NTSB says EMS accident rate is too high
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Rotorspeed, you are right on with your plan. At this time at least one of the major operators in the US (AMC) is well on its way with such a program without being forced into it by the federal government. Their aircraft are presently equipped as follows:
• Very reliable and proven single engine machines AS-350s and B-407s
• Duel Garmin IFR GPS Units – Paying to keep GPS data bases current has been an issue.
• All aircraft are equipped with Radar Altimeters
• All aircraft are NVG equipped with trained crews
• All pilots are instrument rated
• All flights are centrally monitored and tracked by company flight operations with a very sophisticated company proprietary system and monitored by operations personnel (former line pilots) 24/7.
• Most aircraft incorporate HTAWS with plans for 100% incorporation in future
At this time I see two significant holes left to be filled, the incorporation of either two or three axis autopilots and dual hydraulics. Dual hydraulics is optional on the AS-350B2/3 but standard on the B4. I am sure that cost has been a driving factor. Companies have opted for NVG’s in lieu of the more expensive auto pilots. NVGs may help with not encountering IIMC but do little or nothing once IIMC in encountered.
• Very reliable and proven single engine machines AS-350s and B-407s
• Duel Garmin IFR GPS Units – Paying to keep GPS data bases current has been an issue.
• All aircraft are equipped with Radar Altimeters
• All aircraft are NVG equipped with trained crews
• All pilots are instrument rated
• All flights are centrally monitored and tracked by company flight operations with a very sophisticated company proprietary system and monitored by operations personnel (former line pilots) 24/7.
• Most aircraft incorporate HTAWS with plans for 100% incorporation in future
At this time I see two significant holes left to be filled, the incorporation of either two or three axis autopilots and dual hydraulics. Dual hydraulics is optional on the AS-350B2/3 but standard on the B4. I am sure that cost has been a driving factor. Companies have opted for NVG’s in lieu of the more expensive auto pilots. NVGs may help with not encountering IIMC but do little or nothing once IIMC in encountered.
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SASless
To be blunt nothing hits me square between the eyes from your last post. As usual with your posts I find you tend to avoid concise, pertinent responses but ramble on a bit, undoubtedly with a lot of experience and some valid views beneath it all.
Sasless- Like a lot of people of our generation, often tends to write as he would speak in the crew room or bar. It lends an air of authenticity to his posts and I'm far from alone in thinking that pprune gains tremendous benefit from his 'rambling on a bit'
Perhaps it's that some of us believe nothing will improve dramatically until certain infrastructure changes evolve. off airway IFR routing and PIS arrivals to visual or contact approaches as a mentioned example.
It's well and good to propose new bigger more capable machines, but where does the dough come from? I suspect the IFR, two pilot twin with all available bells and whistles was only Sasless thinking out loud. We all think it would be great. There's an economic reality and a lack of aforementioned infrastructure that will not be overcome be more rules and regs. Until everything else is in place.
Out of time.....Happy New Year to all
170'
To be blunt nothing hits me square between the eyes from your last post. As usual with your posts I find you tend to avoid concise, pertinent responses but ramble on a bit, undoubtedly with a lot of experience and some valid views beneath it all.
Sasless- Like a lot of people of our generation, often tends to write as he would speak in the crew room or bar. It lends an air of authenticity to his posts and I'm far from alone in thinking that pprune gains tremendous benefit from his 'rambling on a bit'
Perhaps it's that some of us believe nothing will improve dramatically until certain infrastructure changes evolve. off airway IFR routing and PIS arrivals to visual or contact approaches as a mentioned example.
It's well and good to propose new bigger more capable machines, but where does the dough come from? I suspect the IFR, two pilot twin with all available bells and whistles was only Sasless thinking out loud. We all think it would be great. There's an economic reality and a lack of aforementioned infrastructure that will not be overcome be more rules and regs. Until everything else is in place.
Out of time.....Happy New Year to all
170'
If one thinks stating the solution to Helicopter EMS accident rates can be done in two or three short sentences then there is no hope of there being effective communication between individuals who view the situation from different perspectives as the issues are far to varied and complex to be so nicely summed up in a manner akin to that of a Readers Digest magazine.
Rotorspeed.....if you do not like the answer...don't ask the question!
You pointedly asked for my input....you got it....deal with it!
If you find fault with my views...argue your points....but don't attack me personally as that is considered very impolite in these circles.
You can disagree but you do not have to be disagreeable....and that is exactly how you come across.
Does your Helicopter EMS experience equate to the time you spent doing that research by any chance?
Some slight problems with your thinking on "Singles".....you have any concept of the impact of putting two pilots in a 206L, 407, 350 helicopter has on the ability to carry a patient?
If you do...you would not have suggested that at all.
When Operators specify a maximum body weight for pilots....as a famous country comedian says...."Here's your sign!"
Your equipment list sounds very much like that I proposed as my personal preference....are you poaching from my list?
Do you assume there is insufficient data on record to be able to make a decision re Engine Failure rates for the various single engine helicopters used for EMS operations currently? Why do we need you "phase" concept. We can make that determination right now....as the EMS Operators have done. They are using these aircraft and we do not hear of a problem with accidents due to engine failures.
Rotorspeed.....if you do not like the answer...don't ask the question!
You pointedly asked for my input....you got it....deal with it!
If you find fault with my views...argue your points....but don't attack me personally as that is considered very impolite in these circles.
You can disagree but you do not have to be disagreeable....and that is exactly how you come across.
Does your Helicopter EMS experience equate to the time you spent doing that research by any chance?
Some slight problems with your thinking on "Singles".....you have any concept of the impact of putting two pilots in a 206L, 407, 350 helicopter has on the ability to carry a patient?
If you do...you would not have suggested that at all.
When Operators specify a maximum body weight for pilots....as a famous country comedian says...."Here's your sign!"
Your equipment list sounds very much like that I proposed as my personal preference....are you poaching from my list?
Do you assume there is insufficient data on record to be able to make a decision re Engine Failure rates for the various single engine helicopters used for EMS operations currently? Why do we need you "phase" concept. We can make that determination right now....as the EMS Operators have done. They are using these aircraft and we do not hear of a problem with accidents due to engine failures.
Last edited by SASless; 5th Jan 2012 at 12:49.
Avoid imitations
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Sasless- Like a lot of people of our generation, often tends to write as he would speak in the crew room or bar. It lends an air of authenticity to his posts and I'm far from alone in thinking that pprune gains tremendous benefit from his 'rambling on a bit'
BTW, I'm not sure that two pilots in the present aircraft will be possible. Having operated the 355N in a casevac role (police aircraft, prior to air ambulance in our part of the world), it wasn't practical because when the casualty is on board his legs and feet need to go under the instrument panel, meaning that the front left seat had to be left out. We were obliged to leave one of our observers and his seat behind, sometimes in the hills if we diverted in from our normal job to pick up an urgent casualty case.
Also, the main issue under discussion seems to be loss of visual cues, trying to fly VFR, below safety altitude in IMC. Stabilise the aircraft (autopilot), make it fully IFR capable but leave it single pilot. Not sure how the old mindset of "let's always struggle VFR" could be cured, though.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 5th Jan 2012 at 19:11.
Shy.....I lived long enough to retire....which in our profession does speak for itself and managed to do so without being involved in an accident or chargeable incident. I do have some basis for conjecture about safety issues and concepts based upon those several years experience.
We can disagree without being disagreeable can we not?
If you poke a grouchy ol' bear with a stick....they sometimes bark a bit you know.
Here of late I have been using my walking stick to trip up children as they run by.....darn pesky whippersnappers!
Oh....did sell the yacht....and moved ashore for a while but it will take a bit to wash the salt off my hide.
We can disagree without being disagreeable can we not?
If you poke a grouchy ol' bear with a stick....they sometimes bark a bit you know.
Here of late I have been using my walking stick to trip up children as they run by.....darn pesky whippersnappers!
Oh....did sell the yacht....and moved ashore for a while but it will take a bit to wash the salt off my hide.
"Just a pilot"
No stats or sources cited but-
First, why do most of the industry's serious mishaps happen at night when we fly half as much in the dark? Why is pilot error so much more dangerous at night?
There's no scientific physiological consideration given to scheduling pilots for night duty in the industry. There's no consideration for circadian rhythm or effective sleep's importance to efficient rest. The result is that sleep deficit, poor sleep quality and circadian disruption, which all have adverse effects on mental efficiency are all ignored as potential contributory issues to poor pilot decision making. Part 135 minimum mandate "10 hours of uninterrupted rest" as a standard is clearly inadequate in light of these known issues.
It seems that the most common rotation schedules are 7 days, 7 off, 7 nights, 7 off and a variation of 7&7 where the scheduled duty pilot works "X" 12 hour day schedules, takes a 24 hour interval, and works "Y" nights.
The first schedule, straight 7 successive night duty periods is unsatisfactory for a substantial part of the population that lack facilities dark and quiet enough to get a "good nights sleep" without interruption. These pilots accumulate the bad effects as the duty period progresses, becoming less and less efficient.
The second schedule, with a 24 hour interval to adjust to night duty, starts the pilot fatigued and in the middle of the duty schedule, and allows inadequate time to flip the circadian clock completely. Most pilots on this schedule start night duty tired and then disrupt their circadian cycle, resulting in poor sleep (and poor tinking when awake) accumulating a sleep deficit and sleep poorly until their body clocks adjust- and then cycle off to normal diurnal existence. The only arguable operational benefit of this schedule is that the night duty period is brief, 3 or 4 nights. And it fits a calendar handily, in my opinion an esoteric variation of "get home-itis": I really really want it to be this way because it's easier...
There's no point in mentioning the pilots I know who are invulnerable and believe that they can go all day and all night. Or those who show up making statements like I really need to sleep tonight...
I've never had an operator acknowledge that these problems exist, up to and including Uncle Sam. Machismo and invulnerability is apparently acceptable in this one regard, "Real men (pilots) just do it" even though physiological science seems otherwise.
Night operations should not be viewed as the same as day operations with less light, because they are not. First,what you see and how you see is different at night. You have to learn to see differently and in a world without color, or learn to use aided vision, which entails unique issues. The weather is also subtly different at night in most areas, with much less convective effect bad weather becomes worse weather due to stratification.
Having more capable equipment- autopilots and real IFR capability, for instance- often only complicates the decision process, especially problematic with night scheduling issues. Add that people tend to complacency in familiar scenarios, and one might be inappropriately counting on "George" or a pop-up IFR saving your bacon when a better call would be to decline a request based on intelligent assessment of existing conditions, or abort enroute.
The current vogue for corporate operational control regimes and risk assessment tools don't begin to address the scheduling issue. The answer is having brief night duty schedules, started with a well rested pilot, and either effective self assessment or encourage pilots to make the "knock it off call" when there is any doubt.
There's no scientific physiological consideration given to scheduling pilots for night duty in the industry. There's no consideration for circadian rhythm or effective sleep's importance to efficient rest. The result is that sleep deficit, poor sleep quality and circadian disruption, which all have adverse effects on mental efficiency are all ignored as potential contributory issues to poor pilot decision making. Part 135 minimum mandate "10 hours of uninterrupted rest" as a standard is clearly inadequate in light of these known issues.
It seems that the most common rotation schedules are 7 days, 7 off, 7 nights, 7 off and a variation of 7&7 where the scheduled duty pilot works "X" 12 hour day schedules, takes a 24 hour interval, and works "Y" nights.
The first schedule, straight 7 successive night duty periods is unsatisfactory for a substantial part of the population that lack facilities dark and quiet enough to get a "good nights sleep" without interruption. These pilots accumulate the bad effects as the duty period progresses, becoming less and less efficient.
The second schedule, with a 24 hour interval to adjust to night duty, starts the pilot fatigued and in the middle of the duty schedule, and allows inadequate time to flip the circadian clock completely. Most pilots on this schedule start night duty tired and then disrupt their circadian cycle, resulting in poor sleep (and poor tinking when awake) accumulating a sleep deficit and sleep poorly until their body clocks adjust- and then cycle off to normal diurnal existence. The only arguable operational benefit of this schedule is that the night duty period is brief, 3 or 4 nights. And it fits a calendar handily, in my opinion an esoteric variation of "get home-itis": I really really want it to be this way because it's easier...
There's no point in mentioning the pilots I know who are invulnerable and believe that they can go all day and all night. Or those who show up making statements like I really need to sleep tonight...
I've never had an operator acknowledge that these problems exist, up to and including Uncle Sam. Machismo and invulnerability is apparently acceptable in this one regard, "Real men (pilots) just do it" even though physiological science seems otherwise.
Night operations should not be viewed as the same as day operations with less light, because they are not. First,what you see and how you see is different at night. You have to learn to see differently and in a world without color, or learn to use aided vision, which entails unique issues. The weather is also subtly different at night in most areas, with much less convective effect bad weather becomes worse weather due to stratification.
Having more capable equipment- autopilots and real IFR capability, for instance- often only complicates the decision process, especially problematic with night scheduling issues. Add that people tend to complacency in familiar scenarios, and one might be inappropriately counting on "George" or a pop-up IFR saving your bacon when a better call would be to decline a request based on intelligent assessment of existing conditions, or abort enroute.
The current vogue for corporate operational control regimes and risk assessment tools don't begin to address the scheduling issue. The answer is having brief night duty schedules, started with a well rested pilot, and either effective self assessment or encourage pilots to make the "knock it off call" when there is any doubt.
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Not sure how the old mindset of "let's always struggle VFR" could be cured, though.
Maybe some rule changing that people are not going to like will be needed wrt to VMC.
Now you have a visual range up to the pilots interpretation, perhaps that range should be extended but instead prescribe conditions that will allow that visual range I.E. I know in a quarter moon I can easy see that far. Right, new VMC rules. Flights during less than 1/4 moon must be filed IFR.
same same for fog, cloud etc, why not have a required differential on your forecast dewpoint temperature to be filed on a flight plan prior to flight along with ambient temperature. Then if in breach of the differential, the insurance or risk of being exposed to no insurance esp. third party, becomes the controller.
At the end of the day night is as clear as being hurt right where it counts, in the pocket. Any system that is self driven is much cheaper and usually far more effective.
Avoid imitations
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SASless,
Yes, of course we can. But, as I said before, the problem comes when the bear wakes up unprovoked and tries to bite all passers by.
In some cases you might just end up with a grouchy ol' bear on each end of the stick....
I know we're singing off the same hymn sheet but not necessarily always quite in tune...
We can disagree without being disagreeable can we not?
If you poke a grouchy ol' bear with a stick....they sometimes bark a bit you know.
If you poke a grouchy ol' bear with a stick....they sometimes bark a bit you know.
In some cases you might just end up with a grouchy ol' bear on each end of the stick....
I know we're singing off the same hymn sheet but not necessarily always quite in tune...
Avoid imitations
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TeT,
Good start, but you'll be aware that the moon phase alone doesn't determine the actual usable light levels. Cloud, atmospheric pollution, cultural lighting etc all play a part too. Sometimes a flight can be made with no moon but purely on cultural lighting (UK Police have this option written into their "Visual Contact Flight" night rules, it's the pilot's own go/no-go decision).
As a point of interest, in UK, "filing IFR" wouldn't make a difference. Because there is no night VFR. The rules here state in essence that outside of CAS, at 3,000ft or below, IFR are deemed to be met if sufficient visual cues are available to carry on safely. Essentially the same as if the flight was flown under "Special VFR" rules in a control Zone, although the term is avoided in this context.
Obviously, the problem is how to know if sufficient visual cues will be maintained along the whole route.
Having the ability to abort "Night VFR" and pull up to MSA in a properly equipped IFR aircraft is surely safer than not. The worst case is having to "suck it and see" in marginal conditions, in a non-IFR compliant aircraft then fly into reduced visual cues, with no easy get out. If NVGs are in use, and they lose effectiveness due to reduced available light levels or IMC, this is when even highly skilled/experienced pilots can lose it and buy the farm. Night disorientation is very easily found in an unstabilised aircraft. This is why we (RAF SH) fought hard to get the night cloud and vis limits correct. The limits for NVG ops had to also allow "unaided flight".
Thankfully, in UK at least, there is nothing to prevent a properly equipped and trained helicopter pilot alternating between the "Visual Cue by night IFR" (my term) and the "Full IFR" as he sees fit. As long as he can obtain visual cues before he descends below 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within 5nm of the aircraft, it remains legal and safe. Obviously, provided accurate situational awareness is maintained.
These days, in my small part of aviation, this essentially is how I operate much of the time by night. Sometimes a SVFR departure can be made, followed by an IMC transit, then an ILS to an airfield requiring a bit of a drive for the passengers. Obviously, the icing level may prevent an IMC climb to MSA and that is when finer judgement is needed. Sometimes a "no-go" decision will be made on the ground. Sometimes, that decision will prove in retrospect to have been over-cautious and leave me open to criticism (and it has), but as we all know, it's so much safer than the ultimate penalty paid for being under cautious...
Here it isn't a requirement to file a written flight plan for IFR provided I remain clear of Class A airspace. Special VFR entry to any control zone can be requested on the radio. No guarantees, but procedures are in place to allow it, day or night.
Good start, but you'll be aware that the moon phase alone doesn't determine the actual usable light levels. Cloud, atmospheric pollution, cultural lighting etc all play a part too. Sometimes a flight can be made with no moon but purely on cultural lighting (UK Police have this option written into their "Visual Contact Flight" night rules, it's the pilot's own go/no-go decision).
As a point of interest, in UK, "filing IFR" wouldn't make a difference. Because there is no night VFR. The rules here state in essence that outside of CAS, at 3,000ft or below, IFR are deemed to be met if sufficient visual cues are available to carry on safely. Essentially the same as if the flight was flown under "Special VFR" rules in a control Zone, although the term is avoided in this context.
Obviously, the problem is how to know if sufficient visual cues will be maintained along the whole route.
Having the ability to abort "Night VFR" and pull up to MSA in a properly equipped IFR aircraft is surely safer than not. The worst case is having to "suck it and see" in marginal conditions, in a non-IFR compliant aircraft then fly into reduced visual cues, with no easy get out. If NVGs are in use, and they lose effectiveness due to reduced available light levels or IMC, this is when even highly skilled/experienced pilots can lose it and buy the farm. Night disorientation is very easily found in an unstabilised aircraft. This is why we (RAF SH) fought hard to get the night cloud and vis limits correct. The limits for NVG ops had to also allow "unaided flight".
Thankfully, in UK at least, there is nothing to prevent a properly equipped and trained helicopter pilot alternating between the "Visual Cue by night IFR" (my term) and the "Full IFR" as he sees fit. As long as he can obtain visual cues before he descends below 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within 5nm of the aircraft, it remains legal and safe. Obviously, provided accurate situational awareness is maintained.
These days, in my small part of aviation, this essentially is how I operate much of the time by night. Sometimes a SVFR departure can be made, followed by an IMC transit, then an ILS to an airfield requiring a bit of a drive for the passengers. Obviously, the icing level may prevent an IMC climb to MSA and that is when finer judgement is needed. Sometimes a "no-go" decision will be made on the ground. Sometimes, that decision will prove in retrospect to have been over-cautious and leave me open to criticism (and it has), but as we all know, it's so much safer than the ultimate penalty paid for being under cautious...
Here it isn't a requirement to file a written flight plan for IFR provided I remain clear of Class A airspace. Special VFR entry to any control zone can be requested on the radio. No guarantees, but procedures are in place to allow it, day or night.
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I like to provide an alternate point of view. This is not just to be disagreeable, but if someone else is saying what I would, why bother to post?
That said as preface, I tend to get a bit edgy when the proposed solutions seem to built of silicon chips and rules. Furthermore, I'm a civilian and though it doesn't get as much airplay in these days of Call of Duty III, I think there is a great heritage of civilian aviation that doesn't have to give up the podium to anybody. I became acquainted with that heritage through my father, who was there when Mr. Hughes looked over a table of schematics, finally pointed his finger at a place on the airplane that nobody else was looking at and said, "Fire that man."
Enough digression. As I say, I resist solutions made of computers and regulations. I believe that the answer to the problem lies with the pilot, and the pilot alone.
I ask you: when you read these reports and try to figure out what happened do you, as I do, try to imagine how much time elapsed betwen the time the metal bent and the time the pilot suspected that he was where he shouldn't be, doing what he shouldn't? How far did the pilot go beyond the chicken-out point? Maybe the chicken-out point was on the ground...
Give him a Bell 47 with wooden blades, or give him an autopilot that could solo the Starship Enterprise, you haven't made him safer unless he knows that it's his helicopter and that he is under absolutely no pressure to fly it longer than he feels is safe. Train him in the EP's, sure, but make sure you train him in how to quit a flight at the first moment that his personal risk needle swings into the red.
Retrain or remove any person or thing in his entire life that puts any pressure on him to "just try it a little farther." Until you have done that you haven't done enough, and you certainly haven't done the single best, cheapest, thing you could have to make sure they all go home.
That said as preface, I tend to get a bit edgy when the proposed solutions seem to built of silicon chips and rules. Furthermore, I'm a civilian and though it doesn't get as much airplay in these days of Call of Duty III, I think there is a great heritage of civilian aviation that doesn't have to give up the podium to anybody. I became acquainted with that heritage through my father, who was there when Mr. Hughes looked over a table of schematics, finally pointed his finger at a place on the airplane that nobody else was looking at and said, "Fire that man."
Enough digression. As I say, I resist solutions made of computers and regulations. I believe that the answer to the problem lies with the pilot, and the pilot alone.
I ask you: when you read these reports and try to figure out what happened do you, as I do, try to imagine how much time elapsed betwen the time the metal bent and the time the pilot suspected that he was where he shouldn't be, doing what he shouldn't? How far did the pilot go beyond the chicken-out point? Maybe the chicken-out point was on the ground...
Give him a Bell 47 with wooden blades, or give him an autopilot that could solo the Starship Enterprise, you haven't made him safer unless he knows that it's his helicopter and that he is under absolutely no pressure to fly it longer than he feels is safe. Train him in the EP's, sure, but make sure you train him in how to quit a flight at the first moment that his personal risk needle swings into the red.
Retrain or remove any person or thing in his entire life that puts any pressure on him to "just try it a little farther." Until you have done that you haven't done enough, and you certainly haven't done the single best, cheapest, thing you could have to make sure they all go home.
Last edited by Aerobot; 6th Jan 2012 at 01:37. Reason: clarity
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Aerobot, Do you really think your proposition is realistic? 
Get rid of rules and technology and concentrate on the pilots? When all existing pilots are sacked, because they don't comply, who will train this new "breed" of aviators who chicken out at the first sign of any risk? How will the "personal risk" meters be calibrated?
Go back to the Bell 47? How many patients and medical staff will fit in one of those, in addition to the pilot? How much fuel can it carry?
You will, of course, be financing this venture yourself.. Because no-one else will.
Get rid of rules and technology and concentrate on the pilots? When all existing pilots are sacked, because they don't comply, who will train this new "breed" of aviators who chicken out at the first sign of any risk? How will the "personal risk" meters be calibrated?
Go back to the Bell 47? How many patients and medical staff will fit in one of those, in addition to the pilot? How much fuel can it carry?
You will, of course, be financing this venture yourself.. Because no-one else will.
Dang Shy....you are sneaking onto my turf again!
ABot just said in a slightly different way what I said in reponse to JimL when he talked of "improving aircraft stability" and I suggested even if I had another pilot, a three/four axis autopilot and all the neat kit....I would still be very uncomfortable doing the VFR IFR Night thing you guys do....in marginal weather.
Abot did not suggest one should use a Bell 47 for EMS work....but said given the Bell 47 or....operative word he used was "or" ... a sophisticated IFR Twin...the Pilot(s) were a key common element.
I agree with what he had to say....as we have seen repeatedly, in crash after crash, pilot decision making/judgement is probably the leading factor in those events.
That ties in with my view that until we can improve the Helicopter IFR enroute structure to facilitate actual IFR flying and thus eliminate the VFR IFR Night (or Scud Running in daylight) with its inherent risks of IIMC, CFIT, LOC in IMC following IIMC.....we shall continue to have the problems we do.
ABot just said in a slightly different way what I said in reponse to JimL when he talked of "improving aircraft stability" and I suggested even if I had another pilot, a three/four axis autopilot and all the neat kit....I would still be very uncomfortable doing the VFR IFR Night thing you guys do....in marginal weather.
Abot did not suggest one should use a Bell 47 for EMS work....but said given the Bell 47 or....operative word he used was "or" ... a sophisticated IFR Twin...the Pilot(s) were a key common element.
I agree with what he had to say....as we have seen repeatedly, in crash after crash, pilot decision making/judgement is probably the leading factor in those events.
That ties in with my view that until we can improve the Helicopter IFR enroute structure to facilitate actual IFR flying and thus eliminate the VFR IFR Night (or Scud Running in daylight) with its inherent risks of IIMC, CFIT, LOC in IMC following IIMC.....we shall continue to have the problems we do.
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Congratulations, Shy. I have never had anything I've posted be so amazingly misunderstood. I'd explain it, but I see that SAS gets it so I don't have to.
Thanks, SAS. I had a bad moment there while I wondered if I'd really said some bonehead thing. I meant something along the lines of "safety equipment is nice, but concentrate on pilot's judgment." Nice to see I got that message across.
Thanks, SAS. I had a bad moment there while I wondered if I'd really said some bonehead thing. I meant something along the lines of "safety equipment is nice, but concentrate on pilot's judgment." Nice to see I got that message across.
It's well and good to propose new bigger more capable machines, but where does the dough come from? I suspect the IFR, two pilot twin with all available bells and whistles was only Sasless thinking out loud.
Try the UK model of charity funding with Medicare paying a certain amount as well into the coffers. Enough is raised in UK to support HEMS and AA and all provide twin-engine, IFR capable helicopters.
Complaining that Medicare only pay a certain amount per flight and that dictates the spec of the aircraft just ignores what needs to be changed in order to improve the safety of HEMS in the US - remove the bottom line so operators don't have to cut corners and provide the minimum spec aircraft and allow new blood into the business.
Big $s vs Good Judgment
Changing the funding model will do little to effect the results if we don’t have a system ultimately driven by prudent PIC decisions. The Maryland AS-365 mishap provides an example of this. Maryland’s HEMS program is fully funded as part of the cost of every driver license fee. As such Maryland operates SPIFR AS-365 helicopters. However, being a state government organization they were not obligated to operate under FAR- Part 135 but rather under Part 91 allowing for VFR flight operations at significantly lower weather conditions than required by their commercial counter parts. There has to be a point where good judgment trumps rules, regulations and minimum equipment requirements.
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Just caught up with this interesting thread!
Jack Carson; pleased you agree we’re closing in a sensible proposal and interesting ref AMC.
SASless; to deal with your main points in your post #188.
Well how exactly am I supposed to know your answer before I ask a question?! Of course I am pleased to read alternative views – that’s how we learn.
I did indeed deal with it, in my post. But you got tetchy, because I was objective and criticised elements your reply. Quite validly I maintain, and I suspect a few others might have agreed with me.
My HEMS experience is zero. But I have considerable helo flying experience including at night and in poor weather, VMC and IMC. I also have considerable experience running a business, so understand commercial realities, and matters of safety and medical care. So I feel qualified to contribute to this subject, as well as welcoming input from those with direct HEMS experience.
No, I hadn’t considered where a second pilot might go in a 206/AS350. Good point, though one made, typically, somewhat sneeringly by you, but constructively and sensibly by ShyTorque, whose posts I have great respect for, dealing knowledgeably, intelligently and pertinently with issues.
It doesn’t really matter though, as in that case the alternative of having an autopilot would be required. Regardless of space, my own view would anyway be that in a single (and light twin) a good autopilot would be preferable, given a balance of payload, cost and safety.
What a telling remark! This is not about “poaching” from anyone’s list, but about using any information anyone proposes that contributes to the debate and adds to our Pprune consensus (should we ever get that far!) on a regulation way forward. It would be a great testimony to the expertise amongst Pprune if we could prove to lead the way here. Might even influence regulators worldwide – you never know! Where is there a better forum for getting input from a broad range of mainly sensible opinions and constructively debating to a valid conclusion?
No I don’t. You’re probably right – there maybe sufficient info on failure rates now. But I was more thinking that maybe C20s on 206s might not be as good as AS350 Arriels or 407 250 C-47s, and allowing the opportunity to phase out 206s if they are deemed not reliable enough for effectively SE IFR long term. Perhaps you could tell us what failure rates each of these engines have then and propose a suitable minimum failure rate for SE IFR?
The main point is that I believe this forum should provide a platform for opinion, objective robust debate and information. Sometimes SASless I feel you come over as if you were holding court in your own bar, expecting everyone to bow to your superior experience and wisdom. You can shy away from responding succinctly to questions raised, yet get defensive, affronted and haughty with those who take you to task. Be nice if you could be more objective and have a bit more respect for the many intelligent, reasoned comments others post.
Having said that, I’d love to be in bar and listen to your views and stories – I’m sure they’d be fascinating! And I agree with 170 – you certainly make a great contribution to Pprune.
And finally Crab's last para is right, HEMS businesses, whether Europe or US, should be ones that are primarily run to sensible operating procedures and regulations, not according to what payments are offered. If it can’t afford to be done safely enough it shouldn’t be done at all. Evolution should be on a sensible timescale though.
Agree with your theory, Aerobot and Devil 49, but better training could/should have been in place for years and accident rates are still unacceptable. So it seems it alone cannot be replied upon. Regulation change, including that referred to by Jack Carson ref Part 91, needs to come too.
Jack Carson; pleased you agree we’re closing in a sensible proposal and interesting ref AMC.
SASless; to deal with your main points in your post #188.
Rotorspeed.....if you do not like the answer...don't ask the question!
You pointedly asked for my input....you got it....deal with it!
Does your Helicopter EMS experience equate to the time you spent doing that research by any chance?
Some slight problems with your thinking on "Singles".....you have any concept of the impact of putting two pilots in a 206L, 407, 350 helicopter has on the ability to carry a patient? If you do...you would not have suggested that at all.
It doesn’t really matter though, as in that case the alternative of having an autopilot would be required. Regardless of space, my own view would anyway be that in a single (and light twin) a good autopilot would be preferable, given a balance of payload, cost and safety.
Your equipment list sounds very much like that I proposed as my personal preference....are you poaching from my list?
Do you assume there is insufficient data on record to be able to make a decision re Engine Failure rates for the various single engine helicopters used for EMS operations currently? Why do we need you "phase" concept.
The main point is that I believe this forum should provide a platform for opinion, objective robust debate and information. Sometimes SASless I feel you come over as if you were holding court in your own bar, expecting everyone to bow to your superior experience and wisdom. You can shy away from responding succinctly to questions raised, yet get defensive, affronted and haughty with those who take you to task. Be nice if you could be more objective and have a bit more respect for the many intelligent, reasoned comments others post.
Having said that, I’d love to be in bar and listen to your views and stories – I’m sure they’d be fascinating! And I agree with 170 – you certainly make a great contribution to Pprune.
And finally Crab's last para is right, HEMS businesses, whether Europe or US, should be ones that are primarily run to sensible operating procedures and regulations, not according to what payments are offered. If it can’t afford to be done safely enough it shouldn’t be done at all. Evolution should be on a sensible timescale though.
Agree with your theory, Aerobot and Devil 49, but better training could/should have been in place for years and accident rates are still unacceptable. So it seems it alone cannot be replied upon. Regulation change, including that referred to by Jack Carson ref Part 91, needs to come too.