Senior Australian army pilots accused of being cowboys
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Yes, I agree re Angus...a fine aviator and leader..
BOIs have to come up with a tangible target, be it supervisors, pilots or whatever...the fact that Special Ops is just bloody dangerous is slightly unpalatable. It is unfortunate that this Squadron has been branded 'cowboys'....
My two cents worth?
A combination of:
High Rate of closure,
High ROD,
Transient NP droop (due to those crappy analog ECUs) leading to a decrease in RRPM at the critical point,
A component of 'mission creep', and
Bad luck on the day.
And yes, all those latent causal factors which set the scene for the mission....
And as you know Helmet Fire, the BOI recommendations will probably give birth to a whole new opportunity for the industry to flog something to the military.....Remember 96 BH crash = aviation risk assessment/management? A new component of the annual recat perhaps? Bah!..My High Cynicism caution light is flashing...
Cheers...
BOIs have to come up with a tangible target, be it supervisors, pilots or whatever...the fact that Special Ops is just bloody dangerous is slightly unpalatable. It is unfortunate that this Squadron has been branded 'cowboys'....
My two cents worth?
A combination of:
High Rate of closure,
High ROD,
Transient NP droop (due to those crappy analog ECUs) leading to a decrease in RRPM at the critical point,
A component of 'mission creep', and
Bad luck on the day.
And yes, all those latent causal factors which set the scene for the mission....
And as you know Helmet Fire, the BOI recommendations will probably give birth to a whole new opportunity for the industry to flog something to the military.....Remember 96 BH crash = aviation risk assessment/management? A new component of the annual recat perhaps? Bah!..My High Cynicism caution light is flashing...
Cheers...
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My two cents worth as a former naval pilot who has done this fast roping thing to a lot of decks, all the things said below by delta torque did indeed happen except the one about bad luck. Bad luck is where the helo was doing the approach and a bird flies into the tail rotor (been done before).
The aircraft was placed in a situation where it was unrecoverable and the inevitable happened with the sad loss of life.
Yes, they were practising for the real event, but one thing I have learnt over my years is that there is never an excuse to push training beyond safety. Don't solely blame the pilot (we have all F**ked up at some stage and somehow gotten away from it), the Sqn bosses should be held accountable for not showing more control. A lesson to learn for all aviators.
Clint Eastwood said 'A man's gotta know his limitations' and I live by that rule.
The aircraft was placed in a situation where it was unrecoverable and the inevitable happened with the sad loss of life.
Yes, they were practising for the real event, but one thing I have learnt over my years is that there is never an excuse to push training beyond safety. Don't solely blame the pilot (we have all F**ked up at some stage and somehow gotten away from it), the Sqn bosses should be held accountable for not showing more control. A lesson to learn for all aviators.
Clint Eastwood said 'A man's gotta know his limitations' and I live by that rule.
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All this criticism is just so well founded.
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???
Hands up all the Black Hawk pilots???
Hands up all those who still think it was vortex ring???
Hands up all those who still think power does not overcome gravity???
Whoa there, old dawgs, tis not a time to be rattling cages.
No I guess not everyone has drove a Blackhawk,
I will stick my hand up and say that vortex ring played a significant part, to wit the accelerating ROD. Also like many others, I know that power can beat gravity, if you aren’t fiercely involved in a close relationship with that hot little Sheila, vortex ring.
But really we have all dissected the ‘final flight path’ on another thread previously; rehashing it too much won’t do any of us any good, its yesterday’s news.
For my money as I said before and I’ll not back away from it and I’m not saying it just to console the wife of a reportedly very fine man, but I reckon the final stages of the A/C tape portrayed a decision of excellence on the part of the pilot. Another twenty feet and he might just have got it over the side, not saying he would have pulled it up before the water at all. His actions are all there on the A/C tape for anyone who wants to review it.
Had he made the classic pilot error mistake of pulling aft on the cyclic at about five to three seconds before impact, then almost certainly his ROD would have been monumental and the deck impact far more catastrophic than it was.
How he got the A/C to its position where he had to attempt recovery, well the BOI has covered that aspect fairly well I think. I.E. Systemic chain of command problems that need rectifying.
Re the wind moving around the ship, there was another famous video of a helicopter slamming into a helideck, I think it was a sea-king. RN? I can’t remember. There was all sorts of conjecture about T/R failure etc.
What was evident after watching the video about twenty times was the M/R blades tips flapping down and up very swiftly, independently of any pitch change two or three times just before it developed a fast rate of descent, then impact.
VRS? Yep I reckon. Wind moving around the ships superstructure interfering with the A/C approach path? Yep I reckon.
One thing I will take issue with in the Fiji incident is the expression “can do pilots”.
Well “hello” says Mrs TET as I read it out to her, “Aren’t these pilots who have, ‘to do’ in times of war and safely too, who cannot have, ‘a can’t do’ attitude.”
What a load of frogs-twaddle. Mr big cheese shot hisself well in the foot there, and needs a severe attitude change on that issue, why have a military if it going to be staffed with ‘can’t do’ derelicts. What an insult, we need the can do people and I would think that they are.
I’m not knocking anyone’s respect for one’s peers, that is to be expected and respected, but that doesn’t mean that the big cheese is adept in some of the wider aspects of many helicopters potential flight regimes with their inherent dangers. There is possibly not much reason as to why he should be, if he has never had to chase belligerent cattle out of tall trees and cane grass.
If the pilots had the luxury of practicing in some of these wider aspects they would find that all this stuff about taking risks is just clap trap. As for approaching a target from the upwind position if you wish to surprise them , bloody hell, you quickly find the fallacy of that when not working the wind properly with cattle, which by the way have a very sensitive hearing.
I know mustering drivers were oft referred to as cowboys. I don’t know if it counts but I was once told that I was a “blasted hillbilly’ by a certain Mr Reg Trewenick, bless him. Our one and only civilian examiner of airmen for a long time.
Well how was I to know back then in ’74 when he came to do my brand new mustering endorsement test, that a helicopter was supposed to be grounded if the bloody old radios were broken, as usually were those valves and steam pipe things? Any way, he got over as I’m sure the squadron will after a tough day yesterday.
All the best
tet
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Fine words from an experienced operator TET, and I tip my hat to your expertise...but we are really talking apples and oranges..
Cattle, however belligerent, do not employ small arms or heavy weapons,
nor do they take and hold hostages....
Mustering has it's own set of advanced skills but the risk matrix pans out quite differently to Special Ops, which has an unlimited array of scenarios and threats.
Cheers....
Cattle, however belligerent, do not employ small arms or heavy weapons,
nor do they take and hold hostages....
Mustering has it's own set of advanced skills but the risk matrix pans out quite differently to Special Ops, which has an unlimited array of scenarios and threats.
Cheers....
I have been told (Not confirmed) that AAvn will not implement the recomendation to fit Blackhawks with emergency flotation devices for maratime ops. This seems to be one of the most important recomendations as it may have saved the lives of the two who died.
Does anyone know why they would make this decision?
Does anyone know why they would make this decision?
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The report talks quite a bit about the issue of flotation devices. One of its findings is: “The Board finds that there is insufficient evidence rationally to conclude that the fitting of flotation devices to Black Hawk 221 would have improved its survivability in the circumstances of the events of 29 November 2006.” Primarily that’s because of the catastrophic nature of the crash, which might have rendered the devices inoperable.
The actual recommendations are: “15(a) A detailed and comprehensive review be conducted into the fitting of the current fleet of Army Black Hawk helicopters flotation devices and cognate issues”; and “15(b) Defence considers the priority allocation to 171 Avn Sqn of MRH 90 aircraft upon their acquisition by reason of the operations known to be performed by 171 Avn Sqn over water.”
The actual recommendations are: “15(a) A detailed and comprehensive review be conducted into the fitting of the current fleet of Army Black Hawk helicopters flotation devices and cognate issues”; and “15(b) Defence considers the priority allocation to 171 Avn Sqn of MRH 90 aircraft upon their acquisition by reason of the operations known to be performed by 171 Avn Sqn over water.”
Hi TET, well said.
I think we can agree to disagree on the VRS bit, however I would urge you to research VRS through the prune in relation to explanations by Nick Lappos. Even the Sea King accident is discussed. I am just keen to see this accident not labelled by something that will detract from the very real learning outcomes presented here at the cost of two very fine soldiers.
The reference to power was directed both here and to the thread that discussed the causes previously, as was the Black Hawk pilot comment. No, you do not have to be a Black Hawk pilot to examine/comment on the accident. But, when so many Black Hawk pilots are trying to communicate the issue here and are getting shot down with "VRS" and "lack of power" and "downwind caused it" and "hot shot attitude caused it" and "I wouldn't approach a ship that way" etc etc etc, then I think it is time to point out that the Black Hawk has unique characteristics. This is true of many types, and that those who are not familiar with that particular type may just want to entertain the possibility that it has a unique characteristic rather than assume the only probable causes are limited to the commentators experience and background. Examples would include the R22 collective/RRPM coupling, Squirrel JacK Stall, Jetranger LTE, and Huey LTA. Just to name some.
For those still willing to accept the possibility of unique characteristics (that still comply to the law of physics despite previous statements) the Black Hawk in the S70A-9 model has a transient droop problem. I contend that if that approach had been flown exactly the same in a Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc, etc, with the exact same power margins, then they would NOT have hit the ship. I have personally seen and experienced transient droop in S70 ops (as would a vast majority of Black Hawk pilots) and I can tell you they have nothing to do with wind direction and little to do with power margin. They certainly are not confined to CT operations or even special forces. Hiding behind other causes detracts significantly from the opportunity to engineer the problem out.
Before the emotive take me out of context: the Black Hawk is the finest combat helicopter I know of, and transient droop is a tiny blemish in an amazing helicopter that I would choose 10 out of 10 times for the role it performs. I certainly would NOT choose the Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc in preference.
I have not read the report in full Elan, however I would be reasonably sure that a report of this calibre would also consider the following somewhere: floatation devices versus a DECU. One (floats) reduces but does not remove the consequences of the problem IF it occurs during the tiny percentage of the aircraft's operational profile , the other (DECU) removes the problem over the entire profile thus also removing the argument that the problem needs permanent fitment of floats with a drag and power penalty throughout life of type.
I ask again...Does anyone have "cowboy report"? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?
Delta Torque has hit the nail on the head.
I think we can agree to disagree on the VRS bit, however I would urge you to research VRS through the prune in relation to explanations by Nick Lappos. Even the Sea King accident is discussed. I am just keen to see this accident not labelled by something that will detract from the very real learning outcomes presented here at the cost of two very fine soldiers.
The reference to power was directed both here and to the thread that discussed the causes previously, as was the Black Hawk pilot comment. No, you do not have to be a Black Hawk pilot to examine/comment on the accident. But, when so many Black Hawk pilots are trying to communicate the issue here and are getting shot down with "VRS" and "lack of power" and "downwind caused it" and "hot shot attitude caused it" and "I wouldn't approach a ship that way" etc etc etc, then I think it is time to point out that the Black Hawk has unique characteristics. This is true of many types, and that those who are not familiar with that particular type may just want to entertain the possibility that it has a unique characteristic rather than assume the only probable causes are limited to the commentators experience and background. Examples would include the R22 collective/RRPM coupling, Squirrel JacK Stall, Jetranger LTE, and Huey LTA. Just to name some.
For those still willing to accept the possibility of unique characteristics (that still comply to the law of physics despite previous statements) the Black Hawk in the S70A-9 model has a transient droop problem. I contend that if that approach had been flown exactly the same in a Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc, etc, with the exact same power margins, then they would NOT have hit the ship. I have personally seen and experienced transient droop in S70 ops (as would a vast majority of Black Hawk pilots) and I can tell you they have nothing to do with wind direction and little to do with power margin. They certainly are not confined to CT operations or even special forces. Hiding behind other causes detracts significantly from the opportunity to engineer the problem out.
Before the emotive take me out of context: the Black Hawk is the finest combat helicopter I know of, and transient droop is a tiny blemish in an amazing helicopter that I would choose 10 out of 10 times for the role it performs. I certainly would NOT choose the Squirrel, BK117, A109, B412, etc in preference.
I have not read the report in full Elan, however I would be reasonably sure that a report of this calibre would also consider the following somewhere: floatation devices versus a DECU. One (floats) reduces but does not remove the consequences of the problem IF it occurs during the tiny percentage of the aircraft's operational profile , the other (DECU) removes the problem over the entire profile thus also removing the argument that the problem needs permanent fitment of floats with a drag and power penalty throughout life of type.
I ask again...Does anyone have "cowboy report"? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?
Delta Torque has hit the nail on the head.
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The report does indeed look at DECUs. Apparently when the flight was recreated in a DECU-equipped simulator, the pilot flying was "unable to replicate rotor droop in the simulator". The report says there have been reasonable grounds in the past for NOT adopting DECUs (the high cost of fitting the fleet – $60 to $100 million – especially in the context of the eventual phase-out of Black Hawks) but recommends that the subject be revisited...
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especially in the context of the eventual phase-out of Black Hawks
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Ned,
If they're R models, they'll have the DECU as standard.
Bids may be bids, but with the purchase of the MRH90 and delivery ensuing, the horse has bolted.
If anything, given the desire for reducing the number of types, there may be more 90s.
If they're R models, they'll have the DECU as standard.
Bids may be bids, but with the purchase of the MRH90 and delivery ensuing, the horse has bolted.
If anything, given the desire for reducing the number of types, there may be more 90s.
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Freewheel,
The rumours I have heard is that the Navy doesnt want the MRH90 and are in the process of lobbying for the R models to either replace or supplement the Seahawks they have now.
I also heard that GL who used to be in the Navy is now working for AusAero and pushing the option for the Navy to get the 90.
Is it too late to get the R models do you think.
Ned
The rumours I have heard is that the Navy doesnt want the MRH90 and are in the process of lobbying for the R models to either replace or supplement the Seahawks they have now.
I also heard that GL who used to be in the Navy is now working for AusAero and pushing the option for the Navy to get the 90.
Is it too late to get the R models do you think.
Ned
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As to the call about that particular pilot being a cowboy, having flown with him when I was a maintainer I too was amazed at such comments, and during my time at Oakey when he was also posted to SAA, he was one of the 'better' pilots out there I can say, very very professional, sad loss for the whole of the ADF..sad to see that said about Army pilots in general as well, very professional group to work with.
He actually managed to fill in the EE360 correctly and I never had to chase him about it, compared to a few other Army pilots!...lol
I think the Navy can probably 'lobby' all it likes for newer Seahawk/Blackhawk variants..however they also have to meet the requirements of AIR9000...something about being few types of platforms and more commonality across the ADF..looks promising for the Naval MRH90 variant. Their current delivery of MRH90's is a replacement for the Seaking.
-from another ex-Blackhawk type now a darn AA MRH90 employee...
He actually managed to fill in the EE360 correctly and I never had to chase him about it, compared to a few other Army pilots!...lol
I think the Navy can probably 'lobby' all it likes for newer Seahawk/Blackhawk variants..however they also have to meet the requirements of AIR9000...something about being few types of platforms and more commonality across the ADF..looks promising for the Naval MRH90 variant. Their current delivery of MRH90's is a replacement for the Seaking.
-from another ex-Blackhawk type now a darn AA MRH90 employee...
Thread Starter
There is no report calling them cowboys/CDF didn't call the accident pilots cowboys!
Chaps - how about a wee bit of perspective regarding the CDF's comments. 
What was reported in the SMH was
Helmet Fire,
There is no report labelling the pilots cowboys, it is only reportedly what was said by the CDF at the moment he finished reading the BOI report, which is I guess the one you should read if you're interested. The terms of reference etc will be on the BOI website.
mechchick
and thekite
...
I also don't think he labelled the accident pilot(s) a cowboy. He was commenting on the senior pilots of the squadron, in the context of the culture that was found to exist at the squadron, not about the accident itself.
What was reported in the SMH was
He is said to have been appalled by its revelations. The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys" and launched an audit of all of Defence's helicopter fleets to ascertain if the problems were more widespread.
I ask again...Does anyone have "cowboy report"? What is the context of the comments? What was the report terms of reference, and who was the expert who compiled the report?
mechchick
As to the call about that particular pilot being a cowboy
Angus Houston's comment that the pilots are cowboys is hardly fair.
I also don't think he labelled the accident pilot(s) a cowboy. He was commenting on the senior pilots of the squadron, in the context of the culture that was found to exist at the squadron, not about the accident itself.
Last edited by Tibbsy; 8th Aug 2008 at 18:15.
