Senior Australian army pilots accused of being cowboys
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the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.
Safety, Culture and Risk. The Organisational Causes of Disasters - Health Sociology Review
...examines the problems which arose from the ‘deseal/reseal' program for repairing the fuel tanks of F111 fighters in the RAAF. The solvents used in this program caused extensive neuro-psychological harm to many ground-crew and resulted in a major Board of Inquiry of which Hopkins was a member. The proximate causes of the injuries could be attributed to failure to use personal protective equipment; however the equipment sometimes dissolved in the solvents and was very difficult to wear in the space and heat inside the fuel tanks.
Hopkins identifies several factors operating in the RAAF which contributed to the injuries. These included a lack of attention by medical personnel to complaints from the workers over many years; the priority placed on operational flying over the supporting logistics; the lack of authority for those involved with health and safety of ground crew compared to aircrew; and inadequate systems for reporting incidents in ground crew compared to aircrew.
The point is well made that the same organisation can have a very good record for flight safety but a poor one regarding safety of other workers such as ground crew. The analysis of reasons for this imbalance is instructive. The key is the focus of senior management, which in turn depends on comprehensive safety reporting systems and organisational structures to effectively implement decisions about safety. These factors were present for flight safety but defective for the OHS of ground crew.
Now if a dilutation occurred that implies the new organsation simply does not have an effective hazard & effects management process and they are not letting the risks direct where they pay attention.
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To totally understand the reason for the merger of DFS and DAFS, but I do not agree. DFS-ADF is responsible to the ADF for flight safety and accident/incident investigation across the ADF. DAFS is responsible for Air Force Safety for one service only. Incorporating the two under one Group Captain with at time conflicting requirements is difficult.
DFS-ADF gained significant resources after the ADF flight safety system was found lacking post Black Hawk accident 1996. In my opinion, the merger has created an organization that cannot meet its mission.
The US military system has it merits. At service level, ground safety and aviation safety are two separate units that report to a one star general. Each unit is commanded by a GPCAPT(E), with separate resources.
Anyway, this is thread creep.
DFS-ADF gained significant resources after the ADF flight safety system was found lacking post Black Hawk accident 1996. In my opinion, the merger has created an organization that cannot meet its mission.
The US military system has it merits. At service level, ground safety and aviation safety are two separate units that report to a one star general. Each unit is commanded by a GPCAPT(E), with separate resources.
Anyway, this is thread creep.
Thread Starter
Why then as big chief number one, he who has had ample opportunity to review the selection, training and recurrency training standards of his helicopter pilots for so long is he now coming out and making grandiose statements like that?.
Might've been difficult for him though, after all as CDF, he's probably also responsible for the selection, training and recurrency training standards of tank drivers, ship drivers, truck drivers, plumbers, carpenters, LAME's, clerks, radar operators.....
C'mon Topendtorque....
His boss is the Minister of Defence - perhaps he should resign too?
If he's making 'grandiose' statements, it's because he's seen investigation findings that have caused him to make that assessment, with insight based on many years experience as a pilot. Make no mistake, he's not a pilot any more - he's the military CEO of Australia's largest employer (except for the Coles/Myer group).
The responsibility for 'selection, training and recurrency training standards' of his helicopter pilots lays squarely at the feet of the others in the chain of command, not the CDF.
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"Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?"
The Navy, certainly in my time there, made a very controlled approach to the ship within the SHOL (Ship's Helicopter Operating Limits) being for an approach to land, VERTREP or transfer to any part of the ship designated for such an evolution.
I would have never contemplated making a tactical approach to any part of the ship, even for fast roping practice to the helo deck, let alone an approach downwind.
The Navy, certainly in my time there, made a very controlled approach to the ship within the SHOL (Ship's Helicopter Operating Limits) being for an approach to land, VERTREP or transfer to any part of the ship designated for such an evolution.
I would have never contemplated making a tactical approach to any part of the ship, even for fast roping practice to the helo deck, let alone an approach downwind.
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I would have never contemplated making a tactical approach to any part of the ship, even for fast roping practice to the helo deck, let alone an approach downwind.
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"Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?"
As you are using a relative wind to find a flying course you can end up with an approach that has a downwind component and still be within the envelope (shol) Not preferred by too many aircraft at night though
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now now Tibbsy,
you know as well as i do that "his minister" is now in opposition.
a quirk of a changed government in a democracy is that the new boys get to bad mouth the old gaurd, without pain to themselves.
I hope that you didn't vote for this pole tortoise, now known as krudd.
The new minister should have been out of bed a bit earlier than big cheese and said -'now listen up big cheese, any more o'these cowboy attacks an you're out, savvy?'
big cheese, being the luckiest person to hold his job, (and I say caustically - still alive-) must by then have worked out that all he needs do is to say to the training and selection chiefs, "this is what I want, and this is what I get or you're out, dah de dah".
simple, probably he won't because he didn't work it out first time around.
as far as reading maps or more particularly, changing the oil, well I think that question may also be embarrassing.
tet
you know as well as i do that "his minister" is now in opposition.
a quirk of a changed government in a democracy is that the new boys get to bad mouth the old gaurd, without pain to themselves.
I hope that you didn't vote for this pole tortoise, now known as krudd.
The new minister should have been out of bed a bit earlier than big cheese and said -'now listen up big cheese, any more o'these cowboy attacks an you're out, savvy?'
big cheese, being the luckiest person to hold his job, (and I say caustically - still alive-) must by then have worked out that all he needs do is to say to the training and selection chiefs, "this is what I want, and this is what I get or you're out, dah de dah".
simple, probably he won't because he didn't work it out first time around.
as far as reading maps or more particularly, changing the oil, well I think that question may also be embarrassing.
tet
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Now pandalet, which "stuff" do you mean? If its the fencepost turtle, I'm glad you asked, here it is;-
While stitching up the hand of a 75 year old Queensland farmer, who got cut on a gate while working cattle, the rural doctor struck up a conversation with the old man. Eventually the topic got around to Kevin 07 and his appointment to Prime Minister of Australia.
"Well, ya know," drawled the old farmer, "this Rudd fella is what they call a fencepost turtle."
Not being familiar with the term, the doctor asked him what a fencepost turtle was.
The old farmer said, "when you're driving along a country road and you come across a fence post with a turtle balanced on top, that's called a fencepost turtle."
The old farmer saw a puzzled look on the doctor's face, so he continued to explain, "You know he didn't get up there by himself, he definitely doesn't belong up there, he doesn't know what to do while he is up there, and you just gotta wonder what kind of dill put him up there in the first place!''
Savvy?
While stitching up the hand of a 75 year old Queensland farmer, who got cut on a gate while working cattle, the rural doctor struck up a conversation with the old man. Eventually the topic got around to Kevin 07 and his appointment to Prime Minister of Australia.
"Well, ya know," drawled the old farmer, "this Rudd fella is what they call a fencepost turtle."
Not being familiar with the term, the doctor asked him what a fencepost turtle was.
The old farmer said, "when you're driving along a country road and you come across a fence post with a turtle balanced on top, that's called a fencepost turtle."
The old farmer saw a puzzled look on the doctor's face, so he continued to explain, "You know he didn't get up there by himself, he definitely doesn't belong up there, he doesn't know what to do while he is up there, and you just gotta wonder what kind of dill put him up there in the first place!''
Savvy?
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The report was released this morning:
Pilot error 'main cause in Black Hawk crash' - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Pilot error 'main cause in Black Hawk crash' - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
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"Physics"
Collective down.
Flaring.
Wind up the chuff.
Heavy load.
All the bells and whistles, DECU, anticipators and power in the world wont overcome gravity.
Watch the wind, its your best friend to your face but very quick to stab you in the back.
Flaring.
Wind up the chuff.
Heavy load.
All the bells and whistles, DECU, anticipators and power in the world wont overcome gravity.
Watch the wind, its your best friend to your face but very quick to stab you in the back.
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thekite
Angus houston's comment that the pilots are cowboys is hardly fair. Yes the pilot executed a flairing turn into a downwind position and apparently just fell through the resulting vortex ring. But was the ship stationary or underway?
And if it was underway, could the skipper have turned sharply to simulate evasive action, thus placing the Blackhawk down wind?
And if it was underway, could the skipper have turned sharply to simulate evasive action, thus placing the Blackhawk down wind?
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According to the report, the “serials on 29 November 2006 were planned to be conducted to a static target to overcome the perceived lack of recency in such approaches. Accordingly, at 1403 KANIMBLA’s engines were declutched and at 1412 her shaft brakes were engaged. The evidence of LCDR Collins indicated that KANIMBLA had drifted 600 yards in a westerly direction from the time BLACK 1 launched to the time of the accident at 1611.”
One of the reports findings is that: “It does not appear to have been appreciated by 171 Avn Sqn how KANIMBLA would lie in the water relative to the wind while drifting. Not knowing this compromised 171 Avn Sqn’s ability to best brief how the wind on 29 November 2006 would most likely be coming around the ship as the target.”
One of the reports findings is that: “It does not appear to have been appreciated by 171 Avn Sqn how KANIMBLA would lie in the water relative to the wind while drifting. Not knowing this compromised 171 Avn Sqn’s ability to best brief how the wind on 29 November 2006 would most likely be coming around the ship as the target.”
Interesting
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Three quick points:
1. It wasn't VR it was rotor droop (decaying Nr);
2. When flying in an anti terrorist role wouldn't it be a dead giveaway to assault a target into wind every time? I know where I would be looking if I were a terrorist; and,
3. When training for such a role mistakes are going to happen, we all make them.
1. It wasn't VR it was rotor droop (decaying Nr);
2. When flying in an anti terrorist role wouldn't it be a dead giveaway to assault a target into wind every time? I know where I would be looking if I were a terrorist; and,
3. When training for such a role mistakes are going to happen, we all make them.
All this criticism is just so well founded.
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???
I am positive someone some one here was about to mention LTE....
Alongside the death of a highly skilled professional soldier, this accident also resulted in the death of a fine aviator, trained by one of the better training organisations in the world. Wouldn't it be helpful to debate the accident causes so that there may be some lessons we can take home to protect us from the same fate?
The personal attacks on attitudes and actions are misplaced and emotive. IMHO. The "big cheese" was one of my instructors, and a man I looked up to then and continue to admire now. The criticisms mentioned in this thread are entirely inconsistent with the 18 years I have known him - 2 of which were spent as one of his direct subordinates.
On the "cowboy report", is it public? I have not found it anywhere beyond these incredibly convenient and emotive "cowboy" quotes everyone seems to be latched onto. Does anyone have the report? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?
That said, I do believe another strong debate that we need to open up is how realistic does war role training need to be? It is said that a sword needs to be kept sharp to be useful in combat: these fine men died keeping that sword sharp and I respect the fact that they lost their lives serving Australia.
How sharp and how many cuts are acceptable to keep it that way? This question will have a direct bearing on acceptable attitudes and can-do cultures that perhaps we NEED to have in certain combat arms. The level of acceptability will always be highly divisive, but that is the reason to keep having the debate: that we may find a cultural acceptable level of risk V readiness. Whilst we search for that line, I believe such emotive criticism of the current practitioners as expressed in this thread is unreasonable, and should be / could be kept out of the debate.
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???
I am positive someone some one here was about to mention LTE....
Alongside the death of a highly skilled professional soldier, this accident also resulted in the death of a fine aviator, trained by one of the better training organisations in the world. Wouldn't it be helpful to debate the accident causes so that there may be some lessons we can take home to protect us from the same fate?
The personal attacks on attitudes and actions are misplaced and emotive. IMHO. The "big cheese" was one of my instructors, and a man I looked up to then and continue to admire now. The criticisms mentioned in this thread are entirely inconsistent with the 18 years I have known him - 2 of which were spent as one of his direct subordinates.
On the "cowboy report", is it public? I have not found it anywhere beyond these incredibly convenient and emotive "cowboy" quotes everyone seems to be latched onto. Does anyone have the report? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?
That said, I do believe another strong debate that we need to open up is how realistic does war role training need to be? It is said that a sword needs to be kept sharp to be useful in combat: these fine men died keeping that sword sharp and I respect the fact that they lost their lives serving Australia.
How sharp and how many cuts are acceptable to keep it that way? This question will have a direct bearing on acceptable attitudes and can-do cultures that perhaps we NEED to have in certain combat arms. The level of acceptability will always be highly divisive, but that is the reason to keep having the debate: that we may find a cultural acceptable level of risk V readiness. Whilst we search for that line, I believe such emotive criticism of the current practitioners as expressed in this thread is unreasonable, and should be / could be kept out of the debate.