CAT A Profile cause of crash?
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Heavy Man!
The pilot reported that he lifted the helicopter straight up during the takeoff. The torque was about 94 percent and "everything was nominal."
It doesn't look like much of a thrust margin to me!
Certainly not enough for a Roof Top Helipad departure.
Without prejudice to the ongoing investigation.
The basic premise of the question is wrong; the manoeuvre rather than the profile might have had something to to with the crash as indicated in the following extract from the report referenced above:
Most Category A back-up procedures require a clear area (no obstacles above the level of the site) in which to perform both the back-up and the continued take-off. Up to quite recently, this was not recognised in Fight Manuals; it is interesting to note that this has been rectified in amendments to both Eurocopter and Bell Flight Manuals and to Operational Regulations.
Jim
The basic premise of the question is wrong; the manoeuvre rather than the profile might have had something to to with the crash as indicated in the following extract from the report referenced above:
A hospital security video camera, which was located near the top of the brick structure and overlooked the helicopter landing pads, recorded a portion of the accident flight. It showed the helicopter as it came in for landing from the south and landed on about a 340-degree heading on the north landing spot. The helicopter stayed on the deck for about 3 minutes before it departed. The video showed the helicopter as it lifted off the north landing spot and it flew backwards toward the brick structure while the nose of the helicopter remained pointing to the northwest. It showed the helicopter as it went out of view of the video recorder as it continued to climb. Since it was a sunny day, the shadow of the helicopter and the towers on top of the brick structure were visible on the helicopter pad below. The shadow of the helicopter's tail rotor appeared to strike an object on one of the towers, and the tail rotor immediately shattered and the helicopter went into a right yaw. The helicopter came back into the view of the video recorder as the main rotor blades began to impact the brick structure. The video recording stopped and did not record the helicopter hitting the hospital roof.
One of the most neglected elements of performance calculations is that, not only have the reserves of power and distances to be evaluated in the context of the site, but also the obstacle environment (more an element of Performance Class 1 considerations than the Category A procedure). Most Category A back-up procedures require a clear area (no obstacles above the level of the site) in which to perform both the back-up and the continued take-off. Up to quite recently, this was not recognised in Fight Manuals; it is interesting to note that this has been rectified in amendments to both Eurocopter and Bell Flight Manuals and to Operational Regulations.
Jim
Last edited by JimL; 8th Jun 2008 at 12:57.
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What Cat A back-up profile?
I cannot remember the A-model having any kind of helipad profile in the RFM let alone a back-up. Can somebody who has flown an 'A' recently confirm that this is the case.
When teaching Cat A I am careful to point out that using a CAT A profile does not make you Cat A compliant. Only if that is combined with an acceptable obstacle environment (thank you Jim) and you operate at the correct 'WAT' mass, will this be the case.
At the same time if you are stuck at an ad hoc site without the benefit of a survey and above the WAT mass this does not preclude you from using a Cat A profile given that it is probably the one you have trained for and can react instinctively for in the event of an OEI situation........ but ........ bumping into obstructions is not in the recipe for success!
A lesson for us all.
G
When teaching Cat A I am careful to point out that using a CAT A profile does not make you Cat A compliant. Only if that is combined with an acceptable obstacle environment (thank you Jim) and you operate at the correct 'WAT' mass, will this be the case.
At the same time if you are stuck at an ad hoc site without the benefit of a survey and above the WAT mass this does not preclude you from using a Cat A profile given that it is probably the one you have trained for and can react instinctively for in the event of an OEI situation........ but ........ bumping into obstructions is not in the recipe for success!
A lesson for us all.
G
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The 76 (only flown A and C) did not have any Flight Manual approved procedure which gave accountability for a take off or landing to a heli pad. The only procedures documented where accountability was catered for were the Cat A take off and landing to a runway. From memory in the worse case conditions at sea level 1,000 of runway was required for a landing, 2,000 feet for an aborted take off and 3,500 feet for a continued take off.
Back to basics - so it looks like a simple lookout turn might have saved the day, reminding the pilot (who was probably under some pressure as he was on a check ride) of what was behind him.
Crab,
Yes it sounds very simple and basic doesn't it; however, a large number of these elevated pads (not necessarily this one) do not have the space for a clearing turn and that is why formal procedures have to be in place, and control exercised.
From what I can see in the pictures (and Google Earth) this is one of those sites which do not have Touch Down and Positioning Markers (TD/PB - i.e. a bum line) and therefore any manoeuvre has hazards associated with obstacles on the site.
Even when a bum-line is provided, the manoeuvre you suggest can be frought with danger unless it is associated with a turn where the pilot follows the line throughout the manouevre. In an incident on a rig in Norway, this fact was forgotten and the partial spot turn resulted in the tail being put well into the limited obstacle sector.
As you have also indicated, such checks do result in the pilot being put under a great deal of pressure; for that reason (and I am making no judgement about this accident), pre-flight and in-flight briefings must be of the highest order.
Jim
Yes it sounds very simple and basic doesn't it; however, a large number of these elevated pads (not necessarily this one) do not have the space for a clearing turn and that is why formal procedures have to be in place, and control exercised.
From what I can see in the pictures (and Google Earth) this is one of those sites which do not have Touch Down and Positioning Markers (TD/PB - i.e. a bum line) and therefore any manoeuvre has hazards associated with obstacles on the site.
Even when a bum-line is provided, the manoeuvre you suggest can be frought with danger unless it is associated with a turn where the pilot follows the line throughout the manouevre. In an incident on a rig in Norway, this fact was forgotten and the partial spot turn resulted in the tail being put well into the limited obstacle sector.
As you have also indicated, such checks do result in the pilot being put under a great deal of pressure; for that reason (and I am making no judgement about this accident), pre-flight and in-flight briefings must be of the highest order.
Jim
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I believe there was a set of Category A profiles set up for the S-76 in the UK.
But more to the point - without a Category A profile, if you hover in the HV curve, you're breaking a limitation (unless you are configured for less than 9 passengers and have the appropriate Flight Manual Supplement).
While this may come as a surprise to some, look in the Flight Manual - for a 'normal' S-76, the HV curve is in the limitations section, not the performance section....
Ditto for nearly any Part 29 helicopter, and certainly true for any with >9 passengers.
But more to the point - without a Category A profile, if you hover in the HV curve, you're breaking a limitation (unless you are configured for less than 9 passengers and have the appropriate Flight Manual Supplement).
While this may come as a surprise to some, look in the Flight Manual - for a 'normal' S-76, the HV curve is in the limitations section, not the performance section....
Ditto for nearly any Part 29 helicopter, and certainly true for any with >9 passengers.
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I don't see 94% torque while climbing straight up, more or less, as being a problem. If it takes 94% to hover, then you probably can't do a Cat A takeoff, but that torque during the maneuver is plenty of margin, IMO.
The takeoff was more likely a Class 2 demo than Cat A, because a Cat A procedure requires that the takeoff location be surveyed.
The takeoff was more likely a Class 2 demo than Cat A, because a Cat A procedure requires that the takeoff location be surveyed.
Shawn,
Absolutely correct; the HV diagram is a limitation in a Part 29 helicopter.
Explain then how any take off from an elevated helipad - which is not conducted over water (where the alleviation of Part 91.9(d) kicks in) - can be conducted in a Part 29 helicopter in the US.
The exemption is particularly pertinent for offshore operations (more accurately take-off over water) with a Part 29 helicopter but does not apply to onshore elevated procedures (other than those conducted with a Category A procedure - i.e. Performance Class 1).
This problem was clearly understood in Europe and, following the lead of the FARs, a more extensive alleviation was provided in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(c). However, in their wisdom, the authors of the EASA Essential Requirements (ERs) were not wise to this fact and made compliance with the limitations section of the RFM compulsory. The legal situation being what it is, it is not possible to amend the ERs (for some years) and further, it is not possible to provide an alleviation within the IRs.
What does that mean? At the point when the EASA ERs become compulsory, unless this requirement has been repealed (or amended) any excursion into HV diagram (for a Part 29 helicopter) will be illegal (including all offshore operations and Battersea). In fact, as the ERs are applicable to all Part 29 helicopters, it will apply equally to private aviation (including business aviation), and commercial aviation (including aerial work).
Now hands up all those who have never flown a helicopter into the HV diagram (before you answer yes, look at height at the bottom of the larger of the curves).
Jim
Absolutely correct; the HV diagram is a limitation in a Part 29 helicopter.
Explain then how any take off from an elevated helipad - which is not conducted over water (where the alleviation of Part 91.9(d) kicks in) - can be conducted in a Part 29 helicopter in the US.
The exemption is particularly pertinent for offshore operations (more accurately take-off over water) with a Part 29 helicopter but does not apply to onshore elevated procedures (other than those conducted with a Category A procedure - i.e. Performance Class 1).
This problem was clearly understood in Europe and, following the lead of the FARs, a more extensive alleviation was provided in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(c). However, in their wisdom, the authors of the EASA Essential Requirements (ERs) were not wise to this fact and made compliance with the limitations section of the RFM compulsory. The legal situation being what it is, it is not possible to amend the ERs (for some years) and further, it is not possible to provide an alleviation within the IRs.
What does that mean? At the point when the EASA ERs become compulsory, unless this requirement has been repealed (or amended) any excursion into HV diagram (for a Part 29 helicopter) will be illegal (including all offshore operations and Battersea). In fact, as the ERs are applicable to all Part 29 helicopters, it will apply equally to private aviation (including business aviation), and commercial aviation (including aerial work).
Now hands up all those who have never flown a helicopter into the HV diagram (before you answer yes, look at height at the bottom of the larger of the curves).
Jim
JimL,
Some "normal" helicopter operations are done primarily in that dreaded portion of the H/V diagram. Does that mean FAR Part 133 operators are out of business if they use a Part 29 aircraft?
Or....will they have to revert to using "single" engined, Non-Part 29 aircraft?
(....work such as logging, seismic, construction lifts, fire fighting....)
Some "normal" helicopter operations are done primarily in that dreaded portion of the H/V diagram. Does that mean FAR Part 133 operators are out of business if they use a Part 29 aircraft?
Or....will they have to revert to using "single" engined, Non-Part 29 aircraft?
(....work such as logging, seismic, construction lifts, fire fighting....)
Surely the answer is to either:
It's a shame the thread starter has choosen such an inflamatory title for this topic - clearly a profile does not cause a crash: it's the choice of the profile in the obstacle environment, by the pilot, that caused it. As has been stated earlier - is there actually such a profile for the 76A anyway????
- Remove the HV curve from the limitations section
- Provide a method of determining the HV limits for a given WAT (Like the Bell 212 RFM)
- Provide a statement within the Cat A helipad WAT graphs that "within the envelope depicted, there is no HV limitation"
It's a shame the thread starter has choosen such an inflamatory title for this topic - clearly a profile does not cause a crash: it's the choice of the profile in the obstacle environment, by the pilot, that caused it. As has been stated earlier - is there actually such a profile for the 76A anyway????
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There was definitely a back up CAT A helipad procedure for the A model in the UK. I think it relied on two rad alt calls, one at 80' and one at 120'. Single pilot required special rad alt lights.
If my aged memory from 20 odd years ago serves me correctly, 80' was straight forward and down, between 80 and 120 was a nose down and nose up manoeuvre to get back to the helipad and 120' and over was a continued take off. The weights were very restrictive, around 9000-9400lbs in the UK climate. The profile required 1 hour's training and a supplementary check ride to be checked out.
I was one of the few who was checked out for a limited number of departures during some unusual operations.
If my aged memory from 20 odd years ago serves me correctly, 80' was straight forward and down, between 80 and 120 was a nose down and nose up manoeuvre to get back to the helipad and 120' and over was a continued take off. The weights were very restrictive, around 9000-9400lbs in the UK climate. The profile required 1 hour's training and a supplementary check ride to be checked out.
I was one of the few who was checked out for a limited number of departures during some unusual operations.
SASless,
For those in Europe who do not know what a 'normal' category helicopter is; it is the same as 'small' helicopter in JARs/CS - i.e. certificated under Part 27.
The answer to your question is that the rule will be ignored because it serves no useful purpose - thus bringing the regulation into disrepute. Look at the dilemma it poses; I am an EMS operator and I have a mixed fleet of EC135s and EC145s; with the EC135s operations can be conducted, quite legally, to the scene (in Europe we would call it the HEMS Operating Site) and with the EC145s they cannot.
This limitation has no knowledge of operational context - it affects, equally, private operations and aerial work as well as commercial air transport - operations to runways, elevated sites as well as offshore operations and specialist activities contained in the description of aerial work.
Some years ago, there was a move to have the HV diagram put back into the information section; this was supported by the operational community and most manufacturers. Not only was this opposed by the FAA (and a small minority of manufacturers seeking commercial advantage) but a letter was issue by the Rotorcraft Directorate confirming its application.
212man has the correct approach but, in fact, most of what he asks for is already done. Look for example at the relationship between a Category A procedure and the HV diagram; AC 29-2C already makes the statement that the Category A profile may modify the HV diagram.
In fact this is at the root of the problem; when FAR 29 was modified in 1989, there was an implicit assumption that the next generation of helicopters would all operate in Performance Class 1 using Category A procedures - i.e. truly a transport category like the Boeing 737.
What this long-sighted vision failed to take into account was that, as with this accident, there is more to consider than the reserves of power. In a number of operations, the environment of the operating site does not permit the type of deterministic behaviour that is a feature of 'runway' operations. This is exemplified in offshore operations where the environment (turbulence, size of surfaces, obstacle environment, aircraft limitations, moving surfaces etc) does not map well onto the conditions under which Category A procedures are defined and tested. Hence the importance of the use of Performance Class 2 - particularly as it has now been descibed well enough (it can be scaled to fit the circumstance) to make it an extremely useful tool.
For the last two points in 212man's post, that is the norm and most manufacturers do, so define, their procedures.
What has this to do with the accident report above - well little except as background information to those who think that these are simple binary choices. In this I would echo 212man's remark and state that the premise of malabo's title has no validity. For the causes of this accident we will, as always, have to take into account human factors as well as mechanical and procedural circumstances.
It is no accident that the most important European contribution to the work of the IHST was to modify the analysis tool so that it took more account of Human Factors.
Jim
For those in Europe who do not know what a 'normal' category helicopter is; it is the same as 'small' helicopter in JARs/CS - i.e. certificated under Part 27.
The answer to your question is that the rule will be ignored because it serves no useful purpose - thus bringing the regulation into disrepute. Look at the dilemma it poses; I am an EMS operator and I have a mixed fleet of EC135s and EC145s; with the EC135s operations can be conducted, quite legally, to the scene (in Europe we would call it the HEMS Operating Site) and with the EC145s they cannot.
This limitation has no knowledge of operational context - it affects, equally, private operations and aerial work as well as commercial air transport - operations to runways, elevated sites as well as offshore operations and specialist activities contained in the description of aerial work.
Some years ago, there was a move to have the HV diagram put back into the information section; this was supported by the operational community and most manufacturers. Not only was this opposed by the FAA (and a small minority of manufacturers seeking commercial advantage) but a letter was issue by the Rotorcraft Directorate confirming its application.
212man has the correct approach but, in fact, most of what he asks for is already done. Look for example at the relationship between a Category A procedure and the HV diagram; AC 29-2C already makes the statement that the Category A profile may modify the HV diagram.
In fact this is at the root of the problem; when FAR 29 was modified in 1989, there was an implicit assumption that the next generation of helicopters would all operate in Performance Class 1 using Category A procedures - i.e. truly a transport category like the Boeing 737.
What this long-sighted vision failed to take into account was that, as with this accident, there is more to consider than the reserves of power. In a number of operations, the environment of the operating site does not permit the type of deterministic behaviour that is a feature of 'runway' operations. This is exemplified in offshore operations where the environment (turbulence, size of surfaces, obstacle environment, aircraft limitations, moving surfaces etc) does not map well onto the conditions under which Category A procedures are defined and tested. Hence the importance of the use of Performance Class 2 - particularly as it has now been descibed well enough (it can be scaled to fit the circumstance) to make it an extremely useful tool.
For the last two points in 212man's post, that is the norm and most manufacturers do, so define, their procedures.
What has this to do with the accident report above - well little except as background information to those who think that these are simple binary choices. In this I would echo 212man's remark and state that the premise of malabo's title has no validity. For the causes of this accident we will, as always, have to take into account human factors as well as mechanical and procedural circumstances.
It is no accident that the most important European contribution to the work of the IHST was to modify the analysis tool so that it took more account of Human Factors.
Jim
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JimL (and others)
First - the reason that people ranging from the authorities to the pilots don't understand this is that it's not widely understood. I've had very experienced pilots in a civil authority operations section who did not understand this.
I have yet to understand how heli-skiing in Bell 212s with 10 passengers on board is carried out when they appear to fly in the HV curve regularly.
Second - how to get around it? For one aircraft in an EMS role, a Flight Manual Supplement was published for <9 pax that did move the HV curve to the performance section and solved the problem.
For those engaged in Part 133 work with Part 29 helicopters like the S-61, the configuration should have taken care of this - no passengers while doing external load operations is the norm, is it not?
As for just removing the HV curve from the limitations section of the FM for those helicopters so approved - this is not going to happen. The HV curve, as defined and tested, is there to provide a greater degree of safety than found on a 'normal' category of helicopter. The reason for this is the same as the reason that a Boeing 747 has a higher degree of safety than a Piper Malibu - more people are put at risk in the 747. The decision was made some time ago that the dividing line would be 10 for the number of people put at risk that deserved better safety.
And the supplement for Category A procedures says exactly what 212man proposed - the HV curve is no longer a limitation when these procedures are followed.
First - the reason that people ranging from the authorities to the pilots don't understand this is that it's not widely understood. I've had very experienced pilots in a civil authority operations section who did not understand this.
I have yet to understand how heli-skiing in Bell 212s with 10 passengers on board is carried out when they appear to fly in the HV curve regularly.
Second - how to get around it? For one aircraft in an EMS role, a Flight Manual Supplement was published for <9 pax that did move the HV curve to the performance section and solved the problem.
For those engaged in Part 133 work with Part 29 helicopters like the S-61, the configuration should have taken care of this - no passengers while doing external load operations is the norm, is it not?
As for just removing the HV curve from the limitations section of the FM for those helicopters so approved - this is not going to happen. The HV curve, as defined and tested, is there to provide a greater degree of safety than found on a 'normal' category of helicopter. The reason for this is the same as the reason that a Boeing 747 has a higher degree of safety than a Piper Malibu - more people are put at risk in the 747. The decision was made some time ago that the dividing line would be 10 for the number of people put at risk that deserved better safety.
And the supplement for Category A procedures says exactly what 212man proposed - the HV curve is no longer a limitation when these procedures are followed.
Shawn,
I have no problem with your basic premise; except that the principle use of Part 29 helicopters is in offshore operations.
Not to understand that and make provisions is really head-in-the-sand regulation. Yes, it is dealt with in FAR 91.9(d) (for offshore) and in JAR-OPS 3.005(c) but, in the case of onshore for FARs (the case we are discussing), and for all operations under EASA ERs it is not considered, or addressed.
I am not sure it is stated anywhere that the HV diagram is applicable only to passenger transit or to more than 9 passengers (this is a work-around that is directed mainly at FAR 29.1); all the exceptions you have shown are work-around for rules that were entered in FAR 29 at revision 39.
Let me put forward a hypothesis: for all Part 29 helicopters that are operating in PC1 using a Cat A procedure, the HV diagram is modified such that it does not apply; for all Part 29 helicopters that are operating in PC2, they are either exposed or not exposed to an engine failure (for a very short period during take-off or landing). The conditions under which exposure (for those on the helicopter - third parties need additional protection) is permitted is an operational issue. Operational issues should be deal with under operational regulations - after risk assessment has been undertaken. This risk assessment may be used to place limitations upon the task, the crew members, and the carriage of personnel in the helicopter. There should be fewer restrictions placed upon aerial work than those for the carriage of 19 paying passengers (stepped proportionately) and private operations should be dealt with differently from commercial air transport.
Jim
I have no problem with your basic premise; except that the principle use of Part 29 helicopters is in offshore operations.
Not to understand that and make provisions is really head-in-the-sand regulation. Yes, it is dealt with in FAR 91.9(d) (for offshore) and in JAR-OPS 3.005(c) but, in the case of onshore for FARs (the case we are discussing), and for all operations under EASA ERs it is not considered, or addressed.
I am not sure it is stated anywhere that the HV diagram is applicable only to passenger transit or to more than 9 passengers (this is a work-around that is directed mainly at FAR 29.1); all the exceptions you have shown are work-around for rules that were entered in FAR 29 at revision 39.
Let me put forward a hypothesis: for all Part 29 helicopters that are operating in PC1 using a Cat A procedure, the HV diagram is modified such that it does not apply; for all Part 29 helicopters that are operating in PC2, they are either exposed or not exposed to an engine failure (for a very short period during take-off or landing). The conditions under which exposure (for those on the helicopter - third parties need additional protection) is permitted is an operational issue. Operational issues should be deal with under operational regulations - after risk assessment has been undertaken. This risk assessment may be used to place limitations upon the task, the crew members, and the carriage of personnel in the helicopter. There should be fewer restrictions placed upon aerial work than those for the carriage of 19 paying passengers (stepped proportionately) and private operations should be dealt with differently from commercial air transport.
Jim
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Our teaching dilemma
If you pitch up at a European or at least a JAA approved TRTO (Type Rating Training Organisation) you will be taught according to an approved syllabus and then subjected to a JAA Licence Proficiency Test (LPC). The fact that this test contains a requirement to demonstrate competence at flying each certified Cat A and Cat B take off and landing procedure and then demonstrate competence at handling engine failures before and after TDP and before and after LDP necessarily influences the content of the course itself.
If your National Aviation Authority does not mandate the use of Cat A or Performance Class 1 operating standards (virtually all non JAA states) then this may seem like a complete waste of time and a wasted opportunity to teach more relevant skills. Nearly 50% of A TR course can be Cat A related.
Moreover there are some in the JAA world who take the attitude that 'you may not like Cat A but we are going to ram it down your throat regardless'. Regrettably instead of persuading these those in 'Cat A denial' to 'get with the programme' it may just force them to use schools that teach something more in line with their needs. This is sad if it puts these folk off the idea of using simulators for recurrent training.
If the idea of using Cat A operating standards is going to replace the 'we've been doin' this way for years so what's the problem' attitude then it has to begin with regulators changing the culture. This will put some older machines out of business and maybe some operators but given a 5 or 10 year notice period it should be possible.
Anybody with two engines who flies around in situations where the loss of one results in embarrassment or worse should be learning from the JAA - IMHO.
How on earth can a Part 135 operation justify the title 'Spot Charter' when the guys who do the flying (passengers) are not the people who do the hiring. Fair enough if you like the look of the tatty old helicopter because the price is right and you are the passenger but when you buy the cheapest machine around and then send your employees off to work in it - no - that's not playing the game.
G
If your National Aviation Authority does not mandate the use of Cat A or Performance Class 1 operating standards (virtually all non JAA states) then this may seem like a complete waste of time and a wasted opportunity to teach more relevant skills. Nearly 50% of A TR course can be Cat A related.
Moreover there are some in the JAA world who take the attitude that 'you may not like Cat A but we are going to ram it down your throat regardless'. Regrettably instead of persuading these those in 'Cat A denial' to 'get with the programme' it may just force them to use schools that teach something more in line with their needs. This is sad if it puts these folk off the idea of using simulators for recurrent training.
If the idea of using Cat A operating standards is going to replace the 'we've been doin' this way for years so what's the problem' attitude then it has to begin with regulators changing the culture. This will put some older machines out of business and maybe some operators but given a 5 or 10 year notice period it should be possible.
Anybody with two engines who flies around in situations where the loss of one results in embarrassment or worse should be learning from the JAA - IMHO.
How on earth can a Part 135 operation justify the title 'Spot Charter' when the guys who do the flying (passengers) are not the people who do the hiring. Fair enough if you like the look of the tatty old helicopter because the price is right and you are the passenger but when you buy the cheapest machine around and then send your employees off to work in it - no - that's not playing the game.
G
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I'm not saying that Category A is the be-all and end-all for safety. Nick Lappos has made some excellent points about there being a lot of other things to consider.
But, and this is a big point, instilling Category A mentality into the process will raise our collective level of awareness considerably. Maybe to something closer to the FW scheduled world. Can you imagine if any of the major airlines decided that they were going to let their pilots make a wild-assed-guess at takeoff distances on a day-to-day basis?
Unless we start with something that approaches the FW mentality for performance and procedures, we're not ever going to get their level of safety.
How did these guys not know there were obstacles behind them?
Even better - why were they doing this check ride in the real helicopter to a real rooftop with real people in a hospital underneath them?
I don't believe the oil companies would accept helicopters doing training approaches to an operational oil rig, would they?
But, and this is a big point, instilling Category A mentality into the process will raise our collective level of awareness considerably. Maybe to something closer to the FW scheduled world. Can you imagine if any of the major airlines decided that they were going to let their pilots make a wild-assed-guess at takeoff distances on a day-to-day basis?
Unless we start with something that approaches the FW mentality for performance and procedures, we're not ever going to get their level of safety.
How did these guys not know there were obstacles behind them?
Even better - why were they doing this check ride in the real helicopter to a real rooftop with real people in a hospital underneath them?
I don't believe the oil companies would accept helicopters doing training approaches to an operational oil rig, would they?
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Oil companies have been allowing training approaches to operating rigs for years, probably as long as helicopters have been flying to them, at least in the US. There simply isn't any other way to get the training done, with any realism at all.
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OK - I agree there is a need for training, but what are the restrictions placed on the training?
I know that many rigs will not let you land if you have an emergency as the rig is worth far more than the helicopter, so I assume there must be some limits placed on the training aspect.
I know that many rigs will not let you land if you have an emergency as the rig is worth far more than the helicopter, so I assume there must be some limits placed on the training aspect.