the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.
There was a reason for this merger, to make sure the fiasco of the F111 tanks health problems was not repeated. At the time non-flight safety issues were not being properly managed in comparison to flight safety. Go read Andrew Hopkins case study on RAAF safety.
Safety, Culture and Risk. The Organisational Causes of Disasters - Health Sociology Review
...examines the problems which arose from the ‘deseal/reseal' program for repairing the fuel tanks of F111 fighters in the RAAF. The solvents used in this program caused extensive neuro-psychological harm to many ground-crew and resulted in a major Board of Inquiry of which Hopkins was a member. The proximate causes of the injuries could be attributed to failure to use personal protective equipment; however the equipment sometimes dissolved in the solvents and was very difficult to wear in the space and heat inside the fuel tanks.
Hopkins identifies several factors operating in the RAAF which contributed to the injuries. These included a lack of attention by medical personnel to complaints from the workers over many years; the priority placed on operational flying over the supporting logistics; the lack of authority for those involved with health and safety of ground crew compared to aircrew; and inadequate systems for reporting incidents in ground crew compared to aircrew.
The point is well made that the same organisation can have a very good record for flight safety but a poor one regarding safety of other workers such as ground crew. The analysis of reasons for this imbalance is instructive. The key is the focus of senior management, which in turn depends on comprehensive safety reporting systems and organisational structures to effectively implement decisions about safety. These factors were present for flight safety but defective for the OHS of ground crew.
Now if a dilutation occurred that implies the new organsation simply does not have an effective hazard & effects management process and they are not letting the risks direct where they pay attention.