere to go - if you make the same poor decision but have a real IFR option, then plan B saves the day.
I will say again, change the funding model and regulate for SPIFR aircraft and appropriately trained and competent pilots and the problem will likely go away almost overnight.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 424 Likes
on
224 Posts
Aerobot said:
Aerobo, I don't think I misunderstood it. After doing my time in professional aviation, best part of a couple of decades military, then para-military day & night casevac/SAR, later Police/Air ambulance, some private/corporate (which strangely enough actually puts the pilot under heavy personal pressures, especially at night) I could see flaws in what you had written and replied to it, albeit somewhat tongue in cheek.
Obviously any pilot needs to make safe and sensible decisions every time he flies or he will not last long, he'll either kill himself or get sacked. But for a job such as Night EMS (one of the most demanding there is) the best equipment should ideally also be provided - if we expect it to be done reliably and safely.
The UK for once seems to be ahead of the USA in this respect, for good reason - we suffered our own tragic losses in the past and it was eventually deemed necessary for the regulators to act. This took away some responsibility from the operators; as I said before, it levelled the playing field for all with regard to the level of equipment and type of aircraft that was seen as acceptable. I could quote you two examples of why in UK we now have twin engined, stabilised helicopters for public transport night flights (this is deemed to include police and Air Ambulance flights in UK).
We continue to lose aircraft in marginal conditions and I could also quote you three fatal helicopter accidents where pilots' decision making, planning and competency for the job has been an issue. So I agree with your sentiments in part but not as far as the suggestion that the use of good equipment is less important, not if you want the job to be done safely and efficiently.
I'm lucky enough to have operated some of the world's more capable and better equipped helicopters. I've also been given some inadequate ones and expected to cope and provide the same service.
There has been many a time when I would have been unable to do the job in a less capable machine. If I hadn't gone and got the job done, someone would have died. There have been times when I have been put under very heavy pressure to fly when I knew the job might not get completed. Sometimes, in those circumstances, I've gone and proved it couldn't be done. Sometimes I was wrong and we did finally get the job done, because the weather improved, for example.
However, I've always stood up to those putting me under pressure to fly when I regarded the flight to be unsafe. I've also turned back when continued flight was becoming unsafe. So far it's worked, I've never been sacked and I'm still here typing this stuff.
The thing about an IFR capable aircraft is that it gives the pilot another way of getting the job done, or recovering safely if it can't be done. It requires more planning, more fuel, more time to organise and complete. If it's not flown properly, it can bring its own further dangers. However, the ground always wins a CFIT contest.
You need IFR equipment or you can't train the pilots to fly it.
Trying to do an IMC job in a VFR only aircraft is a ticket to nowhere except to an accident. This is the real crux of the matter.
Congratulations, Shy. I have never had anything I've posted be so amazingly misunderstood. I'd explain it, but I see that SAS gets it so I don't have to.
Obviously any pilot needs to make safe and sensible decisions every time he flies or he will not last long, he'll either kill himself or get sacked. But for a job such as Night EMS (one of the most demanding there is) the best equipment should ideally also be provided - if we expect it to be done reliably and safely.
The UK for once seems to be ahead of the USA in this respect, for good reason - we suffered our own tragic losses in the past and it was eventually deemed necessary for the regulators to act. This took away some responsibility from the operators; as I said before, it levelled the playing field for all with regard to the level of equipment and type of aircraft that was seen as acceptable. I could quote you two examples of why in UK we now have twin engined, stabilised helicopters for public transport night flights (this is deemed to include police and Air Ambulance flights in UK).
We continue to lose aircraft in marginal conditions and I could also quote you three fatal helicopter accidents where pilots' decision making, planning and competency for the job has been an issue. So I agree with your sentiments in part but not as far as the suggestion that the use of good equipment is less important, not if you want the job to be done safely and efficiently.
I'm lucky enough to have operated some of the world's more capable and better equipped helicopters. I've also been given some inadequate ones and expected to cope and provide the same service.
There has been many a time when I would have been unable to do the job in a less capable machine. If I hadn't gone and got the job done, someone would have died. There have been times when I have been put under very heavy pressure to fly when I knew the job might not get completed. Sometimes, in those circumstances, I've gone and proved it couldn't be done. Sometimes I was wrong and we did finally get the job done, because the weather improved, for example.
However, I've always stood up to those putting me under pressure to fly when I regarded the flight to be unsafe. I've also turned back when continued flight was becoming unsafe. So far it's worked, I've never been sacked and I'm still here typing this stuff.
The thing about an IFR capable aircraft is that it gives the pilot another way of getting the job done, or recovering safely if it can't be done. It requires more planning, more fuel, more time to organise and complete. If it's not flown properly, it can bring its own further dangers. However, the ground always wins a CFIT contest.
You need IFR equipment or you can't train the pilots to fly it.
Trying to do an IMC job in a VFR only aircraft is a ticket to nowhere except to an accident. This is the real crux of the matter.
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: USA
Posts: 336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Since we are all spit balling here and nothing seems to be off the table how about this:
Deem single engines VFR-Day only and allow them to operate only by day (since, it seems, that a lot of accidents happen at night).Organize them in a hub and spoke system.Have a "fully loaded" IFR capable Twin (or two) at a hub and sprinkle the VFR singles in the spokes. they take care of business during the day and in VFR conditions and the twins pick up the load, or the slack, at night ,or in IFR conditions, respectively.Crew the twins single pilot with a four axis A/P or have two pilots,depending on the location (urban vs rural, mountainous vs flat,benign weather vs four -seasons- rage etc)
Crew the VFR aircraft with younger,new to HEMS pilots and let them use that time as a stepping stone for the IFR Captaincy in the twins in the future. Allows them to make good decisions as they build time and experience.
I agree with Devil 49.Night shifts are not the same as day shifts and 3 or 4 or 7 nights in a row with flights at 2 am (the lowest point in your circadian rhythm) does not an effecient pilot make.If you happen to be awake after midnight, either completing or beginning a flight, you should have more than the ten hour rest period currently allowed by regulations.It should be more.Maybe even the whole next day and a half off. Of course, that will mean hiring more pilots per base and the operators will baulk at that.
Any takers?
Alt3.
Deem single engines VFR-Day only and allow them to operate only by day (since, it seems, that a lot of accidents happen at night).Organize them in a hub and spoke system.Have a "fully loaded" IFR capable Twin (or two) at a hub and sprinkle the VFR singles in the spokes. they take care of business during the day and in VFR conditions and the twins pick up the load, or the slack, at night ,or in IFR conditions, respectively.Crew the twins single pilot with a four axis A/P or have two pilots,depending on the location (urban vs rural, mountainous vs flat,benign weather vs four -seasons- rage etc)
Crew the VFR aircraft with younger,new to HEMS pilots and let them use that time as a stepping stone for the IFR Captaincy in the twins in the future. Allows them to make good decisions as they build time and experience.
I agree with Devil 49.Night shifts are not the same as day shifts and 3 or 4 or 7 nights in a row with flights at 2 am (the lowest point in your circadian rhythm) does not an effecient pilot make.If you happen to be awake after midnight, either completing or beginning a flight, you should have more than the ten hour rest period currently allowed by regulations.It should be more.Maybe even the whole next day and a half off. Of course, that will mean hiring more pilots per base and the operators will baulk at that.
Any takers?
Alt3.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Croydon
Posts: 285
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Crab
The Maryland State Police are owned, maintained and crewed by State Troopers, but as they are treated as a 'public' (ie government) aircraft they are not subject to FAA regulation.
Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
NTSB held a meeting recently after a series of accidents in the 'public' category (both government operated and supervised aircraft):
Forum: Public Aircraft: Ensuring Safety for Critical Missions
One other example is this New Mexico Police mountain rescue accident, which is worth reading om how some of these units are run:
Board Meeting - Crash of Agusta S.p.A. A-109E helicopter, N606SP, near Santa Fe, NM, June 9, 2009
The Maryland State Police are owned, maintained and crewed by State Troopers, but as they are treated as a 'public' (ie government) aircraft they are not subject to FAA regulation.
Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's attempt to regain visual conditions by performing a rapid descent and his failure to arrest the descent at the minimum descent altitude during a nonprecision approach. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot‘s limited recent instrument flight experience, (2) the lack of adherence to effective risk management procedures by the MSP, (3) the pilot‘s inadequate assessment of the weather, which led to his decision to accept the flight, (4) the failure of the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (PCT) controller to provide the current ADW weather observation to the pilot, and (5) the increased workload on the pilot due to inadequate FAA air traffic control handling by the Ronald Reagan National Airport Tower and PCT controllers.
The safety issues discussed in this report involve risk assessments, pilot performance and training, terrain awareness and warning systems, air traffic control deficiencies, SYSCOM duty officer performance, and emergency response. Also discussed are patient transport decisions, flight recorder requirements, and FAA oversight. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA, the MSP, Prince George‘s County, all public helicopter emergency medical services operators, and six other organizations whose members are involved in search and rescue activities
The safety issues discussed in this report involve risk assessments, pilot performance and training, terrain awareness and warning systems, air traffic control deficiencies, SYSCOM duty officer performance, and emergency response. Also discussed are patient transport decisions, flight recorder requirements, and FAA oversight. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA, the MSP, Prince George‘s County, all public helicopter emergency medical services operators, and six other organizations whose members are involved in search and rescue activities
Forum: Public Aircraft: Ensuring Safety for Critical Missions
This safety forum, "Public Aircraft: Ensuring Safety for Critical Missions", addresses oversight of public aircraft. The goals of the forum are to (1) raise awareness of the importance of effective oversight in ensuring the safety of public aircraft operations; (2) identify where responsibility lies for oversight of public aircraft operations; and (3) facilitate the sharing of best practices and lessons learned across a number of parties involved in the oversight of public aircraft operations.
Public aircraft are operated by a federal, state or local government for the purpose of fulfilling governmental functions, such as firefighting, search and rescue, law enforcement, wildlife or land management, or aeronautical research. Government organizations conducting public aircraft operations supervise their own flight operations without oversight from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Public aircraft are operated by a federal, state or local government for the purpose of fulfilling governmental functions, such as firefighting, search and rescue, law enforcement, wildlife or land management, or aeronautical research. Government organizations conducting public aircraft operations supervise their own flight operations without oversight from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Board Meeting - Crash of Agusta S.p.A. A-109E helicopter, N606SP, near Santa Fe, NM, June 9, 2009
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's decision to take off from a remote, mountainous landing site in dark (moonless) night, windy, instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident were an organizational culture that prioritized mission execution over aviation safety and the pilot's fatigue, self-induced pressure to conduct the flight, and situational stress. Also contributing to the accident were deficiencies in the NMSP aviation section's safety-related policies, including lack of a requirement for a risk assessment at any point during the mission; inadequate pilot staffing; lack of an effective fatigue management program for pilots; and inadequate procedures and equipment to ensure effective communication between airborne and ground personnel during search and rescue missions.
I see the sense of my last post has been misconstrued; I was not advocating flying IFR - that is not the answer for 'scene' work. My post was mainly concerned with the issue of the visual cueing environment. Visual cueing is important for three reasons:
It is a matter of launching in accordance with the latest dispatch criteria but planning for the unexpected.
I understand SASLess' wish for a comprehensive low level IFR structure combined with a PinS type arrival but en-route and arrival procedures will have to be compliant with PANS OPS or TERPS. These prescribe the obstacle clearance criteria for en-route section, specify the surveying criteria to establish obstacle clearance in the arrival segment and require either a visual approach (really out of the question) or a proceed VFR (which will require VFR weather). This has not been a simple matter even for heliport procedures; for example the lighting criteria has still not been resolved.
In addition the helicopters will have to be certificated for flight in IMC (one of the points that is not being accepted at the moment). The pilots will have to be trained, checked and have instrument recency (otherwise one problem will be replaced by another); wasn't instrument proficiency and recency the main cause of the Maryland accident.
The real answer lies with a change of culture and the correct application of the FAAs dispatch criteria through oversight of operational control. The posters that have stated that the business model will not change are absolutely correct - it is the american way!
An improvement in the safety record will be hard won and will come gradually with education, culture change and regulatory oversight.
There is no silver bullet!!
Jim
(1) to permit the pilot to control the helicopter from cues outside of the aircraft;
(2) to permit the crew members to see all obstacles within the flight path; and
(3) to permit the crew to use pilotage to find their way to the scene.
i.e. flying VFR. Adequacy of the cues (as I said previously) is related to the handling qualities. The more attention that has to be applied to accessing visual cues, the less brain power is available to control the helicopter. If controlling the helicopter is provided by automatics, it is unlikely that control will be lost if the visual cues are reduced. Not IFR but VFR in a reduced visual cue environment where the visibility is not in question.(2) to permit the crew members to see all obstacles within the flight path; and
(3) to permit the crew to use pilotage to find their way to the scene.
It is a matter of launching in accordance with the latest dispatch criteria but planning for the unexpected.
I understand SASLess' wish for a comprehensive low level IFR structure combined with a PinS type arrival but en-route and arrival procedures will have to be compliant with PANS OPS or TERPS. These prescribe the obstacle clearance criteria for en-route section, specify the surveying criteria to establish obstacle clearance in the arrival segment and require either a visual approach (really out of the question) or a proceed VFR (which will require VFR weather). This has not been a simple matter even for heliport procedures; for example the lighting criteria has still not been resolved.
In addition the helicopters will have to be certificated for flight in IMC (one of the points that is not being accepted at the moment). The pilots will have to be trained, checked and have instrument recency (otherwise one problem will be replaced by another); wasn't instrument proficiency and recency the main cause of the Maryland accident.
The real answer lies with a change of culture and the correct application of the FAAs dispatch criteria through oversight of operational control. The posters that have stated that the business model will not change are absolutely correct - it is the american way!
An improvement in the safety record will be hard won and will come gradually with education, culture change and regulatory oversight.
There is no silver bullet!!
Jim
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JimL
Can you ever see single engine helicopters being approved for IMC flight, with suitable equipment? Is it a question of a proven engine failure rate and if so what would that be?
Can you ever see single engine helicopters being approved for IMC flight, with suitable equipment? Is it a question of a proven engine failure rate and if so what would that be?
JimL,
Current Regulations and Industry practice allows a Pilot to pass a Part 135 IFR Check ride and be deemed both Current and Proficient....and usually a Company Training Captain shows up at the base...conducts a very minimum ground training and perhaps an hour or so flight training ride then conduct the Check Ride. If the Pilot meets the minimun standard he is good to go.
We talk about "currency" and "proficiency" as if they are the same. They most assuredly are not. Some of these "IFR" bases rarely fly IMC much less IFR between their six-monthly checkrides. If the Operator/Customer provide for it....sometimes one can add an practice Instrument Approach to a leg that does not conflict with the task of getting a patient to the medical facility.
For an aircraft that is based away from an Instrumented Approach Airport....it is very rare then for the Pilot to even do a practice approach. Most cases the Pilot is the sole occupant aboard the aircraft and cannot use a Hood or other Vision obscuring device.
Depending upon the prevailing weather.....flights in actual IMC of any kind can be rare for the whole host of reasons one can list.
Again....when we talk of IFR Programs....there is a whale of a difference between the theory and reality and we can see the results of that in the accident statistics.
The whole concept of IFR route structure and Approach criterion must be reviewed from the perspective of HELICOPTER performance and not as is done currently by most Certification Authorities. Helicopters are very much different than Airplanes in their approach speeds, ability to operate at very slow speeds, and that they are designed to operate away from Airports.
Yes obstacle clearance is an issue and mobile obstacles like Cranes, Advertising Balloons and the like are a problem to contend with but that does not preclude doing these kinds of appoaches. There are areas in this country where it would be quite feasible and easy enough to survey. Granted someone has to pay for the survey, design, and certification of the Approaches but that happens now for the Airplane world.
Helicopter Operators are doing that....I am led to believe the Royal Flight has done something very similar for the 76(s) used to fly the Queen...have they not? It can be done....but there has to be an attitude at the Government level of "Git'er Done!" not the usual...."Not Possible!".
All these changes and improvements....starting with a simple Radalt or GPS to the Helicopter IFR Infrastructure all come with a cost....either for doing it and paying for the purchase of the unit.....or in lives lost due to it not being available and being needed.
We need to get Nick Lappos to recount his experience with that bit of Testing and see what he thinks of the ability to make that happen and what it would entail from the Helicopter Industry and Government.
The pilots will have to be trained, checked and have instrument recency (otherwise one problem will be replaced by another); wasn't instrument proficiency and recency the main cause of the Maryland accident.
We talk about "currency" and "proficiency" as if they are the same. They most assuredly are not. Some of these "IFR" bases rarely fly IMC much less IFR between their six-monthly checkrides. If the Operator/Customer provide for it....sometimes one can add an practice Instrument Approach to a leg that does not conflict with the task of getting a patient to the medical facility.
For an aircraft that is based away from an Instrumented Approach Airport....it is very rare then for the Pilot to even do a practice approach. Most cases the Pilot is the sole occupant aboard the aircraft and cannot use a Hood or other Vision obscuring device.
Depending upon the prevailing weather.....flights in actual IMC of any kind can be rare for the whole host of reasons one can list.
Again....when we talk of IFR Programs....there is a whale of a difference between the theory and reality and we can see the results of that in the accident statistics.
The whole concept of IFR route structure and Approach criterion must be reviewed from the perspective of HELICOPTER performance and not as is done currently by most Certification Authorities. Helicopters are very much different than Airplanes in their approach speeds, ability to operate at very slow speeds, and that they are designed to operate away from Airports.
Yes obstacle clearance is an issue and mobile obstacles like Cranes, Advertising Balloons and the like are a problem to contend with but that does not preclude doing these kinds of appoaches. There are areas in this country where it would be quite feasible and easy enough to survey. Granted someone has to pay for the survey, design, and certification of the Approaches but that happens now for the Airplane world.
Helicopter Operators are doing that....I am led to believe the Royal Flight has done something very similar for the 76(s) used to fly the Queen...have they not? It can be done....but there has to be an attitude at the Government level of "Git'er Done!" not the usual...."Not Possible!".
All these changes and improvements....starting with a simple Radalt or GPS to the Helicopter IFR Infrastructure all come with a cost....either for doing it and paying for the purchase of the unit.....or in lives lost due to it not being available and being needed.
We need to get Nick Lappos to recount his experience with that bit of Testing and see what he thinks of the ability to make that happen and what it would entail from the Helicopter Industry and Government.
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Over here
Posts: 1,030
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Change the way EMS is funded in the US.
I agree that the primary cause of most accidents is poor pilot decision-making. Even if the operator imposes no pressure to fly at all, and truly most don't, at least the larger ones, self-imposed pressure is a constant. Some pilots are in this business to be a hero and save lives. Those need to be weeded out. I have no idea how to do that, however.
Sasless's opinion of what the government should do, versus mine, is the essential argument taking place in the US right now. One side says the government should do nothing, while the other says it should do more than it's doing. I think part of the reason for having a government is to take care of the poor and the weak. Others believe it's only to protect the rich and powerful, and that they're going to be part of that someday, if they're not already. In the meantime, our infrastructure is falling apart. Roads, bridges, and everything else are crumbling because there isn't enough income to pay to maintain it, much less to improve it. Until this debate is settled by overwhelming elections, nothing is likely to change. I'm pessimistic in the short run, but optimistic in the long run.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Charlotte NC
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's our fault
I've been reading this thread since it began. I rarely post but enjoy keeping up with what's going on and getting a sense of what's going on in our community. I respect the experience and the opinions represented here.
I just can't resist putting in my own two cents. I've flown in the military, ems, and in the corporate world and I think we would all agree that statistically, pilot error is the cause of 80% of accidents in the U.S. I wonder if it's the same in the U.K. and other places?
I would like to tell my freinds not operating in the U.S. about a few things that are not going to change:
There will never be a requirement for twin engine aircraft at the national or state level.
There will never be a requirement for 2 pilots at the national or state level.
There will never be a requirement for ems aircraft to be SPIFR equipped or that they must fly IFR.
These things are not going to happen...ever.
I know that's not popular, even with pilots in the U.S. but that's the truth.
When operators can't get pilots to fly aircraft not so equipped then it might change, or when patients refuse to fly then it might happen but I can promise you that it won't occur thru regulation.
My humble opinion is that we (pilots) are killing ourselves. The reason the pilot (owner) of the Mayo charter crashed is because he killed himself. The same applies to the guy who ran out of gas, or went IIMC, or CFIT (2 engine) or hit a tower (two engine)or tried to beat a TRW home. The aircraft they were flying didn't break or malfunction, it was willfully misused by the pilot.
We need to change the culture, in old pilots who mentor young pilots and in the young pilots. No job is worth killing yourself and those with you, don't take the job if you don't like the equipment and don't fly if you aren't sure you can make it home. Quit if you are being pressured to fly, if you and your crew are dead, you've still lost your job.
I have had the benefit of mentors who drilled that into me and contrary to the nature of the typical type A personalities of helicopter pilots, taught me to be humble about my skills and equipment.
I agree with all of you as far as equipment and crew, but the thing we can change at our level is the culture at our job so that there is no question as to whether a flight should be attempted or not.
Those of us posting here can have a huge impact on the accident rate by being an example and a mentor to those around us!
Fire Away!!!
I just can't resist putting in my own two cents. I've flown in the military, ems, and in the corporate world and I think we would all agree that statistically, pilot error is the cause of 80% of accidents in the U.S. I wonder if it's the same in the U.K. and other places?
I would like to tell my freinds not operating in the U.S. about a few things that are not going to change:
There will never be a requirement for twin engine aircraft at the national or state level.
There will never be a requirement for 2 pilots at the national or state level.
There will never be a requirement for ems aircraft to be SPIFR equipped or that they must fly IFR.
These things are not going to happen...ever.
I know that's not popular, even with pilots in the U.S. but that's the truth.
When operators can't get pilots to fly aircraft not so equipped then it might change, or when patients refuse to fly then it might happen but I can promise you that it won't occur thru regulation.
My humble opinion is that we (pilots) are killing ourselves. The reason the pilot (owner) of the Mayo charter crashed is because he killed himself. The same applies to the guy who ran out of gas, or went IIMC, or CFIT (2 engine) or hit a tower (two engine)or tried to beat a TRW home. The aircraft they were flying didn't break or malfunction, it was willfully misused by the pilot.
We need to change the culture, in old pilots who mentor young pilots and in the young pilots. No job is worth killing yourself and those with you, don't take the job if you don't like the equipment and don't fly if you aren't sure you can make it home. Quit if you are being pressured to fly, if you and your crew are dead, you've still lost your job.
I have had the benefit of mentors who drilled that into me and contrary to the nature of the typical type A personalities of helicopter pilots, taught me to be humble about my skills and equipment.
I agree with all of you as far as equipment and crew, but the thing we can change at our level is the culture at our job so that there is no question as to whether a flight should be attempted or not.
Those of us posting here can have a huge impact on the accident rate by being an example and a mentor to those around us!
Fire Away!!!
Last edited by 430EMSpilot; 6th Jan 2012 at 22:37.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,576
Received 424 Likes
on
224 Posts
Some pilots are in this business to be a hero and save lives. Those need to be weeded out. I have no idea how to do that, however.
One "senior" in particular was less experienced than me in the role but decided to show me how to fly 6,000 lbs plus, long line underslung loads "properly" when he thought I was too slow on the approach. He took control, pulled the guts out of the aircraft during the next climb from the pickup point in the valley below, then he cut the corner to approach directly at 90 degrees to the ridgeline drop site (I'd gone in at 45 degrees to the slope to get a better wind direction and to give an escape route if we ran out of power). Unfortunately, he was far too fast, ran out of power and with no escape route, all other options. He bounced the load downslope of the ridgeline and nearly took out the ground handling party on the rebound. He went really quiet after that. I looked across at him, said nothing but he knew....
Same person later scared his crew half to death by getting the empty long strop hooked up on a 10 foot high wire mesh fence. He suddenly transitioned off a drop site after another hillside USL job. He ignored the crewman who was trying to hold him steady in the hover until the strop was pulled in..... luckily the fencing gave way before the aircraft nosed right over into the hill, but it was on it's way.....
There are other true stories of "derring do" involving the same person but I'll keep those to myself.
It's difficult to get rid of this type of pilot once they get to a certain level, but these are exactly the ones who need getting rid of, because they can encourage the wrong type of institutional mentality amongst young pilots.
430....nothing to fire away at....you got it figured out.
Luck trumps judgement and skill every time....butone should hedge your bets as much as possible.
Luck trumps judgement and skill every time....butone should hedge your bets as much as possible.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: On the move...
Age: 58
Posts: 358
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting thread with robust discussion.
Just one thought on how to change culture, in Australia most health services only allow helicopters to land at a hospital pad that can maintain Cat A performance. This would then extend to only twins being allowed in and the natural extension is that they are also IFR aircraft. Would a change in health service culture lead towards a change in aviation culture?
I realise the risk of comparing apples with oranges as has been hinted at with comparing US and UK models.
Just one thought on how to change culture, in Australia most health services only allow helicopters to land at a hospital pad that can maintain Cat A performance. This would then extend to only twins being allowed in and the natural extension is that they are also IFR aircraft. Would a change in health service culture lead towards a change in aviation culture?
I realise the risk of comparing apples with oranges as has been hinted at with comparing US and UK models.
Rotorspeed,
The certification criteria for approval for single-engine flight in IMC already exists in Appendix B to Part 27; the operational criteria for single-engine flight in IMC is part of Annex 6, Part III, Section II, Chapter 3 and its Appendix.
To answer a point made in your previous post: the reliability of turbine engines reached a plateau a decade or so ago, it is unlikely that it will improve. Each functional part of the helicopter is assessed for failure; where that failure would result in a hazardous outcome the part is replaced well within its failure horizon (you saw after the failure of the AW139 tail rotor, replacement at half the observed lowest failure point). Where the failure of a part might be critical and it can be duplicated then redundancy is introduced - this is employed for generators, hydraulics, critical instruments (artificial horizon) and their power packs, and engines. A probabilistic approach is taken to forecasting failure using the outcome as a driver for the policy.
The outcome to the failure of an engine is related to the environment over which the failure occurs; that provides the basis of policy related to single-engine IMC for the carriage of passengers. The ICAO text (which was written with careful consideration) provides States with the ability to permit or deny single-engine flights in IMC over their territories for that very reason (look for the riders in the text).
SASLess, the criteria for PinS procedures is already tailored for helicopters. Where this might be adjusted is if the whole approach is undertaken automatically (as is being demonstrated by EC). The critical element is visual acquisition; for instrument airfields with their sophisticated lighting systems, there is potential. For heliports (under the present regulations), this remains just a dream. For off-airport approaches there are additional issues that are non-trivial. It is not just a matter of surveying but one of guarding the environment to ensure that the obstacle environment remains as surveyed. The location of any 'scene' work is unpredictable; although we might imagine how that could be done, it is a problem of a magnitude far greater than steps that might be taken to reduce the current accident rate to an acceptable level - even if that includes improvement in the handling qualities of (a particular group of) helicopters. Discussing these issues in the vernacular is a million miles away from the formal risk assessment that would be required before it could come into existence.
As has been indicated many times before; the majority of accidents have a human factors element. If we can change the culture of operators/pilots to accept the current system/limits (and understand the consequences of not applying them) we will have to change little else. The event that causes the accident is probably the first time that it has been encountered by that pilot. One solution therefore is to ensure that pilots understand and take advantage of the experience of others less fortunate than themselves. It would be difficult to imagine 'Gomer' as an accident statistic - except with respect to a mechanical failure. Operational limits must not be seen as a challenge (as it appears that engine-failure is to some).
Jim
The certification criteria for approval for single-engine flight in IMC already exists in Appendix B to Part 27; the operational criteria for single-engine flight in IMC is part of Annex 6, Part III, Section II, Chapter 3 and its Appendix.
To answer a point made in your previous post: the reliability of turbine engines reached a plateau a decade or so ago, it is unlikely that it will improve. Each functional part of the helicopter is assessed for failure; where that failure would result in a hazardous outcome the part is replaced well within its failure horizon (you saw after the failure of the AW139 tail rotor, replacement at half the observed lowest failure point). Where the failure of a part might be critical and it can be duplicated then redundancy is introduced - this is employed for generators, hydraulics, critical instruments (artificial horizon) and their power packs, and engines. A probabilistic approach is taken to forecasting failure using the outcome as a driver for the policy.
The outcome to the failure of an engine is related to the environment over which the failure occurs; that provides the basis of policy related to single-engine IMC for the carriage of passengers. The ICAO text (which was written with careful consideration) provides States with the ability to permit or deny single-engine flights in IMC over their territories for that very reason (look for the riders in the text).
SASLess, the criteria for PinS procedures is already tailored for helicopters. Where this might be adjusted is if the whole approach is undertaken automatically (as is being demonstrated by EC). The critical element is visual acquisition; for instrument airfields with their sophisticated lighting systems, there is potential. For heliports (under the present regulations), this remains just a dream. For off-airport approaches there are additional issues that are non-trivial. It is not just a matter of surveying but one of guarding the environment to ensure that the obstacle environment remains as surveyed. The location of any 'scene' work is unpredictable; although we might imagine how that could be done, it is a problem of a magnitude far greater than steps that might be taken to reduce the current accident rate to an acceptable level - even if that includes improvement in the handling qualities of (a particular group of) helicopters. Discussing these issues in the vernacular is a million miles away from the formal risk assessment that would be required before it could come into existence.
As has been indicated many times before; the majority of accidents have a human factors element. If we can change the culture of operators/pilots to accept the current system/limits (and understand the consequences of not applying them) we will have to change little else. The event that causes the accident is probably the first time that it has been encountered by that pilot. One solution therefore is to ensure that pilots understand and take advantage of the experience of others less fortunate than themselves. It would be difficult to imagine 'Gomer' as an accident statistic - except with respect to a mechanical failure. Operational limits must not be seen as a challenge (as it appears that engine-failure is to some).
Jim
Setting the wrong example
I'm reading this thread since the beginning and I find it contains a lot of very interesting information and points about the whole issue.
I was reading the current Vertical Mag and found the Bell 429 (EMS) ad on the back. Doesn't this kind of "talk" contribute to the "Heroes" attitude that is one of the major factors in EMS accidents or am I seeing something that isn't there?
I mean no pilot will go out in marginal weather etc. JUST because of this ad, but doesn't this kind of talk keep the "We have to save this person whatever the costs" attitude alive, of which we all agree is killing EMS crews by the dozen?
I'm sorry to point it out this harsh but all this "Hero" crap really get's me going. These people deserve our respect but the "common man" doesn't seem to understand that this kind of hero worship is killing people.
Would like to post a picture but I think commercial pictures are not allowed.
This is the text in the ad:
"There's nothing you wouldn't do to help save a life. We share your dedication and commitment. So much so we invented aerial EMS almost 60 years ago. So when your mission is to maximize the golden hour and save lives, the Bell 429 stands ready to serve your heroic measures with extraordinary means."
Greetings
I was reading the current Vertical Mag and found the Bell 429 (EMS) ad on the back. Doesn't this kind of "talk" contribute to the "Heroes" attitude that is one of the major factors in EMS accidents or am I seeing something that isn't there?
I mean no pilot will go out in marginal weather etc. JUST because of this ad, but doesn't this kind of talk keep the "We have to save this person whatever the costs" attitude alive, of which we all agree is killing EMS crews by the dozen?
I'm sorry to point it out this harsh but all this "Hero" crap really get's me going. These people deserve our respect but the "common man" doesn't seem to understand that this kind of hero worship is killing people.
Would like to post a picture but I think commercial pictures are not allowed.
This is the text in the ad:
"There's nothing you wouldn't do to help save a life. We share your dedication and commitment. So much so we invented aerial EMS almost 60 years ago. So when your mission is to maximize the golden hour and save lives, the Bell 429 stands ready to serve your heroic measures with extraordinary means."
Greetings
Last edited by muermel; 7th Jan 2012 at 07:56. Reason: Highlighting
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: retirementland
Age: 79
Posts: 769
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Good observation. I would have hoped Bell would be thinking more about safety culture.
Last edited by Shell Management; 7th Jan 2012 at 08:04. Reason: Following addition of text by previous poster
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks Jim, interesting as ever.
What actually is the modern turbine engine failure rate? And what is the probability of a second engine on a twin failing within say 1 hour, eg realistic max OEI flight duration. Or any other short time? Obviously assuming not related causes eg fuel. Any chance of a link to Appendix B Part 27?
In broad practical terms, can you give any examples of when SE IMC might be approved, private or public transport?
With regard to the requirement for twin engines for at least UK and ? all European public transport, is that simply because an engine is a critical component capable of duplication, or because of any specific failure probability?
What actually is the modern turbine engine failure rate? And what is the probability of a second engine on a twin failing within say 1 hour, eg realistic max OEI flight duration. Or any other short time? Obviously assuming not related causes eg fuel. Any chance of a link to Appendix B Part 27?
In broad practical terms, can you give any examples of when SE IMC might be approved, private or public transport?
With regard to the requirement for twin engines for at least UK and ? all European public transport, is that simply because an engine is a critical component capable of duplication, or because of any specific failure probability?
Last edited by rotorspeed; 7th Jan 2012 at 08:57.
One solution therefore is to ensure that pilots understand and take advantage of the experience of others less fortunate than themselves.
Rather than publishing a "Lessons Learned" on each individual crash....and summaries on a regular basis and ensuring the widest distribution and consumption.....bad news gets hushed up. Part of that comes from fear of legal proceedings, bad public relations, and in far too many times the abject fear Management has in admitting mistakes or shortcomings of their Operations or Management system.
Pilots tend to believe such tragedies occur to others....until too late!
Rotorspeed,
Your later statements are based upon false premises; enable your PMs and I can discuss it with you.
In the meantime the first element of your post is described here:
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/176...ml#post6923997
Jim
Your later statements are based upon false premises; enable your PMs and I can discuss it with you.
In the meantime the first element of your post is described here:
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/176...ml#post6923997
Jim